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Résumé
Les échanges constitués d’une succession d’actes linguistiques (dialogues, discours), témoignent d’une inter-
action complexe entre ces différents actes. En d’autre termes, les effets d’une action linguistique dépendent
de son contexte d’execution. Le sens d’un discours, par exemple, dépend non seulement du sens de chacun
d’entre eux pris isolément, mais aussi de la manière dont ses énoncés constitifs sont agencés et des liens
de cohérences que ceux-ci entretiennent les un avec les autres. Il est essentiel pour un modèle linguistique
de rende compte de ces liens et cela soulève plusieurs questions : comment dériver ces liens, comment les
représenter au sein d’une forme logique, de quelle façon au juste contribuent-il au "sens" et/ou comment
influencent-ils le choix d’une action linguistique dans un contexte particulier?
Face à ces considérations, nous nous intéressons dans un premier temps (part I) à la structure de la
forme logique du discours ou du dialogue : les contraintes qu’elle doit respecter, et la façon dont différentes
représentations diffèrent. Nous proposons un formalisme unifié pour les représentations adoptées par dif-
férentes théories influentes, ainsi qu’une perspective nouvelle sur les types d’information qu’elles expriment.
Ces contributions s’appuient sur une interprétation commune aux différents types de formes logique dans
laquelle chacune exprime un ensemble de constituants, de relations, et un ensemble de manières possi-
ble de faire porter les premières sur les secondes. Cela fournit un moyen de comparer différentes formes
logiques pour un même discours à un instant donné. Mais la forme logique est un objet dynamique, modi-
fié au fil de la conversation, et le problème se pose donc de quantifier l’impact des changements provoqués
par la réalisation d’une nouvelle action linguistique. Dans un cadre abstrait où nous modélisons simple-
ment les échanges comme des séquences de coups dialogiques, munies d’une fonction d’interprétation
dans un espace "sémantique" différent, nous nous intéressons aux "distance sémantique" i.e., aux distances
entre séquences de coups linguistiques dont la mesure s’appuie essentiellement sur la proximité des inter-
prétations sémantiques respectives de deux séquences. Nous proposons de telles distances et explorons
différents axiomes liant "sémanticité" des distances, structure de l’espace sémantique et déroulement de la
conversation.
Un second travail (parts II and III) porte sur l’interaction entre formes logique et rationalité dans la
conversation, plus particuliérement dans les conversations où les intérêts des participants divergent. Notre
objectif a été la construction d’une classe de modèles en théorie des jeux dans une perspective nouvelle :
les conversations en tant que séquences infinies de coups linguistiques. Un agent atteint son objectif s’il
peut jouer certaines séquences et perd sinon. Ces jeux apportent une caractérisation mathématique de
classes d’objectifs conversationnels décrivant la forme générale qu’une conversation réussie doit prendre.
De manière cruciale, on peut justifier et expliquer via des considérations sémantiques le choix des objectifs
conversationnels des joueurs : en nous appuyant sur une représentation logique du sens d’une séquence de
coups (par exemple, en SDRT), nous pouvons définir les contraintes linguistiques générales (rester cohérent,
consistant, crédible) qui sont des conditions nécessaires à ce qu’une conversation remplisse son objectif, et
décrire les préférences des agents en termes de contenu auxquels ils s’engagent. Cela nécessite cependant
une sémantique adéquate. Pour l’obtenir nous employons des outils de logique modale dynamique pour
définir une logique des engagements publics (imbriqués) et l’intégrer au sein de la SDRT. Celle-ci permet
de représenter les déclaration des participants vis-à-vis de leur propre engagements et de ceux de leurs
interlocuteurs (incluant les implicatures), en conservant ces représentations sujettes à une conséquence (et
donc une conséquence) logique adaptée. Cela permet aussi un modèle de "grounding" a granularité plus
fine que les approches existantes, qui demeurent cependant axiomatisable comme des cas particulier.
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Abstract
Sequential linguistic exchanges rely on a complex interplay between the different linguist acts consti-
tutive of the exchange: the effects of a linguistic action depend on its context of performance. A book,
a public allocution, a chat with a friend, a debate or a bargaining session, are as many examples of such
exchanges that involve sequences of utterances. It is essential that a model of linguistic exchange accounts
for these links that meaningful units have with one another, which raises a certain number of challenges:
how to derive them and integrate them to a logical form, how do they contribute to the “meaning", and/or
influence the choice of a given linguistic act to perform next, in a given context ?
To address these questions, we first look, in part I into the structure of the logical form of discourse and
dialog: what structural constraints to adopt, what impact for a choice of constraints. We review somemajor
theories of discourse structure and propose a unified formalism to switch from one to another, and a novel
understanding of the different sort of information that these theories respectively encode. Structures of
different kind are all interpreted into a common space: each structure specifies a set of constituents, one of
relations, and different possible sets of scopes that the formermight take over the latter.This yields a way to
compare logical forms for a single discourse at some point in time. But logical forms also undergo changes
as conversations unfolds, and the question of whether we can quantify the impact of a new linguistic action
arrises. Placing ourselves at an abstract level where we simply model exchanges as sequences of atomic
moves, equippedwith a interpretation function into a different, ‘semantic’, space,we study ‘semanticmetrics’
i.e., distances or similarity between sequences of linguistic moves that would base the closeness of two
conversations on that of their respective semantic interpretation. We sketch an ‘axiomatic map’ of possibly
atractive properties that such metrics can have w.r.t. to the properties of the semantic space, define and
test several metrics against these axioms.
A second body of work (parts II and III) focuses on the interaction of logical forms and rationality
in conversations, more specifically strategic dialogs, where the interest of the participants diverge. We
propose a game theoretic account of such conversations within a new perspective: conversation as infinite
sequences of moves. An agent is successful if he can play certain sequences, otherwise he looses. These
games bring a mathematical characterization of class of conversational objectives describing the "shape"
that a successful conversation must take. Crucially, we can explain why a player adopts a given set of
winning sequences on semantic grounds: using a logical representation of the meaning of a sequence of
moves (using e.g., Segmented Discourse RepresentationTheory), we can formalize linguistic constraints
that are generic necessary conditions on successful plays (staying coherent, consistent, credible) , and
describe agents’ preferences in term of the contents that agents commit to. This requires a semantics
expressive enough, we therefore define a dynamic logic of (nested) commitments and integrate it in SDRT.
This allows to represent participants’ statements about the content of theirs, or their opponent’s previous
moves in the dialog (including implicatures), and keep those representations subject to a sound notion of
logical consequence (and hence, of consistency). This yields also a formal account of acknowledgment and
grounding that is more formal and fine-grained that traditional approaches, which can be recoverable as
particular cases.
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Introduction
What does it mean, that a sentence, or a discourse, means something? This vast question has drawn the
attention of philosophers, linguists and logicians since antiquity, and more recently, of computer scientists
as well.
In Artificial Intelligence (AI), interest in this question arises from a desire to model language use
(basically, with a long term objective of building artificial systems that use language). Modeling language
use requires to understand and capture the effects of linguistic actions, and linguistic actions can be thought
of as linking via some relation (or attitude), a speaker that uses a language expression and the meaning of
that expression.
How to capture these relation and meaning then? At least, we need a formal representation of these
concepts: one that allows to formulate a set of relevant questions about them, in an explicit, unambiguous,
precise way, and imposes unique, proovably correct answers for a significant subset of these questions.This
is a prerequisite to any computationalmodel that, in addition, would provide an effective way to compute
correct answers to some (decidable) questions. Hence, we need a formal language to represent both our
objects of interest (expressions, meanings, attitudes) and questions about them, and a mathematical theory
over that language capturing aspects of the objects’ structure relevant to the questions we want the model
to answer.
We need to determine, therefore, the kind of issues about meaning to address formally, the seman-
tic representations of language expressions that we should consequently adopt, and aspects of semantic
structure that we have to theorize toward this aim.
At least two aspects of meaning seem primordial in understanding language use: issues about entail-
ment, i.e., about whether a given expression’s meaning is included in that of another, and issues about
rationality, i.e., about one’s objectives in using language and how using a given expression in a given
context serves these objectives. Another arguably important aspect of the structure of natural language is
compositionality, i.e., the role that the internal structure of linguistics expressions (in a broad sense, where
an expression might be constituted of several sentences), built out of smaller pieces, plays in answering the
two previous questions.
Semantics
Several proposals exist of candidate representations and structures. Distributional semantics, for instance,
represents themeaning of an expression as its sets of contexts of use (the exact definition ofwhich varieswith
the approach). Under this view, the space of semantic representations generally inherits a structure of finite-
dimensional vector space, and operators from linear algebra such as a cosine distance.This yieldsmodels of a
purely language-internal notion of meaning, successful in providing a computational account of questions
regarding e.g., similarity of words’, or small constructions’ meaning (like adjective-noun compounds).
Current distributionalmodels however, fare far less well with thematters of entailment and compositionilaty
mentioned above. Plausibly, they offer a quite powerful way to look into lexical meaning but lack a way to
integrate logical forms, i.e. the internal structure of semantic objects, that supports purely logical inferences.
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We will focus on another view, inherited from philosophers like Leibniz, and popularized by Frege’s
logic of terms and subsequent developments in symbolic logic.This view defends the idea thatmeanings (or
thoughts) can be the objects of descriptions in a logical language. One of the characteristics of this tradition
in semantics, is a take on compositionality where an expression of the language refers to something, an
object of a certain type depending on the expression’s syntactic category: names refer to entities, predicates
to properties of entities (typically thought of as the set of those entities of which the property holds), so that
predicates and names can combine to yield a compound expression denoting a proposition–namely one
that states that the property denoted by the predicate holds of the entity denoted by the name. Approaches
to the semantics of natural language adopting such a logical view constitute the body of formal semantics.
Often, such approaches naturally inherit a model for entailment from their underlying logical formalism,
and tend to rely on compositional interpretative mechanisms.
Works in formal semantics thus give meaning an objective existence, in the logical realm. Meanings
are attached to the expressions that bear them, not to locutors’ particular mental states, though they may
involve some contextual parameters. Rationality, in this picture, rests ultimately on the logical capabilities
of language users: extracting the right meaning of an expression, and recognizing its consequences.
Pragmatics
Using language however, involves more than just bringing about expressions and meanings. Speaking is an
action, it affects the world, and it does so by placing speakers, and possibly their interlocutor, in a certain
relation with these meanings they produce. It is in virtue of such relations that other then respond, argue,
or react in other ways.These relations between speakers and the objects they produce, are precisely the field
of study of pragmatics. As a consequence, rationality in pragmatics, not only involves agents’ deductive
capabilities, but also their preferences, what they wish to achieve in speaking or listening. Conversationalists
choose to perform a given linguistic action typically if the reaction they expect from others matches their
preferences.
Consider for instance a typical information-seeking dialog: A wants to know at what time her train
leaves. She asks B. In so doing, she commits herself to the meaning of her question. B, caring to help, or
simply in virtue of a desire of keeping with social convention (for instance), chooses to acknowledge A’s
question and answer it. If, in addition, A and B have a common knowledge that B prefers A getting her
train over Amissing it, then, intuitively, B should answer sincerely and A should believe B’s answer. But
then again, under the same hypothethis, if B does not know a direct answer to that question, she might
answer “It should be written over there”, with now an effect of A infering that B does not know a direct
asnwer (because, otherwise, she would have used that answer).
Hence, rationality yields inferences that goes beyond the litteral meaning of what is said (B in the
example above did not say that she does not know, nor anything that, taken independently of its particular
use in context, logically entails such a conclusion), also called implicatures. Grice introduced the study
of implicatures (and the term itself). His views on the matter still underly most works on the subject,
most notably the idea that conversational implicatures are not to be considered part of litteral meaning,
alternative senses attached to the expressions themselves, but obtainable from a systematic computation,
via reasoning about what was said, and why (“Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity”–Grice 1989).
Works in pragmatics have given rise to formal accounts of meaning using game-theoretic settings:
meaning is defined relative to an equilibrium, as a solution concept of a game where agents exchange
linguistic actions in order to maximize some contextually given utility profile. Meaning, in this picture, is
relativized to agents’ actions in equilibrium: as such it captures rationality in the above sense, but obviously
depends strongly on the locutors’ beliefs and desires, which forms the rational basis for them to adopt an
equilibrium. Such a perspective on meaning, therefore, seems to oppose formal semantics’ purely logical
account.
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Dynamics
In the present thesis, our interest lies in a problem that, we shall see, is transversal to both the opposing
views of above: formal semantics’ objective conception ofmeaning as purely logical, and the game-theoretic
conception of meaning as a solution concept of a game involving locutors’ beliefs and preferences.
This problem is the dynamics of discourse and conversations. Both involve production of linguistic
expressions in a sequence. Linguistically, they go beyond the sentencial level that many works in formal
semantics focus on. As for pragmatics, the kind of games used by the vast majority of approaches, signaling
games,models only a single exchange of a linguistic action performedby a sender, and an interpretive action
subsequently performed by a receiver. We shall see that this ‘local’ setting brings a number of difficulties,
in particular in a context where a common assumption of cooperativity is, at least, dubtious: first, there
is a problem in setting local utilities when the conversation is not over and subsequent linguistic actions
can make the game evolve either in a good or a very bad direction. One could try to solve such a problem
by, for instance, seeing the single exchange as a subgame of a more complex game, applying a principle of
backward induction to find the subgame’s utilities, but we will argue that this leaves the initial problem
unchanged: the real struggle is an epistemic limitation where noone is able to impose, or foresee a definitive
ending for the conversation.
Interestingly, dynamic theories of meaning are, by essence, theories of the semantics/pragmatics inter-
face. At the heart of these theories’ concern, we find coreference, temporal anaphora, coherence relations
between utterances, questions and their answers, agreements, corrections, grounding and other kind of
phenoma which are best explained considering discourse, or conversation as a coherent whole, where a
given contribution is always interpreted relatively to its context of use, involving preceding linguisticmoves,
or seen the other way around, where a given move affects the interpretation of subsequent ones.
Among these theories, those following the views of dynamic semantics, like DRT (Kamp, 1981) or
SDRT (Asher, 1993) adopt a position which we can think of as intermediary between the extremes we have
mentioned: in SDRT for instance, so-called coherence relations (or rhetorical relations) are infereddefeasibly
between different contributions: like conversational implicatures (of which cancellability is a fundamental
property) they can, under some circonstances, be cancelled. They indeed share a lot of properties and
interractwith implicatures (Asher, 2013). But importantly, their inference is,most of the time,not amatter of
reasoning directly about agents’ intentions or preferences, but dictated by conventions linking characteristic
linguistic patterns (e.g. a sentence mentioning an event of falling, followed by one mentioning a event
of pushing) to some general communicative purpose (e.g., explaining a previous utterance) supporting
a given pragmatic inference. In other words, pragmatic inferences are mediated by that of a particular
discourse structure: just like objective, structural rules of interpretation govern the possible encodings of
semantics into syntax, rules of information packaging, govern the encoding of pragmatics into the internal
organization of conversations. Conceived of this way, meaning, including implicatures, or alikes, have an
objective existence that keeps in linewith the viewof formal semantics. Still, in the dynamic picture, locutors’
decisions on using some move, in some context, appeal to their conversational purposes and preferences;
decisions arguably involves evaluating how a move’s meaning, its short term and long term effects on
discourse structure, something dynamic in essence, fare with these preferences. In particular, rejecting an
inference has consequences, which a locutor must carefully balance: it comes with a commitment to the
negation of the particular discourse structure that underlied the cancelled inference, and so with an implicit
commitment to either another inferable, licenced structure, corresponding to yet another communicative
purpose, or else to incoherence, linguistic incompetence, lack of cooperativity or worse on the part of the
agent who produced the material that triggered the inference.
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Strategic conversations and choosen approach
Grice’s account of implicatures computation crucially relies on the interplay between a principle, called
the cooperative principle: “Make your contribution such as it is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” (Grice, 1989) and four
conversational maxims:
Maxim of Quality. Make your contribution true; so do not convey what you believe false or unjustified.
Maxim of Quantity. Be as informative as required.
Maxim of Relation. Be relevant.
Maxim of Manner. Be perspicuous; so avoid obscurity and ambiguity, and strive for brevity and order.
Several formalizations of these maxims have been proposed, some approaches have also proposed
refinement, or more elementary or different principles, but in the vast majority of pragmatic accounts of
rationality, a version of the cooperativity principle remains central in one way or another. In game-theoretic
pragmatics for instance, cooperativity translates into a requirement that utility profiles of different agents at
least partially match for their actions to have any effect. In other words, most works in pragmatics assume
that communication, of any form, requires agents to share an interest.
Yet, people talk even when this is, in all appearance, not the case: in so-called strategic settings, such as
political debates, negociations, bargaining sessions, disputes or trials, people might have common knowl-
edge of their diverging interest and yet still engage in conversations.
In order to not theorize such a behaviour as irrational, there are only two possibilities for the theory:
either strategic settings must ‘hide’ a form of cooperativity of some sort (e.g. politness constraints, Brown
and Levinson, 1978), which requires one to explain how and why it is so, or communication, at least in a
sense that needs defining, can happen without cooperativity.
In light of these considerations, it takes a new importance that dynamic semantics somehow conciliates
the views of formal semantics and pragmatics: meanings determined objectively, that do not depend on
locutors mental state, hence not on cooperativity either, may form the ground for communication in
strategic setting. Yet static semantics will not do: attaching implicatures statically to the meaning of some
contribution leaves only two possibilities: either an implicature is to be included as part of the meaning
of the contribution, or it is not. But, in non-cooperative settings, an implicature can either survives, get
grounded by the participants, or it can get rejected or cancelled and disappear. Whether one or the other
obtains depends on subsequent moves, not on the single contribution that triggers the implicature.
Choosen approach
Wewill address the problem of rationality in strategic conversations by developing the dynamic solution as
a compromise that encompasses both an objective notion of meaning, and an account of rationality with
regards to agents’ preferences. Our proposed solution will rely on a logically precise account of discourse
structure, that we will extend with a dynamic, commitment-based semantics, on the one hand, and on a
ressort to infinite sequential games on the other hand.
This thesis
Following the above, our general concern is the dynamic meaning of discourse and conversations, in
regards of the following questions:
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1. At the heart of discourse and conversations dynamics, is the idea that a new linguistic action entering
the contextmust be related in someway to some content previously introduced (Hobbs, 1979). Several
influential proposals have been developed of discourse representation that includes such relations.
There is, however, no general agreement on the exact meaning of these representations. Some, like
SDRT are oriented toward semantics,with amodel-theoretic interpretation, other like D-LTAG seem
syntactically driven, and some like Rhetorical Structure Theory (Mann andThompson, 1986) have
an ambiguous status. We will aim at understanding precisely what these representations express and
how they compare, both within a given formalisms and across theories.
2. More generally, we will try to work out a notion of semantic distance to compare different semantic
representations. The motivation for this is twofold: first, question 1 above asks for a quantification of
semantic differences brought by different assumptions regarding discourse relations. It is interesting
to try to quantify the semantic impact of differences in the representation of elementary units as well,
and, in general, to do so abstracting as much as possible over representational peculliarities. Second,
the central notion around which this thesis revolves is that of dynamics in conversational meaning,
and a question that arises naturally thinking of dialog and discourse as dynamic objects, driven by
rational principles, is one of quantifying the ‘deviation’ that a move brings vis à vis another. If for
instance, an agent wishes that the conversation takes a particular form, and she faces an unexpected
move, it is interesting to quantify how far such amove takes the conversation from her ideal obective.
3. We will examine the problem of rationality in strategic settings as previously sketched. We will in
particular investigate how to overcome the limitations of traditional game-theoretic approaches with
a different kind of games.
4. Finally, we will ask the question of the dynamics of agents’ commitments as conversation unfolds, in
presence of ambiguity. We will investigate also how this dynamics interacts with discourse relations,
and how it relates to the problem of grounding.
Overview of the thesis
Chapter 1 is an introduction to formal semantics in the Montagovian tradition, and to dynamic semantics
through DRT and continuation-style semantics.
Chapter 2 is an introduction to theories of discourse structure. We introduce and discuss basic notions
such as elementary units, complex units and coherence relations. We then review in detail two influential
theories: RST and SDRT.
Chapter 3 proposes a unified language to express different discourse formalisms using a monadic second
order language and itsmodel-theory.We showa correspondence betweenRST anddependency trees,under
some well-defined interpretations using our language, and we propose a similarity metric for comparison
of different structures.
Chapter 4 proposes an axiomatic exploration of the notion of semantic metric. We give, in an abstract
setting, a precise definition of the notion of semantic metric, and its implications. We propose general
distances on differently structured semantic spaces and propose candidate axioms and impossibility results.
Chapter 5 examines the specifities of conversationwith respect to discourses and texts, and briefly discusses
two semantics theory of conversations KoS, and D-SDRT.
Chapter 6Details the challenges raised by strategic contexts and the difficulties that difficulties for signaling
games to account for these.
Chapter 7 introduces a new kind of infinite games and explores how it can address the challenges discribed
in chaper 6.
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Chapter 8 Links a notion of credibility first introduced in chapter 7 to public commitments. It establishes on
this basis the need for a semantic theory that deals with nested commitments and ambiguous commitments,
proposes a first semantics and examines its limitations.
Chapter 9 proposes a dynamic propositional logic of commitments with ambiguous moves that overcome
the limitations of the logic in chapter 8. It then discusses the problem of acknowledgments and grounding.
Chapter 10 links two different versions of the semantics in chapter 9 via a notion of inductive, iterated
acknowledgments, then restores the full power of SDRT relational moves to the dynamic logic of chapter 9.
xviii
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Structures, semantics, distances
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1.1 Preliminaries
1.1.1 Model-theoretic semantics and the correspondence theory of truth
An appealing idea, and one of the most common view on semantics, consists in identifying the meaning
of a sentence or a discourse s, with the conditions at which s is true. More specifically, Tarski (Tarski, 1936)
initiated a lasting tradition of works inmodel-theoretic semantics (to which the present thesis subscribes).
Following Tarski, the truth-conditions of sentences of a language (which Tarski restricts to an artificial
one, though the idea has later been thoroughly applied to natural language), must be defined in ametalan-
guage (in a non-circular way). Most often, the language of Zermelo-Fraenkel’s set theory is used as such
a metalanguage, and truth is then defined in set-theoretic terms, relatively to a set-theoretic construction
called amodel.
In regards to compositionality, model-theoretic semantics naturaly conforms to a Fregean composi-
tional unpacking of truth-conditions: language expressions ‘talk about’ or refer to things, and these things
are elements of a hierarchy of domains (sets) in the model. These domains reflect the syntactic types of
expressions in the language: each domain encompasses the possible extensions for expressions of a given
type (i.e. objects that expressions of this type might refer to). For instance, entities in the language have
extensions which are individuals in the model; monadic predicates, such as adjectives or common nouns
in natural language, have extensions which are sets of individuals. Binary predicates, such as transitive
verbs in natural language, have extensions which are sets of pair of individual, and so forth. Typically, the
simple application of a predicate (e.g. snores) to an entity (e.g., John) has a truth-condition, requiring that
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the extension of the entity in the model is part of that of the predicate (commonly written, given a modelM, asM⊧ snores(John) iff ∥John∥M ⊆ ∥snores∥M).
Arguably, model-theoretic semantics constitutes a mathematical formulation of the so-called corre-
spondence theory of truth, a philosophical definition of truth favored for instance by Russel, in which truth
is correspondence with the world. Model theoretic semantics subscribes to this view insofar as a model can
be considered as a mathematical representation of (a given perception of) the world–at least as reflected
by the semantics of the language.
1.1.2 Montague semantics and compositionality
Montague (Montague, 1988), usingmodel-theoretic techniques, achieved a very influential semanticmodel
for natural language. Among others, the following important features, in particular, have contributed to
the success of the model:
• The semantic intepretation of each linguistic unit mirrors its syntactic category.
• The semantics builds on intensional logic: it is expressed in terms of objects called possible worlds:
models involve a set of possible worlds, and semantic interpretations of every type of linguistic items,
including sentences, are relativized to a model and a possible world of the model. In theoretical
terms, linguistic expressions (at any level) are not directly associated extensions in the model, as
briefly described above, but intensions, formally, functions from worlds to extensions. Truth or lack
thereof, therefore, is now a property of a sentence in a possible world of a given model.
Montague’s approach has shown that natural language might be analyzed in the same way as mathe-
maticians’ and logicians’ artifical languages. Achieving the first point above, in particular, implied solving
difficulties relative to differences between the syntactic structures of sentences, and their logical forms: in
sentences like I ate every cookies, the quantified phrase every cookies is a sister constituent of the verb ate
in the verb phrase ate every cookies. Yet, the logical form of this sentence is that of a universally quantified
statement; roughly, everything that has the “cookie” property is such that “I” stand in the relation of “ate” with
it, where the quantifyier takes scope over the binary predicate denoted by the verb. In addition,Montague’s
solution to these problems is ‘semantic in essence’, and does not require syntactic transformations such
as those provided through a notion of covert movement of the quantified noun phrase, in some syntactic
accounts.
Montague’s semantics can be formulated immediately in set-theoretic terms, but the most common
formulations use an intermediary language such as Church’s simply typed lambda calculus (Church, 1940,
which can then be equipped with a model-theoretic, denotational semantics, though there are other possi-
bilities). Roughly, the simply typed lambda calculus involves types for entities e, truth-values t, worlds (or
situations) s, constants and variables which are terms of these types, and type-construction rules: for every
term T of type τ′ and variable x of type τ, λxT is a term of type ⟨τ, τ′⟩ (the type of functions from terms of
type τ to terms of type τ′), and for each terms f of type ⟨τ, τ′⟩ and X of type τ, f X is of type τ′ (function
application). With this surfacic overview, we can sketch Montague’s account. Let us drop the intensional
aspect i.e., the dependence to worlds in this simple exposition:
Basic expressions of a given syntactic categories are mapped, via a lexicon, to a term of the correspond-
ing type:
• the common noun cookie, is mapped to a representation cookie = λx cookie(x) of type ⟨e, t⟩ (a
function from individual to truth-values, i.e. a property).
• The quantifier every is mapped to a representation every = λPλQ ∀xP(x) → Q(x) of type⟨⟨e, t⟩, ⟨⟨e, t⟩, t⟩⟩ (generalized quantifier).
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• The transitive verb ate is mapped to a binary predicate ate = λxλy ate(x, y) of type ⟨e, ⟨e, t⟩⟩
• The pronoun I is mapped to an individual I = I of type e.
Montague’s solution to avoid syntactic movement consists in a rule of type-raising, which states that
a semantic term of type τ can be identified with the set of all properties that hold of it. Importantly, this
is a logical principle (identity of indiscernibles) not a syntactic manipulation1. It allows to substitute an
individual of type e to a term representing the set of properties that hold of that individual; for instance
substituting the interpretation of I, of type e, with the term λPP(I) of type ⟨⟨e, t⟩, t⟩. The interpretation of
the transitive verb ate is a function from entity to functions from entity to truth-values. Applying the same
principle to the first argument yields, throughanother transformation,a littlemore complex due to its role as
a function’s argument (yet precisely described by the theory), a new interpretation λQλx Q(λy ate(x, y)),
of type ⟨⟨⟨e, t⟩, t⟩, ⟨e, t⟩⟩.
It is easy to check, that applying these two changes, and given the typing rules sketched above, the
term I(ate(ever ycookie)) is well-typed and of type t, hence represents a truth-value. In order to
achieve a full semantics, one needs to complete the picture, and among other things, detail the semantics
of logical constants, which can be done in more than one way (basically for instance, adding constants
,⊺ : t and an predicate of true equality, =τ : ⟨τ, τ, t⟩ for each type τ, interpreted as external equality over
extensions of terms of type τ). Anyway, a sound interpretation will have to give the same interpretation
to terms that are equivalent up to β-reduction, i.e., such that one is derived from the other replacing λ
abstracted variables with contents provided by functional application ((λX T)(U) ↝β T[U/X]); this
provides us with a picture of the semantic mechanisms sufficient for the present introduction: one can
indeed check that I(ate(ever ycookie)) β-reduces to ∀x cookie(x) → ate(I, x), which, at least
intuitively, seems accurate.
Reintroducing worlds in the simplified picture of above, allows to further account for contextual de-
pendencies, propositional attitudes or reported speech and intensional contexts in general: in the example
we took, one can for instance make the interpretation of I a function from worlds to entity, taking into
account parameters of the context of enunciation and allowing elements of pragmatics to enter the context.
1.2 Dynamic semantics
1.2.1 Limits of the Montagovian approach
The semantics of Montague presented in the previous section focuses on isolated sentences, and suffers
well known difficulties to account for cross-sentencial phenoma.These, led to the development of dynamic
semantics (Kamp, 1981; Heim, 1982; Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991; Kamp and Reyle, 1993).
One of the major limitation of Montague’s approach concerns the semantic treatment of anaphora.
Consider the following set of (classical) examples:
(1.2.1)A man walked in. He ordered a beer.
(1.2.2)#It is not the case that no man walked in. He ordered a beer.
(1.2.3)Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
(1.2.4)I bought a sage plant yesterday. I bought seven others with it.
1This principle as been argued to overgenerate possible readings, but more recent and refined alternatives exist. Some rely for
instance on powerful syntactic formalism such as combinatorial categorial grammars, conservative of the direct mapping from
syntactic to sematic types.
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The problem of Montague’s semantics, is that discourse referents, such as the one introduced by the noun
phrase a man, are introduced as variables bounded by quantifiers in the semantic representations. When
subsequently the pronoun he, then refers to that referent, predications made of the pronoun must en-
ter the scope of the quantifier: Montague’s account of the first sentence in example (1.2.1) is equivalent
to the first order formula ∃x man(x) ∧ walk_in(x). Moreover, still following Montague, the second
sentence will be rendered with a free variable, as an equivalent to ∃b beer(b) ∧ order(x, y). Bringing
the two sentences togther, should, in order to account for the correct reading for this example, result in∃x∃b man(x)∧walk_in(x)∧beer(b)∧order(x, y). Yet, even assuming that x and y are successfuly iden-
tified, generalizing a merging operation, such that, for instance, the merging of the two former formulae
yield the latter is not trivial.
This is further confirmed by the other examples of the set: example (1.2.2) shows for instance, that
the merge should not be allowed if the first formula is ¬¬(∃xman(x) ∧walked_in(x)), yet equivalent
to the representation of the first sentence of example (1.2.1). example (1.2.3) shows that a naive account
of anaphora as reduplication of content will not do: the sentence as a meaning that differs from that
of Every farmer who owns a donkey beats a donkey. Finally example (1.2.4) shows that neither can one
assume a treatment of anaphora as definite descriptions in disguise: while replacing he with the man that
walked in in example (1.2.1) might do the trick, replacing it with the sage plant that I bought obviously fails
with example (1.2.4) (it fails a presuposition of uniqueness).
Besides anaphora, another sort of problem concerns compositionality. Consider the examples below:
(1.2.5)John stopped talking. Mary was singing.
(1.2.6)John stopped talking. Mary sang a song.
In these two examples, It seems reasonable to assume that the meaning of the first sentence is identical in
both cases. Also, interpreted in isolation, the two second sentences differ only in some aspectual parameters
of the eventuality of singing they introduce; they do not involve a reference to the eventuality introduced
in the first sentence. Yet, the prefered reading of the first example above is one whereMary’s state of singing
overlaps temporally the event of John stopping talking, and the prefered reading of the second example is
one where Mary’s singing temporally follows that of John stopping talking. These two readings are even
incompatible with one another. AMontagovian treatment two sentences, taken in isolation, cannot account
for such temporal relations between evenluaties arising when the second sentence is interpreted in context
of the first.
Dynamics semantics address these issues. The main change brought by dynamic semantics, is the
switch from a semantics defined with static truth-condition to one defined in terms of transformation
of an input context into an output one. The semantics of a sentence is defined as such a transformation,
called a context change potential. This is common to all dynamic theories of meaning. We will focus here
on Discourse Representation Theory(DRT, Kamp, 1981).
1.2.2 Syntax of a DRT basic fragment
DRT constructs logical forms for input sentences that are calledDiscourse Representation Structures (DRSs).
Let us recall here the syntax of DRSs for a basic fragment of DRT. As we will need such an operator later, we
introduce as off now, a modal conditional > in this fragment, modeling ‘normal consequences’ of a given
proposition.
Definition 1 (Syntax of DRSs). Let V denotes a countably infinite set of dicourse referents, and Σ =
⊍k∈ω Σ(k) be a first order signature, i.e. a disjoint union for each integer k of sets of predicate symbols
Σ(k). Symbols in Σ(k) are said to be of arrity k. A DRS is a pair ⟨U ,K⟩, where U ⊆ V is a set of referents
(called the discourse universe of the DRS), andK is a list of conditions that can recursively involve sub-DRSs.
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Let [] be a symbol for the empty list (nil), and :: a list constructor symbol (for convenience, expansion of
the list is made toward the right), the set of DRSs,K is defined by the following grammar:
K ::= ⟨U ,K⟩
K ::= [] ∣ K :: γ
γ ::= P(x1, . . . , xn) ∣ ¬K ∣ K1 ∧K2 ∣ K1 ∨K2 ∣ K1 → K2 ∣ K1 > K2 ∣ x = y
With, U ⊆ V ; for arbitrary n, P a predicate symbol of arrity n (P ∈ Σ(n)) and x1 . . . xn n discourse
referents of V , and x, y discourse referents as well.
DRSs are often represented using a ‘box’ notation, whith two-floors boxes: the top floor is used to
list the discourse referents and the lower to list the conditions; for instance the logical form of the first
sentence in example (1.2.1) can be accounted for as the DRS ⟨U0,K0⟩ with U0 = {x} and K0 = man(x) ::
walk_in(x), and the second sentence (after resolution of the anaphora) can be accounted for as ⟨U1,K1⟩
with U1 = {b, y} and K1 = ⟨beer(b) :: ordered(y, b) :: y = x⟩. Equivalently these two DRSs can be
represented as, respectively
x, b
man(x),walked_in(x)
b, y
beer(b), ordered(y, b),
y = x .
DRS, in addition have amerge operation ⊕, defined as ⟨U ,K⟩ ⊕ ⟨U ′,K′⟩ = ⟨U ∪U ′, append(K,K′)⟩,
where append stands for list concatenation. In example (1.2.1) with the notations of above,
x, b
man(x),walked_in(x) ⊕
b, y
beer(b), ordered(y, b),
y = x =
x, y, b
man(x),walked_in(x),
beer(b), ordered(y, b),
y = x
Universal quantification is accounted for using → and DRS nesting: the DRS for example (1.2.3), for
instance, is:
x, y
f armer(x), donkey(y), owns(x, y) →
z
beats(x, z), z = y .
The semantics descibed in the next section ensures that this representation indeed has the right interpreta-
tion.
1.2.3 Semantics
As previously mentioned, the semantics of DRSs is defined in terms of transformation of an input context,
which is called a context-change potential. Formally, a context, or state, is represented in DRT as a pair
involving a possible world w, and a partial assignment function f mapping some of the referents in V to
individuals in a the domain of a model. Formally:
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Definition 2 (Model). A modelM is a tuple ⟨D,W ,⋆, I(k)⟩, with D a set of individuals, W a set of
worlds, ⋆ a dynamic selection function (see below), and for each k ∈ ω, I(k) an interpretation mapping
triples made of an arrity-k predicate symbol, a k-tuple of individuals and a world, to truth values: I(k) :(Σ(k) × Dk ×W) ↦ {⊺,
}.
The set of assignmentsA overM is defined as the set of partial functions f : V ↪ D. A partial function
f ′ extends f iff ∀x ∈ dom( f ), x ∈ dom( f ′) and f ′(x) = f (x). A state, is a (world,assignment), pair (w, f )
withw ∈W and f ∈ A. We let S denote the set of states. A dynamic proposition or context-change potential
p is a relation between states p ⊆ S × S . We let P = ℘(S × S) denote the set of dynamic propositions. To
write that two states s and s′ stand in relation for p we will write indifferently (s, s′) ∈ p (prefix notation)
or s p s′ (infix notation).
Finally, the dynamic conditional assignment function ⋆ is a function mapping, at a given world, a dy-
namic proposition to another dynamic proposition, it is usefull to capture a notion of ‘normal consequence’
of a dynamic proposition (see for instance Asher and Lascarides, 2003): ⋆ : W × P ↦ P .
The semantics of DRSs is provided below:
Definition 3. The semantics is defined recursively (for DRSs and for conditions alone). In what follows
we assume given a modelM, and we write ⋅ instead of ⋅M.
• (w, f ) ⟨U , []⟩ (w′, f ′) iff w = w′ and f ′ extends f , dom( f ′) = dom( f ) ∪U .
• (w, f ) ⟨U ,K :: γ⟩ (w′, f ′) iff ∃(w′′, f ′′) (w, f ) U ,K (w′′, f ′′) and (w′′, f ′′) γ (w′, f ′)
• (w, f ) P(x1, . . . , xn) (w′, f ′) iff (w, f ) = (w′, f ′) and I(n)(P, ⟨ f (x1), . . . f (xn)⟩,w) = ⊺.
• (w, f ) ¬γ (w′, f ′) iff (w, f ) = (w′, f ′) and there exists no (w′′, f ′′) such that (w, f ) K (w′′, f ′′)
• (w, f ) K → K′ (w′, f ′) iff (w, f ) = (w′, f ′) and for all (v, g) such that (w, f )K(v, g) there
exists (u, h) such that (v, g)K′(u, h).
• (w, f ) K ∨ K′ (w′, f ′) iff (w, f ) K (w′, f ′) or (w, f ) K′ (w′, f ′).
• (w, f ) K ∧ K′⟩ (w′, f ′) iff ∃(w′′, f ′′) (w, f ) K (w′′, f ′′) and (w′′, f ′′) K′ (w′, f ′)
• (w, f ) K > K′ (w′, f ′) iff (w, f ) = (w′, f ′) and for all (v, g) such that (w, f ) ⋆(w, K) (v, g)
there exists (u, h) such that (v, g) K′ (u, h).
• (w, f ) x = y (w′, f ′) iff (w, f ) = (w′, f ′), x, y ∈ dom( f ) and f (x) = f (y).
We see that, the discourse universe imposes to update assignments to encompass new referents in their
domain, while conditions always leave the assignment unchanged, but filter them, letting only through
those assignments that satisfies certain properties with respect to the model.
This semantics ensures the right interpretation for the DRSs of the previous section: for instance,
(w, f )


x, z, b
man(x),walked_in(x),
beer(b), ordered(z, b),
z = x

	 (w′, f ′)
ensures that f ′ maps x to an individual in the interpretation of the predicate walked in at the actual world,
b to an individual who verifies the beer property at the actual world, and such that both stand in the
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relation denoted by ordered at the actual world (since f ′(z) = f ′(b) and f ′(z) stand with f ′(x) in the
latter relation). This assignment ensures in particular, existence in the model of the individual to which
variable are assigned, hence the DRS represents accurately accounts for the existential reading of both
undefinites in example (1.2.1).
Furthermore
(w, f )

 x, yf armer(x), donkey(y), owns(x, y) →
z
beats(x, z), z = y

	 (w′, f ′)
requires that f = f ′ (since the discourse universe at the top level is empty), hence it is not required that the
domain of f be extended by f ′, and there is no garantee of existence of a farmer x or donkey y in the model,
in accordance with the meaning of example (1.2.3). Morover, the semantics requires that any extension of
g of f which would interpret x has an individual with the farmer property and y has an individual with
the donkey property and such that x and y stand in the owning relation, verifies also that x and y stand in
the beating relationship (since f must be extendable to an assignment to z that is equal to f ’s assignment
to y and that verifies the relation). Hence, we get the correct reading on that example too, where x and y
are both universally quantified.
On the other hand, assuming the following DRS for example (1.2.2) accounts for the failure of the
pronoun to find a referent:
b, z
¬¬ xman(x),walked_in(x) , beer(b), ordered(z, b), z = x .
We see from the semantics of the condition z = x, the only contexts (w, f ) that can be let through
the above DRS are those such that f already assigns a content to x, which means that a referent x must
have been introduced in some other, previous contribution for the anaphora to succeed 2. In particular,
the anaphora will fail in an empty context, and even in a state where x is assigned an individual, there is
no guarantee from this DRS alone, that z refers to somehting that is a man.
Dynamic consequence: Importantly, DRT captures a dynamic notion of entailment in natural language,
in a form of update and test:
Definition 4. Let S and S′ be two SDRSs, S ⊧ S′, reads as S entails S′ and is defined as:
∀M∀s, s′ if s S then ∃s′′ (w, f ) SM (w′, f ′)
Also, static Tarskian truth and validity are easilly recovered, defining: defineM, s ⊧ φ as ∃s′ s SM s′
(truth w.r.t. to a state), and ⊧ φ iff ∀M∀sM, s ⊧ φ (validity). Indeed, one can define a translation t from
DRS to first order formulae over the same signature, such thatM, (w, f ) ⊧ φ iffM, f ⊧ f .o. t(φ)(w).
2We consider here for simplicity, a more DPL-oriented version of DRT, the original DRT has more constraints on referent
names
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Accessibility conditions: the above considerations illustrates how the semantics of DRT imposes acces-
sibility conditions on referents.
A referent x is immediately accessible for anaphora in a DRS S iff x is introduced in the universe of a
DRS S′ such that S is a sub-DRS of S′, or x is introduced in a DRS S′ such that S′ → S is a condition in a
bigger DRS. Accessibility is the transitive closure of immediate accessibility. (Accessibility of x in S implies
for instance that S ⊧ zz = x ).
Let us conclude here, with a brief word on propositional attitude: we did not include other modal
operators than the ‘normal consequence’ conditional >which will use in subsequent sections, but it is clear
that states as world assignment leaves all liberty to introduce other modal constructions, e.g. a belief Bel
operator, and its counterpart as a relation between worlds in the model. DRT can thus handle intensional
contexts.
1.2.4 Constructing DRSs
So far we have presented DRSs and their interpretation, but not the process in which they are built from
an input discourse. To this aim Kamp and Reyle (1993) develops a construction algorithm, inductively
transforming an input syntactic derivation tree into a DRS.
This construction process, and the fact that the formulation of DRT is essentially first-order, departs
from theMontagovian view, which has motivated several accounts proposing to embed DRT in aMontago-
vian framework, for instance λ-DRT (Muskens, 1996) and continuation-style passing (de Groote, 2006).
We briefly expose in this section the principles underlying the continuation-style passing solution
of de Groote (2006). This choice has two motivations: first, it relies on the simply typed lambda calculus,
which we have already briefly exposed in section 1.1.2, and importantly, does not require us to introduce a
detailed account of syntax, which is convenient as the remainder of the thesis is mostly focused on semantic
issues. Second, it can express Segmented Discourse RepresentationTheory as well (Asher and Pogodalla,
2011b, see also section 2.3 for an introduction to SDRT), a framework that underlies an important part of
our contributions in the present thesis.
We illustrate this method on the treatment of an example in the spirit of examples (1.2.5) and (1.2.6),
using the occasion to sketch the way dynamic semantics deals with temporal anaphora.
Let us therefeore, once again, consider the framework of the simply typed lambda calculus. This time,
we take basic types to involve, at least, entities e, truth values t, and time and eventualities є (we adopt a
Davidsonian view with events as individuals, as is classic in DRT. We also identify here the type of times
and eventualities for simplicity, as it suffices for our present needs). We will let⋒,⊆,⊏ be constants of type⟨є, ⟨є, t⟩⟩ representing respectively, temporal overlap, inclusion, and precedence.
Continuation-style semantics represents a discourse as a λ−abstraction of type Γ = ⟨γ, ⟨⟨γ, t⟩, t⟩⟩
where γ is the type of input contexts. A discourse thus asks for
i) an input context i of type γ containing the effects of processing the previous discourse,
ii) A continuation o of type ⟨γ, t⟩ representing the discourse to come,
and constructs from these a truth value (type t). hence, a discourse denotes a relation between input
contexts and output contexts. This is indeed what dynamics semantics pictures.
As in section 1.1.2 we will not work out a model theory, though this can be done, but rather focus on
the reduction steps of the λ-calculus to obtain a normal form specifying the content of the discourse as a
first-order formula, with two remaining lambda abstractions abstracting the input and output contexts.
To account for examples (1.2.5) and (1.2.6), we need to assume contexts of type γ consisting of a record
of
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• First, two ordered lists of accessible referents of respectively, entity and eventualities or times to
account for anaphora.
• Second, a function associating to the elements of the previous list a set of attributes: for instance, genre
and number for entities, tense and aspect for eventualities (e.g., states/event distinction, present or
past tense). Using DRT syntactic notation, we write for instance    	
 the features
of an eventuality introduced by a verb with a stative aspect and a past tense. We let τ denote a type
for such surfacic attributes (τ is a finite enumerative type).
All of this is within the representation power of the simply typed lambda calculus. To manipulate the
context, we need to further assume:
1. A rule for pragmatic inferences r : ⟨γ, t⟩ implementing the set of rules that DRT adopts in its con-
struction process to deal with, e.g. temporal anaphora (see Kamp and Reyle, 1993). To get an idea of
how this works and what it does, consider as an example, that s is the last enventuality that entered
the context i, that s is associated in i the feature   (s was introduced by a stative verb), and
that the reference point in i is e′. Following DRT’s account, state should include temporally their
reference point, therefore r(i) reduces to e′ ⊆ s.
2. For l ∈ {e, є}, update functions l : ⟨l , ⟨γ, γ⟩⟩, outputs a context updated with the add of a referent
of the corresponding type l to the list of accessible referents of the input context.
3. For l ∈ {e, є}, sell : γ → l that selects a referent of type l in the context for coreference.
4. For l ∈ {e, є}, a function νl : ⟨γ, ⟨τ, ⟨є, γ⟩⟩⟩ outputs a context updated adding, if not already present,
a referent of type l to the list of accessible referent and associating this referent with the feature
passed as argument.
The last ingredient needed to put continuation-style semantics at work is a so-called binder rule to
combine a discourse with a sentence. We can for instance use the one below:
Let s : γ be a sentence-typed object, define s¯ = λio s(λ j r( j) ∧ o( j)) i.e. s¯ simply transforms s in order
to apply pragmatic inferences (for instance integrate anaphoric temporal condition) before applying the
continuation o. The binder rule is simply provided by:
D ⋅ S = λio Di(λi′ ¯Si′o)
This binder rule states, that interpreting a sentence S in the context of the discourse D consists in
feeding the continuation s¯ to D, and that this continuation involves, interpreting s, then resolving the
temporal anahpora in s using r.
If all of this is given, we can account for examples (1.2.5) and (1.2.6). To illustrate both entities and
temporal anaphora let us consider this alternative example:
(1.2.7)John fell. He was running.
We can represent the lexicon as follows (For simplicity, we integrate here DRT rule for the introduction of
eventuality and time, for respectively past, stative and past,non stative sentence, directly in the meaning of
fell and was running):
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John = λPλi P(John)(John    i)
fell = λxλio ∃e, t fall(x, e) ∧ e ⊆ t ∧ t < now ∧ o(νє(i,, e))
he = λPλi P(sele(i))
was running = λx λio ∃s, t′ be_running(x, s) ∧ s ⋒ t′ ∧ t′ < now ∧ o(νє(i,, s))
We leave up to the reader to check the details of the sentential derivation for both sentences. Let s1 and
s2 respectively denote the first and second sentences of example (1.2.7). Assuming a syntactic parse gives
us s1 = John(fell), we have after some reduction steps:
s1 = λio ∃e, t fell(John, e) ∧ e ⊆ t ∧ t < now ∧ o(John   e [νє(i,, e)])
and similarly s2 = he(was running), yielding after some reduction steps:
s2 = λio ∃s, t′ be_running(sele(i), s)s ⋒ t′ ∧ t′ < now ∧ o(νє(i,, s))
So that the binder rule will yield, after reduction again:
s1 ⋅ s2 =λio ∃e, t fell(John, e) ∧ e ⊆ t ∧ t < now
∧ ∃s, t′ be_running(sele(John   e [νє(i,, e)]), s) ∧ s ⋒ t′ ∧ t′ < now
∧ r(νє([John   e [νє(i,, e)]],, s))
∧ o(νє([John   e [νє(i,, e)]],, s))
The last step that remains is the reduction of the call to the selection function and the pragmatic
inferences rule. Assuming, for instance an empty input context i:
• sele(John   e [νє(i,, e)]) should reduce to John which is the only entity accessible in the
updated context John   e [νє(i,, e)].
• r(νє([John  e [νє(i,, e)]],, s)), implementing DRT rules, should reduce to the con-
dition e ⊆ s, since the context encodes that an event e was introduced followed by a state s, DRT
takes the reference point to be the last introduced event if there is one, and DRT imposes that if the
last introduced eventuality is a state, it includes temporally its reference point.
The above, then, finally reduces to:
s1 ⋅ s2 =λio ∃e, t fell(John, e) ∧ e ⊆ t ∧ t < now
∧ ∃s, t′ be_running(John, s) ∧ s ⋒ t′ ∧ t′ < now
∧ e ⊆ s
∧ o(νє([John   e [νє(i,, e)]],, s))
If we had, instead treated a second sentence like he got back up, the context would have encoded a
succession of event after interpreting s2 and the call to r, following DRT rules would have reduced to the
different constraint e ⊏ s, with ⊏ representing temporal precedence.
de Groote (2006) gives a precise and motivated description of the type and content of entries in the
lexicon for each syntactic categories, and, in particular, shows how the entry for quantifiers and the negation
use the input context and continuation passing to encode DRT’s accessibility rules.
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1.3 The need for a rich semantics/pragmatics interface
DRT has been applied to a wide range of additional pragmatic phenomena, including, for instance, pre-
suppositions (van der Sandt, 1992), attitudes reports (Asher, 1986; Kamp, 1990; Maier, 2010) and modal
subordination (Roberts, 1989; Asher and Pogodalla, 2011a). Yet, as argued in Asher and Lascarides (2003),
DRT, lacks to integrate something to complete the picture of the semantics/pragmatics interface. What is
missing is a general picture of the implicit or explicit links that make discourse a coherent object, the links
between utterances that Hobbs (1985) introduces as coherence relations.
We recap here some of the arguments that bring to this conclusion:
First, the theory’s authors themselves acknowledge such a limitation: Kamp and Reyle (1993) provides
the following example:
(1.3.1)John drank the beer. He liked it. Some of it ran down his chin.
the problem is that the rules we sketched in the previous section for temporal anaphora predict a reading
where the event of the beer running down John’s chin is temporally subsequent to John’s drinking the
beer, not simultaneous. The theory’s author note that the correct reading should follow from inferring an
elaboration relation between the two events. DRT however, was formulated before formal, explicit account
of discourse structure emerged, which led the author to adopt simplying assumptions to the benefic of
a formal, explicit account: “We will therefore have to settle for a compromise. So we shall oversimplify and
assume that the principles we stated above hold generally: Events always follow their reference point, states
always include it” (Kamp and Reyle, 1993, p. 528)
It seems also that DRT pictures of accessibility might be refined by considerations on discourse struc-
ture. Consider for instance:
(1.3.2)Max visited his sister yesterday. She has lovely hair.
(1.3.3)#Max visited his siter yesterday. Then he had a problem with his car and was late for dinner. She has
lovely hair.
The second discourse above, if acceptable, is at least less coherent. Moreover accepting the reference
of She to Max’s sister seems to require a link of some kind between Max being late for dinner and Max’s
sister’s hair being lovely. In terms of accessibility, DRT does not make a difference of treatment between
these two examples, and DRT does not explicitely model lack coherence.
DRT’s rules for temporal anaphora captures something of the semantic constraint imposed by coher-
ence relations, but this is a partial account, as the following example shows:
(1.3.4)Max fell. John helped him up.
On such an example, DRT successfully adds to the interpretation that the helping event followed the falling
event. But this exemple, arguably features more: a more coherent interpretation is one where Max falling
caused John helping. More problematic is the following:
(1.3.5)Max fell. John pushed him.
The sequence of verbal tense in the latter exemple are the same as before, but this time, coherence favors a
reading were the pushing caused the falling.This reading implies also that the pushing preceded the falling,
which goes against the temporal rules of DRT, as we sketched them in the previous section.
For a more detailed motivation of integrating coherence relations to the dynamic framework, we refer
the reader to Asher and Lascarides (2003).
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Following these conclusions, we move in the next chapter to a review of coherence relations and
different frameworks that use them in the analysis of discourse.
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2.1 Elementary Discourse Units and Coherence relations
Most, if not all, discourse theories assume discourse structure to be derived in a process involving two
steps:
the first step consists in segmenting the input text, i.e. identifying the Elementary Discourse Units
(EDUs). EDUs are “atoms” at the level of discourse, the content of which is assumed to be described
at a lower level of syntactic and semantic analysis. The other step consists in identifying how EDUs are
combined with one another by mean of coherence relations and yield more complex structures.
Discourse formalisms however differ in the way they address these two tasks. For instance, Rhetorical
StructureTheory (RST,Mann andThompson, 1987) assumes that discourse structure is obtained through a
succesive application of abstract schemas, specifying how different communicative intentions of the writer
are structurally realized, while another formalism such as (DLTAG, Forbes et al., 2001) offers a purely
syntactic framework relying on a lexicalized grammar. Then again, other theories such as the linguistic
discourse model (LDM, Polanyi, 1996) and Segmented Discourse RepresentationTheory (SDRT, Asher
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and Lascarides, 2003) infer structure and relations using a mix of different information sources (discourse
connective, lexical information, cohesion markers, the semantic content of discourse units, world knowl-
edge).
Another important distinction between theories lies in the way they constrain possible structures (tree
structures, graphs, dependency structures, . . . ). There is finally some variation in the interpretation and
definition theories provide for both elementary units and coherence relations.
Before presenting some major theories of discourse, we briefly discuss these two central notions:
2.1.1 Elementary Discourse Units
What exactly an EDU is, is still subject to some debate and varies slightly with the formalism. There is
however a strong agreement between theories that EDUs’ informative content should introduce a single
eventuality or state of affairs.
As such, EDUs differ from sentences, prosodic units, conversational turns and other linguistic units
stemming from fields such as sentential syntax, semantics, prosody or pragmatics3–see for instance Polanyi,
1996, p. 5. The syntactic unit of the single (finite or non-finite) clause (roughly, a grammatical construction
involving a single verbal predicate and its arguments) provides a very close approximation, as most of the
time a single clause introduces a single discourse unit. Clausal units have for instance been used in the
RST-Treebank (Carlson et al., 2001), a corpus annotated in the framework of rhetorical structure theory
and one of the most used corpora for discourse parsing (see for instance duVerle and Prendinger, 2009;
Subba andDi Eugenio, 2009).This choice intends to maximise the “balance between granularity of tagging
and ability to identify units consistently on a large scale” (Carlson et al., 2001, p. 3). Clauses are also the
smallest possible arguments of relations in the Penn Discourse Treebank (PDTB, Prasad et al., 2008),
another widely used corpus annotated with discourse relations and their arguments. A few non-clausal
exceptions are however permitted such as nominalizations, some anaphoric expressions, answers such as
yes and no. SDRT and recent versions of the LDM further advocate a specific segmentation for cases such
as infinitive complements (Mary needs to go), parenthetics (Guy Hosneld, 55 years old, was . . . ), detached
adverbials (For two decades, John has been working at the library), arguing that such small embedded or
detached construction introduce their own EDU.The main reason put forward, is that these units must be
allowed to be later on targeted as argument of subsequent coherence relations leaving the matrix clause
appart, and/or to become part of a complex substructure subordinated to the samematrix, as a whole. Such
a segmentation is intanciated for instance in the Annodis (Afantenos et al., 2012a) and Settler (Afantenos
et al., 2012b) corpora.
In a nutshell, segmentation granularitity is ultimately driven by the need for coherence relations to
get the right scope with respect to the theory’s modeling goals. In particular, it is crucial that theories
concernedwith the semantic interpretation of discourse ensure that the semantic consequences of a relation
are evaluated in the right context (to account for anaphora resolution, propositional attitudes, among
other things), on the right arguments (otherwise the process results in a skewed logical interpretation).
Polanyi et al. (2004) for instance includes a detailed proposal of a semantically driven, rather fine-grained
segmentation, listing the corresponding syntactic constructions.
As a concluding remark, it is worth noticing that recent automatic approaches to discourse segmenta-
tion achieve high performances (with around 85 F-score or more), whether one requires continuously
spanning EDUs (Subba and Di Eugenio, 2007), or permits embedded elementary units (Afantenos et al.,
2010). Discourse segmentation is thus a well-understood, yet crucial step in the more general task of dis-
course parsing as segmentation errors naturally pass on to later steps of parsing such as the identification
of ocherence relations.
3Allthough units such as sentence or turn taking are still relevant to the analysis of discourse and dialogue structure, they
often introduce complex structure involving more than one unit
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2.1.2 Coherence relations
As we have seen is the case for EDUs, the difference between the sets of coherence relations assumed by
distinct theories is one of granularity more than one of nature: the two following principle are widely
agreed on:
• Coherence relations induce a hierarchical structure over discourse. Most theories assume coherence
relations to come in two kinds: coordinating, placing their arguments on the same level, and subor-
dinating, placing one of their arguments above the other in the hierarchy4. It is generally agreed that
this hierarchy affects available sites for finding antecedents for correference, projecting presuppos-
tions and attaching discourse continuations. Most often this is modeled via the definition of a set
of open and closed nodes in the discourse structure as, e.g. a right frontier constraint (Polanyi, 1985;
Grosz and Sidner, 1986; Asher, 1993).
• Coherence relations have semantic consequences. These consequences impact for instance the tem-
poral, spatial and thematic organization of a text (Hobbs et al., 1993b; Kehler, 2002; Asher, 1993; Las-
carides and Asher, 1993; Hobbs et al., 1993b; Hitzeman et al., 1995), inter alia, but also propositional
attitudes, and implicatures. Typically, the semantic conditions of a relation such as  (a, b)
in SDRT (or the RST-equivalent 	
		(a, b)) imposes that b’s main eventuality be temporally
subsequent to a’s.
Themain point of divergence regarding coherence relations lies in the cardinality of the set of relations
theories adopt, which in turn depends on the specific aims of the theory.
D-LTAG for instance, as a purely syntactic theory, naturally identifies relations with discourse con-
nectives. In the PDTB, the set of relations is based on the set of discourse connectives too, but a single
connective might, depending on its context of use, introduce different subtypes of a given relation type.
Hence, many additional semantic distinctions are made, and a hierarchic classification of relations is pro-
posed. RST is one of the theories assuming the largest number of relations, discriminating between very
fine-grained level of variation of the writer’s communicative intentions. As an example, RST distinguishes
between “volitional” and “non-volitional causes”. Taking a different perspective, driven by the concern of
providing a modular theory of compositional meaning, SDRT argue in favor of a more restricted set of
relations, sufficient for the semantic interpretation of discourse and dialogue. Candidate relations must
survive a kind of semantic Ockham’s razor: two relations may be distinguished only if they introduce dis-
tinct semantic consequences. Hence SDRT does not distinguish between “volitional” and “non-volitional”
causal relations, as the event-property of being “volitional” or not is not a semantic consequence of being
in a causal relationship. It might however still be entailed or implicated by other parts of the discourse
(consider John pushed mary. She fell. John is a terrible person v.s. John pushed mary. She fell. But it wasn’t
on purpose).
There is however some agreement over the taxonomy of discourse relations —almost all recent theo-
ries include expressions that refer to relations like Elaboration, Explanation, Result, Narration, Contrast,
Attribution. Sanders et al. (1992); Bateman and Rondhuis (1997); Benamara and Taboada (2015) discuss
correspondences between different taxonomies.
We now review some of the major discourse theories. We put a special focus on SDRT, which will
constitute one of our starting point for the semantic and pragmatics analysis of dialogue, and will therefore
be of heavy use in all parts of the present thesis.
4Not all theories use the terms “subordinating” and “coordinating”, andmay have instead theory-specific closely related notions,
such as the nucleus/satellite disctinction in RST
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2.2 Rhetorical StructureTheory
2.2.1 Overview
In the words of the theory’s authors, RST is “a descriptive framework for text” which “identifies hierarchic
structure in text” and “describes the relations between text parts in functional terms” (Mann andThompson,
1987). RST thus adopts a descriptive and functional perspective on discourse structure: coherence relations
represent a way for an analyst to describe what he thinks the intended communicative function5 of two
adjacent spans of text is. The analyst’s judgments are explicited by the constraints associated with the
relations.
RST makes a distinction between relations involving a Nucleus and a Satellite (which we will write NS
or SN-relations, depending on the relative positions of the nucleus and satellite), and relations involving
two nuclei (multinuclear, or NN-relations). This distinction is quite analoguous to the distinction between
subordinating (NS/SN-relations) and coordinating (NN relations), discussed in the previous section. RST’s
specifity however, is to attach this information to the discourse unit itself, and not to the relation. A given
unit is either a nucleus or a satellite, never both, but it might contain other nuclei or satellites as subunits.
Relations are associated a set of up to 4 constraints (given in the form of statements in natural language).
These constraints express properties that must be met by, respectively, each of their argument, their combi-
nation, and the writer’s intention behind using the relation. We provide for instance the definition of the
relation   as used in the RSTTB:
Constraints on   (NS or SN-relation)
Nucleus: ∅
Satellite: ∅
Combination of N and S: The situation presented in the nucleus is the cause of the situation presented
in the satellite. The cause, which is the nucleus, is the most important part. The satellite represents
the result of the action.
Writer’s intention: The intention of the writer is to emphasize the cause.
An analysis in the framework of RST consists in the successive application of schemas to the input text. A
schema is an abstract specification of a (flat) fragment of discourse structure. Formally, a schema can be
defined as a graph s = (V , E) such that V = ⟨v0a0 . . . vnan⟩ is a linearly ordered set of vertices (placeholder
for relations’ arguments), with each vi annotated with a nucleus/satellite token ai ∈ {N , S} and E ⊆ V ×
V ×R is a set of edges annoted with coherence relations (we letR denote the set of coherence relations).
Furthermore, only two cases are permitted:
• Either there is a unique i such that ai = N , and every edge in E links a satellite to this nucleus (single
nucleus).
• Or ∀i ai = N and E = {R(vi , vi+1) ∣ i < n} for some multinuclear relation R ∈ R (multinuclear
schema).
For instance, the schema corresponding to instances of the NS-relation  	
 is simply given by
V = ⟨v0N , v1S⟩, E = { 	
(v0, v1)}. Applying s to a span of text T simply consists in splitting
T into n adjacent subspans of text t1 . . . tn, mapping them to each of to the placeholders for relations’
arguments in the schema. In other words, applying s to T consists in intanciating within T the fragment of
5i.e. the intented effect that the writers think he achieves on a reader.
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structure that s specifies. The application is nevertheless permitted only at the condition that it is plausible
to the analyst, that the constraints associated with relation Ri hold between ti and ti+1, for each Ri . Once a
schema has been applied to a span T , T and the subspans involved in the schema application become DUs.
The analysis ends when:
1. A schema has been applied to the span encompassing the whole discourse.
2. Every span used as argument to a relation is either an EDU or a schema has been applied to it.
3. No text span is used as an argument in two distinct schema applications.
The analysis results in a hierarchic structure called an RST Tree.
As appears from the above, an RST tree is tight to the point of view of the analyst who produces it.
Now what an analyst thinks the writer intends to communicate might obviously differ from what the
writer actually intends to communicate (let alone what he actually commits to). However, a semantically
competent analyst might of course not produce just any structure, at least if he believes the writer to be
semantically competent and rational as well. Intuitively, such assumptions impose that the analyst judges
that the author intends to communicate, at least, what he actually commits to (by conventionl meaning).
Thus,even thoughRST is not a theory of semanticmeaning,anRST tree can be thought of as expressing both
a set of constraints over the semantic interpretation of a text, and a plausible interpretation of the writer’s
intentions compatible with these constraints. Indeed Mann andThompson (1987) insists that the analyst
“has access to the text, knowledge of the context in which it was written, and shares the cultural conventions
of the writer and the expected readers, but has no direct access to the writer or other readers”, analyst
judgments are thus assumed objectively determined by the content of the text, not by the analyst subjective
beliefs. Therefore, it makes sense to refer to the set of possible RST trees for a given text. Anticipating a
little on the next chapter, these considerations also provide a justification on a comparative approach of
RST to other discourse theories based on the semantic scope of coherence relations.
We now discuss in more details the set of RST Trees that might be output by the above process, and
their use in annotated corpora.
2.2.2 Structures and Corpora
In order to discuss the structural constraints governing RST Trees, let us first introduce a few more preci-
sions about RST schemas:
RST defines five type of schemas, consisting respectively in:
1. A single NS- (a0 = N , a1 = S) or SN- (a0 = S, a1 = N) relation: V = ⟨v0a0 , v1a1⟩, E = {R0(v0, v1)}.
2. A single NN-relation (just like the above, except that a0 = a1 = N).
3. For some specific relations such as   or 	
, a multinuclear schema exist for arbitrary long
sequences of such relations i.e. for all n ∈ N RST has a schema
V = ⟨v0N . . . vnN⟩, E = {R(vi , vi+1) ∣ i < n}
with R = 	
 or R =  .
4. For some pair of relations such as (	,		), a common nucleus linked to a
satellite by each of the relations (a schema exists for each position of the nucleus). For instance with
the nucleus in the middle:
V = ⟨x0S , x1N , x2S⟩, E = {	(x0, x1),		(x1, x2)}
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5. A Join schema, linking two nucleus but involving no relation. This schema is merely a conventional
way to represent the absence of any relation. We can therefore reduce it to the multinuclear schema,
by assuming a specific multinuclear   relation and a convention that this relation actually stands
for the absence of other relations (which is indeed the representation adopted practice).
In the following, let⊆ denote textual inclusion of spans, and<t denote textual precedence. <t is naturally
extended to spans by defining that s1 <t s2 iff the left boundary of s1 appears prior to the left boundary of s2
in the text. Notice that, allthough Mann andThompson (1987) defines a span as an “uninterrupted linear
interval of text”, excluding the possibility that segmenting an embedded EDU yields a discontinuous span
for its matrix EDU, this definition is easily relaxed into a weaker and consensual assumption of non partially
overlapping spans. Adjacency, required in RST for two spans to be linked by a coherence relation, is simply
reinterpreted as immediate succession with respect to <t , and nothing changes besides this. The choice of
the left boundary for spans’ ordering naturally makes a discountinous matrix EDU textually precede its
splitting embedded EDUs, which is the convention used in corpora featuring such segmentation, as e.g.
ANNODIS. As a consequence, segmentation raises no issue to the comparison of RST Trees and other
structures proposed in the next chapter.
The denomination “RST Tree” is legitimate because DUs (spans) form a tree with respect to immediate-
inclusion (s′ is a child of s if s′ ⊊ s and there is no span s′′ such that s′ ⊊ s′′ ⊊ s), moreover each non-
elementary DU T is itself an acyclic graph ⟨V[ti/vi], E⟩ obtained from the application of a schema ⟨V , E⟩
to T , replacing each vi by T ’s ith (w.r.t <t) child. We thus see that, due to the schemas of type 3 and 4 above,
an RST Tree is indeed a little more than a regular labelled tree.
As previouslymentioned,RST is a theoryunderlying several corpora, suchas theRSTTreebank (RSTTB,
Carlson et al., 2001) and the Potsdam commentary corpus (Stede, 2004). In practice, these corpora involve
a huge majority of schemas 1 and 2, (if any occurence of 3 at all). Indeed, approaches to discourse parsing
such as duVerle and Prendinger (2009) focus on structures obtainable from schema 1 and 2 only. As a
consequence, when refering to RST, we will often focus our efforts on such structures, without multiple
relations-schemas (especially when relating RST Trees and DGs in chapter 3). It is straightforward to see
that, for this class of simpler RST Tree, each DU’s internal structure involves a single edge between two chil-
dren DUs, and therefore is fully describable as a binary trees whith each node labelled with both nuclearity
(except for the root) and a single relation label:
Definition 5 (Binary RST Tree). • An EDU is an RST Tree.
• If R is a nucleus-statellite relation symbol, s1 and s2 are both binary RST Trees the root of which are
contiguous spans, and ⟨a1, a2⟩ ∈ {⟨N , S⟩; ⟨S,N⟩} then R(t1a1 , t2a2) is an RST Tree.
2.2.3 Examples
To conclude the present introduction to RST, we provide two examples and their RST structures:
(2.2.1)[Interprovincial Pipe Line Co. said]C1 [it will delay a proposed two-step, 830 million dollar [(US
$705.6 million)]C3 expansion of its system]C2 [because Canada’s output of crude oil is shrinking.]C4
(from RSTTB, wsj_2363)
(2.2.2)[“he was a very aggressive firefighter.]C1 [he loved the work he was in,"]C2 [said acting fire chief Lary
Garcia.]C3 . ["He couldn’t be bested in terms of his willingness and his ability to do something to help
you survive."]C4 (from Egg and Redeker, 2010)
The segmentation can be read from the examples with elementary discourse units placed in square
brackets, indexed with the unit’s name. Note that example (2.2.1) features an embedded unit C3 which
splits C2 into two discontinuous spans. RSTTB has actually no units with discontinuous spans, instead a
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more complex encoding is usedwhere discontinuous units are segmented as two different continuous units,
linked by an “artificial”  	 relation.We drop this here, simply takingC3 has having a discontinuous
span. We will generally consider  	 (or its pendant 
 in ANNODIS) as an empirical way
to recover from segmentation mistakes.
Figure 2.1 graphically depicts the (binary) RST Trees for exemples examples (2.2.1) and (2.2.2). To
improve lisibility, the N/S annotations of a child node is written midway on the edge to its parent node.
Figure 2.1: RST Trees for examples (2.2.1) and (2.2.2)
(a) RST Tree for exam-
ple (2.2.1)
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(b) RST Tree for example (2.2.2)
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2.2.4 Summary
We have seen that RST proposes to model the hierarchic organization of discourse with tree-shaped struc-
tures. Nodes of these structures correspond to spans of text, labelled with coherence relations holding
between different (adjacent) subspans. Whether or not a relation holds is something that the analyst must
judge, given the constraints associated with each relation (formulated in natural language). RST’s take on
discourse structure is to be understood in terms of communicative function of spans vis à vis each other.
Although the interpretation of RST trees, in some way, tells us something about the semantic inter-
pretation of discourse, RST differ from a formal theory of semantic meaning, such as SDRT which we
introduce in the next section. As we will see, one of the main switch in perspective, is the vision of relations
as logical operators. A consequence is, for instance, that SDRT emphasizes the impact of the semantic
scope of a coherence relation and precises the compositional semantic interpretation of complex units.
Such notions are less important to RST’s descriptive perspective, where the exact contribution of each
subunit of a complex DU to the satisfaction of a relation’s constraints is consequently a little blurred.
2.3 Segmented Discourse RepresentationTheory
2.3.1 Overview
Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT) Asher (1993); Asher and Lascarides (2003), is a
semantic theory which inherits a framework from dynamic semantics and enriches it with coherence
relations.
SDRT, as DRT, is a representational theory: it assumes the existence of logical forms, structured mental
representations obtaining at a level intermediary between the surface structure of discourse and semantic
values. The main insight of SDRT is to adopt a set of logical forms of which discourse structure is made a
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first class citizen. In these logical forms called SegmentedDiscourse Representation Structures (SDRSs), co-
herence relations play the role of discourse-level predicates scoping over lower-level discourse constituents.
these consitutents may themselves recursively exhibit an analog structure. Like DRSs in DRT, SDRSs are
incrementally refined as discourse unfolds, and are equipped with a model-theoretic interpretation, pro-
viding at each step a transition from internal representations to semantic values. The set of SDRSs and
their model-theoretic interpretation together constitute the logic of information content.
An SDRS roughly corresponds to a set of discourse labels, one of which is the top label. Labels are
assigned a content, which is
• Either a semantic representation of an EDU, in a given base-level language, such as DRT or DPL.
• Either a set of subordinate labels linked by discourse relations. (Complex Discourse Unit, CDU).
Themodel-theoretic interpretation of a CDU is obtained by applying the semantic consequences associated
with coherence relations to the recursively unpacked semantic content of the relations’ arguments. The
semantic interpretation of an EDU label is simply the one of its content, furnished by a base-level dynamic
logic. The interpretation of the SDRS is by definition that of its top-label. We will detail this in the next
subsection.
An important specifity of the theory is the distinction made between infering and evaluating SDRSs.
Asher and Lascarides argue that infering the structure of a given discourse is computationally less challeng-
ing than deciding a property of the structure’s interpretation. Consider for instance the following discourse:
[John is a brilliant mathematician]1, [he found a polynomial algorithm deciding 3-SAT.]2 [He concluded that
P=NP]3. On the hone hand, it seems rather easy to infer that the rhetorical function of 2 and 3 is to support
the claim made in 1 (in SDRT terms,  	 and  
		⋆ can be inferred), even ignoring
the precise denotation of terms such as 3-SAT , P, or NP. It is as easy to spot that 3 rhetorically comes as a
result of 2 (plausibly triggered by the joint presence of the lexical items found and concluded). On the other
hand, actually evaluating whether the result between 2 and 3 obtains would require at least some familiarity
with John and basic complexity theory. Similarly, evaluating the truth of 2 on its own would require to
know John’s algorithm (if indeed there is one), as well as expert knowledge of theoretical computer science.
Following this line of reasoning, the logic of information content is designed to be (at least) first order
expressive, with an undecidable (indeed non recursively enumerable) consistency check problem, whereas
the inference of discourse structure, assumed to be a decidable problem, is internally modeled by mean
of a glue logic (also refered to as the logic of information packaging). The glue logic is intended to have a
restricted access to SDRSs’ content and world knowledge, to be kept decidable, while remaining sufficiently
expressive to model structural inferences. Indeed the glue logic’s domain objects are (syntactic) fragment
of SDRSs, not world’s individual or abstract semantic entities. SDRT thus aim at separating information
content from information packaging and explain the flow of information between the two layers.
This concern for separating the intepreter’s evaluation of the discourse (what he believes) and the
discourse content (“what is said”, derived on linguistic grounds) is central to the perspective adopted
by SDRT, and distinguishes the theory from other closely related semantic-oriented models such as, for
instance,Hobbs et al. (1993a)’s abductive theory where every step of interpretation is conducted in the same
first order object language. Such a distinction further applies to other belief-change models of discourse
interpretation, building on Searle (1969) and Grice (1975) vision of meaning and speech acts, such as Grosz
and Sidner (1986). A detailed review is presented in Asher and Lascarides (2003, chapter 3). The general
claim is that, even though the semantic interpretation of discourse may affect an interpreter’s cognitive
state, semantic understanding cannot be equated with such cognitive changes. We adopt in the present
thesis such a position, which constitute the starting point for our analysis of strategic conversation through
the game-theoretic proposal in chapter 7 and the commitments-based semantics developped in chapters 8
to 10.
22
2.3. Segmented Discourse Representation Theory
We now examine in more details SDRSs and their interpretation.
2.3.2 The syntax of SDRSs: directed acyclic graphs
SDRT assumes provided a base-level dynamic logic L0, equipped with a class of models, and for each
modelM, a set of states XM and (dynamic) interpretation ⋅M : L0 ↦ XM × XM. To ease notational
clutter, we will drop the ⋅M exponent notation whenever the model is clear from context. for x, x′ ∈ XM
and φ ∈ L0, we will use infix notation xφMx′ with the same meaning as ⟨x, x′⟩ ∈φM.
Let Π be an infinite countable set of discourse labels, andR be a set of rhetorical relations. LetR←
andR→ denote two subsets ofR, standing for, respectively left veridical and right veridical relations. An-
ticipating a bit on the semantic consequences of relations, left (resp. right) veridical relations are those
which semantically imply the content of their left (resp. right) argument. A relation is veridical if it is both
left and right veridical, and non-veridical if it is neither left nor right veridical. Veridical relations include
for instance  	,  
		, , 	, . Examples of left veridical, non
right veridical relations are 	 and . Examples of non veridical relations are 		
and 		. Finally, assume a partition ofR into coordinating, and subordinating relations.
We are now ready to define the syntax of SDRSs. Looking ahead to chapter 3 we provide a reworked,
graph-theoretic version of the definition in Asher and Lascarides (2003), slightly more complex, but with
the advantage of making all structural constraints on SDRSs fully explicit at once (also integrating in the
process considerations on discourse structure such that the ones presented in Asher et al. (2011)).
Definition 6 (SDRS). An SDRS is a tuple S = ⟨A,O, E, πtop, f ⟩ where
• A is a finite subset of Π (set of discourse labels)
• πtop ∈ A
• O ⊆ A× A is a set of edges such that ⟨A,O⟩ is a tree rooted in πtop (in the graph-theoretic sense6).
Edges in O need not be directed, but direction is implicit and can always be retrieved as follows:
define the “oustscope” order ≺∗ on labels: π2 ≺∗ π1 iff π1 ∈ P(πtop, π2), whereP(πtop, π) denotes the
(unique) path from πtop to π in ⟨A,O⟩. Finally direct edges from left to right in descending order
w.r.t. ≺∗.
• E ⊆ R × A× A is a set of directed edges labelled with discourse relations, such that ⟨A, E ∪ O⟩ is a
directed acyclic graph (with O directed as above), and such that O is closed for incoming coherence
relations, i.e. whenever we have ⟨π0, π⟩ ∈ O and R(π1, π) ∈ E, we have ⟨π0, π1⟩ ∈ O (as we did when
reviewing RST, we write R(π, π′) ∈ E with the meaning of ⟨R, π, π′⟩ ∈ E). A final constraint is that
two labels might not be linked by both a coordinating and a subordinating relation.
• f is a function mapping EDU labels to formulae in L0. An EDU label is a label minimal for ≺∗. Any
other label is a complex discourse unit (CDU) label.
• S respects the right frontier constraint the definition of which will be provided after introducing a
few additional notations.
Put more simply, an SDRS is essentially an acyclic directed graph with a “top” label, and two kind of
edges: edges in O describe the subunits of complex discourse units, while edges in E encode the coherence
relations holding between different discourse units. Labels at the bottom of the structure represent EDUs,
and are associated the corresponding representations in the lower language via f .
6i.e., a graph such that there is a unique path from πtop to any other node. Equivalently we could have dropped πtop from the
definition of an SDRS, and defined O as a set of directed edges.
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Notice that, while the definition explicitely forbids an incoming coherence relation to “penetrate” a
complex discourse unit, it licences outgoing coherence relations to cross the boundaries of CDUs: it is
possible that an edge in E links π1 to π2 when, for instance, π1 is a child of π and π2 is a sibling of π. This is a
desirable feature of the theory, and allows the modelling of discouse asides (e.g. digressions or commentary
performed while in a embedded, subordinated discourse topic).
The following definition permits to retrieve the recursive structure of discourse from the graph-theoretic
definition: define π ≺ π′ as O(π, π′) ∈ O, or equivalently: π ≺∗ π′ and ¬∃π′′ ∉ {π, π′} π ≺∗ π′′ ≺∗ π′.
Note that ≺∗ is the transitive relexive closure of ≺, which justifies the notational choice. π ≺ π′ reads as “π′
immediately outscope π”.
Since EDU labels represent elementary units, they inherit the textual ordering of EDUs, which we let<T denote. This is the last ingredient to the definition of the Right Frontier and associated constraint:
Definition 7 (Right Frontier). The right frontier of an SDRS S is the set of nodes RF(S) inductively defined
as the least set such that:
• πlast ∈ RF(S), where πlast is the last EDU label in textual order (i.e. w.r.t. <T)
• ∀π ∈ RF(S)∀π′ ≻ π π′ ∈ RF(S)
• ∀π ∈ RF(S)∀π′ s.t. R(π′, π) ∈ E for some subordinating R, π′ ∈ RF(S).
Definition 8 (Right Frontier constraint). The definition is recursive: a single EDU label π verifies the
right frontier constraint. For the recursive step, let S = ⟨A,O, E, πtop⟩ (omitting the assignation f for
convenience) and let S − πlast denotes the minor of S obtained by the following process: remove πlast from
A as well as any edge in E or O involving πlast. If the parent π′ of πlast has no other descendant, π′ is by
definition an EDU label of S − πlast, marked as last in textual order.
S verifies the right frontier constraint iff:
• S − πlast recursively verifies the right frontier constraint.
• ∀R(π′, π) ∈ E, π′ ∈ RF(S − πlast).
This definition expresses that the incremental construction of S must be performed in such a way that
new information is always attached on a node of the right frontier of the current structure, or otherwise
starts a new complex discourse unit which itself has to attach on the right frontier. The right frontier
constraint, thus model possible sites for attachment. As we will see later, it also models possible antecedents
for anaphora resolution.
To illustrate the above definitions, we provide on fig. 2.2 an example of discourse and associated SDRS
(of course it remains to explain how SDRT predicts this structure to be interpreted and infered. Graphical
convention are as follows: edges in E (coherence relations) are drawn in black, horizontaly when coordi-
nating, vertically when subordinating (subordinating edges may be inclined for a better rendering). Edges
in O (Labels outscoping relations) are drawn dashed and in red. Nodes of the right frontier are squared
in black, with blue labels. The example involves relations of elaboration, entity elaboration (  ) and
continuation (	
). To avoid overloading the drawing with too much edges, the top label is not repre-
sented, but it is implicitely understood that it outscopes all other labels (and immediately outscopes π, π′
and π3).
The example involves an instance of discourse aside: we see that the relation of entity elaboration
linking π3 to π2, “escapes” the CDU label π′ and thus forms a discourse aside at the level of the top-label.
We now turn to the interpretation of SDRSs.
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Figure 2.2: Example discourse (translated from ANNODIS) and associated SDRS
(2.3.1)[Principles of natural selection.]π1 [The the-
ory of natural selection [as it was initially de-
scribed by Charles Darwin,]π3 rest on three
principles:]π2 [1. the principle of variation]π4
[2. the principle of adaptation]π5 [3. the princi-
ple of heredity]π6
π1
π′
π2
π′′π3
π4 π5 π6
 	
 	 
 
	 	
2.3.3 The logic of information content
The interpretation of SDRSs builds on, and extends the dynamic semantics ⋅ of the base-level language.
Hence, the semantics of an SDRS is understood as a context-change potential . The idea is that, at each level
of the hierarchy, the interpretation of a complex unit is obtained by applying the semantic consequences
of relations to their arguments, the semantics of which is recursively unpacked.
Since dynamic cunjunction is not commutative (for instance, a cunjunctmight introduce a new referent
into the context which a subsequent cunjunct might then pick up), we must see that coherence relations
and their arguments are evaluated in the appropriate order. Basically, this amounts, when a CDU label
involves more than one relation, to evaluate the relations in an order that respects the textual ordering
of EDUs. To achieve this, it suffices to order relations lexicographically, extending the definition of <T to
complex units by comparing textual left bounds, and in case of equality, defining sublabels as preceding
their parent CDU (which cover every case since CDU labels are non-overlapping as a consequence of the
tree requirement for ⟨A,O⟩)7. Formally: π <T π′ iff, letting lπ , lπ′ be the <T minimal EDU labels such
that lπ ≺∗ π and lπ′ ≺∗ π′, we have either lπ <T lπ′ or lπ = lπ′ and π ≺∗ π′
A set of coherence relations instances D ⊆ E is then simply ordered lexicographically (R(π1, π2) <
R(π′1, π′2) iff π1 <T π′1 or π1 = π′1 and π2 <T π′2). If more than one relation hold between the same arguments,
the order inwhich they are evaluateddoes not have any semantic impact, sowe assume an arbitrary ordering
in that case.
Using the above order,we extend the definition of the interpretation f to include (CDU) labels, defining
for such a label π, f (π) denote the list of relations obtained from ordering the set {R(π′, π′′) ∣ π′′ ≺ π}8.
The language of SDRS formulae is the base level language extented with propositions R(π, π′) for
R ∈ R, π, π′ ∈ Π.The semantic content KSπ of a label π in S, is defined as a SRDS formula, as follows:
Definition 9 (Semantic content). Let S be an SDRS:
• For an EDU label l , KSl = f (l)
7Also, ⟨A, E ∪ O⟩ being acyclic imposes that a relation never links a label to one of his ancestors or descendants.
8The constraint π′′ ≺ π purposedly focus on the second argument π′′, in order to adequately capture discourse asides which
must be evaluated as part of the content of π.
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• For a CDU label, let f (π) = ⟨R1(π11, π12), . . . ,Rn(πn1 , πn2 )⟩ and define
KSπ = R1(π11, π12) ∧ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∧ Rn(πn1 , πn2 )
the dynamic conjunction of the coherence relations’ predicates in the scope of π.
In the following, when S is clear from context, we write Kπ instead of KSπ .
Now, it remains to define the semantics interpretation of relations. In SDRT, the full semantics of
relations is left underspecifiedbut for each relation,an expression of itsmain semantic consequences relative
to the content assigned to its argument labels is provided. Let then ΦR(π,π′) denote such (underspecified)
semantic constraints imposed by R over labels π and π′ in S. For a veridical relation R, the following definesR(π, π′):
x R(π, π′) x′ iff x (π ○ π′ ○ ΦR(π,π′)) x′. (Schema for veridical relations)
For left-only veridical relations, the term π′ is deleted in the formula above, and fornon-veridical relations,
this simply boils done to R(π, π′) = ΦR(π,π′).
From the above we see that interpretation of SDRS formulae, hence, that of the semantic content of
labels, is defined in a double recursion: for a SDRS formula χ = R(π, π′), χ depends on ΦR(π,π′) where
ΦR(π,π′) is assumed to be a SDRS formula itself computed from the contents of π and π′. Now, since the
contents of π and π′ involve only strictly lesser label w.r.t. ≺, and that ≺ is well founded by definition, the
correction of this doubly recursive definition follows.
Let us finally have a look into the semantic consequences of a few relations. We need to first precise the
base level langage, its models and states: following the tradition in relations’ semantics in SDRT, consider a
base level language with, at least, the expressivity of the DRT fragment presented in section 1.2. We provide
the semantics of the relations  , 	
,  and 	, to which
aim it will suffice to assume a base language with a conditional operator > in addition to standard dynamic
cunjunction and negation, a signature Σ involving at least binary predicates for (temporal) precedence and
inclusion of eventualities (resp. ⊏,⊆∈ Σ(2)), and models which are tuplesM = ⟨D,W ,∗, I(k)⟩ with D a
set of domain individuals,W a set of worlds, ∗ : W × ℘(W) ↦ ℘(W) a worlds selection function, and
Ik : Σ(k) × Dk ×W ↦ {⊺,
}.
The following statements are assumed to be theorems of the underlying logic and define (minimal)
semantic constraints for  , 	
,  and 	:
Definition 10 (Some semantic consequences).
Φ (π,π′) → (Kπ > K′π)
Φ	
(π,π′) → (eπ′ ⊆ eπ)
Φ(π,π′) → (Kπ ∨ Kπ′)
Φ	(π,π′) → (¬(eπ ⊏ eπ′) ∧ ¬Kπ′ > ¬Kπ)
In the above, we let eπ denote the “main” eventuality in the content of label π. The main eventuality of
an EDU label l is straightforwardly defined as the single eventuality introduced by the EDU, i.e. the single
event or state discourse referent introduced in the DRS Kl . For CDU labels, a recursive computation needs
defining. We do not however fully detail this, as it requires a close investigation into event semantics taking
us too far from our main concern. Let us simply assume that we can define for each type of relation how
the argument’s event and conditions thereon contribute to define a “sum” event, and that the main event
of a CDU label is a mereological compound of the event produced by the relations it contains9.
9The idea here is that, for instance,  	(π1 , π2) will produce a “sum” eventuality e on which the disjunction of
the condition holding on eπ1 and those holding on eπ2 must hold, whereas a veridical relation would typically define a main
eventuallity encompassing both eπ1 and eπ2 as subeventualities.
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Put in less formal terms,  (π, π′) simply requires that K′π ’s normally follows from Kπ .
	
(π, π′) imposes themain event of π′ to be part of themain event of π.  provides
a discourse-level relational version of dynamic disjunction. Finally, 	 requires two conditions
to be met: first, its first argument must not temporally precede its second, then a causal relation must hold
between the second (explanans) and the first argument (explanandum), here formalized as a counterfactual
claim “if the explanans would not obtain, then normally neither would the explanandum”.
2.3.4 The construction of SDRSs
We now know what SDRSs are and how they are semantically interpreted. The last thing that remains to
describe is the process of incrementally building an SDRS from an input text. However, the precise formal-
ization of the mechanisms involved in this process, unlike the logical forms and semantic interpretation
detailed so far, is not directly a main concern of the next sections and chapters. Indeed, in subsequent
sections, we will rely on SDRT’s model of update and inference of relations as it stands, without advocat-
ing major theoretical additions or dwelve far into the technical details of the mechanisms at stake. For
this reason, we adopt here a global and less formally detailed perspective than the one of two preceding
subsections.
As previously mentioned, SDRSs’ incremental construction ressorts to the glue logic. The glue logic
and associated language involve two components:
• A logical language Lglue for describing (underspecified) logical forms. Lglue represents underspeci-
fication at every level, from the lexicon to the level of discourse. A class of finite models is defined,
each of which includes a represensation of a (fully specified) SDRS. A (static) tarskian satisfaction
relation ⊧glue formalizes what it means for a model (hence, for a fully specified structure) to sat-
isfies constraints expressed in Lglue. Moreover, Lglue has the property that every formula imposes
an upper bound on the size of its minimal models (reflecting the finite number of distinct syntactic
constituents stemming from the grammar. For instance, a discourse with n EDUs, imposes exactly
n distinct EDU labels, and consequently no more than 2n CDU labels in each fully specified SDRS).
As a consequence satisfiability and decidability w.r.t. ⊧glue are decidable. Lglue can indeed be seen
as an essentially propositional (more accurately, involving skolem normal forms without function
symbols) modal10 language.
• A non-monotonic defeasible consequence ∣∼ , built on top of ⊧glue . This defeasible consequence
models the pragmatically prefered interpretations of a given underspecified representation. Tech-
nically, Lglue includes a modal conditional operator > representing defaults, and the set of formulae
φ such that T ∣∼ φ is defined using a saturation procedure consisting in, roughly, choosing a given
formula a such that T ⊧glue a > b for some b, then adding a formula a → c for every c such that
T ⊧glue a > c, and repeating this process while the result remains a ⊧glue consistent theory. This
yields a set of maximal extensions from which one can define T ∣∼ φ as equivalent to: φ is a con-
sequence of every maximal extension. See Asher and Morreau (1991); Asher and Mao (2000) for
details. ∣∼ can be prooved decidable as well.
The idea behind the language Lglue, is to describe parts of a logical form. To this aim variables of the
language are labels representing syntactic nodes of a logical form. Lglue can be thought of as derived from
the language of SDRS formulae, introducing a countable set of variable labels which includes discourse
labels, and associating every n-ary syntactic constructor c of the language of SDRS formulae11 with an
n + 1-ary predicate Pc of Lglue. Such a predicate applied to labels l1 . . . ln+1 expresses that the position ln+1
10due to the defeasible modal conditional >.
11this includes the DRS syntactic constructor which builds a DRS from variables and conditions.
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must represent a SDRS formula obtained applying the syntactic constructor c to the formulae at positions
l1, . . . , ln.
Consider as an example the discourse “[I won’t go out,]πa [a wolf is outside.]πb”. Let SW denote the
SDRS for this example and assume that the content of the top label of SW is  	(π1, π2) with
Kπ1 =
s
s : ¬ ◇ ee : Go_out(I) and Kπ2 =
x, s′
Wolf(x) ∧ s′ : Outside(x)
Now ⊆ s′ .
The content of π1 is fully described in Lglue by the following formula (∈ encodes the constructor used to
syntactically build the DRS’s universe):
χ1(π1) = DRS(l 1Vars, l1, π1)∧ ∈ (l0, l 1Vars) ∧ Ps(l0) ∧ P:(l0, l2, l1) ∧ P¬(l3, l2) ∧ P◇(l4, l3)∧DRS(l2Vars, l6, l4)∧ ∈ (l5, l2Vars) ∧ Pe(l5) ∧ P:(l5, l7, l6) ∧ Pgo_out(l8, l7) ∧ PI(l8).
The content of π2 is fully described by:
χ2(π2) = DRS(l ′Vars, l ′2, π2)∧ ∈ (l ′0, l ′Vars) ∧ Px(l ′0)∧ ∈ (l ′1 , l ′Vars) ∧ Ps′(l ′1) ∧ PWolf(l ′0, l ′2)∧ P:(l ′1 , l ′3, l ′2) ∧ POutside(l ′0, l ′3) ∧ P⊆(l ′4, l ′1 , l ′2) ∧ PNow(l ′4).
Finally,SW is characterized as the unique SDRS S such that S ⊧glue χ1(π1)∧χ2(π2)∧P 	(π1, π2, π⊺).
Using Lglue, the inference of relations is driven by axioms of the form:
?(α, β, γ) ∧ 
		 > R(α, β, γ).
The predicate ? offers a way to encode that α and β should be linked by some rhetorical relation as part
of the content of γ. Here α, β and γ are free label-variables implicitely universally quantified over, whereas
the πi and li in the representation of the previous example must be understood as constants (in fact both
result from the skolemisation of bounded variables: the first in the scope of a universal quantifier while
the second in the scope of an existential one). In practice, this means that when reasoning about a given
underspecified logical form χ, these axioms might be instanciated with each of the different tuples of label
constants in χ.
The 
		 can be anything expressible in the glue language. For instance, SDRT model the
inference of causal relations, by introducing a predicate CauseD into the glue language. CauseD(π, π1, π2)
holds if there is linguistic evidence in the context π (a CDU label outscoping both π1 and π2) that π1
and π2 are linked by a causal relation. Presence of such evidence, in other words, licence to infer CauseD,
is axiomatised using lexical information and/or world and linguistic knowledge encoded as sentences
of Lglue. For instance, the presence in π1 of a predicate indicating a change of location such as fall, in
cunjunction with a predicate describing a physical force initating motion, such as push, monotically entails
CauseD(π, π1, π2) for π1, π2 ≺ π. CauseD furnishes the basis for inferering  	:
?(α, β, γ) ∧CauseD(σ , α, β) >  	(α, β, γ). ((Simplified) rule for  	)
To handle the small example we introduced, it seems reasonable to assume part of world knowledge
that situations involving a wolf outside and situations of not going out are good candidate for a causal
relationship, something which can be accounted for assuming an Lglue axiom in the spirit of:
((Wolf(ν, μ) ∧Outside(ν, μ) ∧ ν ≺ α) ∧ (P¬(ν′, μ′) ∧ PGo_out(η, λ) ∧ λ ≺ μ′ ≺ β)) → CauseD(σ , α, β).
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Rules of inference need not necessary involve defaults. Coherence relations might also be lexicalized
by discourse markers such as because. The presence of because in a given discourse label triggers a solid,
non-cancellable inference to  	 (though the exact scope of the relation might still be subject
to pragmatic default reasoning).
The defeasible entailment is explicitely devised as to handle conflicting defaults by giving priority to the
most specific premises12. This provides the modeler with a modular way to write down and refine inference
rules for each relation without having to worry too much about their compatibility. For instance, SDRT
advocates that 
	 can be infered as a default relation, which, in the simplest approach, writes as:
?(α, β, γ) > 
	(α, β, γ). (default 
	)
The design of the default logic allows this rule to be used without further trouble in cunjunction with the
rule for  	 and the axiom 
	(α, β, γ) → ¬ 	(α, β, γ′) which transfers
the temporal incompatibility of 
	 and  	 into the glue language: if CauseD can be
inferred, the more specific antecedent for inferring  	 will get priority and 
	 will be
consequently blocked.
Before we conclude this section, let us briefly provide more details about the role played by the right
frontier in the construction of the logical form of discourse. The right frontier constrains both anaphora
resolution, and attachment sites for linking new discourse constituents to the context. These are indeed
two faces of the same coin: in both cases the problem is to find a referent (be it a discourse label, a event
referent, a point in time, or an individual) in the discourse universe, and in both cases available referents
must be found on the right frontier. Discourse referents available for attachment are those of the right
frontier, discourse referents available for anaphora resolution are those which are DRS-accessible in a label
of the right-frontier. In the glue language, anaphoric expressions are therefore modeled as introducing a
formula l = l1 ∨ l = l2 ∨ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∨ l = ln where l is a new label constant representing the anaphoric expression,
and the lis are previously introduced accessible labels of the same sort as l (event, individual, dicourse
labels, . . . ).
Wrapping up all of the above, the update process is summarized below: assuming that the current
context is a finite set of fully specified SDRS {S1, . . . , Sn}, and that {χ1, . . . , χn} denote their respective
description in Lglue.. Let πx be a new EDU to introduce to the discourse and χx(πx) be the formula
describing the content of πx .
SDRT update:
• For each Si , let avail_sites(Si) denote the set of pairs ⟨π, π′⟩ such that attaching πx to π in π′ respects
the right frontier constraint in Si . Let κxSi denote the formula encoding constraints on anaphora
resolution: κxSi imposes that each label corresponding to anaphoric expression in χx(πx)must be
equated with a label in χi , DRS-accessible in some discourse label on the right frontier. Define, finally
Si+?(π, πx , π′) as the set of fully specified S′ such that whenever χi ∧ χx(πx)∧κxSi∧?(π, pix , π′) ∣∼ φ,
we have S′ ⊧glue φ. S′ is thus the (possibly empty) set of fully specified SDRSs encompassing, at once,
the old information, the considered new attachment of πx , constraints on anaphora resolution, and
anything defeasibly inferable therefrom (in particular, inference of one or more coherence relations).
Define finally the update of S as the set of fully-specified SDRSs obtained as the result of sequentially
updating each of the Si with each of the available attachment sites in avail_sites(Si).
• SDRT assumes a last step in the construction of logical forms, where the set of fully-specified SDRSs
obtained through updating is filtered, retaining only those which maximize discourse coherence. The
12This comes as a direct consequence of the logic validating the specifity axiom a > c ∧ b > a ∧ b > ¬c ⊧glue a > ¬b
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Figure 2.3: SDRSs for examples (2.2.1) and (2.2.2)
(a) SDRS for example (2.2.1)
C1
π
C2
C3 C4
 
	

(b) SDRS for example (2.2.2)
C3
π
C1
π′
C2 C4
 
	

theory describes some general principles contributing to improve discourse coherence, such as the
number of coherence relations inferred, the number of anaphorical link resolved, or the quality of
infered scalar relations such as .
2.3.5 Examples
To conclude our introduction to SDRT, we briefly discuss the SDRSs for examples (2.2.1) and (2.2.2). The
structures are displayed on fig. 2.3. We represent SDRSs with the same graphical convention as before. To
stay consistent with our labeling choices in the segmentation of the examples, we keep Ci as the label of
the ith EDU. We use greek letters to label CDUs.
We wish to emphasize the following considerations relative to these examples:
• On fig. 2.3(a), the right scope of the  isC2 only,while the left scope of the 	

is C3 only. Now that we are familiar with the interpretation of SDRSs, we can appreciate how this
impacts semantic interpretation, and correlatively how placing both C2 and C3 in the scope of the
	
would differ: doing so would yield a weaker (and inaccurate) meaning representation
for this part of the discourse, implying the proposition that “if Canada output of crude oils weren’t
shrinking, then either C3 or C2 or the fact that C3 is a restatement of C2 would normally not hold”.
• In the RST Tree on fig. 2.1(a), the left subtree for the 	
 node, spans over C2 and C3.
Showing that semantic scopes are, to the least, not always directly readable from an RST Tree.
• The same kind of remark can be conducted regarding the relative scope of 	 and
  in example (2.2.2).
• Example (2.2.1) is arguably ambiguous between the structure on fig. 2.3(a) and a structure where
C3 is not a subconsitutent of π (semantically, a structure where the author endorse the restatment
instead of reporting it). As we have seen, this ambiguity can be accounted for in the glue language.
• In RST,   is a SN-relation (the matrix clause is a satellite) whereas in SDRT it is a
subordinating relation (NS-equivalent, the matrix clause dominate the reported speech). However,
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Hunter et al. (2006) shows how in the framework of SDRT an evidential, veridical reading is, in
many case, defeasably inferable. In such an evidential reading the matrix clause is subordinated to
the reported speech, which is, intuitively what RST’s   captures.
On another note, several corpora annotated in the framework of SDRT now exist. We mention here,
DISCOR (Baldridge et al., 2007), ANNODIS (Afantenos et al., 2012a) and STAC (Afantenos et al., 2012b),
which have supported important empirical investigations and the main parsing efforts lead in SDRT.These
3 corpora are constituted of discurvely annotated texts from, respectively, theWall Street Journal, the french
Est Republicain, and tchat conversations between players of an online version of Settlers of Catan.
2.4 Someother approaches:Dependency graphs,DiscourseDAGs,D-LTAG
We briefly discuss in this section some additional approaches to discourse structure. These approaches
arguably differ from SDRT and RST insofar as they are either computationnally driven, or relative to some
corpora and aim rather at capturing a certain class of structures fulfilling a given purpose than providing
an abstract theoretical account of the nature of discourse structure and of what exactly it expresses. We are
mostly intereseted in the constraints defining each adopted class of discourse structure, and will focus on
this aspect.
We already mentioned D-LTAG in the beginning of the present chapter. D-LTAG is a grammatical
formalism extending lexicalized tree adjoining grammars to discourse. Coherence relations in D-LTAG are
all lexicalizedby,either relaizedorunrealizeddiscoursemarkers.This togetherwith the rules of composition
in D-LTAG makes the set of finalized structures reducible to binary RST-Trees without nucleus-satellite
annotation.
We also consider Dependency Graphs (DGs). Muller et al. (2012) derive DGs from the SDRSs of the
ANNODIS corpus to get a reduced search space, simplifying automated discourse parsing. A DG is an
SDRS in which there are no CDUs and there is a unique arc between any two nodes, and which is is
projective13. Muller et al. (2012) provide a procedure ζ from SDRSs to DGs, which we slightly modify to
respect the Frontier Contraint that they use. ζ works in a bottom-up fashion replacing every CDU π that
is an argument of a rhetorical relation by the top-most, textually leftmost, immediate sub-constituent of
π which do not appear as the right argument of any relation in π. If this violates projectivity, the CDU is
instead removed by distributing relations over its internal consitutents, removing internal relations that
violates projectivity. To give a simple example (with a simplified notation, the content of CDU written in
square brackets): ζ(R([R′(a, [R′′(b, c)])], d)) = ζ(R([R′(a, b) ∧ R′′(b, c)], d)) = R(a, d) ∧ R′(a, b) ∧
R′′(b, c). Example (2.2.2) provides a more complicated example where a relation is distributed (and the
	
 deleted) to keep the result projective. Figure 2.4 depicts the trees for examples (2.2.1)
and (2.2.2). For these examples and the vast majority of cases, output structures are Dependency Trees
(DTs) i.e. they further verify that any node has at most one parent node (i.e. appears on the right of at most
one relation).
To obtain the DG depticted fig. 2.4(b), ζ is applied to the SDRS of fig. 2.3(b). By definition ζ always
produces projectiveDGs. In that particular case, replacing π with its “head”makes 	
(C2,C4)
cross  (C1,C3) therefore, ζ drops 	
(C2,C4) and distributes the 


over C2 and C4.
Another influential contribution on the structure of discourse, and the last wemention here, is brought
up byWolf andGibson (2005a). Wolf andGibson propose an empirically driven and corpus-based account.
They advocate generic graph structures which they use in building a corpus, the discourse Graphbank,
annotedwith such structures.Theyput forward a numberof examples that they argue cannot be represented
13i.e. which does not contain crossed dependencies . . . . . w.r.t. to the textual ordering of nodes
31
Chapter 2. Theories of discourse structure
Figure 2.4: DGs for examples (2.2.1) and (2.2.2)
(a) DG for example (2.2.1)
C1
C2
C3 C4
 
	


 
(b) DG for example (2.2.2)
C1
C2
C3
C4
 
 
as projective tree structures, mostly due to nodes linking via several relations to multiple nodes, or crossed
dependencies.
The set of structures used in the Graphbank corpus are very close in spirit to SDRSs, and might be
identifiedwith “relaxed” SDRSs which do notmandatorily respect the right frontier constraint (for instance,
a structure like . . . .
Rcoord Rcoord
might be encountered in Graphbank, allthough the right frontier
constraint forbids such usage of a coordinating relation Rcoord).
2.5 Questions raised
We have reviewed some of the main approaches to discourse structures, with a special focus on RST
and SDRT. While each formalism proposes a perspective of its own on the nature and interpretation
of coherence relations, some concerns (especially, regarding the semantic consequences of relations) are
shared. We have also seen that several corpora now exist annotated with such structures: RSTTB, Discor,
GraphBank14.
The question naturally arrises then, of how exactly these annotations compare, and consequently of
how corresponding theoretical views diverge and/or agree. A related problem is one of quantifying such
agreement or disagreement. We have discussed differences in structural constraints governing sets of
possible structures, but can we formalise all of these constraints within a common framework? Finally
and more importantly, can we compare those structures and translate from one formalism to another? For
instance, what kind of information should we extract from, e.g. an RST structure that is provided to us,
assuming we are interested in an application in the framework of SDRT? Such considerations constitute
the topic of the two following chapters.
14The Penn Discourse Treebank could also be considered as a corpus with partial dependency structures.
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3.1 Motivation: different scopes for different interpretations
3.1.1 Differences in the scope of relations
Let us start with a concrete look at inter-theoretical structural discrepancies, through a graphical summary
of the treatments of one of our running examples, example (2.2.2). Recall first that we focus here on
the comparison of structures, not on matching relations taxonomies. Hence the proposed methods are
designed to be independant of any specific set of relations. Translations between formalisms will work
as long as one applies them to structures involving relations from a single given set. Put another way, we
assume that a meaningful correspondance between relations is already achieved (e.g. on the basis of works
33
Chapter 3. Expressivity and comparison of discourse theories
Figure 3.1: Different structures for example (3.1.1)
(a) RST tree for example (3.1.1)
(intensional  )
 	

	
 	
C1
N
C2
S
S
C3
N
N
C4
S
(b) SDRS for example example (3.1.1)
C3
π
C1
π′
C2 C4

	
 	
			
(c) DG for example (3.1.1)
C1
C2
C3
C4

	
 	  	
like Sanders et al. (1992); Bateman and Rondhuis (1997); Benamara and Taboada (2015)), so that structures
to compare already agree on the set of coherence relations involved. Therefore, our examples rely on a
fixed set of relations involving  		,  	, 
	 and the like. We also assume,
for the sake of exposition, an intensional reading of 
	 in example (2.2.2). Consequently we
consider for this example an RST tree which departs slightly from the one provided in Egg and Redeker
(2010) andwhich is presented in fig. 2.1(b). In term of structures, this means that we use here 
	
as an NS relation, while fig. 2.1(b) implements 
	 as an SN relation, which is more classical
in RST. Accordingly, we assume an SDRS with an intensional 
	 as well, which is already the
structure provided in fig. 2.3(b). We leave it up to the interested reader to apply the necessary changes
to see how, in the following, the RST tree of fig. 2.1(b) and the suitably modified version of the SDRS
of fig. 2.3(b) implementing the evidential (SN , veridical) 
	 compare in our formalism. We
duplicate example (2.2.2) below into example (3.1.1) and the different structures and associated formalisms
are exposed on fig. 3.1.
(3.1.1)[“he was a very aggressive firefighter.]C1 [he loved the work he was in,"]C2 [said acting fire chief Lary
Garcia.]C3 . ["He couldn’t be bested in terms of his willingness and his ability to do something to help
you survive."]C4
RST provides a tree annotated with nuclearity features presented on fig. 3.1(a), which (s1) linearly
encodes. SDRT provides a different kind of structure visible on figure fig. 3.1(b), with equivalent linear
encoding in (s2). Dependency graphs (DGs) from Muller et al. (2012) give yet another representation,
depicted on fig. 3.1(c), encoded by (s3).
 	1(
	( 	2(C1N ,C2S)S ,C3N)N ,C4S) (s1)

	(C3, π) ∧ π : 	(C1, π1) ∧ π1 :			(C2,C4) (s2)
 	1(C1,C2) ∧ 
	(C1,C3) ∧  	2(C1,C4) (s3)
We thus see, in the illustrative example chosen and for the relation types they agree on, that different
annotation models and theoretical frameworks all represent a form of dominance, using an order relation
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over discourse constituents and/or relations instances, but invoke different numbers of relation instances
and assign them different arguments or different scopes, at least on the surface. This should not be much
of a surprise, since the kind of dominance that a given type of structure represents need not necessary be
purely semantically driven. Consequently, it is not mandatory that a structure transparently encodes the
sets of arguments that relations, taken as semantic objects, must have. It is the case, by choice of design, for
SDRT, but might differ for other theories. It seems unlikely however, that a salient notion of dominance
between discourse constituents leaves the actual semantic scope of relations completely unrestricted. In
other words, a structure of a given kind, even though it does not express a semantic representation per se,
should at least constrain the set of compatible semantic scope for relations.
For this reason, we develop in this chapter a method of comparison based on sets of admissible scopes
of relations in different types of structures. To this aim we define a central notion of interpretation into
a common formalism, applicable to different types of structures, and which formally specifies the set of
relations’ semantic scopes admissible with respect to a given structure of a given type and its informational
content. This theoretical work is important for furthering empirical research on discourse: discourse an-
notations are expensive. It behooves researchers to use as much data as they can, annotated in several
formalisms, while pursuing prediction or evaluation in their chosen theory. We provide a theoretical basis
to do this.
3.1.2 What do structures express?
Indeed, what a given structure expresses exactly is often not clear; some discourse theories are not com-
pletely formalized or lack a worked out semantics. Nevertheless, we have seen that, in all of them, rhetorical
relations have important semantic consequences.Theories like SDRT or later versions of the LDM (Polanyi
et al., 2004) adopt a conception of discourse structure as logical form. Discourse structures are like logical
formulae and relations function like logical operators on the meaning of their arguments. Hence their
exact scope has great semantic impact on a wide range of interpretative tasks in exactly the way the relative
scope of quantifiers makes a great semantic difference in first order logic (these interpretative tasks involve,
among others, recognizing of textual entailment, anaphora and ellipsis resolution, or the temporal, spatial
interpretation of texts). By concentrating on exactmeaning representations, however, the syntax-semantics
interface becomes quite complex: as happens with quantifiers at the intra sentential level, discourse rela-
tions might semantically require a scope that is, at least a priori, not determined by syntactic considerations
alone and violates surface order (see s2).
Other theories like Polanyi’s early version of the LDM (Polanyi, 1985; Polanyi and Scha, 1984) or D-
LTAG adopt a syntactic point of view, and RSTwith strongly constrained (tree-shaped) structures is subject
to parsing approaches (duVerle and Prendinger, 2009; Sagae, 2009; Subba and Di Eugenio, 2009) that
adhere to the syntactic approach in adopting decoding strategies of syntactic parsing. In such theories,
discourse structure representations, subject to syntactic constraints (e.g. dominance of spans of text one
over another) respect surface order but do not always and unproblematically yield a semantic interpretation
that fits intuitions. According to Marcu (1996), an RST tree is not by itself sufficient to generate desired
predictions; he employs the nuclearity principle, NP, as an additional interpretation principle on scopes of
relations.
We focus here onRST and SDRT,whichwe have introduced at length andboth counts several annotated
corpora. Other kind of structures such as Graphbank’s graphs, or D-LTAG trees are, in terms of structures
and their interpretation, very close in spirit to either RST Trees or SDRSs, and fit in our formalism as well.
We will also extensively consider the DG representations of discourse.
We will first introduce in section 3.2 a language for describing semantic scopes of relations that is
powerful enough to:
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1. compare the expressiveness (in terms of what different scopes can be expressed) of the different
formalisms considered;
2. give a formal target language that will provide comparable interpretations of the different structures
at stake
Section 3.3 discusses Marcu’s nuclearity principle and proposes an alternative way to interpret an RST tree
as a set of different possible scopes expressed in our language. Section 3.4.1 provides intertranslability results
between the different formalisms. Section 3.5 defines a measure of similarity over discourse structures of
different formalisms.
3.2 Describing the scope of relations
3.2.1 Language
We provide here a language expressive and general enough to express the structures of aforementioned
formalisms. All theories involve structures that one can describe using a list of rhetorical relations and their
arguments, provided two parameters are set: first, the nature of the arguments, second the set of constraints
that restrict the admissible lists of relations (including, e.g. right frontier, or requirement for tree structures).
SDRT for instance, regarding the first parameter, licences complex discours units as argument of relations
(e.g. π : Rsubord(b, c) ∧ Rsubord(a, π)), which finds a counterpart within RST Trees, where a relation may
directly appear as argument of another (R(aN ,R(bN , cS)S)) but not within dependency graphs.
To deal with the first parameter above, we remark that it suffices to list, for each instance of a discourse
relation, the set of elementary constituents that belong to its left and right scope in order to express every
kind of structure. We do this in a way that an isomorphic structure can always be recovered. Models of
our common language will consists in a list of relation instances and elementary constituents, together
with a set of predicates stating what is in the scope of what. As for the second point, we axiomatize each
constraint in our common language, thereby describing each type of discourse structures as a theory of
the language.
Formally, our scope language Lscoping is a fragment of that of monadic second order logic with two
sorts of individuals: relation instances (i), and elementary constituants (l). Below, we assume thatR is the
set of all relation names ( 	, 
	, 	, . . . ).
Definition 11 (Scoping language). Let S be the two-elements set {i, l}. The set of primitive, disjoint types
of Lscoping consists of i, l and t (type of formulae). For each of the types in S, we have a countable set of
variable symbols Vi (Vl ). Two additional countable sets of variable symbols V⟨i,t⟩ and V⟨l ,t⟩ range over sets
of individuals. These four sets of variable symbols are pairwise disjoint.
The alphabet of our language is constituted by Vi , Vs, a set of predicates, equality, connector and quan-
tifier symbols. The set of predicate symbols is as follows:
• For each relation symbol r inR, LR is a unary predicate of type ⟨i, t⟩—we write LR :⟨i, t⟩ .
• unary predicates, sub, coord and sub−1 :⟨i, t⟩.
• binary predicates ∈⋅∣ and ∈∣⋅:⟨l , i, t⟩.
• two equality relations, =s :⟨s, s, t⟩ for s ∈ {i, l}.
Logical connectors, and quantifiers are as usual:
• ∧,∨,→ of type ⟨t, t, t⟩, ¬ of type ⟨t, t⟩
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• For each type s ∈ {i, l}, for each variable x ∈ Vs, ∀x : s and ∃x : s of type ⟨t, t⟩.
• For each type s ∈ {i, l}, for each set variable symbol X ∈ V⟨s,t⟩, ∀X : ⟨s, t⟩ and ∃X : ⟨s, t⟩ are of type⟨t, t⟩.
The sets Γτ of well-formed terms of type τ are defined, as follows:
• variables, or logical constants of type τ are in Γτ .
• For each symbol σ of type ⟨τ1, . . . , τn⟩ in the alphabet, for all (t1, . . . , tn−1) ∈ Γτ1×⋅ ⋅ ⋅×Γτn−1 ,σ[t1, . . . , tn−1] ∈
Γτn .
Γt is the set of well formed formulae of the scope language.
The predicates ∈⋅∣ and ∈∣⋅ take a relation instance r of type i and a elementary constituent x of type l as
arguments. Intuitively, theymean that x has to be included in the left (for ∈⋅∣) or right (for ∈∣⋅) scope of r. For
each relation symbolR such as  	
 or		
, the predicate LR takes a relation instance
r has argument and states that r is an instance of the rhetorical relation R. Predicates sub, coord and sub−1
apply to a relation instance r, respectively specifying that r’s left argument hierarchically dominate its right
argument, that both are of equal hierarchical importance, or that the left one is subordinate to the right
one.
Definition 12 (Scoping structure and Interpretation). A scoping structure is an Lscoping-structure i.e. a
tupleM= ⟨Di ,Dl , ∣.∣M⟩ where Di and Dl are disjoint sets of individuals for the sorts i and l respectively.∣.∣M assigns to each predicate symbol P of type ⟨τ1, . . . , τn, t⟩ a function ∣P∣M : Dτ1 × ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ × Dτn ↦ {0, 1}.
Variables of type ⟨i, t⟩ are assigned (characteristic functions of ) subsets of Di and similarly variables of
type ⟨l , t⟩ are assigned a subsets of Dl . The predicates =i and =s are interpreted as equality over Di and Dl
respectively.
The interpretation ⋅Mv of a formula φ ∈ ΦS is the standard (i.e.with “full” semantics) interpretation of
a monadic second order formula w.r.t. to a model and a valuation (interpretation of first order quantifiers
and connectors is as usual, quantification over sets is over all sets of individuals). Validity ⊧ also follows
the standard definition.
These scoping structures offer a common framework for different discourse formalisms. We first show
how to encode SDRT, RST and DGs as scoping structures, and then how to use the scoping language to
axiomatise each of the 3 formalisms constituting our main interest.
3.2.2 Encoding to and decoding from scoping structures
We first proceed to encode SDRT, RST and DGs as scoping structure, and the other way around:
Fact 1. For each of the tree type of structures T ∈ {SDRT,RST,DG}, one can define a pair of algorithms⟨IT , ET⟩ such that:
• From a given structure s of the theory T , IT computes a scoping structure s′ = IT(s).
• Given such a computed structure s′, ET(s′) retrieves the original structure s, i.e. ET(IT(s)) = s.
• Conversely, for each scoping structure s′ such that a call to ET(s′) is successful and ET(s′) = s we
have IT(ET(s′)) = s′.
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To flesh out IT and ET for the different theories, we need to define dominance between relation in-
stances. Given a scoping structureM, set L_Args(r) = {e ∈ Dl ∣ (e, r) ∈ ∣ ∈⋅∣ ∣M} (the set of edus in the left
scope of r); define R_Args(r) analogously (replacing ∈⋅∣ with ∈∣⋅). Let Args(r) ≜ L_Args(r) ∪ R_Args(r).
Left and right dominance for relations, ⊏⋅∣ and ⊏∣⋅, are defined as follows:
r ⊏⋅∣ r′ iff Args(r) ⊆ L_Args(r′)
r ⊏∣⋅ r′ iff Args(r) ⊆ R_Args(r′)
Dominance ⊏ is the disjunction of the two above relations: ⊏=⊏⋅∣ ∪ ⊏∣⋅. Note that these are all axiomatizable
in the scoping language:
r ⊏⋅∣ r′ ≡ ∀z : l ((z ∈⋅∣ r ∨ z ∈∣⋅ r) → z ∈⋅∣ r′) with ⊏∣⋅ axiomatized analogously.
L_Args(r,X) ≡ ∀z : l (z ∈⋅∣ r↔z ∈ X) with R_Args(r,X) similar
Args(r,X) ≡ ∀z : l ((z ∈⋅∣ r ∨ z ∈∣⋅ r) ↔ z ∈ X).
RST Encoding IRST The NS, NN and SN relation types of RST will be respectively encoded by the pred-
icates sub, coord and sub−1. We proceed recursively. If t is an EDU e, return Mt = ⟨Di = ∅,Dl = {e}, є⟩
where є is the interpretation that assigns the empty set to each predicate symbol. If the root of t is a binary
node instantiating a relation R(t1a1 , t2a2), let Hr ∈ {sub, coord, sub−1} be the predicate that encodes the
nuclearity type a1a2. Let Mt1 = ⟨D1i ,D1l , ∣.∣1⟩ and Mt2 = ⟨D2i ,D2l , ∣.∣2⟩ be the scoping structures returned by
the alogithm for t1 and t2 respectively.The algorithm returnsMt = ⟨D1i ∪D2i ∪{r},D1l ∪D2l , ∣.∣Mt ⟩where r is
a ’fresh’ relation instance variable not in D1i or D
2
i , and ∣.∣Mt is updated in the appropriate fashion to reflect
the left and right arguments of r and ensure that Hr and LR are the one and only type and label predicate
that r satisfies. Finally, if the root of t is an acyclic graph ⟨V , E⟩ where E has more than one relation (RST
schema 3 or 4), for each Ri(t1i , t2i ) ∈ E, retrieve the N/S annotation a1, a2 for t1i and t2i in V , then proceed
as above to recursively compute the scoping-structuresMi encoding the relation (taking care to introduce
a ’fresh’ relation instance ri into the model for each relation in E). Finally return the merge of the models
Mi .
RST Decoding ERST Given a finite scoping structureM = ⟨Di ,Dl , ∣.∣M⟩, for each relation instance r
compute the left arguments of r and its right arguments.Then identify Label(r), the unique relation symbol
R such that r ∈ ∣LR ∣M. If that fails, the algorithm fails. Similarly retrieve the right nuclearity schema from
the adequate predicate that applies to r. If Di = ∅ and the structure is a single EDU e, returns e. Otherwise
compute the dominance relations for r. IfM = IRST(t) for some RST Tree t then there is at least one
maximal relation instance for the dominance relation. If t the root node of t is a binary node (schema 1 or
2), there is exactly one maximal element in the dominance relation. If there is none, then we return fail.
1. If there is exactly one, call it rtop, recursively compute the two RST Trees t1 and t2 for the argument
spans of rtop by applying the alogrithm to the restriction ofM to the set of relation instances in Di
that are, respectively, left- and right-dominated by rtop. Then use the spans of t1, t2 and the nuclearity
information and label for rtop to reconstruct the root node from the two recursively computed
subtrees and return the result.
2. If there are k maximal relations, the root node of the encoded RST Tree must result from a schema 3
or 4 and be a directed acyclic graph V = ⟨t0a0 , . . . , tnan⟩, E = {Ri(tki , tli) ∣ 0 ≤ i ≤ k}. Each relation
instance ri maximal for dominance must encode one of the relation in E, so restrict Di to ri and the
relations it dominates, then proceed exactly as in 1. to retrieve ri ’s label (Ri), nuclearity, argument
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spans and their substructures. Once this is done, if no failure has been encountered, reconstruct, if the
retrieved cardinality, nuclearity and argument spans of the relations matches, the schema application
for the root node and returns it. Otherwise, the root node does not result from the application of a
valid RST schema and the algorithm fails.
SDRT Encoding and Decoding, ISDRT, ESDRT: Encoding and decoding for SDRT is quite similar to the
case of RST, so we sketch it with less details: the idea is once again to rely on the recursivity of the input
structure.
The encoding is rather simple, it amounts to list for each relation in the input SDRS the set of elementary
units that it scopes over, then encode this and the relation’s label and subordinating/coordinating type into
the interpreation of the adequate predicates. For instance, we can proceed top down as we dit for RST: A
SDRS s can be seen as a complex constituent πtop that contents a graph g = ⟨V , E⟩whose edges are relations
holding between sub-constituents, simple or complex as well. First come up with an encoding of the set
E of all edges that hold between two sub-constituents of s, i.e. a structureM = ⟨Di = Ei ,Dl = V , ∣ ⋅ ∣M⟩
where the following holds: for each edge e ∈ Ei , e ∈ ∣LR ∣M and e ∉ ∣LR′ ∣M for R ≠ R′, this encodes the
label of e. Similarly one and only one predicate among sub and coord holds of e. Finally, ∣ ∈⋅∣ ∣M and∣ ∈∣⋅ ∣M consists of all the pairs (x, e) of left and right nodes x of the edges e ∈ E. Then, for each complex
immediate sub-constituent of s in Dl , updateM as follows: for c such a subconsituent, recursively compute
its encodingMc , then add everything ofMc toM, finally remove c fromM but add instead for each relation
r scoping over c to the right (left), all the pairs {(x, r) ∣ x is a constituent in Mc}.
The crucial point behind the decoding is, as in the RST case, to retrieve the hierarchical structure using
only the set of elementary units over which relations scope, which is what the scoping structure informs
us about. Again, computing dominance between relations does the trick. The relations which are maximal
for dominance must form the content of the top-label, which can thus be retrieved. The recursive steps
(i.e. successively moving to inner constituents) are achieved by restricting the domain of relation instances
Di to the left or right dominated relations of each of the maximal relations.
DG: Dependency graphs are syntactically a special case of SDRSs; there is only one CDU whose domain
is only EDUs.
So farwe have not really used the scoping language,only scoping structures as a pivot formalism.We can
for instance imagin encoding an SDRS into a scoping structure and decode it into an RST Tree. Of course
thismight fail if the input SDRS fails tomeet the structural requirements ofRSTTrees. As a consequence our
decoding algorithms implements partial functions. Indeed only those structures obtainable from encoding
an RST tree will yield an RSTTree when fed to the RST decoding algorithm. One can then wonderwhat this
set of structures exactly is. The next subsection provides an answer to this question, which also constitutes
our first use of the scoping language.
3.2.3 Structural constraints axiomatized
The scoping language allows us to axiomatize the three classes of scoping structures corresponding to
RST Trees, SDRSs and DGs. As not all scoping structures obey these axioms, our language is strictly more
expressive than any of these discourse formalisms.
As a first example of an axiom, the following formula expresses that a relation cannot have both left
and right scope over the same elementary constituent:
Strong Irreflexivity:
∀r : i∀x : l ¬(x ∈⋅∣ r ∧ x ∈∣⋅ r) (A0)
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Strong irreflexivity entails irreflexivity; a given relation instance cannot have the same (complete) left and
right scopes. All discourse theories validate A0.
Below, we define axioms (A1-A9) that axiomatize the structures corresponding to RST, SDRT and DGs.
Axiom A1 says that every discourse unit is linked via some discourse relation instance. Axiom A2 insures
that all our relation instances have the right number of arguments; Axioms A3 and A4 ensure acyclicity
and no crossing dependencies. A5a and A5b restrict structures to a tree-like dominance relation with a
maximal dominating element, while A6 defines the Right Frontier constraint for SDRT, and A7 fixes the
domain for SDRT constraints on CDUs. A8 ensures that no coordinating and subordinating relations have
the same left and right arguments, while A9 provide the restrictions needed to define the set of DGs:
We need to write down some elementary definitions in the scoping language before we axiomatize the
different constraints: we first introduce scope(r, x) as a shortcut for x ∈⋅∣ r ∨ x ∈∣⋅ r. We assume that we
have access to the textual order of EDUs as a strict linear ordering <t :⟨l , l , t⟩ over EDUs. We also appeal
to the notion of a chain of relations instances forming a structure x1 →r1 x2 →r2 . . . →rn xn with arguments
x1 . . . xn constituted only of EDUs in X. We write this as Chain(R,X) for a set of relations R and a set of
EDUs X. Chain(R,X) can be expressed in MSO and we provide below a possible expression. The first
line states that every relations in R scopes over a subset of X, the second that, for all but a single relation
r ∈ R (the leftmost one), any relation r′ ∈ Rmust have a left scope which equals15 the right scope of another
relation of R. We do not impose irreflexivity nor acyclicity, as it the purpose of A0 and A3 respectively.
(∀r : i, x : l (r ∈ R ∧ scope(r, x)) → x ∈ X)∧
∃r : i (r ∈ R ∧ ∀r′ : i (r′ ∈ R ∧ r′ ≠ r) → ∃r′′ : i (r′′ ∈ R ∧ ∀X′ :⟨l , t⟩ R_Args(r′,X) ↔ L_Args(r′′,X)))
To handle RST relations with multiple satellites, we define a nest: Nest(X,R) iff all r ∈ R have the same left
argument in X but take different right arguments in X. Finally, we define CDUs, conforming the definition
of SDRS, we define a predicate EDU testing whether a set of constituent is as singleton and a predicate
CDU testing whether a set of elementary constituents is fed as an argument to some relation, and closed
for incoming relations:
EDU(X) ≡ ∃!x : l x ∈ X
CDU(X,R) ≡ ∃r : i (L_Args(r,X) ∨ R_Args(r,X)) ∧ ∀r′ : i ((∀x : l (x ∈∣⋅ r′ → x ∈ X)) → r′ ∈ R)
Thedefinition forCDUdoes not include the top label, but it is dispensable to the expression of the structural
axioms which follow.
Axiomatization
∀x : l∃r : i (x ∈⋅∣ r ∨ x ∈∣⋅ r) (A1:Weak Connectedness)∀r : i∃x, y : l (x ∈∣⋅ r ∧ y ∈⋅∣ r) (A2 :Properness of the relation)∀X :⟨l , t⟩ (X ≠ ∅ → ∃y : l y ∈ X ∧ ∀r : i ((∀z : l scope(r, z) → z ∈ X) → ¬y ∈⋅∣ r))
(A3 :Acyclicity or Well Foundedness)
No crossing dependencies using the textual order <t of EDUs:
∀x, y, z,w : l (x <t y <t z <t w) →
∀r, r′ : i ((x ∈⋅∣ r ∧ z ∈∣⋅ r ∧ y ∈⋅∣ r′ ∧w ∈∣⋅ r′) → (r′ ⊏∣⋅ r ∨ r ⊏⋅∣ r′)) . (A4)
15The “equality” relation on sets used here can be expressed in the language as reciprocal inclusion. ZFC axiom of extensionality
ensures then that this relation is indeed interpreted as equality on sets of individuals.
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RST tree structures:
RST “treeness” is a little tricky to axiomatize (again due to schema 3 and 4), we will follow the same lead
that lies behind ERST : the idea is that the set of relations maximal for dominance gives us the internal
structure of the “root” node of the tree, and must therefore instantiate a schema. Each of these relations r
introduces two children nodes (one on the left and one on the right), the internal structure of which, again,
is provided by the set of relations maximal within all relations left, or right dominated by r, according to
the position of the considered children node w.r.t. r. These relations must in turn instanciate a schema, and
so forth moving to lower-level nodes. To express this, we use quantification over sets to retrieve all “nodes”
and internal topmost relations in the previous sense, i.e. either the set of relations maximal for dominance,
or sets of relations maximal for dominance relative to left or right dominance by some given parent
relation. Then we impose that these set of relations instanciate schemas. We use the following predicates:
node(X,R) ≡(EDU(X) ∧ R = ∅) ∨ (∀x : l x ∈ X ∧ ∀r : i r ∈ R↔ ¬∃r′ : i r ⊏ r′)
∨((∀x : l , r : i (r ∈ R ∧ scope(r, x)) → x ∈ X)∧
⋁
dominated∈{⊏⋅∣,⊏∣⋅}∃r0 : i (∀r : i r ∈ R↔ r dominated r0 ∧ ¬∃r
′ : i (r′ ⊏ r0 ∧ r ⊏ r′)))
and two predicates Schema3(X,R) and Schema4(X,R) telling us whether the set of relations instances R
results from the application of a RST schema of type 3 or 4 to X. These predicates can be axiomatised in
MSO, however their exact content depends on the set of schemas of type 3 and 4 which we have not fully
specified. We thus describe the general form this predicates might take:
Schema3(X,R) ≡ Chain(X,R) ∧ ∀r : i (r ∈ R → coord(r)) ∧ ⋁
R∈{  }
∀r : i (r ∈ R → LR(r))
Schema4(X,R) ≡ Nest(X,R) ∧ (∃r1 : i, r2 : i (∀r : i (r ∈ R → (r = r1 ∨ r = r2))
∧ sub−1(r1) ∧ sub(r2) ∧ L	

(r1) ∧ L(r2)))
∨ . . .
The condition ensuring RST tree-like structures are below16:
∀R :⟨i, t⟩,X :⟨l , t⟩ node(X,R) → (EDU(X) ∨ (∃!r : i r ∈ R) ∨ Schema3(X,R) ∨ Schema4(X,R)) (A5a)
Binary RST Trees are axiomatized by taking the same axiom and assuming further that Schema3,4 ≡ 
.
In this case, the axioms simply says that
a) there is a unique maximal relation (the root node) and
b) every relation has a unique maximal left descendant and a unique maximal right descendant.
Moreover, assuming strong irreflexivity (A0) and well foundedness (A3) (or finite structures), this entails
existence of a unique parent relation for dominance17:
∀X :⟨l , t⟩ ((EDU(X) → ∃!r : i (L_Args(r, X) ∨ R_Args(r, X)))∧ (3.1)
∀r : i (Args(r,X) → ∃!r′ : i (L_Args(r′,X) ∨ R_Args(r′,X)))). (A5b)
16Notice that existence of a root node spanning over every elementary edus follows from A1 (weak connectedness)
17Assume no type 3 or 4 schemas and a node r0 with two ancestors incomparable for dominance, r and r′. Using A5a, we can
show that their must be a relation s0 dominating both r and r′. Either there is a relation s ⊏ s0 which “separates” r from r′, i.e.
r ⊏⋅∣ s and r
′ ⊏∣⋅ s (or the other way around), or r and r
′ must both be maximal for dominance relative to the scope of some
relation dominated by s0. In the latter case, using A5a again, we get another majorant s1 between r-r′ and s0. Iterating the process
show that there must exist a separating relation s: otherwise we could construct an infinite decreasing sequence s0, s1 , . . . of
distinct relations. But then s violates strong irreflexivity since by definition r and r′ both scope over the arguments of r0.
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Hence we recover binary RST Trees.
Right Frontier:
recall that the right frontier constraint formally expresses that any DU C (elementary or complex) attaches
only to elements of the right frontier of the sub-SDRS formed by elements preceding C in textual order.
In order to write this in the scoping language, we need to express the restriction to textually preceding
elements: let C :⟨l , t⟩ denote a set of EDUs, we overload <t with the type ⟨l , ⟨l , t⟩, t⟩ defining x <t C as “x
textually precedes every units of C”. We then define accessibily for attachment in the SDRS restricted to
constituents in X. Let last(x,X) hold iff x is the last element of X in textual order.
Acc(C,X) ≡ ∃a : l (a ∈ C ∧ ∃R :⟨i, t⟩ (Chain(R,X) ∧ ∀r : i (r ∈ R → sub(r))
∧ ∃r′ : i r′ ∈ R ∧ scope(r′, a)
∧ ∃x : l , r′′ : i (r′′ ∈ R ∧ scope(r, x) ∧ last(x))))
this can be glossed as “C is accessible in X iffC contains an EDU a such that there is a chain of subordinating
relations in X linking a and the last EDU of X in textual order. From there, the right frontier constraint
simply asks that every DU or EDU links to an accessible constituant in the approriately restricted SDRS.
To quantify over DUs here, it suffices to quantify over subsets of the set of EDUs which constitute the right
scope of some relation:
∀C :⟨l , t⟩∀r : i (R_Args(r,C) (3.2)
→ (∀X :⟨l , t⟩, L :⟨l , t⟩ ((∀x : l x <t C ↔ x ∈ X) ∧ L_Args(r, L))
→ Acc(L,X)))
(A6: Right Frontier Constraint)
CDUs or EDUs and no overlapping CDUs:
∀r : i,X :⟨l , t⟩ (X = {L,R}_Args(r) → (EDU(X) ∨ ∃R :⟨i, t⟩ CDU(X,R)))∧
∀X :⟨l , t⟩,Y :⟨l , t⟩,R :⟨i, t⟩,R′ :⟨i, t⟩ (CDU(X,R) ∧ CDU(Y ,R′) → (R ∩ R′ ≠ ∅ → (R ⊆ R′ ∨ R′ ⊆ R)))
(A7)
The same arguments cannot be linked by subordinating and coordinating relations.The formal axiom (A8)
is trivial.
DGs:
Finally, two axioms for restricting SDRSs to dependency graphs:
∀r : i, x : l , y : l ((x ∈⋅∣ r) ∧ y ∈⋅∣ r)) ∨ (x ∈∣⋅ r) ∧ y ∈∣⋅ r))) → x = y (A9a:No CDUs.)
∀r : i, r′ : i,X :⟨l , t⟩,Y :⟨l , t⟩ (L_Args(r,X) ∧ R_Args(r,Y) ∧ L_Args(r′,X) ∧ R_Args(r′,Y)) → r = r′
(A9b :unique arc)
We note that as a consequence of A4, A5a and A5b we have no discourse aside or non-contiguous span:
∀x : l , y : l , r : i (x ∈⋅∣ r ∧ y ∈⋅∣ r ∧ x ≠ y)→ ¬∃r′ : i, z : l (x ∈⋅∣ r′ ∧ z ∈∣⋅ r′ ∧ ¬(z ∈⋅∣ r ∨ z ∈∣⋅ r))
We also note that A5a and A5b entail A7, A8 and A9b, though not vice-versa.
Using the above axioms, one can show:
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Fact 2.
1. The theory T(bin−)RST={A0,A1,A2,A3,A4,A5a, (A5b),A8} characterizes (binary) RST trees in the
sense that:
• ERST applied to any structure M such that M ⊧ T(bin−)RST yield an (binary) RST Tree.
• for any RST Tree t, IRST(t) ⊧ TRST .
2. The theory TSDRT={A0,A1,A2,A3,A6,A7,A8} similarly characterizes SDRSs.
3. The theory TDG=TSDRT ∪ {A9a,A9b} similarly characterizes DGs.
3.3 Immediate vs. mediated intepretation
The previous section defined the set of scope structures as well as the means to import, and then retrieve,
RST trees, DGs, or SDRSs into, and from, this set. Some of these scope structures export both into RST
and SDRT, yielding a 1 to 1 correspondence between a subset of SDRT and RST structures. Moreover, this
correspondence is “meaningful”: intuitively, it captures more than just any computable bijection between
the two countable set of structures would. What, then, does it precisely capture? In mathematics, an iso-
morphism is a special kind of bijection that preserves structural operations or properties; as we shall see,
our correspondence preserves the immediate interpretation of relations’ scope.
3.3.1 Immediate Interpretation
Consider a scope structureM (validating A0,A1,A2). Whether a relation instance r, labeled by relation
name R holds between two discourse units inM depends on the semantic content of its left and right
arguments. These are recursively described by L_Args(r), all relations r′ such that r′ ⊏⋅∣ r, R_Args(r)
and all relations r′ such that r′ ⊏∣⋅ r. Algorithm IT computes what we call the immediate interpretation of
an input structure. Intuitively, in this interpretation the semantic scope of relations is directly read from
the structure itself; a node R(t1, t2) in a RST Tree expresses that R holds between contents expressed by
the whole substructures t1 and t2. Similarly, for SDRT and DGs, the immediate interpretation of an edge
π1 →R π2 is that R holds between the whole content of π1 and π2.
Definition 13 (Immediate interpration). For an SDRS (resp. DG,RST Tree) s, the immediate interpretation
of s is the scoping structure si = ISDRT(resp. DG,RST)(s). In the case of SDRT, this interpretation is standard
and we simply write s = si .
While this immediate interpretation is standard in SDRT, it is not in RST. Consider again example (3.1.1)
from the introduction or:
(3.3.1)[In 1988, Kidder eked out a $ 46 million profit,]C31 [mainly because of severe cost cutting.]C32 [Its
1,400-member brokerage operation reported an estimated $ 5 million loss last year,]C33 [although
Kidder expects to turn a profit this year]C34 (RST Treebank, wsj_0604).
(3.3.2)[Suzanne Sequin passed away Saturday at the communal hospital of Bar-le-Duc,]C3 [where she had
been admitted a month ago.]C4 [. . .] [Her funeral will be held today at 10h30 at the church of Saint-
Etienne of Bar-le-Duc.]C5 (Annodis corpus, translated).
These examples involve what are called long distance attachments. Example (3.3.1) involves a relation of
 , or  	
 between C31 and C33 but which does not involve the contribution of C32 (the
costs cutting of 1988). Example (3.3.2) displays something comparable. A causal relation like , or
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at least a temporal   holds between C3 and C5, but it should not scope over C4 if one does not
wish to make Sequin’s admission to the hospital a month ago a consequence of her death last Saturday.
Finally in example (2.2.2) C4 elaborates on C1, but not on the fact that C1 is attributed to chief Garcia, so
the corresponding elaboration relation should not scope over C3.
It is impossible however, to account for long distance attachments using the immediate interpretation
of RST trees. Example (3.3.1), for instance, also involves an explanation relation between C31 and C32, which
should include none of C33 or C34 in its scope. Since C31 is in the scope of both the explanation and the
contrast relation,Axiom A5a of the previous subsection entails than an RST tree involving the two relations
has to make one of the two relations dominates the other.
3.3.2 Nuclearity Principle(s)
Marcu’s Nuclearity Principle (NP, Marcu, 1996) provides an alternative to the immediate interpretation
and captures some long distance attachments (Danlos, 2008; Egg and Redeker, 2010). According to the
NP, a relation between two spans of text, expressed at a node of a RST Tree should hold between the most
salient parts of these spans.Most salient part is recursively defined: the most salient part of an elementary
constituent is itself, for amultinuclear schemaR(t1N , t2N) . . . R(tk−1N , tkN) itsmost salient part is the union
of the most salient parts of the ti 18. Following Egg and Redeker (2010), the NP, or weak NP is a constraint
on which RST trees may correctly characterize an input text; it is not a mechanism for computing scopes.
Given their analysis of example (2.2.2) reported in the introduction, NP entails that 	
1 holds
between C1 and C4, accounting for the long distance attachment, and that 
 holds between
C1 and C4 which meets intuition in this case. There is however no requirement that 
 do not
hold between the wider span [C1,C2] and C3, as there is no requirement that 	
1 does not hold
between [C1,C2,C3] and C4. In order to accurately account for example (2.2.2), the former must be true
and the latter false.
However, this interpretation of NP together with an RST tree does not determine the semantic scope
of all relations. Danlos (2008) reformulates NP as a Mixed Nuclearity Principle (MNP) that outputs de-
terminate scopes for a given structure. The MNP requires for a given node, that the most salient parts of
his daughters furnish the exact semantic scope for the relation at that node. The MNP transforms an RST
tree t into a scope structureMt , which validates A0 − A3 but also A6.19, A7 and A8. HenceM could be
exported back to SDRT and the MNP would yield a translation from RST-trees to SDRSs.
But when applied to the RST Treebank, the MNP yields wrong, or at least incomplete, semantic scopes
for intuitively correct RST Trees. The mixed principle applied to the tree of (s1) gives the 

scope over C1 only, but not C2, which is incorrect. Focusing on the attribution relation which is the second
most frequent in the RST Treebank, we find out that, regardless of whether we assign 
’s argu-
ments S andN orN and S, this principle makes wrong predictions 86 of the time in a random sampling of
50 cases in which we have attributions with multi-clause second argument spans. Consider example (2.2.1)
again.
Applied to the annotated RST Tree for this example (fig. 2.1(a)), the MNP yields an incorrect scope of
the attribution relation over C2 only, regardless of whether the attribution is annotated N-S or S-N .
The idea behind the weak NP provides a better fit with intuitions. The principle givesminimal seman-
tic requirements for scoping relations; everything beyond those requirements is left underspecified. We
formalize this as the relaxed Nuclearity Principle (RNP), which does not compute one structure where
each relation is given its exact scope, but a set of such structures.
18Except for   which only retains the most salient part of tk
19That A6 is valid in the resulting model is not immediate. Assume a multinuclear (coordinating) relation instance r has scope
over xn and xn+k later in the textual order. Then it is impossible to attach with r′ a later found constituent xn+k+l to xn alone, for
it would require that xn+1 escapes the scope of r′ from the MNP which it will not do by multinuclearity of r.
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The target structures are not trees any more, but we want them to still reflect the hierarchical infor-
mation present in the RST Tree. We therefore define a notion of weak dominance over structures of the
scoping language: for two sets of constituents, Y weakly dominate X, written X ⊴ Y , iff X ⊆ Y or there is a
relation subordinating X to Y . Weak dominance is given by transitive closure ⊴∗ of ⊴. For two relations,
r′ ⊴⋅∣ r iff the left argument of r weakly dominates both arguments of r′. ⊴∣⋅ is symmetrically defined. Recall
now that the immediate interpretation of an RST Tree t simply consists in reading semantic scopes directly
from the tree-descendance in t, i.e. transforming left or right descendance in t into left or right-dominance⊏⋅∣ , ⊏∣⋅ in a scoping structure. The idea behind the RNP can be formulated analogously, but this time, left
and right tree descendance are respectively interpreted into left and right weak dominance in a scoping
structure. Unlike the strong dominance constraints stemming from the immediate interpretation, the weak
dominance ones are generaly realized in more than a single scoping structure. Still, the set of all structures
s such that there exists an RST tree t admitting s as a member of its RNP interpretation can be axiomatized
as well: one has to replace A5a with a weakened version. To this aim the predicate node used in A5a’s
formulation must be adapted to use weak dominance instead of strong dominance, and every node in that
sense must either be an EDU, have a maximal relation for weak dominance, or conform to the weakened
version of schema 3 or 4 (where Chains and Nests are tested only relative to relations nuclei). We let AW5
denote this weakened version of A5a. The RNP interpretations maps any RST Tree t to a set of structure
verifying A0,A1,A2,A3,A4,AW5 . Below, we formally define this RNP mapping:
Definition 14 (RelaxedNuclearity Principle). We assign to an RSTTree t a formula of the scoping language
φt = ∃x¯∃r¯ ψt ∪ Γt such that:
1. x¯ consists is a set of variable of type l , one for each EDU in t. r¯ consists is a set of variable of type i,
one for each relation instance in t.
2. ψt is a formula specifying that all individuals quantified in x¯ and r¯ are pairwise distinct, and that
there is no other individuals that the ones just mentioned. ψt also specifies for each node n of t, the
relations R1n(t01 , t02) . . . Rkn(tk1 , tkn) constituting of the substructure of n are labeled with the adequate
relation symbols R0 . . . Rk and relation type (subordinating if NS . . . ).
3. Γt encodes the nuclearity principle applied to t: for every relation R(s1, s2) appearing in the substruc-
ture of some node s of t, Γt specifies that the corresponding relation instance variable r must scope
over EDUs in s only, and furthermore must left (resp. right) weakly dominate every relation in the
substructure of s1 (resp. s2). Note that this entails that r includes it its left (resp. right) scope the
nucleus(nuclei) of si20.
The interpretation tRNP is definedas the set of structuresM that validate φt andA0,A1,A2,A3,A4,AW5
(they all have ∣t∣ individuals, as fixed by ψt). Moreover, it can be shown that each model of this set validates
TSDRT ; so we have a interpretation of an RS-Tree into a set of SDRSs.
3.3.3 Illustrative example
Consider example example (3.1.1) again, with the RST Tree of fig. 3.1(a). The table below lists the scoping
structures for the different interpretations. To keep things readable, we simply represent the scope scoping
structure as a list of relations instances in the format R([args1, args2]), indicating a relation instance r
labeled with R and scoping on the left (resp. right) over the set of EDUs arg1 (resp.) args2. We also factorise
some structures using the notation [args] ∣ [args′] to denote several distinct structures at once: one with
20This is obtained through an easy induction.
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args as argument to the targeted relation, the other that has arg′. We drop the subordinating/coordinating
nature of relations which is the same for each of the structures listed below and fig. 3.1(b).
We first display the immediate and Mixed NP interpretations:
Immediate Interpretation: MNP:
 	([C1], [C2])

	([C1,C2], [C3])
 	([C1–C3], [C4])
 	([C1], [C2])

	([C1], [C3])
 	([C3], [C4])
The RNP interpretations are listed below:
RNP:
 	([C1], [C2])

	([C1], [C3])
 	([C3] ∣ [C1,C3] ∣ [C1–C3], [C4])
 	([C1], [C2])

	([C1,C2], [C3])
 	([C3] ∣ [C1–C3], [C4])
This example and associate intepretations illustrate some noticeable facts:
• Both the immediate and the MNP interpratation are admissible under the RNP.
• The following interpretation, with overlapping consituents
 	([C1], [C2]

	([C1,C2], [C3])
 	([C1,C3], [C4])
is not admissible under the RNP: [C1,C2] is not weakly dominated by [C1,C3]. As a consequence
 	([C1,C3], [C4]) does not weakly dominate 
	([C1,C2], [C3]) on the left
as the RNP requires. More generally, the RNP forbids overlapping constituents. In fact it is sufficient
to ensure that all target structures comply to A6,A7,A8 and A9b.
Now that we have formally defined the different interpretations of an RST Tree, we turn in the next
section to the interpretation of DGs and show how it can be related to the RNP on RST Trees.
3.4 Relation between RST Trees and DGs
3.4.1 Interpretation of DGs
DGs are a restriction of SDRSs to structures without complex constituents. So the ζ function of subsection 2
can transform distinct SDRSs transform into the same DG with a consequent loss of information.
a →R1 π
π : b →R2 c ∣
a
b c
R1 R2 ∣ π →R2 cπ : a →R1 b (3.3)
Each of the SDRSs above yields the sameDG after simplification, namely, the one in themiddle.The natural
interpretation of a DG g describes the set of fully scoped SDRS structures that are compatible with these
minimal requirements, i.e that would yield g by simplification. To get this set, every edge r(x, y) in g, r,
must be assigned left scope among the descendants of x in g (and right scope among those of y); this is a
consequence of
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i) x and y being heads of the left and right arguments of r and
ii) the SDRSs that are compatible with g do not admit relations with a right argument in one constituent
and a left one outside of it.
Definition 15. Assume that we map each node21 x of g into a unique variable vx ∈ Vl and each edge e into
a unique variable symbol re ∈ Vi . Define x¯ and r¯ in an analogous way as in definition 14.
For a given dependency graph g, we compute a formula φg = ∃x¯∃r¯ ψg ∪ Γg such that
• ψg is defined analogously as in definition 14, defining the set of relation instances and EDUs.
• Γg is the formula stating the minimal scopes for each relation instance: for all edge in e = R(x, y)
in g, Γg entails i) re has vx in its left scope and vy in its right scope and ii) let Des(x) be the set of
variable symbols for all the descendants of x in g, Γg entails that if re has left scope over some vz
then vz is in Des(x) (symmetrically for y and right scope).
The interpretation g of a DG is: {M ∣M ⊧ φg ,A0-A3,A6,A7}. The DG
a
b c
R1 R2
for instance,
is interpreted as a set of three structures isomorphic to the ones in (3.3) above.
We now relate DGs to RST Trees interpreted with the RNP. The idea is that the two kinds of structure
express analoguous forms of dominance between coherence relations. However, DGs and their interpreta-
tion are generally slightly less constrained than RST Trees: for instance, given a DG g, we can always find
RST Trees whose RNP interpretations are included in that of the DG, but not always an RST Tree which
admits all of the DG interpretations at once under RNP. We therefore, focus on a restricted class of DGs,
with a restricted set of interpretations.
3.4.2 Restrictions on DGs: Dependency Trees and the S_CDP+ interpretation
Afirst restriction is needed because projectivity has different consequences forDGs andRSTTrees: Assume
that a relation r1 holds between e1 and e2 and a relation r2 holds between e2 and e3 with e1 <t e2 <t e3.
Assume furthermore that r1 subordinates e1 to e2 and r2 subordinates e3 to e1. In any projective graph
representation of such a structure, the arc representing r2 must be drawn “above” the arc for r1. Now for
RST with RNP this entails that r1 cannot scope over e3, while for a DG this is still permitted since r2 makes
e3 a descendant of e1 in the DG sense. Notice also that in the RST Tree, the “head” of the complex argument
to r2 is e2 not e1, which gives us an intuitive glance at why the RST Tree is not a faithful representation of the
DG.This situation is illustrated, for instance, by figs. 3.1(a) and 3.1(c): in the RST Tree, the  
cannot take scope over C4 whereas it can in the DG. Hence we must define the subset of DGs exempt of
these non RST compatible dependencies, but also restrict the interpretation of DG to impose RST-like
projectivity constraints on dominance. This is down below, after we expose the second restriction.
The second restriction concerns coordinating Chains, and Nests, as previously defined. Consider for
instance a coordinating chains of 3 edus or more involving a single coordinating relation: x1 →R1 x2 →R2⋅ ⋅ ⋅ →Rn−1 xn. We have, intuitively, two choices to represent such a structure in RST. Either we use a type 3
schema, or we binarize it. Neither solution is plainly satisfactory on its own: a type 3 schema will forbid
that Rk takes right scope over any unit in xm+1 for m > k, whereas the original DG does. Binarising the
Chain into a binary tree R1(x1,R2(x2, . . . ,Rn−1(xn−1, xn)),on the other hand, imposes by multinuclearity
that each of the Rk scopes on the right over the whole set of nuclei of xk+1, xk+2, xk+2 . . . , which accounts
for only some of the possible interpretations of the DG. Ideally, the more general correspondence should
be achieved by associating such a DG with the two elements set of RST Trees containing both versions,
21Recall that unlike RST Trees, DGs have EDUs as nodes and relations as edges.
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with the type 3 schema, and with the binarized tree, thus covering all possible interpretations. An different
but analoguous problem is encountered with Nests when the unique nucleus does not textually precede
or succede every satellites. However type 3 and 4 schemas, as they have been used so far in theoretical
work and corpora cover only a restricted set of such problematic Chains (namely those involving a single
relation, like  ) and Nests (actually very few, made of special combination of only 2 relations).
Hence our choice here is to focus on binary RST Trees, without type 3 or 4 schemas, and establish a
narrower correspondence by restricting the intepretation of coordinating Chains to match that of their
tree binarization in RST (under RNP). To this aim we introduce the interpretation principle S_CDP below.
We remark nevertheless, that introducing more generic form of schemas into RST would make it possible
to achieve larger correspondence.
Definition 16 (DGRST, ⋅S_CDP+). • A DG g is RST-expressible iff it is a DT (every EDU has at most
one parent EDU) and for every arc x →r y, there is no unit z with x <t z <t y and z →r′ x. Let
DGRST denote the set of RST-expressible DGs.
• S_CDP is an adapted and strengthened version of a principle called Continuing Discourse Pattern,
(CDP,Asher and Lascarides, 2003). S_CDPstates that whenever a coordinating relation Ric originates
as a node which appear to be also in the right scope of another relation Rs, Rs weakly dominate Ric
on the right.
• ⋅S_CDP+ is defined as the restriction of DG’s interpretation ⋅ conforming to S_CDP and futher-
more verifying that whenever a relaion x →r y holds in the DG, the corresponding relation weakly
dominate on the left every relation holding between x and z such that x <t z <t y.
Wehave seen already that theDGonfig. 3.1(c) is notRST expressible because it involves  	(C3,C1)
and the relation 
	(C2,C1). We can still apply the S_CDP+ interpretation to it, which im-
poses that the external  	 dominates the 
	 on the left, hence to force the external
 	 to scope over at least both C1 and C3 (since C3 weakly dominates C1).
We are now equipped with everything needed to formalize the correspondence.
3.4.3 Relation between DGs and RST
Overall this section, we consider only binary RST Trees. Hence, we will simply use the phrase “RST Trees”
to refer to binary RST Trees.
Fact 3. We can define a translation G from RST Trees to dependency graphs, and a translation H from
RST-expressible DGs to sets of RST Trees such that the following statements are true:
• For each RST Tree t, G(t) is an RST-expressible DG and tRNP ⊆ G(t)S_CDP+ .
• For each RST-expressible DG d dS_CDP+ = ⋃t∈H(d)tS_CDP+
• For each RST-expressible DG d, for each t ∈ H(d), G(t) = d.
We provide the definition of G andH below:
Definition 17 (RST Trees to DGs). The translation G takes a RST Tree t as input and outputs a pair ⟨G, n⟩,
whereG = ⟨Nodes, Edges⟩ is the image DG, and n an attachment point used along the recursive definition
of G.
• If t is an EDU x then G(t) = ⟨({x},{}), x⟩.
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• If t = R(t1N , t2S) then let ⟨G1, n1⟩ = G(t1) and ⟨G2, n2⟩ = G(t2).
G(t) = ⟨(G1 ∪G2 ∪ {Rsubord(n1, n2))}; n1⟩
• If t = R(t1S , t2N) then G(t) = G(R(t2N , t1S))
• If t = R(t1N , t2N) (multinuclear), let ⟨G1, n1⟩ = G(t1) and ⟨G2, n2⟩ = G(t2).
G(t) = ⟨(G1 ∪G2 ∪ {Rcoord(n1, n2))}; n1⟩
We can seeDTs (which include RST-expressible DGs) as recursive structures with a root node a, and set
of outgoing edges r0, . . . rn linking a to the roots of dependent structures which are themselves DTs.Wewill
therefore defineH recursively. As we have seenH outputs a set of target RST Trees. This non-determinism
comes from the possible choices in the order of processing of the relations r0, . . . rn.
To express these possible choices, and flesh out H, we will need the notion of an inside-out strategy.
Let a be an EDU and assume that a is part of a sequence
x1 <t ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ <t xk <t a <t yk+1 <t ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ <t yk+l
of k+ l + 1 textually ordonned EDUs. For such a sequence, an inside-out strategy centered at a, is a traversal
of the x′s and y’s in an order that respects the constraint that the x’s are visited in increasing order of their
distance to r, and that so are the y’s. For instance, assuming k = l , both xk , xk−1, . . . , x2, x1, yk+1, yk+2, . . . , y2k
and xk , yk+1, xk−1, yk+2, . . . , xk−i , yk+i+1, . . . , x1, y2k are inside-out strategies. Formally, an inside-out strat-
egy is a permutation22 σ of the interval [1; k + l] such that
∀i ∈ [1, k + l] ((σ(i) ≤ k → σ−1([σ(i); k]) ⊆ [1; i]) ∧ (σ(i) > k → σ−1([k + 1, σ(i)]) ⊆ [1; i])).
We are now able to defineH:
Definition 18 (From RST-expressible DGs to RST Trees). Let d be an RST-expressible DG rooted in a (a
is the unique consitutent is not the right argument of any relation).H is defined recursively:
• If d is an EDU, returnH(d) = {a}.
• If there is a single outgoing relation a →R b, let d ↾b denote the subtree rooted in b and Tb = H(d′).
H(a) = {R(aa1 , ta2) ∣ t ∈ Tb}
where a1 and a2 reflects the appropriate nuclearity type for R.
• If there are multiple relations
a
x1
r1
. . . xk
rk
xk+1
rk+1
. . . xk+l
rk+l
then, assuming without loss of generality
that x1 <t ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ <t xk <t a <t xk+1 <t ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ <t xk+l , let σ be an inside-out strategy centered at a. Let
t1, . . . , tk+1 be k + 1 RST Trees and let finally Ht1 ,...tnσ (d) be defined as the output of the following
procedure:
1. Initialize an RST-Tree variable t with t := a.
2. For i from 1 to k:
22in the mathematical sense of bijection of a set of integer onto itself
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3 Select the relation a →rσ(i) xσ(i). ApplyingH to the simple structure a →rσ(i) xσ(i) results
in a singleton set containing a unique (depth 1) RST Tree t′.
4 Replace a with t and xσ(i) with tσ(i) in t′. Update t with t := t′.
5 Output {t}.
Finally, let H(d) = ⋃
t1 . . . tk+l ∈ H(d ↾x1) × ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ × H(d ↾xk+l )
σ inside-out strategy
Ht1 ,...,tnσ (d).
Recall the RST Tree (s1) for example (3.1.1), also displayed on fig. 3.1(a). Applying G to this tree yields
the following dependency tree (in linearized notation):
 	1(C1,C2) ∧ 
	(C3,C1) ∧  	2(C3,C4). (s′3)
Notice that it differs from the DG on fig. 3.1(c) which is not RST-Expressible. (s′3)S_CDP+ supports any
RNP admissible reading of the RST Tree, but also an additional one:
 	1([C1], [C2])
 	2([C3], [C4])

	([C1,C2], [C3,C4])
.
H((s′3)) yield in return two possible RST Trees (one for each of the two possible inside out strategies C1,C4
and C4,C1 at the top level), namely the orignal one (s2), and a second one:

	( 	(C1N ,C2N)S , 	(C3N ,C4S)N). (s′1)
This second tree indeed complete the possible interpretations with the one that was missing from (s′1)
(s′3)S_CDP+ = (s1)RNP ∪ (s′1)RNP .
We have seen how we can use the scoping language and structures to formalise a common understand-
ing of binary RST Trees and a fragment of Dependency Graphs. More generally, we can use the scoping
language to compute a similarity score between any two scoping structures, which provides us a general
mean of comparision for structures of the different theories and their different interpretations. We expose
this in the next section.
3.5 Similarities and distances
The framework we have presented yields a notion of similarity that applies to structures of different for-
malisms. Tomotivate our idea, recall example 2.2.2; the structure in (s3) in which 
	 just scopes
over C1 differs from the intuitively correct interpretation only in that 
	 should also scope over
C2 as in (s2), while a structure that does this but in which C3 is in the scope of the Elaboration relation is
intuitively further away from the correct interpretation.
Our similarity measure Sim over structuresM1 andM2 assumes a common set of elementary con-
stituents and a correspondence between relation types in the structures. We measure similarity in terms of
the scopes given to the relations. The intuition, is that given a map f from elements of relation instances inM1 to relation instances inM2, we achieve a similarity score by counting for each relation instance r the
number of EDUs that are both in the left scope of one element of r and in f (r), then divide this number
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by the total number of diffrents constituents in the left scope of r1 and r2, and do the same for right scopes
as well. The global similarity is given by the correspondence which yields the best score.
Given a relation r1 ∈ M1 and a relation r2 ∈ M2, let δ(r1, r2) = { 1 if r1 and r2 have the same label0 otherwise .
Define C⋅∣(r1, r2) = ∣{x : l ∣ M1 ⊧ x ∈⋅∣ r1 ∧M2 ⊧ x ∈⋅∣ r2}∣, the number of constituents over which r1
and r2 scope and D⋅∣(r1, r2) = ∣{x : l ∣M1 ⊧ x ∈⋅∣ r1∨M2 ⊧ x ∈⋅∣ r2}∣. Define C∣⋅ and D∣⋅ analogously and
assume thatM1 has less relation instances thanM2. Let Inj(D1i ,D2i ) be the set of injections of relations
instances ofM1 to those ofM2. Let ∣M∣i denotes the number of relations instances of a finite scoping
structureM.
Sim(M1,M2) = 12Max(∣M1∣i , ∣M2∣i)×
Max
f ∈Inj(D1i ,D
2
i )
∑
r:i
δ(r, f (r)) × (C⋅∣(r, f (r))
D⋅∣(r, f (r)) +
C∣⋅(r, f (r))
D∣⋅(r, f (r)))
If M2 has more relation instances, Invert arguments and use the definition above. If they have same
number of instances, both directions coincide.
d(M1,M2)=1 − Sim(M1,M2)
For a discourse structureM, Sim(M,M) = 1; Sim ranges between 0 and 1. d is a Jaccard-like metric
obeying symmetry, d(x, y) = 0 iff y = x, and d satisfies to the triangle inequality. One can further define
the minimal, maximal or average similarity between any pair of structures of two sets S1 and S2. This gives
an idea of the similarity between two underspecified interpretations, such as the ones provided by RNP
of section 3.3.
For example, the maximal similarity between (s2) interpreted as itself (immediate interpretation) and a
scoping structure for the (general, non S_CDP+) interpretation of the DG (s3), is 7/12. It is achieved for the
interpretation of (s3) where   is given left scope overC1,C2,C4,	
1 holds between
C1 and C2, and 	
 fails to match the  of (s3). maxs∈ζ((s2)sim((s2), s) = 7/12
also, because ζ must distribute [2, 4] in (s2) to avoid crossing dependencies; so ζ((s2)) ≅ (s3). The
maximal similarity between (s2) an interpretation of the RST tree in (s1) with RNP (the same hold for (s′3))
is 19/36, achieved when both C1 and C2 are left argument of the   (though not C4, which isn’t
in any such interpretation). Under the MNP, the similarity drops to 17/36.
Given our results in section 3.4.1, we have:
Fact 4. i) For any RST-expressible DG g, for any S_CDP+ valid interpretation of g, there an RST tree
t and a RNP valid interpretation of t such that Sim(g, t) = 1.
ii) For any interpretation of an RST tree under RNP there is a DT g and an interpretation of g under
S_CDP+such that Sim(t, g) = 1.
We will now review some related work before concluding this chapter.
3.6 RelatedWork
Our work shares a motivation with Blackburn et al. (1993): Blackburn et al. (1993) provides a modal logic
framework for formalizing syntactic structures; we have used MSO and our scope language to formalize
discourse structures. While many concepts of discourse structure admit of a modal formalization, the fact
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that discourse relations can have scope over multiple elementary nodes either in their first or second argu-
ment makes an MSO treatment more natural. Danlos (2008) compares RST, SDRT and Directed Acyclic
Graphs (DAGs) in terms of their strong generative capacity in a study of structures and examples involving
3 EDUS. We do not consider generative capacity, but we have given a generic and general axiomatization
of RST, SDRT and DT in a formal interpreted language. We can translate any structure of these theories
into this language, independent of their linguistic realization. We agree with Danlos that the NP does not
yield an accurate semantic representation of some discourses. We agree with Egg and Redeker (2010) that
the NP is rather a constraint on structures, and we formalize this with the relaxed principle and show how
it furnishes a translation from RS trees to sets of scoped structures. Danlos’s interesting correspondence
between restricted sets of RST trees, SDRSs and DAGs assumes an already fixed scope-interpretation for
each kind of structure: SDRSs and DAGs are naturally interpreted as themselves, and RS Trees are inter-
preted with the mixed NPOur formalism allows us both to describe the structures themselves and various
ways of computing alternate scopes for relations.
With regard to the discussion in Egg and Redeker (2008); Wolf and Gibson (2005b) of tree vs. graph
structures, we show exactly how tree based structures like RST with or without the NP compare to graph
based formalisms like SDRT. We have not investigated Graphbank here, but the scope language can axiom-
atize Graphbank (with A0-A3, A8).
3.7 Conclusions and future directions
In this chapter, we have investigated the nature and expressive power of discourse structures. Our compar-
ison is based on the idea that different kinds of structures denote, at the semantic level, different sets of
admissible scopes for coherence relations. We have therefore explored in various formalisms the different
mechanisms for computing this scopal information from the structures. We provided a unified account of
these interpretative mechanisms, their input and target structures across theories using a pivot language
and associated models to encode the scopes of relations regardless of theory-specific assumptions. We
now dispose of a lingua franca for comparing discourse formalisms, helping us with a deeper thoeretical
understanding of the different sorts of informations that different structures encode, and how these encod-
ings relate. Importantly, we have shed a light on how some classes of structures (e.g. DGs, RST Trees) are
interpreted as sets of (scoping structures isomorphic to) structures of other classes (e.g. SDRSs). Hence,
we can see the former as underspecified representations of the latter. A measure of similarity between
structures allows to quantify the semantic “deviation” between two different representations of the same
discourse. Applied to a given “underspecified” structure, and one of its possible resolution, this similarity
also quantities the information lost in the underspecification process. Our work may thus also be seen as
contributing to clarify the relation between more syntax-oriented (introducing underspecification in their
semantic interpretation) and more semantics-oriented (with transparent semantic interpration but less
syntactically constrained, yielding larger search spaces in parsing tasks) views of discourse structure.
These theoretical results let us hope, in future work, for applications in the field of discourse parsing.
One of our initial motivation was the sparcity of discourse annotated data, and we have made clear how
to link different kind of annotated data, for instance how to switch from RST tree-like reprentations to
Dependency Graphs; both formalisms have been used to train and evaluate discourse parsers, and an
approach combining both sets of data seems a promising way to improve on existing models. Moreover,
so-called loss functions play a significant role in models of structured learning (as e.g., Crammer and
Singer, 2003; Crammer et al., 2006) but a loss functions well-fitted for discourse is something hard to
come up with. Our similarity measure takes a step in that direction. Also, the development of (sentencial)
underspecification has played an important role in achieving wide-coverage grammar at the sentencial
level, and we hope that the hierarchy of expressivity and the underspecified interpretations that we brought
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up for the different discourse formalisms might furnish similar concepts and help the development of
the syntax/semantics interface at the suprasentential level. Finally, our MSO formulation of structural
constraints essentially involve constraints on graphs. Someof these constraints are expressible as constraints
on undirected graphs, others use edges’ directions, but should at least admit non-trivial relaxed undirected
counterparts. This appeal to explore in future work automata-based techniques of model checking, such as
the ones known formCourcelle’s work (Courcelle andEngelfriet, 2012). Efficient (andparticularly automata-
based) model checking for our axioms is indeed something highly desirable for parsing methods based on
constraint decoding such has Muller et al. (2012), where given a set of ’local’ scores on structural fragments,
a search is performed on the set of complete structures satisfying the target formalism’s constraints to find
a structure which globally maximises the sum of all of its fragments’ scores.
The notion of “semantic deviation” that our similarity measure intends to capture is yet another field
for further investigations and the target of the next chapter: the similarity we proposed, allthough its
comparison of the full semantic scopes of discourse-level logical operators makes it less sensible to small
differences in syntactic boundaries than other, more classical, distances defined over syntactic structures
such as ParseEval (Black et al., 1991) and Leaf Ancestor (Sampson, 2000), might still be objectable as a
candidate for measuring “semantic” similarity: one can object, first, that it compares only different struc-
tures built over the same set of EDUs and, second, that in the end, the comparison is still essentially one of
syntactic boundaries, even though it relies on more fine-grained syntactic primitives. For instance, match-
ing an  	 with an  
		 between two structures will weight in the exact same way
as matching an  	 with a 	: it will count as as failure and yield a score of 0. Yet an
 	 is intuitively semantically closer to an  
		 than to a 	.
This illustrates the need to investigate what one could call “essentially semantic” metrics. What exactly
constitutes an essentially semantic metric is an interesting problem in its own right. Intuitively, it should
strongly rely on themodel theoretic interpretation of structures, so that, in particular, structures expressing
the same “meaning”, even realized differently syntactically, are judged very close to each other. Efforts have
been made in that direction to characterise logically equivalent structures (e.g., Roze, 2013; Asher et al.,
2011), but do not propose definitions of metrics or similarity functions. On another note, such metrics
should equally importantly accounts for the “dynamics” of discourse and dialogue, i.e. predicting how and
when these grow closer or further away as new information comes into play.
The next chapter is concerned with these issues and proposes a fundational studies of semantic metrics:
what they should be,which axioms they should satisfy, andwhich functions are good candidate for semantic
metrics. Toward this aim, we switch from the notion of discourse discussed so far to a broader and more
abstract notion of conversation. Conversations in that sense, are simply sequences of token of a given
vocabulary. Working at this high level of abstraction will allow us to investigate in the simplest setting
and without presuming too much of the nature of conversations, the respective structural properties that
conversations, their interpretation, and semantic distances should have with respect to one another. Parts II
and III on the other handwill review and propose accounts ofmore concrete implementation of the notions
of “dialogue” and “conversation”.
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Chapter 4. Semantic distances
4.1 Introduction
If linguistic behavior is to be analyzed as a form of rational behavior (Grice, 1967), it is important to be able
to assess the conversational goals of linguistic agents and the extent to which they are fulfilled by any given
conversation in a manageable way. Specifying preferences over the set of all possible choices of what to say
is clearly intractable for us as theorists and for speakers as practioners. Instead, speakers must be able to
group conversations into semantically similar classes and to assess the relative semantic proximity of any
two pairs of conversations. The preferences of the agents over different ways of expressing themselves have
to do with how close these ways are from satisfying certain positive or negative semantic goals. An elegant
way to be able to do this, is to have a metric over conversations that is semantic in nature. The goal of this
chapter is to identify properties that characterize ‘semantic metrics’ and to identify reasonable axioms that
can help us isolate well-behaved semantic metrics.
A workable definition of semantic distance between texts or conversations is also important for the
evaluation of annotations of discourse structure in text and dialogue. It is also crucial to the success of
the machine learning of semantic structures from annotated data, as all known algorithms rely on some
notion of similarity or loss with respect to the target structure. While measures of syntactic similarity
like ParseEval (Black et al., 1991) and Leaf Ancestor (Sampson, 2000) are well-understood and used in
computational linguistics, they yield intuitively wrong results. ParseEval, for instance, places too much
importance on the boundaries of discourse constituents, which are often notoriously hard even for expert
annotators to agree on. Investigations of distances between semantic interpretations of a text are rarely
examined. While a natural equivalence and ordering relation over contents comes from the underlying
logic of formal semantic analysis, this only gives a very crude measure. Some have appealed to a language
of semantic primitives to exploit the more developed measures of syntactic distance in a more semantic
setting. But such an approach depends on the choice of semantic primitives, with no clear consensus on
how to go about determining these primitives.
Semantic distances are also relevant in the context of formal theories of belief revision. Lehmann et al.
(2001) explores Alchourrón et al. (1985) style postulates that characterize a wide family of belief revision
operator based on pseudo-distances on models satisfying only very mild assumptions. Our problem is
also closely related to the problem of determining the distance of a scientific theory from the truth. This
problem, referred to as the problem of verisimilitude or truthlikeness in philosophy of science (since Popper
(1968)), is arguably reducible to the problem of having a satisfactory concept of similarity between theories
in a formal language.
The aim of this chapter is to study semantic metrics for an abstract and simple concept of conversations.
Syntactically,we assume that conversations aremonoids with respect to concatenation.These conversations
are equipped with an interpretation function mapping them into some distinct semantic space. In general,
our assumptions about the semantic space and the interpretation function will be as minimal as possible.
As far as identifying the axioms that characterize our concept of ‘semanticity’ for a metric goes, we will not
be making any assumption. To analyze candidate axioms that characterize well-behaved semantic metrics,
it will be interesting to consider the effect of assuming a bit more structure. Specifically we will pay some
attention to the case in which the semantic co-domain of the interpretation function is a lattice. As an
example, sequences of propositional formulas with their classical interpretation certainly fall under this
category. We will moreover consider interpretation functions that satisfy some structural properties, for
example assuming that the semantic meaning of a sequence is invariant under stuttering, that is immediate
repetition of the same element in a sequence, or even assuming complete invariance under permutation.
To develop semantic metrics for conversations in natural language or for their representations in some
formalism suitable for discourse interpretation (like for instance SDRT) we first need to clarify the space
of reasonable axioms and metrics for the simplest and most general representations. We take this first step
here.
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4.2. Preliminaries and notation
The chapter is organized as follows. We start with a first section, section 4.2, that contains technical
preliminaries and settles the notation. We then describe in section 4.3 different properties that can be met
by an interpretation function, regarding how it interacts with sequences-concatenation or the structure of
the semantic space. Section 4.4 introduces some elementary background about generalized metrics and
metrics over subsets of a metric space. Section 4.5 draws a map of different level of semanticity for metrics,
corresponding to different requirements on the interaction between the interpretation function and the
metric. Section 4.6 introduces some concrete candidate semantic metrics. Sections 4.6 to 4.8 then describe
how these potential measures of semantic similarity fare with respect to different lists of axioms. We show
that certain combinations of axioms lead to trivialization results. We then conclude.
4.2 Preliminaries and notation
This section contains some technical preliminaries and settles notation. The reader can skip this section
on a first reading, and come back to it when needed.
4.2.1 Sets, functions, sequences, orders and lattices
Let X,Y be two sets. We let X ⊖ Y denote the symmetric difference of X and Y . Let card(X) denote
the cardinality of X. let X∗ be the set of finite strings over X. If f : X → Y , we let f (X) and f [X] be
alternative notation for the image of X under f , that is f (X) = f [X] = { f (x)∣x ∈ X}. We let dom( f ) = X,
target( f ) = Y and ran( f ) = f (X). The kernel of f is the equivalence relation ∼, such that x ∼ y iff
f (x) = f (y). We say that f is isotone whenever for all x, y with x ≤ y we have f (x) ≤ f (y). We write
f : X ↪ Y whenever f is partial function from X to Y , that is there exists a non-empty subset of A ⊆ Y
such that f : A→ Y .
Given a sequence σ ∈ X∗ we let len(σ) be the length of σ . If k ≤ len(σ) then we let σ ∣k , be the prefix
of σ of length k, and we let σ(k) or σ[k] be the kth element of σ . We let ran(σ) be the range of σ , that is
ran(σ) = {σ[k]∣1 ≤ k ≤ len(σ)}. We let?→є be the empty sequence.
A relation ≤ on X is a pre-order on X iff it is a reflexive and transitive relation on X. (X,≤) is a poset
iff ≤ is a pre-order on X such that ≤ is antisymmetric on X, that is x ≤ y and y ≤ x, implies that x = y. A
lattice (X,≤) is a poset such that every two elements x, y ∈ X have a least upper bound (or join, denoted
x ∧ y) and and a greatest lower bound (or meet, denoted x ∨ y). A lattice (X,≤) is bounded whenever X
has a least and a greatest element (denoted 
 and ⊺).
4.2.2 Propositional Languages and interpretation functions
Given a language L we let φ, ψ, χ, φ1, φ2 . . . range over L, and we let
?→φ ,?→ψ ,?→σ ,?→τ ,?→υ ,?→σ1 ,?→σ2 . . . range over
L∗. Given a finite set prop = {p1, . . . , pn} we let Lprop(1) be defined as follows:
φ ::= p∣¬p∣⊺∣

where p ranges over prop. And we define Lprop as follows:
φ ::= p∣⊺∣
∣¬φ∣φ ∧ φ∣φ ∨ φ
where p ranges over prop. We define sig(φ) : L → ℘(prop) where p ∈ sig(φ) iff p occurs in φ. Given
a sequence ?→σ ∈ L∗ or a subset A ⊆ L, we write sig(?→σ ) := ⋃ψ∈ran(→σ ) sig(ψ) or sig(A) := ⋃ψ∈A sig(ψ),
respectively.
Classical truth-functional interpretation of Lprop . Let Wprop = 2prop. Depending on context, will
treat a member V ∈ Wprop either as a function V : prop → {0, 1} or as a subset V ⊆ prop. These
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two representations are of course equivalent. We let ⋅t : L → 2prop, be the classical truth-functional
interpretation function of Lprop(1) and Lprop.
4.3 Properties of interpretation functions
In general, we will work with abstract concepts of a language and of an interpretation function. Let L,X be
non-empty sets.
Definition 19 (Interpretation function). An interpretation function of L into X is a function ∥ ⋅ ∥ : L∗ → X.
An interpretation function for L is an interpretation function L into Y for some non-empty set Y .
4.3.1 Co-domain
In this paper, we will sometimes assume that the semantic space has some structure. We are always explicit
about these assumptions whenever we make them.
Definition 20. We say that ∥ ⋅ ∥ is (W ,≤)–pre-order-valued ((W ,≤)–poset-valued) whenever target(∥ ⋅∥)=W and (W ,≤) is a pre-order (respectively, a poset).
We say that ∥ ⋅ ∥ is pre-order–valued, iff it is (W ,≤)–pre-order-valued for some pre-ordered set (W ,≤),
and similarly for poset–valued.
Definition 21. ∥ ⋅ ∥ is (W ,≤,∧,∨)–lattice-valued iff target(∥ ⋅ ∥) =W and (W ,≤) is a lattice, with ∧ and ∨
as itsmeet and join operator, respectively.
Definition 22. ∥ ⋅ ∥ is (W ,≤,∧,∨,
,⊺)–lattice-valued iff ∥ ⋅ ∥ is (W ,≤,∧,∨)–lattice-valued, and (W ,≤) is
a bounded lattice, with 
 and ⊺ as its least and greatest element, respectively.
We say that ∥ ⋅ ∥ is lattice-valued, iff it is (W ,≤,∧,∨)–lattice-valued for some (W ,≤), ∧ and ∨. We say
that ∥ ⋅ ∥ is bounded lattice-valued, iff it is (W ,≤,∧,∨,
,⊺)–lattice-valued, for some (W ,≤), ∧, ∨, 
 and ⊺.
Definition 23. ∥ ⋅ ∥ is set-valued iff we have target(∥ ⋅ ∥) = ℘(W) for some non-empty setW .
4.3.2 Structural properties for interpretation functions
It will sometimes be interesting to restrict ourselves to interpretation functions satisfying certain structure
properties. Assume that ∥ ⋅ ∥ is ≤–poset-valued. Below the comma ‘,’ is the concatenation operator. The
axiom in the table below, are to be understood as quantifying universally.?→α ,?→β ranging over dom(∥ ⋅ ∥)∗
and α, β ranging over dom(∥ ⋅ ∥).
Axiom name Meaning
contraction ∥?→α ,φ,φ,?→β ∥ ≤ ∥?→α ,φ,?→β ∥
expansion ∥?→α ,φ,?→β ∥ ≤ ∥?→α ,φ,φ,?→β ∥
exchange ∥?→α ,φ,ψ,?→β ∥ = ∥?→α ,ψ,φ,?→β ∥
right monotonicity ∥?→α ,φ∥ ≤ ∥?→α ∥
left monotonicity ∥φ,?→α ∥ ≤ ∥?→α ∥?→ –⊺ ∥?→α ∥ ≤ ∥?→є ∥
adjunction If ∥?→α ∥ ≤ ∥?→β ∥ and ∥?→α ∥ ≤ ∥?→γ ∥
then ∥?→α ∥ ≤ ∥?→β?→γ ∥
mix If ∥?→α 1∥ ≤ ∥?→β 1∥ and ∥?→α 2∥ ≤ ∥?→β 2∥
then ∥?→α 1?→α 2∥ ≤ ∥?→β 1?→β 2∥
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For example, ∥⋅∥ satisfies contraction iff for every?→α ,?→β ∈ L∗ and φ ∈ Lwe have ∥?→α ,φ,φ,?→β ∥ ≤ ∥?→α ,φ,?→β ∥.
Remark 1. If ∥ ⋅ ∥ satisfies exchange, then ∥ ⋅ ∥ for every?→φ and?→ψ that are equivalent up to permutation
we have ∥?→φ ∥ = ∥?→ψ ∥. If ∥ ⋅ ∥ satisfies either right or left monotonicity, then ∥ ⋅ ∥ satisfies?→ –⊺.
4.3.3 Stronger properties
Definition 24 (Conjunctive, intersective intepretation). • ∥ ⋅ ∥ is conjunctive iff it is lattice-valued
and ∀?→φ ,?→ψ , ∥?→φ?→ψ ∥ = ∥?→φ ∥ ∧ ∥?→ψ ∥.
• ∥ ⋅ ∥ is intersective iff it is set-valued and ∀?→φ ,?→ψ , ∥?→φ?→ψ ∥ = ∥?→φ ∥ ∩ ∥?→ψ ∥.
Definition 25. We let ∥ ⋅ ∥t be the interpretation function for L∗ defined by ∥?→φ ∥t := ⋀φ∈ran(→φ )t .
Example 1. ∥ ⋅ ∥t is intersective. If ∥ ⋅ ∥ is intersective, then it is bounded ⊆–lattice-valued.
4.4 Generalized metrics
We start by recalling some basic definitions.
Definition 26 (Semi-Pseudometric). A semi-pseudometric on a set X is a function d : (X × X) → R, such
that for all x, y, z ∈ X we have:
1. d(x, x) = 0;
2. d(x, y) = d(y, x).
Definition 27 (Pseudometric). A pseudometric on a set X is a semi-pseudometric on X, such that for all
x, y, z ∈ X we have:
3. d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z) (triangle inequality).
If d is a (semi-)pseudometric on X, then (X, d) is a (semi-)pseudometric space.
Definition 28 (Trivial pseudo-metric). The trivial pseudo-metric over a set A is the function
d : { A× A→ R∀x, y ∈ A d(x, y) = 0
4.4.1 Metrics on valuations, relations and graphs
Given a finite set prop Hamming distance on 2prop is the metric δham : 2prop × 2prop → ω defined as
δham(V ,V ′) = card(V ⊖ V ′).
4.4.2 Aggregators
Let δi be a pseudo-metric on a set X. We want to study closeness between subsets of X, and so we provide
some natural aggregators α associating with δi a function diα : 2X × 2X → IR, that may or may not be a
pseudo-metric, depending on the particular aggregator.
Definition 29 (min aggregator). Let dimin(A,B) =minx∈A,y∈B di(x, y).
Definition 30 (max aggregator). Let dimax(A,B) =maxx∈A,y∈B di(x, y).
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Definition 31 (Hausdorff aggregator). FormallydiH(A,B)=max{maxx∈Aminy∈B di(x, y),maxy∈Bminx∈A di(x, y)}.
Definition 32 (mean aggregator). Formally diam(A,B) = ∑x∈A,y∈B 1card(A×B)di(x, y).
Remark 2. In general max and mean will return a non-zero value for (A,A). Note also that the min
aggregator will return 0 for (A,B) whenever A∩ B ≠ ∅.
LetW be a set and let d be a pseudo-metric onW . Let L be a language and let ∥ ⋅ ∥ be an interpretation
function for L such that target(∥ ⋅ ∥) = ℘(W) for some non-empty setW . Let diα : ℘(W) × ℘(W) → R be
an aggregator based on the distance di between points ofW . We let diα,L,∥⋅∥ : L
∗ × L∗ → IR be defined by
diα,L,∥⋅∥(?→φ ,?→ψ ) = diα(∥?→φ ∥, ∥?→ψ ∥). When L and ∥⋅∥ are clear from context, we will simply write diα for diα,L,∥⋅∥.
For instance, dhamH,Lprop ,∥⋅∥t is sometimes shortened as d
ham
H when L
prop and ∥ ⋅ ∥t are clear from context.
4.5 What is a semantic metric?
Now thatwe have set the stage for our investigations, our first task is to define our object of interest: semantic
pseudometrics. Semantic pseudometrics are a subclass of linguistic pseudometrics.
Definition 33 (Linguistic (semi-)pseudometric). A linguistic (semi-)pseudometric on a language L is a par-
tial function d : (L∗ × L∗) ↪ R such that dom(d) is symmetric and (dom(d), d) is a (semi-)pseudometric
space.
How semantic pseudometrics should be defined is not a fully straightforward matter. A minimal
requirement would be the following:
If for every?→χ1 ,?→χ2 with ∥?→χ1∥ = ∥?→χ2∥
we have d(?→φ ,?→χ1) = d(?→ψ ,?→χ2) then ∥?→φ ∥ = ∥?→ψ ∥ (min sem separation)
That is, if two sequences?→χ1 ,?→χ2 are semantically non-equivalent, then there should be two (other) seman-
tically equivalent sequences, that are not pairwise equidistant from?→χ1 and?→χ2. A stronger, yet reasonable,
assumption is:
If for every?→χ we have d(?→φ ,?→χ ) = d(?→ψ ,?→χ ) then ∥?→φ ∥ = ∥?→ψ ∥ (sem separation)
The axiom states that if two sequences of formulas?→φ and?→ψ are not semantically equivalent, then there is
some sequence of formulas?→χ that is not at the same distance from both?→φ and?→ψ .
Fact 1. Letd be a semi-pseudometric. Ifd satisfies (sem separation), then it satisfies (min sem separation).
Finally we consider a stronger axiom:
If d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) = 0 then ∥?→φ ∥ = ∥?→ψ ∥ (zero⇒ sem≡)
The axiom is a regularity condition stating, that semantically non-equivalent sequences of formulas, should
be at positive distance of each other.
Fact 2. Let d be a semi-pseudometric. If d satisfies (zero⇒ sem≡), then it satisfies (sem separation).
The two become equivalent if we assume triangle inequality.
Fact 3. Let d be a pseudo-metric. d satisfies (sem separation) iff d satisfies (zero⇒ sem≡).
60
4.5. What is a semantic metric?
The converse of (zero⇒ sem≡), below, states that semantically equivalent sequences formulas, should be
a distance 0 of each other.
If ∥?→φ ∥ = ∥?→ψ ∥ then d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) = 0 (sem≡⇒ zero)
Unsurprisingly (sem≡⇒ zero) will filter out syntactically driven notions such as δcount or δsynt,count .
Definition 34. Given a language L, let δcount(?→φ ,?→ψ ) := card(ran(?→φ ) ⊖ ran(?→ψ ))
Definition 35. Given a language L, let δsynt,count(?→φ ,?→ψ ) := δcount(?→φ ,?→ψ ) + card(sig(?→φ ) ⊖ sig(?→ψ ))
Fact 4. (Lprop(1), δcount) does not satisfy (sem≡⇒ zero).
Fact 5. (Lprop(1), δsynt,count) does not satisfy (sem≡⇒ zero).
As observed previously, (sem≡⇒ zero) rules out a number of aggregators, e.g. :
Fact 6. (Lprop, dhammax ) does not satisfy (sem≡⇒ zero).
We have seen that (sem≡⇒ zero) and the triangle inequality together imply that two semantically equiv-
alent points are equidistant to any other third point. This latter notion of semantic invariance implies in
return (sem≡⇒ zero) and might be a desirable property as well:
If ∥?→φ ∥ = ∥?→ψ ∥ then for every?→χ we have d(?→φ ,?→χ ) = d(?→ψ ,?→χ ) (sem preservation)
Fact 7. Let d be a semi-pseudometric. If d satisfies (sem preservation) then d satisfies (sem≡⇒ zero).
Finally, we can require our (semi-)pseudometric to be fully induced by a distance on the co-domain
of the interpretation function ∥ ⋅ ∥, which we define as follows:
If ∥?→φ1∥ = ∥?→ψ1∥ and ∥?→φ2∥ = ∥?→ψ2∥ then d(?→φ1 ,?→φ2) = d(?→ψ1 ,?→ψ2) (sem induced)
Fact 8. Let d be a semi-pseudometric. If d satisfies (sem induced) then d satisfies (sem preservation).
Fact 9. Let d be a pseudo-metric. If d satisfies (sem≡⇒ zero), then it satisfies (sem induced).
Corollary 1. Let d be a pseudo-metric that satisfies (sem≡⇒ zero). There exists a pseudo-metric d˙ on
ran(∥ ⋅ ∥) such that d˙(∥?→φ ∥, ∥?→ψ ∥) = d(?→φ ,?→ψ ).
Fact 10. Let d be a pseudo-metric that verifies (sem≡⇒ zero). Let ≡ be the kernel of ∥ ⋅ ∥. The following
holds:
1. If?→φ ≡ ?→ψ then ∀?→χ d(?→χ ,?→φ ) = d(?→χ ,?→ψ ).
Fact 11. Let d be a pseudo-metric. If d satisfies (min sem separation) and (sem≡⇒ zero), then it satisfies
(sem separation).
Figure 4.1, on p.62, summarizes the relation between the axioms discussed in this section. We are now
ready to define our notion of ‘semanticity’.
Definition 36 (Semantic Pseudometric). A linguistic (semi-)pseudometric is semantic whenever for all?→φ ,?→ψ we have ∥?→φ ∥ = ∥?→ψ ∥ iff for all?→χ 1,?→χ 2 such that ∥?→χ 1∥ = ∥?→χ 2∥ we have d(?→φ ,?→χ 1) = d(?→ψ ,?→χ 2).
Fact 12. A linguistic semi-pseudometric is semantic iff it satisfies (min sem separation) and (sem induced).
Fact 13. A linguistic pseudometric is semantic iff it satisfies (min sem separation) and (sem≡⇒ zero).
Now that we have settled our definition of semantic pseudo metric, which we will use in the sequel, we
can tackle our main problem—in brief:
What are reasonable properties of a semantic pseudometric on (a subset of) L∗?
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linguistic
semi-pseudometric
(min sem separation) linguistic
pseudometric
(sem≡⇒ zero)
(sem separation) (min sem separation)
triangular
(sem preservation)
(zero⇒ sem≡) (sem induced)
(sem separation)
triangular
(sem≡⇒ zero)
triangular
(min sem separation)
(sem≡⇒ zero)
triangular
(min sem separation)
(sem induced)
(7)(1)
(11)
(2) (8)
(3)
(9)
Figure 4.1: Summary of the results in Section 4.5. Dashed arrows follow from definitions.
4.6 Axioms for semantic metrics
In this section we will investigate how various semantic pseudo metrics behave with respect to some
different axioms, some more intuitive than others. We have already introduced the Hausdorff metric dhamH
over sequences of formulas in Lprop. We now provide some other metrics.
4.6.1 Examples of semantic metrics
If ∥ ⋅ ∥ is finite set-valued, we can define the following metrics:
Definition 37 (Semantic Symmetric Difference Metric). The semantic symmetric difference metric is the
cardinality of the symmetric difference between the respective interpretations. d⊖(?→φ ,?→ψ ) := card(∥?→φ ∥ ⊖∥?→ψ ∥)
Definition 38 (Proportional metric). The proportional metric decreases from 1 to 0 as the ratio between
the intersection and the union of the respective interpretations increases.
dα(?→φ ,?→ψ ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if ∥?→φ ∥ = ∥?→ψ ∥ = ∅
1 − card(∥→φ ∥∩∥→ψ ∥)
card(∥→φ ∥∪∥→ψ ∥)
otherwise
Observe that, with this measure, pairs of sequences with non-empty disjoint interpretations will always be
at distance 1 of each other.
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The idea behind the next metric is to measure closeness by counting how many possible continuations
one sequence has that can not apply to the other. The motivation is twofold: first, it follows the same line
of thought that lies behind d⊖ or dα (which is, roughly, to measure how big the set of semantic values that
“separates” two sequences is), but seems more likely applicable to semantic spaces differing from lattices of
sets –for instance, the kind of spaces used in dynamic semantics. As we outlined in previous chapters, there
are several fundamental differences between “dynamic” interpretation functions and classical “static” ones.
Dynamic cunjunction (∧D) is not commutative and dynamic entailment is not always reflexive. In particu-
lar, φ ∧D ψ does not coincide with the meet of the dynamic-entailment preorder (which is in fact captured
by ¬(¬φ∨D ¬ψ)). Hence, dynamic interpretation is not cunjunctive in our terms. Nevertheless, admissible
continuations should naturally adapt to the dynamic case: in DPL for instance, understanding “admissible”
as “consistent”, ¬P(x) can be an admissible continuation of ¬¬∃xP(x) whereas it is never one of ∃xP(x).
In SDRT, further assuming the right frontier constraint as part of admissibility,  	(π2, π3) is
an admissible continuation of  
		(π1, π2) while it is not one of (π2, π1). Yet many other
continuations will be admissible in both cases, so that a continuation-basedmetric should separate the two
conversations but still judge them quite close to each other. Notions such as symmetric difference seem to
the least less straightforward to adapt to a dynamic setting in such an intuitive way.
But then again, subsequent sections will provide a secondmotivation: it turns out that even in a simple
set-valuated setting, with a cunjunctive interpretation, the continuation-based metric fits some intuitions
(namely (weak ∧ rule)) better than the other metrics explored so far. This is exposed in section 4.8.
For a set-valued interpretation function, we provide a formalization of a continuation-based pseudo-
metric. We give the definition below, then explain why it is indeed a continuation-based pseudometric:
dC(?→φ ,?→ψ ) = 2card(∥
→φ )∥ + 2card(∥→ψ ∥) − 2 ⋅ 2card(∥→φ ∥∩∥→ψ ∥)
2card(∥
→φ ∥)+card(∥→ψ ∥)
.
This pseudometric is continuation-based because in the simplest setting of building a semantic metric
for L∗prop with the classical truth functional ∥ ⋅ ∥t we can derive the above expression by defining an
admissible continuation as a consistent one: a set ∥?→χ ∥t is an admissible continuation of ?→φ just in case∥?→φ?→χ ∥t = ∥?→φ ∥t ∩ ∥?→χ ∥t ≠ ∅. Since, in return, for every subset S ⊆ ∥?→φ ∥t there exists a χ ∈ Lprop such that∥χ∥t = S, an admissible continuation for?→φ is, up to semantic equivalence, a set of semantic values that has
non-empty intersection with ∥?→φ ∥t . Then, an admissible contibuation for?→φ which is not admissible by?→ψ
is, up to semantic equivalence, a set of semantic values S such that S ∩ ∥φ∥t ≠ ∅ and S ∩ ∥ψ∥t = ∅. Such a
set is uniquely decomposed into a non-empty part of ∥?→φ ∥t ∖ ∥?→ψ ∥t and a set of semantic values that are
neither in ∥?→φ ∥t nor ∥?→ψ ∥t . There are exactly 22card(prop)−card(∥φ∥t∪∥ψ∥t) = 22card(prop) × 2card(∥φ∥t∩∥ψ∥t)
2card(∥φ∥t)+card(∥ψ∥t)
such
sets of semantic values that are in neither interpretations. Hence, there are
22
card(prop)
2card(∥φ∥
t∩∥ψ∥t)
2card(∥φ∥t)+card(∥ψ∥t)
× (2card(∥φ∥t∖∥ψ∥t) − 1) + (2card(∥ψ∥t∖∥φ∥t) − 1)
continuations admissible for one of the sequence but not for the other (up to semantic equivalence). Dis-
tributing 2card(∥φ∥
t∩∥ψ∥t) and using card(X) = card(X ∖ Y) + card(X ∩ Y) simplifies the latter expression
to
22
card(prop) × dC(?→φ ,?→ψ ).
Hence, we see that dC indeed counts, up to semantic equivalence, the number continuations admissible
for exactly only one of the two arguments, normalized by the number of sets of semantics values.
In the next section, we will review metrics as shortest path on finite lattices, and see in particular
how to generalize dα , d⊖ and dC from set-valued interpretations to more general lattice-valued ones. As a
byproduct, we will obtain a general statement of the link between these 3 metrics, as well as a proof that the
above continuation metric is indeed a pseudometric (in particular, that it verifies triangular inequality).
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4.6.2 Shortest paths in covering graphs
Monjardet (1981) summarizes interesting results concerning metrics on posets and lattices. We will make
use of two of these results to shed a different light on the semantic metrics defined in the previous section.
In what follows, let ⟨W ,∨,⊺,≤⟩ be a bounded semi-lattice with ⊺ as greatest element. For all x, y ∈W , we
say that y covers x iff x < y and ∀z, x < z ≤ y ⇒ y = z. Define also inductively the rank of an element,
by setting all < -minimal elements of rank 0, and for every y covering a x of rank n, setting y of rank
n+ 1. Notice that, given some finite set S and S′ ⊆ S, rank(S′) in the powerset-lattice ⟨2S ,⊆⟩, coincide with
card(S′).
Definition 39 (Covering graph of a semi-lattice). Let ⟨W ,⊺,≤⟩ be a semi-lattice with ⊺ as greatest element.
The covering graph G(W) = ⟨V , E⟩ ofW is such that V =W and (x, y) ∈ E iff x covers y or y covers x.
Definition 40. An upper valuation is an isotone map v : W → R such that ∀z z ≤ x, y ⇒ v(x) + v(y) ≥
v(x ∨ y) + v(z).
Let G(W) = ⟨W , E⟩ be the covering graph of W and let v be an upper valuation on W . For each
edge (x, y) ∈ E, let the weight function ωv : E → IR induced by v be defined by ω(x, y) = ∣v(x) − v(y)∣.
Moreover, let π(x, y) be the set of paths from x to y. We make use of two results exposed in Monjardet
(1981):
Fact 14 (Monjardet (1981)). Let v be an isotone upper valuation. We have:
1. the function dv(x, y) = 2v(x ∨ y) − v(x) − v(y) is positive and verifies the triangle inequality.
2. dv(x, y) = δv(x, y) :=minpx y∈π(x,y)∑(z1 ,z2)∈px y ω(x, y).
Definition 41. If v is an isotone, positive, upper valuation that assigns 0 to minimal elements in the semi-
lattice, then the normalized distance is defined by
dnv (x, y) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
dv(x,y)
v(x∨y) if v(x ∨ y) ≠ 0,
0 otherwise.
Fact 15. If v is an isotone, positive, upper valuation that assigns 0 to minimal elements in the semi-lattice,
then the normalized distance dnv ≥ 0 and dnv verifies the triangle inequality.
This offers a new perspective on the Symmetric difference and Proportional metrics as metrics defined
by minimal-weighted paths in the lattice:
Fact 16. Consider the (semi-)lattice ⟨2prop,⊆, prop⟩, and the mapping v0 that assigns to each V ∈ 2prop
its rank. We have
d⊖(?→φ ,?→ψ ) = δv0(∥?→φ ∥, ∥?→ψ ∥) = card(∥?→φ ∥ ⊖ ∥?→ψ ∥)
Fact 17. Consider the (semi-)lattice ⟨2prop,⊆, prop⟩, and the mapping v0 that assigns to each V ∈ 2prop
its rank. We have
dα(?→φ ,?→ψ ) = δnv0(∥?→φ ∥, ∥?→ψ ∥)
When the lattice is the lattice of subsets of some set A, the rank of X ⊆ A coincide with its cardinal,
hence the two facts above.This suggest dv0 and dnv0 as natural generalisations of d⊖ and dα formore general
semi-lattices.
The continuations-based metric is also expressible in these minimal-weighted paths terms, but this
requires a little more work:
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Fact 18. Let v : W → R be an isotone, mapping. The mapping w : W → IR such that w : x ↦ −2−v(x) is
isotone as well. Moreover, if v is an upper valuation, then so is w.
Corollary 2. Consider the (semi-)lattice ⟨2prop,⊆, prop⟩, and the mapping v0 that assigns to each V ∈
2prop its rank, and w0 defined by w0(x) = −2−v0(x). We have
dC(?→φ ,?→ψ ) = δw0(∥?→φ ∥, ∥?→ψ ∥)
Corollary 3. d⊖, dα and dC are all pseudometrics.
4.6.3 Stronger semantic axioms
We next move to axioms that differentiate between our metrics. We start by considering the following
axiom:
d(?→φ ,?→φ?→ψ ) ≤ d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) (rebar property)
From the four metrics we have introduced, only dhamH does not satisfy it.
Fact 19. Let ∥ ⋅ ∥ be intersective. d⊖, dα and dC satisfy (rebar property).
Fact 20. Let ∥ ⋅ ∥ = ∥ ⋅ ∥t . (Lprop, dhamH ) does not satisfy (rebar property).
Assume that ∥ ⋅ ∥ is ⪯-poset-valued. The following axiom is very mild:
If ∥?→φ ∥ ⪯ ∥?→ψ ∥ then d(?→φ ,?→φ?→ψ ) ≤ d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) (antitonicity)
Fact 21. Let ∥ ⋅ ∥ satisfy adjunction and right weakening and let d be a semi-pseudometric. If d satisfies
(sem≡⇒ zero), then d satisfies (antitonicity).
4.6.4 Domain axioms for semantic pseudometrics
Domain axioms require the metric to be well-defined on large portions of the language. Given an interpre-
tation function ∥ ⋅ ∥ : L∗ → D of these sequences of sentences into some co-domain, we could expect to
have:
If?→φ ,?→ψ ∈ L∗, then d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) ∈ R. (linguistic domain)
It should be realized that the preceding axiom is relatively strong. Consider for example dhamH .
Fact 22. But (Lprop, dhamH ) does not satisfy (linguistic domain).
Fact 23. d⊖, dα , dC verify (linguistic domain)
Weakening the preceding axiom, without dropping it entirely, can be done if the co-domain of ∥ ⋅ ∥ is
a bounded poset. Recall that 
 denote the least element of a bounded poset.
If ∥?→φ ∥ ≠ 
 and ∥?→ψ ∥ ≠ 
, then d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) ∈ R. (consistent domain)
Fact 24. (Lprop, dhamH ) satisfies (consistent domain).
4.6.5 Axioms for set-valued semantic pseudometrics
If ∥ ⋅ ∥ is set-valued and target(∥ ⋅ ∥) = ℘(W) for some W and (W , δ) is a metric space then we can
investigate axioms like the following one considered in Eiter and Mannila (1997):
whenever ∥?→φ ∥ = {w} and ∥?→ψ ∥ = {v} then d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) = δ(w, v) (EM)
A semanticmetric defined as an aggregator of the values of the distance between points in the interpretation
of either sequences, will satisfy the preceding axiom.
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4.6.6 Signature invariance axioms
The next condition states that the relative proximity of conversations should not depend on irrelevant
aspects pertaining to the choice of signature.
If?→φ ,?→ψ ,?→χ ∈ L’∗ and L′ ⊆ L, then we have (weak sig inv)
dL(?→φ ,?→χ ) ≤ dL(?→ψ ,?→χ ) iff dL′(?→φ ,?→χ ) ≤ dL′(?→ψ ,?→χ )
Fact 25. (Lprop(1), δcount) and (Lprop(1), δsynt,count) satisfy (weak sig inv).
Fact 26. dhamH , d⊖, dα , dC satisfy (weak sig inv)
4.7 Preservation axioms
4.7.1 Uniform Preservation axioms
The following axiom states that extending conversations with a given piece of information should not
change the relative proximity of conversations. Formally:
If d(?→φ ,?→χ ) ≤ d(?→ψ ,?→χ ) then d(?→φ?→φ 0,?→χ?→φ 0) ≤ d(?→ψ?→φ 0,?→χ?→φ 0) (uniform preservation)
But such an axiom can lead to triviality.
Fact 27. Let ∥ ⋅ ∥ satisfy exchange, contraction and expansion and let d be a pseudometric. If d satisfies
(uniform preservation) and (sem≡⇒ zero), then whenever d(φ, χ) ≤ d(ψ, χ) then d(ψχ,φψχ) = 0.
The next corollary is slightly technical. Let us introduce a bit of notation. Let o : L∗ → IR be defined by
o(?→φ ) = d(?→є ,?→φ ), and let ∼ be the kernel of o. Let ≤o be the total pre-order induced by o, with?→φ ≤o ?→ψ
iff o(?→φ ) ≤ o(?→ψ ). Let [?→φ ] be the equivalence class of?→φ in L∗/ ∼. Let ↓[?→φ ] = {?→ψ ∈ L∗∣o(?→ψ ) ≤ o(?→φ )}
and let ↓[?→φ ]∗ be the reflexive transitive closure of ↓[?→φ ].
Corollary 4. Let ∥ ⋅ ∥ satisfy exchange, contraction, expansion and?→є −⊺ and let d be a pseudometric. If
d satisfies (uniform preservation) and (sem≡⇒ zero), then for every?→φ ,?→χ ∈ [?→φ ],?→ψ 1,?→ψ 2 ∈↓[?→φ ]∗ we
have d(?→φ ,?→ψ 1?→χ?→ψ 2) = 0.
Corollary 5. Let ∥⋅∥ satisfy exchange, contraction, expansion and?→є −⊺ and let d be a pseudometric. If d
satisfies (uniform preservation), (sem≡⇒ zero) and (min sem separation), then for every?→φ ,?→χ ∈ [?→φ ],?→ψ 1,?→ψ 2 ∈↓ [?→φ ]∗ we have ∥?→φ ∥ = ∥?→ψ 1?→χ?→ψ 2∥.
Hence (uniform preservation) comes with very disputable consequences. The converse is even more
problematic:
If d(?→φ?→φ 0,?→χ?→φ 0) ≤ d(?→ψ?→φ 0,?→χ?→φ 0) then d(?→φ ,?→χ ) ≤ d(?→ψ ,?→χ ) (uniform anti-preservation)
These two axioms are quite demanding.
Fact 28. Let ∥ ⋅ ∥ = ∥ ⋅ ∥t . dhamH satisfy neither (uniform preservation), nor (uniform anti-preservation).
Fact 29. Let ∥⋅∥ = ∥⋅∥t . dα ,d⊖ anddC satisfy neither (uniform preservation),nor (uniform anti-preservation).
But the situation is much more radical for (uniform anti-preservation): if the interpretation satisfies
very mild conditions: such as contraction, expansion and exchange, then the only semi-pseudometric
satisfying (uniform anti-preservation) and (sem≡⇒ zero), is the trivial metric.
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Fact 30. Let ∥ ⋅ ∥ be an interpretation satisfying contraction, expansion and exchange and let d be a
semi-pseudometric on target(∥ ⋅ ∥). The following are equivalent:
1. d satisfies (uniform anti-preservation) and (sem≡⇒ zero)
2. d is the trivial metric on target(∥ ⋅ ∥)
This result is a very strong argument against the reasonableness of (uniform anti-preservation).
4.7.2 Preservation axioms: close information
The preceding axioms considered extensions of two sequences with the same sequence of formulas. As we
have seen, they are too demanding. What if instead, we are interested in the relative effect of extending
with a sequences that might be more or less similar to the sequence it is extending. We could expect, that
the closer that new sequence is from the original one, the closer the resulting conversation will be from
the original one. Or at least that a reverse in respective orderings cannot occur. Formally,
If d(?→φ ,ψ1) < d(?→φ ,ψ2) then d(?→φ ,?→φ ψ1) ≤ d(?→φ ,?→φ ψ2) (action pref)
Fact 31. dhamH , d⊖, dα , dC do not satisfy (action pref)
Conversely, we can require the deviation of the resulting sequence to be smaller, whenever the original
sequence is closer to the new one by which it is extended.
If d(?→φ , χ) < d(?→ψ , χ) then d(?→φ ,?→φ χ) < d(?→ψ ,?→ψ χ) (coherent deviation)
Fact 32. Let ∥ ⋅ ∥ = ∥ ⋅ ∥t . dα satisfy neither (action pref) nor (coherent deviation).
Fact 33. Let d be a semi-pseudometric on target(∥ ⋅ ∥). The following are equivalent:
1. d satisfies (coherent deviation) and the triangle inequality
2. d is the trivial metric on target(∥ ⋅ ∥)
As we will show, the respective converses of the two preceding axioms are certainly unreasonable.
If d(?→φ ,?→φ ψ1) ≤ d(?→φ ,?→φ ψ2) then d(?→φ ,ψ1) ≤ d(?→φ ,ψ2) (converse strong action pref)
Fact 34. Let d be a pseudometric on target(∥ ⋅ ∥). The following are equivalent:
1. d satisfies (converse strong action pref)
2. d is the trivial metric on target(∥ ⋅ ∥)
If d(?→φ ,?→φ χ) ≤ d(?→ψ ,?→ψ χ) then d(?→φ , χ) ≤ d(?→ψ , χ) (converse coherent deviation)
Fact 35. Let d be a pseudometric on target(∥ ⋅ ∥). The following are equivalent:
1. d satisfies (converse coherent deviation)
2. d is the trivial metric on target(∥ ⋅ ∥)
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4.8 Conjunction and disjunction axioms
4.8.1 Conjunction axioms
Assume that ∥ ⋅ ∥ is lattice-valued. The following axiom regulates the behavior of the distance with respect
to the meet. But as we will see, it is much too demanding.
If ∥?→φ1∥ ∧ ∥?→φ2∥ ≤ ∥?→φ1∥ ∧ ∥?→φ3∥ then δ(?→φ1 ,?→φ2) ≥ δ(?→φ1 ,?→φ3) (strong ∧ rule)
Fact 36. Let ∥⋅∥be lattice-valuedand letd be a semi-pseudometric on target(∥⋅∥). Ifd satisfies (strong ∧ rule),
then whenever ∥?→φ ∥ ≤ ∥?→ψ ∥, we have d(?→χ ,?→φ ) ≥ d(?→χ ,?→ψ ) for any?→χ .
Corollary 6. Let ∥ ⋅ ∥ be lattice-valued and let d be a semi-pseudometric on target(∥ ⋅ ∥). If d satisfies
(strong ∧ rule), then whenever ∥?→φ ∥ ≤ ∥?→ψ ∥, we have d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) = d(?→ψ ,?→φ ) = 0
Corollary 7. Let ∥ ⋅ ∥ be a lattice-valued interpretation satisfying (?→є –⊺) and let d be a semi-pseudometric
on target(∥ ⋅ ∥). The following are equivalent:
1. d satisfies (strong ∧ rule) and the triangle inequality
2. d is the trivial metric on target(∥ ⋅ ∥)
Theabove facts follow from the equality case in (strong ∧ rule): for any sequences?→φ ,?→ψ1 ,?→ψ2, if?→ψ1∧?→φ =?→ψ2 ∧ ?→φ then ?→ψ1 and ?→ψ2 have to be equidistant from ?→φ . Removing this assumption yields a weakening
of (strong ∧ rule) which no longer support the trivialisation result above:
If ∥?→φ1∥ ∧ ∥?→φ2∥ < ∥?→φ1∥ ∧ ∥?→φ3∥ then δ(?→φ1 ,?→φ2) ≥ δ(?→φ1 ,?→φ3) (weak ∧ rule)
Fact 37. dhamH , d⊖ and dα do not satisfy (weak ∧ rule).
Fact 38. For any set-valued ∥ ⋅ ∥, dC verifies (weak ∧ rule).
Corollary 8. ∥ ⋅ ∥t is an intersective interpretation which yield a dC that verifies (weak ∧ rule), the triangle
inequality and is not trivial.
4.8.2 Disjunction axioms
Assume that ∥ ⋅ ∥ is lattice-valued. The following axiom is very mild.
If ∥?→ψ ∥ = ∥?→φ1∥ ∨ ∥?→φ2∥ then d(?→φ 1,?→ψ ) ≤ d(?→φ 1,?→φ 2) (∨ rule)
Fact 39. Assume that target(∥ ⋅ ∥) = ℘(W) for some non-emptyW and that ∥ ⋅ ∥ is lattice-valued. Let δ be
a metric onW . dδH satisfies (∨ rule).
Fact 40. d⊖, dα and dC also satisfy (∨ rule).
4.9 Future Directions
So far we have focused on isolating an abstract concept of semanticity for metrics. We have explored
general axioms that help us express components of this concept. We have also identified more specific
axioms that were candidates at defining the contour of a notion of ‘good behavior’ for semantic metrics,
and thus at being criterion for evaluating such metrics. We have done this at an abstract level, considering
conversations as sequences of formulas where one conversational agent plays a sequence of formulas after
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the other. The conversation thus has the structure of a (syntactic) monoid with a syntactic composition
operation of concatenation. Corresponding to sequences of formulas is their abstract interpretation in a
different, semantic space; the generic notion of a semantic interpretation furnishes the correspondence,
mapping these sequences into the semantic space.
Coming back to the goals outlined in the introduction of this chapter, the next step of our work is
to extend this perspective to structures that represent real conversations. We mention a few directions
here, each of which can be explored independently. In order to do this, we need to fill in this abstract
framework with notions that capture aspects of conversational content at various levels of detail. A first
step is to refine the notion of sequence of formulas into something that preserves more of the logical form
of conversations. Most models of discourse interpretation assume a more structured representation of
conversations, e.g., trees or graphs, in which elementary discourse units are linked together via discourse
relations to form more complex discourse units. Using such structures to represent conversations would
require us to adapt the structural properties of interpretation functions considered in Section 4.3.2 to be
able to reflect the semantics of discourse relations and the units they link together. Second we would need
to revisit the axioms that make use of concatenation, replacing the latter with a notion of a graph update
or graph extension.
Furthermore, to deal adequately with some natural language phenomena such as questions, commands,
agreements and disagreements among speakers, explicit or implicit corrections, it is natural to assume
additional structure for semantic spaces, on top of that providedby general lattices.This additional semantic
structure could also serve to refine some of our axioms, in particular those making hypotheses on lattice-
theoretic relations between the semantic interpretations of two conversations.
Different notions of semantic interpretation carry different amounts of the initial syntactic structure
into the semantic space. The classical notion of information content for a discourse erases all structural
information, mapping discourses such as Jane fell because John pushed her and John pushed Jane so she fell
into the exact same semantic interpretation (either a set of possible worlds or a set of world assignment
pairs as in SDRT and other dynamic semantic theories). Differently structured discourses, even when they
share the same meaning, however, may exhibit different semantic and pragmatic behavior, concerning
the possibility of future coreferences and of ways to extend the conversation. Intuitions dictate that these
features are important for a notion of conversational similarity. It will therefore be important to test metrics
defined on more structurally-conservative spaces, for instance conserving some aspects of the conversa-
tional graph. These metrics should match intuitions as to how far two real conversations are from each
other.
4.10 Conclusions
Our first task was to explore the concept of a semantic metric by identifying a certain number of reasonable
axioms that characterize the idea of ‘semanticity’ for a distance. We clarified the relation between these
different axioms and the triangle inequality, and we mapped out a lattice of axioms in terms of their logical
strength. Next, we explored a structured list of candidate axioms or desirable properties for any semantic
metric. We found several to be too demanding, in the sense that under some structural constraints on the
interpretation function and on the distance, they could only be satisfied by the trivial metric. These axioms
divide into a certain number of categories. First, we considered a certain number of axioms pertaining to
general properties of semantic metrics, including arguably mild assumptions about their structure, their
domain and their insensitivity to the choice of signature. Then, we considered preservation axioms that
carry a general idea of coherence between the relative proximity of sequences and of their extensions.
Finally we considered axioms that are more specific to a lattice- or a set-theoretic approach.
We concentrated on the foundational case of conversations as sequences of propositional formulae
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with a classical truth functional interpretation by studying four semantically induced metrics that looked
intuitively promising (based respectively on the ideas of symmetric semantic difference, semantic propor-
tionality, Hausdorff metric and on possible continuations). We now have a clear picture of their different
behavior. Overall however, these metrics satisfy only few of our axioms that do not lead to a triviality result.
One reason for this are the very strong structural hypotheses behind the set-theoretic, classical interpreta-
tion of the language of the propositional calculus. A further exploration of these axioms in the context of
interpretation into structures like lattices with fewer structural hypotheses and of more general families of
metrics remains to be done. We hope that the abstract setting that we have set up in this chapter can serve
a first step towards achieving this goal.
4.11 Selected proofs
Proof of Fact 2. Assume that ∀?→χ , d(?→φ ,?→χ ) = d(?→ψ ,?→χ ). In particular d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) = d(?→ψ ,?→ψ ) = 0. Hence
by (zero⇒ sem≡), ∥?→φ ∥ = ∥?→ψ ∥. qed
Proof of Fact 3. The right to left direction follows from Fact 2. For the left to right direction, assume that
d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) = 0 (i). Take any ?→χ . By triangle inequality, d(?→χ ,?→φ ) ≤ d(?→χ ,?→ψ ) + d(?→ψ ,?→φ ). Hence, by (i)
we have d(?→χ ,?→φ ) ≤ d(?→χ ,?→ψ ). Similarly we have d(?→χ ,?→ψ ) ≤ d(?→χ ,?→φ ). Hence d(?→χ ,?→ψ ) = d(?→χ ,?→φ ).
But χ was arbitrary, hence for all χ we have d(?→χ ,?→ψ ) = d(?→χ ,?→φ ). By (sem separation), it follows that∥?→φ ∥ = ∥?→ψ ∥. qed
Proof of Fact 4. ∥p¬p∥ = ∥q¬q∥ but δcount(p¬p, q¬q) = 4. qed
Proof of Fact 5. ∥p¬p∥ = ∥q¬q∥ but δsynt,count(p¬p, q¬q) = 6. qed
Proof of Fact 6. Take some φ such that card(∥φ∥) ≥ 2. qed
Proof of Fact 7. Assume that ∥?→φ ∥ = ∥?→ψ ∥. By (sem preservation) we have d(?→φ ,?→χ ) = d(?→ψ ,?→χ ). In par-
ticular we have d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) = d(?→ψ ,?→ψ ) = 0 qed
Proof of Fact 8. Assume that ∥?→φ1∥ = ∥?→ψ1∥. Take some?→χ . We have ∥?→χ ∥ = ∥?→χ ∥. Hence by (sem induced)
we have d(?→φ1 ,?→χ ) = d(?→ψ1 ,?→χ ). qed
Proof of Fact 9. Assume that ∥?→φ1∥ = ∥?→ψ1∥ (i) and ∥?→φ2∥ = ∥?→ψ2∥ (ii). By triangle inequality we have:
d(?→φ1 ,?→φ2) ≤ d(?→φ1 ,?→ψ1)TudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodWudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodX
0, by(sem≡⇒ zero)
+d(?→ψ1 ,?→φ2)
d(?→ψ1 ,?→φ2) ≤ d(?→ψ1 ,?→ψ2) + d(?→ψ2,?→φ2)TudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodWudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodX
0, by(sem≡⇒ zero)
Hence, d(?→φ1 ,?→φ2) ≤ d(?→ψ1 ,?→ψ2). Similarly, we have d(?→φ1 ,?→φ2) ≥ d(?→ψ1 ,?→ψ2). qed
Proof of Corollary 1. ByFact 9,d satisfies (sem induced),hence for every?→φ1 ,?→φ2,?→ψ1 ,?→ψ2 with ∥?→φ1∥ = ∥?→ψ1∥ and ∥?→φ2∥ =∥?→ψ2∥ we have
d(?→φ1 ,?→φ2) = d(?→ψ1 ,?→ψ2)
It follows that d˙(∥?→φ ∥, ∥?→ψ ∥) := d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) is well-defined. Moreover for any?→φ , d(∥?→φ ∥, ∥?→φ ∥) = d(?→φ ,?→φ ) =
0. Triangle inequality is proven similarly. qed
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Proof of Fact 10. First observe, that by triangle inequality, we have
d(?→χ ,?→φ ) ≤ d(?→χ ,?→ψ ) + d(?→ψ ,?→φ )
Now, assume that?→φ ≡ ?→ψ . By (sem≡⇒ zero) we have d(?→ψ ,?→φ ) = 0, hence d(?→χ ,?→φ ) ≤ d(?→χ ,?→ψ ). Simi-
larly, d(?→χ ,?→ψ ) ≤ d(?→χ ,?→φ ) which proves (1). qed
Proof of Fact 11. Assume that ∀χ we have d(φ, χ) = d(ψ, χ) (i). Take some ?→χ1 ,?→χ2 with ∥?→χ1∥ = ∥?→χ2∥. By
(sem≡⇒ zero) we have d(?→χ1 ,?→χ2) = 0 (ii). By triangle inequality we have:
d(?→φ ,?→χ1) ≤ d(?→φ ,?→χ2) + d(?→χ2,?→χ1)TudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodWudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodX
0, by(ii)
d(?→φ ,?→χ2) ≤ d(?→φ ,?→χ1) + d(?→χ1 ,?→χ2)TudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodWudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodX
0, by(ii)
Hence d(?→φ ,?→χ1) = d(?→φ ,?→χ2). Moreover by (i) we have d(?→φ ,?→χ2) = d(?→ψ ,?→χ2). Hence d(?→φ ,?→χ1) = d(?→ψ ,?→χ2).
Since?→χ1 ,?→χ2 were arbitrary, it follows by (min sem separation), that ∥?→φ ∥ = ∥?→ψ ∥. qed
Proof of Fact 18. Let v be an isotone upper valuation and z ≤ x, y. Assume without loss of generality that
v(y) ≥ v(x). Let 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Since 2−v(y) ≤ 2−v(x) and 1α − 1 ≥ 0, we have
2−v(y)(α − 1) + 2−v(x)( 1
α
− 1) ≥ 2−v(y) α2 − 2α + 1
α
= 2−v(y) (α + 1)2
α
≥ 0.
Hence,
−α ⋅ 2−v(y) − 1
α
2−v(x) ≤ −2−v(y) − 2−v(x).
Instantiating this result for α = 2v(z)−v(x) yields after development
−2v(z)−v(x)−v(y) − 2−v(z) ≤ −2−v(y) − 2−v(x).
Since v is an upper-valuation, we have −v(x ∨ y) ≥ v(z) − v(x) − v(y) and thus
−2−v(x∨y) − 2−v(z) ≤ −2v(z)−v(x)−v(y) − 2−v(z) ≤ −2−v(y) − 2−v(x)
i.e., w(x ∨ y) +w(z) ≤ w(x) +w(y) which concludes the proof.
The case v(x) ≥ v(y) is symmetrically dealt with. qed
Proof of Corollary 2.
δw0(∥?→φ ∥, ∥?→ψ ∥) = 2w0(∥?→φ ∥ ∪ ∥?→ψ ∥) −w0(∥?→φ ∥) −w0(∥?→ψ ∥) = −2× 2−v0(∥→φ ∥∪∥→ψ ∥) + 2v0(∥→φ ∥) + 2v0(∥→ψ ∥).
Since v0 coincidewith card() on ⟨2prop,⊆, prop⟩ and card∥?→φ ∥ ∪ ∥?→ψ ∥ = card∥?→φ ∥+card∥?→ψ ∥−card∥?→φ ∥ ∩ ∥?→ψ ∥,
an easy calculation step let us fall back to dC(?→φ ,?→ψ ). qed
Proof of Fact 20. Let ?→φ :=(p1 ∧ p2) ∨ (¬p1 ∧ ¬p2 ∧ ¬p3) and ?→ψ :=(p1 ∧ (p2 ⇒ p3)), and assume some
intersective interpretation of concatenation. We have ∥?→φ?→ψ ∥=∥p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3∥. dhamH (?→φ ,?→φ?→ψ ) = 3, but
dhamH (?→φ ,?→ψ ) = 1. qed
Proof of Fact 22. For any φ, dhamH is neither well-defined for (φ,
) nor for (
,φ). qed
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Proof of Fact 25. Adding a new propositional letter that does not occur in either sequence will not affect
the symmetric difference of the range of formulas, nor the symmetric difference of the respective signature.
Allowing for the negation of the propositional letter that was previously forbidden will not change the sets
either. qed
Proof of Fact 27. Assume thatd(φ, χ) ≤ d(ψ, χ) then d(φψχ, χψχ) ≤ d(ψψχ, χψχ). Byexchange,contraction,
expansion, and (sem≡⇒ zero), we have d(ψψχ, χψχ) = 0. Hence d(φψχ, χψχ) = 0. By exchange,
contraction, expansion, and (sem≡⇒ zero), we have d(φψχ, χψ) = 0. Concluding our proof. qed
Proof of Corollary 4. We only give the idea of the proof. The idea of the proof is to define a linear order
on L∗ compatible with ≤o. By induction, using Fact (27) we first show the claim for formulas in the same
o-equivalence class, then we show that the claim propagate downward, that is for every?→ψ ∈↓[?→φ ]. Finally
we show that the claim propagates with transitive closure. qed
Proof of Corollary 5. Direct from Fact 11 and Corollary 4. qed
Proof of Fact 28. Let k ≥ 2, n = 2k. Now let
φ := p1 ⇒ (¬p2 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬pn) ∧ ¬p1 ⇒ (p2 ∧ . . . ∧ pn),
ψ := p1 ∧ ¬p2 ∧ . . . ∧ p2k−1 ∧ ¬p2k ,
χ := p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn and φ0 := p1. Since k ≥ 2 we have
1 = dhamH (φ, χ) < dhamH (φ, χ) = k, and,
n − 1 = dhamH (φφ0, χφ0) > dhamH (φφ0, χφ0) = k = n/2
Concluding our proof. qed
Proof of Fact 30. (1⇒ 2). Take some?→φ ,?→ψ . By contraction, expansion and exchange we have
∥?→φ?→φ?→ψ ∥ = ∥?→ψ?→φ?→ψ ∥
Hence by (sem≡⇒ zero), d(?→φ?→φ?→ψ ,?→ψ?→φ?→ψ ) = 0 (i). Hence d(?→φ?→φ?→ψ ,?→ψ?→φ?→ψ ) ≤ d(?→ψ?→φ?→ψ ,?→ψ?→φ?→ψ ) (i).
Now, let?→χ = ?→ψ and?→φ0 = ?→φ?→ψ . By (i) and (uniform anti-preservation) we have
If d(?→φ?→φ?→ψ ,?→ψ?→φ?→ψ ) ≤ d(?→ψ?→φ?→ψ ,?→ψ?→φ?→ψ ) then d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) ≤ d(?→ψ ,?→ψ ) = 0
Hence by (i), d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) = 0. Concluding the proof for this direction. The other direction is trivial. qed
Proof of Fact 32. Let n ∈ ω be such that n > 5. Moreover let: φ := (p3∧ . . .∧pn)∧¬(p1∧p2),ψ1 := (p1∨ . . .∨
pn)∧¬(p2∧ . . .∧ pn) and ψ2 := (p2∧ . . .∧ pn). We have dα(φ,ψ1) = 1− 2n+3 = n+1n+3 > dα(φ,ψ2) = 1− 14 = 34 .
But we have dα(φ,φψ1) = 1 − 23 = 13 < dα(φ,φψ2) = 1 − 13 = 23 . qed
Proof of Fact 33. Take some?→φ ,?→ψ . By (coherent deviation) we have
If d(?→φ ,?→є ) < d(?→ψ ,?→є ) then d(?→φ ,?→φ?→є ) < d(?→ψ ,?→ψ?→є )
If d(?→ψ ,?→є ) < d(?→φ ,?→є ) then d(?→ψ ,?→ψ?→є ) < d(?→φ ,?→φ?→є )
Since?→φ ,?→ψ were arbitrary, it follows that for any?→φ ,?→ψ , d(?→φ ,?→є ) = d(?→ψ ,?→є ). In particular d(?→φ ,?→є ) =
d(?→ψ ,?→є ) = d(?→є ,?→є ) = 0. Hence by (triangle inequality) we have ∀?→φ ,?→ψ d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) ≤ d(?→φ ,?→є ) +
d(?→є ,?→ψ ) = 0. qed
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Proof of Fact 34. (1⇒ 2). Take some?→φ ,?→ψ . We have
0 = d(?→φ ,?→φ?→є ) ≤ d(?→φ ,?→φ?→ψ )
Hence by (converse strong action pref) d(?→φ ,?→є ) ≤ d(?→φ ,?→ψ ). But ψ was arbitrary, hence, in particular
d(?→φ ,?→є ) ≤ d(?→φ ,?→φ ) = 0. But φ was arbitrary as well, hence ∀χd(?→φ ,?→є ) = 0. Hence by triangle inequal-
ity for any formula?→φ ,?→ψ we have d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) ≤ d(?→φ ,?→є ) + d(?→є ,?→ψ ) = 0. Concluding our proof. qed
Proof of Fact 35. (1⇒ 2). Take some?→φ and?→ψ . We have
0 = d(?→φ ,?→φ?→є ) ≤ d(?→є ,?→є ?→є ) = 0
By (converse coherent deviation) d(?→φ ,?→є ) ≤ d(?→є ,?→є ) = 0 (i). Similarly, we have d(?→ψ ,?→є ) = 0 (ii).
By (i), (ii) and triangle inequality we have d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) ≤ d(?→φ ,?→є )+ d(?→є ,?→ψ ) = 0. Concluding our proof.
qed
Proof of Fact 36. Take some ?→χ and assume that ∥?→φ ∥ ≤ ∥?→ψ ∥. Since target(∥ ⋅ ∥) is a lattice. We have∥?→χ ∥ ∧ ∥?→φ ∥ ≤ ∥?→χ ∥ ∧ ∥?→ψ ∥. Hence by (strong ∧ rule) δ(?→χ ,?→φ ) ≥ δ(?→χ ,?→ψ ). qed
Proof of Corollary 6. Assume that ∥?→φ ∥ ≤ ∥?→ψ ∥. Since d satisfies (strong ∧ rule), we have by Fact 36 we
have in particular 0 = δ(?→φ ,?→φ ) ≥ δ(?→φ ,?→ψ ) = δ(?→ψ ,?→φ ). qed
Proof of Corollary 7. (1⇒ 2). Take two arbitrary?→φ ,?→ψ . By (?→є –⊺) we have ∥?→φ ∥ ≤ ∥?→є ∥ and ∥?→ψ ∥ ≤ ∥?→є ∥.
Since d satisfies (strong ∧ rule), it follows by corollary 6 that d(?→φ ,?→є ) = d(?→є ,?→ψ ) = 0. By triangle
inequality it follows that d(?→φ ,?→ψ ) = 0. The (2⇒ 1) direction is trivial. qed
Proof of Fact 38. Take?→φ ,?→ψ1 ,?→ψ2 with ∥?→φ ∥ ∩ ∥?→ψ1∥ ⊊ ∥?→φ ∥ ∩ ∥?→ψ2∥. And consider the cardinalities assigned
in Figure 4.2. Let X1 := α1 + η0 and let X2 := α2 + η0. Using these cardinalities and inserting them in the
∥→φ ∥
∥
→ψ2∥
∥
→ψ1∥
η1 η0 α1η2Xφ
0
α2
Figure 4.2: Assigning cardinalities to the respective intersections.
expression of the distance, gives us:
dC(φ,ψ1) = 2card(∥
→φ )∥ + 2card(∥→ψ1∥) − 2 ⋅ 2card(∥→φ ∥∩∥→ψ1∥)
2card(∥
→φ ∥)+card(∥→ψ1∥)
= 2Xφ+η1+η2 + 2X1+η1 − 2 ⋅ 2η1
2Xφ+X1+2η1+η2
Similarly:
dC(φ,ψ2) = 2Xφ+η1+η2 + 2X2+η1+η2 − 2 ⋅ 2η1+η22Xφ+X2+2η1+2η2
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From the two previous expression, after simplifications we find:
dC(φ,ψ1) − dC(φ,ψ2) = 2Xφ(2X2+η2 − 2X1) + 2(2X1 − 2X2)2Xφ+X1+X2+η1+η2
From the assumption that?→φ ∩?→ψ1 ⊊ ?→φ ∩?→ψ2, it follows that η2 ≥ 1, hence:
2Xφ(2X2+η2 − 2X1) + 2(2X1 − 2X2) ≥ 2X2+η2 − 2X2+1 + 2X1+1 − 2X1 ≥ 0
which concludes the proof. qed
Proof of Fact 39. Take?→φ 1,?→φ 2. Assume that ∥?→ψ ∥ = ∥?→φ1∥ ∨ ∥?→φ2∥ (i). By definition, we have
dδH(?→φ 1,?→φ 2) =max{max
x∈∥→φ1∥
min
y∈∥→φ2∥
δ(x, y),
max
y∈∥→φ2∥
min
x∈∥→φ1∥
δ(x, y)}
Hence, we are in one of two cases.
(1) maxx∈∥→φ1∥miny∈∥→φ2∥ δ(x, y) = dδH(?→φ1 ,?→φ2), or,
(2) maxy∈∥→φ2∥minx∈∥→φ1∥ δ(x, y) = dδH(?→φ1 ,?→φ2).
Case 1.There are two subcases.
Subcase 1a. Assume that dδH(?→φ 1,?→ψ ) =maxx∈∥→φ1∥ miny∈∥→ψ ∥ (a). By (i),
max
x∈∥→φ1∥
min
y∈∥→ψ ∥
≤ max
x∈∥→φ1∥
min
y∈∥→φ 2∥
By (a) and (1) we have dδH(?→φ 1,?→ψ ) ≤ dδH(?→φ1 ,?→φ2).
Subcase 1b. dδH(?→φ1 ,?→ψ ) =maxy∈∥→ψ ∥minx∈∥→φ1∥ δ(x, y) (b). Since δ is ametricwe havemaxy∈∥→φ1∥minx∈∥→φ1∥ δ(x, y) =
0. Hence by (i) and (b) we have dδH(?→φ1 ,?→ψ ) = maxy∈∥→φ 2∥minx∈∥→φ1∥ δ(x, y) (ii). But by (1) and defini-
tion of dδH(?→φ1 ,?→φ2) we have maxy∈∥→φ 2∥minx∈∥→φ1∥ δ(x, y) ≤ dδH(?→φ1 ,?→φ2) (iii). By (ii) and (iii) we have
dδH(?→φ1 ,?→ψ ) ≤ dδH(?→φ1 ,?→φ2).
Case 2. Since δ is a metric we have
max
y∈∥→φ1∥
min
x∈∥→φ1∥
δ(x, y) = 0
Hence by (2), we have
max
y∈∥→ψ ∥
min
x∈∥→φ1∥
δ(x, y) = dδH(?→φ1 ,?→φ2)
= max
y∈∥→φ2∥
min
x∈∥→φ1∥
δ(x, y)
= dδH(?→φ1 ,?→φ2) (iv)
We now consider two subcases.
Subcase 2a. dδH(?→φ 1,?→ψ ) =maxx∈∥→φ1∥miny∈∥→ψ ∥ (a). But since δ is a metric we have maxx∈∥→φ1∥miny∈∥→ψ ∥ ≤
maxx∈∥→φ1∥miny∈∥→φ 2∥ (v). But bydefinition d
δ
H(?→φ1 ,?→φ2) and (2)we havemaxx∈∥→φ1∥miny∈∥→φ 2∥ ≤ dδH(?→φ 1,?→φ 2)
(vi). By (v), (vi) and (a), it follows that dδH(?→φ 1,?→ψ ) ≤ dδH(?→φ1 ,?→φ2).
Subcase 2b. Assume that. dδH(?→φ1 ,?→ψ ) =maxy∈∥→ψ ∥minx∈∥→φ1∥ δ(x, y) (b). By (iv), it follows that dδH(?→φ1 ,?→ψ )= dδH(?→φ1 ,?→φ2).
Hence in all cases dδH(?→φ 1,?→ψ ) ≤ dδH(?→φ1 ,?→φ2). Concluding our proof. qed
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Conversational Games
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In chapters 1 to 4 we have been concerned with the logical form of discourse with a focus on its
structural properties induced by coherence relations. We have studied the problem of, given two logical
representations of the same discourse, determining how they agree and how they differ, and quantifying
their similarity or difference.
Chapter 4 made a step in another direction. A discourse is a dynamically evolving object; it has a
meaning at each point in time, which evolves as new discourse moves enter the context. We abtracted over
a specific account of discourse structure, adopting a perspective of discourses as a sequences of moves
equipped with an interpretation function mapping sequences to a given semantic space. Then we inves-
tigated the links between different kind of structures for the semantic space (sets, ordered sets, lattices),
properties of the interpretation function, for instance regarding the effect of new discourse moves with re-
spect to the structure of the semantic space, and properties of metrics of semantic similarity. We proposed
different possible such metrics, the purpose of which is to grasp a scalar notion of ‘semantic deviation’
between two discourses, or given the abstract perspective that we adopted, two conversations.
Indeed, dialogues and conversations too, are sequences of linguisticmoves, with at any point in time, an
interpretation. But conversations, in the usual sense of the word, not our abstract perspective, have indeed
more structure that what we selectively kept in chapter 4: basically, they involve different speakers, therefore
semantic representationsmust be structured in order to keep tract of who said what. Conversations are also
generally thought of has involving a sequence of turns of talk. Their structure is related to that of discourse,
as within and accross a speaker’s different contributions at different turns of talk, the said speaker generally
tries to remain coherent in a sense now familiar from chapter 2. Then again, there is more: for instance,
speakers also generally tries to respond to the interlocutors moves, in a certain, relevant way.
The question we now ask is thus: what is the structure of conversations, and how to formally model
the effects, in particular, the semantic effects, of a conversational exchange? We will see that conversational
meaning is tied to conversational agents’ rationality, and that so-called strategic contexts are a challenge
for existing theories. We will propose a new model of conversations that addresses these issues.
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5.1 Specificities of conversations
5.1.1 Agreement, disputes and grounding
Obviously, the fundamental difference between monologues, and conversations of any kind, is the number
of participants they involve who actually perform linguistic actions (produce utterances, and respond to
others). In the former case, only one agent is conveying content, though there are one or more addressees
that interpret what is said. In the second case addressees might speak too. The more striking implication
of this, maybe, is the possibility for the listeners of a speaker’s contribution to disagree and express their
disagreement, to which the speaker must then react. In the words of Clark and Brennan (1991): “When
Alan speaks to Barbara, he must do more than merely plan and issue utterances, and she must do more than
just listen and understand.They have to coordinate on content”. Hence, while the informational content of a
monologue is, at least in the correspondence theory of truth, arguably reducible to a single (yet structured
and complex) predication, which is, or is not, satisfied by the actual world, the picture is more complicated
for conversations.
It takes for a semantic representation to accuretely model the informational content of a conversation,
to separate what is commonly agreed on by every agent and what is not. If agents have expressed diverging
views, these must be captured and attributed to their resepective owner. This is further complicated by the
different level of grounding that exist, and concerning each of which agents might signal disagreement or
uncertainty: following Clark (1996) there are four levels of grounding:
• of the signal that has been used.
• of the words that this signal convey.
• of the meanings that these words convey.
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• of the commitments on the signal’s user’s part regarding these meanings.
Hence we see that a minimal requirement on a semantic model of conversation, is to separate in the
representation the point of view of the conversation’s participants. To do this, most approaches, in the vein
of Stalnaker (2002), assume a dynamically changing set (with possibly additional structure) of propositions
forming the common ground, the set of informations that agents mutually take as presupposed, when
planing, performing and interpreting new utterances, and a perspective of conversational dynamics where
newly issued content, under specific conditions only, contributes to enrich the common ground, in a specific
way.
5.1.2 Illocutionary acts and rationality
A second distinction between monologues and conversations, is the large variety of different illocutionary
acts they involve. While such acts are not the prerogative of conversations, as coherence relations, chapter 2
has shown, are a staple of dicourse logical form and typically introduce semantic constraints representing
illocutionary effects of the use of a discourse unit in context (“people mean more than they say”). Discourse
however, does not involve the same diversity of speech acts, such as questions, answers, requests, promises,
orders, and others (Searle, 1962, 1965, 1969, inter alia) at the same scale as conversation does.
In terms of SDRT (and other models), we will see, this translates as a whole new set of relational
speech acts linking one to others contributions, such as relations of question-answer pair ( ), question
elaboration ( ), corrections (	

) or acknowledgments (
).
This proliferation of illocutionary acts is to be expected given that conversations are really an exchange
of actions: their effects, rather than solely describing a state of affairs, also change the world as they are
performed. These actions are performed for a purpose, which is for their performer to achieve some
objectives. As such conversations are thus, essentially, rational activities (Grice, 1975).
Hence, rationality, in return, affects the choice of messages to send and the way agents interpret those
messages. A common consequence of these considerations and those formerly made on disagreements
and grounding, is that, the semantic effects of a conversational move are not expressible as a standalone
content, rather, they must be given in terms of an agent’s propositional attitudes toward such a content.The
propositional attitudes involved and the way to model changes brought by linguistic actions vary with the
proposal; so-called cognitive approaches to meaning ressort to private attitudes forming an agent cognitive
state, such as beliefs, desires, or intentions (BDI). Gricean, Neo-gricean approaches, and relevance theory
(Sperber and Wilson, 1986) fall into this category, but also computational approaches such as (Grosz and
Sidner, 1986; Allen and Litman, 1987) which borrow techniques classical in Aritificial Intelligence: BDI,
planning and plan-recognition models. Arguably, (see section 6.4), recent game theoretic approaches to
conversations (e.g., Benz et al., 2005; Franke et al., 2009) also models meaning in term of belief changes.
Thesemodels often involve a view of conversations as a joint activity with a common task to solve, or at least
a shared interest to attain a given goal. As a result they often take private attitudes as primitive semantic unit,
defining locutionary and illucotionary effects in term of agents belief in equilibrium (Franke 2009 however,
reintroduces conventional meaning as a focal point in the interpretation process). On the other hand Ham-
blin (1987); Asher and Lascarides (2003); Lascarides and Asher (2009) rather ressort to an objective, public
attitude of commitment, arguing that conventional meaning remains a primitive which, combined with
rationality might form a basis for one to adopt a given belief, rather than the other way around. Correla-
tively, Asher and Lascarides (2003); Lascarides and Asher (2009) decrease the importance of cooperativity
in their account by increasing that of a rich representation of conversations’ logical structure.
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5.2 Semantic models of conversations
Webriefly review two influentmodels offering fine-grained representations of the semantics andpragmatics
of conversations: KoS (Ginzburg, 2012) on the one hand, and D-SDRT Lascarides and Asher (2009) on the
other hand.
5.2.1 KoS
KoS is a dynamic semanticmodel of conversational interaction: KoS keeps track of the evolution of a seman-
tic representation of conversational content, expressed in the framework of type theory with record (TTR,
Cooper, 2005). KoS integrates concepts from a large set of different areas in linguistics, as e.g.
• dynamic semantic’s view of meaning as update on contexts,
• Clark’s considerations on grounding,
• phonology
• syntax (using Head Driven Phrase Structure embedding in TTR)
• Pragmatics’ common ground.
• An account of discourse structure using a Questions Under Discussion framework (QUD, Roberts,
2012)
Indeed, one of KoS major contributions, is to achieve a simultaneous and coherent application of
such various sources of linguistic knowledge to the modeling of challenging semantic phenomena such as
clarification questions, which can target every level of semantic interpretation. The very large scope of KoS
representations, which include descriptions of signals at every level: phonems, syntactic units, semantic
representation, illocutionary effects and metatalk relations, allows the theory to achieve an unprecedented
explicative power of semantics in spoken dialogs in their full complexity, i.e. including, and accounting
for, hesitations, disfluencies or repairs, among other such phenomena.
KoS implements the dynamics of conversations through a grammar of interaction. Agents are assigned
a Dialog Game Board (DGB) that dialog moves affect in a specific way, modeled in the theory through a
pair of preconditions and effects. Interestingly, DGB involve a public component, and a private one. Two
agents’ public component need not match perfectly, as a consequence, though correlated in some way,
agents’ public attitudes need not involve only facts of the common ground as in more classical approaches.
This is, we think, an attractive feature of the model, and one that the commitment-based semantics we
propose in part III will reproduce, in a model-theoretic setting.
The private and public parts of the DGBs together represent a full informational state for an agent.
In that sense as well, the theory is one of interaction: assuming two (or more) agents represented with
their complete informational states, the theory describes how conversational interaction will make these
informational states dynamically evolve.
In contrast, the D-SDRT approach that we present next, is more restricted in scope, but focus on an
objective notion of meaning that generally do not require knowledge of the private component of agents’
informational states.
5.2.2 D-SDRT
D-SDRT augment SDRT that we presented in chapter section 2.3 with an account of conversations, the
semantics of which is expressed in terms of commitments.
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Semantic representation in D-SDRT are called D-SDRSs; the switch from SDRS to D-SDRSs involve
two changes:
• At every point in the conversation, each conversational agent is assigned her own SDRS.
• The interpretation of D-SDRS is now expressed in terms of context-change potential over p-tuple
of (world, assignment) pairs with p the number of agents involved in the conversation.
More formally, recall our definition of an SDRS: with Π be an infinite countable set of discourse labels,
and R be a set of rhetorical relations, An SDRS is a tuple S = ⟨A,O, E, πtop, f ⟩, with (roughly) A a set
of labels, πtop ∈ A, O a set of edges forming a tree over A, E a set of directed edges forming a directed
acyclic graph over A, and f assigning content to EDUs (plus other additional constraints, see section 2.3).
D-SDRSs are defined over SDRSs as follows:
Definition42 (Syntax ofD-SDRSs). Assume a set of agents I. AD-SDRS is a tuple ⟨n, spk,T ,A,O, E, πtop, f ⟩
where
• spk assigns each turn k ∈ [0, n] a unique speaker i ∈ I.
• S = ⟨A,O, E, πtop, f ⟩ is an SDRS
• T is a mapping from [1; n] × I to subsets of A that assigns a pair of (turn, speaker) (k, i) a subset
Ak,i such that S↾Ak ,i is an SDRS. We let Sk,i = S↾Ak ,i .
• With <S denoting ‘spoken order’, i.e. the order of production of EDUs by speaker, and last(X) the
last EDU label in the set X ⊆ A w.r.t. to <s, we have last(An,spk(n)) = last(A), and last(Ak,i) <
last(Ak+1,spk(k+1)) for every k < n and i ∈ I.
Crucially the syntax ofD-SDRS allow conversational agents to share labels across their SDRSs, and their
respective SDRSs, at each turn must correspond to a fragment of a common, complete SDRS. Intuitively,
this corresponds to a classical, binary view on grounding implemented through discourse labels: at some
turn, either every agent have integrated a label into their respective SDRS, in which case we might say that
the label is grounded, in the sense that discourse participant at least agree that this label and content are
part of the context. Note that if a label is grounded in that sense then so are all the relations that this label
bear to other grounded constituents, or at least one of them fails to acknowledge (at this point) that the
speech act that the label represents occured.
D-SDRSs interpretation is expressed as a context change potential over commitment slates, where the
change of each entry in the commitment slates relies on the interpretation of SDRSs in section 2.3:
Definition 43 (Interpretation of D-SDRSs). Let p = card(I). A commitment slate is a p-tuple of world-
assignment pairs (w, f ). Given a commitment slate σ Let σ[p] denote the kth component of σ .
Let D = ⟨n, spk,T ,A,O, E, πtop⟩ be a D-SDRS. The context change potential of D is provided by:
σ Dd σ ′ iff ∀i ∈ I σ[i] An,i σ ′[i]
With ⋅d the interpretation of D-SDRSs and ⋅ the interpretation of (regular) SDRSs.
Intuitivively, a commitment slate σ represent a set of commitments for each agent: agent i is commmited
to the set of propositions representedby theDRSs that the (world, assignment) pair σ[i] validates.Moreover,
the content change potential at turn k is given by that of the D-SDRS ⟨k, spk,T , S↾Ak ,spk(k)⟩, which gives an
idea of the dynamic evolution of agents’ commitments throughout the conversation.
What we have called a binary view on grounding is tied to the abscence of a commitmentmodality into
the logical language: commitments come as an external machinery provided by commitment slate, and are
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not objects that agents might talk about (since context change potential is always evaluated always entries
of commitment slates separately). In part III of this thesis, we will come back to these considerations and
propose a way to add ambiguity and commitments about commitments to the picture.
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6.1 Game theoretic pragmatics
Assuming that conversationalists are rational, what they say and how they interpret what is said should
follow as actions that maximize their interests given what they believe. Conversational moves should be
calculated via an estimation of best return given what other participants say, which is a natural setting for
game theoretic analyses.
Game theory has had several applications in pragmatics Lewis (1969); Parikh (1991, 2000, 2001); Benz
et al. (2005); Franke (2008); Franke et al. (2009); van Rooij (2003, 2004). Much of this literature uses the
notion of a signaling game, which is a sequential (dynamic) game in which one player with a knowledge
of the actual state sends a signal and the other player who has no knowledge of the state chooses an action,
usually an interpretation of the signal. The standard set up supposes that both players have common
knowledge of each other’s preference profiles as well as their own over a set of commonly known set of
possible states, actions and signals. The economics literature contains a detailed examination of signaling
games, Spence (1973); Crawford and Sobel (1982); Farrell (1993a); Rabin (1990), to name just a few important
papers in this area.
6.2 Strategic contexts
Conversations often involve an element of planning and calculation of how best one can achieve one’s
interests. Previous sections have mentioned game-theoretic approaches to the semantics and pragmatics
of conversations which represents the very meaning of conversational moves as a byproduct of contextual
strategic reasoning. However, such models implicitely assume that conversationalists share a common
interest in solving a given task, an assumption which echoes the gricean maxim of cooperativity. How
these models behave when cooperativity is dropped, is something that we will discuss a little more ahead
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in this chapter. We only remark for the time being, that they have not been purposedly constructed or
extensively tested for such kind of non-cooperative data.
More generally,while there is a large literature in linguistics and inAI on cooperative conversation stem-
ming from Grice (1975), there is little theoretical and formal analysis of conversation in non-cooperative
situations. The work of Traum and Allen (1994), where cooperativity is determined only by the social
conventions guiding conversation, obligations that do not presuppose speakers to adopt each other’s goals,
is an important exception. But still, the formal structure of such conversations remains largely unexplored.
From this section onwards, we will therefore be interested in how conversations proceed in a setting where,
precisely, a general assumption of cooperativity does not hold, i.e. in which dialogue agents cannot assume
that their interests coincide with those of their interlocutors. We will argue that a form of communication
survives in those context, at least in a sense that we will define, and propose a formal theory of message
exchange in settings where agents do not necessarily share interests and goals. We think that the study of
such settings constitutes a promising starting point for achieving a general model of conversation.
In particular, a little explored element in linguistics is the general “shape” of a conversation, its overall
structure and the effects of this structure on content. The goals of conversational participants and the
context of moves they have already made explain why they make the subsequent discourse moves they do
and give a coherence to the conversation as a whole. For conversations where agents share conversational
goals and interests, a broadly Gricean answer explored by Grosz and Sidner (1986); Grosz and Kraus (1993)
inter alia is that the discourse is organized around a problem that it is in the common interest of the
participants to resolve; the structure of the conversation reflects the structure of the decision problem, or
rather the reasoning of conversational participants to construct a plan that solves the common decision
problem.
Non cooperative conversations, conversations where cooperativity or shared goals and interests cannot
be assumed, don’t instantiate reasoning about a common decision problem. Consider a debate between two
political candidates. Each candidate has a certain number of points she wants to convey to the audience;
each wants to promote her own position at the expense of the other’s. Strategic conversations are also
reactive: to achieve their goals, each participant needs to plan for anticipated responses from the other. To
explain “what is going on” in such a conversation, we need to appeal to the participants’ discourse goals,
which may depend on the goals of the participants’ interlocutors. Similar strategic reasoning about what
one says is a staple of board room or faculty meetings, bargaining sessions, and even conversations with
one’s children.These observations indicate that strategic conversations are games, and debates are typically
0 sum games. Typically only one agent can win, though there may also be draws. Such conversations are
common.
Grasping the general conversational goals of conversationalists does not suffice, however, to determine
the structure of a conversation. Since conversations should be the result of rational inference to the best
means for achieving one’s conversational goals given one’s information about the discourse context, partic-
ular linguistic moves in a conversation should be related to an overall conversational goal. For cooperative
conversations, we need to describe the linguistic reflection of the reasoning about a common decision
problem, and this means we need to talk about the way clauses in a text rhetorically relate to each other and
how such related clauses can combine to form more complex discourse units bearing rhetorical relations
to other discourse constituents in a way that has become familiar not only from Grosz and Sidner but from
theories of discourse structure like the ones we introduced in chapter 2. The interaction between goals and
particular moves is important for understanding monologue as well, as one can ask what “problem” the
author was trying to solve in a particular passage; there is a close correspondence between a coherent text’s
discourse structure and the text’s “goal”. We aim to tell a similar story for conversations in not necessarily
cooperative settings. Given certain general conversational goals for our conversational participants, we
want to track how particular discourse moves detailed in a theory like SDRT takes one dialogue agent
towards her conversational goals or thwarts them.
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To get a better idea of the structure of conversations in strategic settings, we start from two intuitions.
First, there is a strong intuition that many strategic conversations have a determinate outcome. One dia-
logue agent can “win” if she can play certain conversational moves; and if she doesn’t, she loses. Second,
another equally strong intuition is that, in many conversations, some conversational strategies, and some
winning conditions or conversational goals, are more complex and more difficult to achieve than others.
Understanding and categorizing such winning conditions and their strategies are an important part of
understanding the large scale structure of conversations. In addition, they also determine whether a con-
versational agent has won the strategic conversational game, which is one important communicative effect
of the conversation. But how can we measure or compare such strategies? We will enforce to systematize
these intuitions and offer an answer to this question.
To this aim, we first introduce a set of key examples of strategic conversations, as well as their intuitive
winning conditions. This will help us fix intuitions and we will regularly come back to and discuss these
examples in subsequent sections and chapters.
6.3 Key examples and intuitions
6.3.1 examples
We present here examples of strategic conversations of two kinds: linguistic reports of real or constructed
conversations and their context, on the one hand, and unrealized strategic contexts and there winning
conditions (more like thought-experiments) on the other hand. Our first and simplest example is of the
latter kind:
(6.3.1)Suppose a candidate,CandidateA,has a joint interviewwith another competing candidate,Candidate
B, for an academic position. Suppose Candidate A has proved an important theorem and she knows
that during the interview if she can mention this, she will have “won” the interview by getting the
job over the smarter candidate B, as long as she can mention this fact, no matter at what point of the
meeting she says so. This is her winning condition.
In the following example from Solan and Tiersma (2005), a prosecutor wants Bronston to say whether
he had a bank account in Switzerland or not; Bronston does not want to make such an admission. His
winning condition is to not answer the question directly, but only to implicate an answer that he doesn’t
have a bank account. He does not want to commit either to having or to not having a bank account.
(6.3.2)a. Prosecutor: Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?
b. Bronston: No, sir.
c. Prosecutor: Have you ever?
d. Bronston: The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.
A non-courtroom variant of example (6.3.2) is example (6.3.3). The background is that Janet and Justin
are a couple, Justin is the jealous type, and Valentino is Janet’s former boyfriend.23
(6.3.3)a. Justin: Have you been seeing Valentino this past week?
b. Janet: Valentino has mononucleosis.
Janet’s response implicates that she hasn’t seen Valentino, whereas in fact though Valentino has mononu-
cleosis she has been seeing him.
23Thanks to Chris Potts and Matthew Stone for this example.
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Consider a voire dire examination in a medical malpractice suit where the plaintiff lawyer (LP) has as a
goal to return repeatedly to the topic about the division of a nerve during a surgery. This goal has a further
objective of getting the witness (D) to characterize the surgical operation as incompetent and mishandled.
Repeatedly coming back to the topic can wear D down as actually happened in the case we cite.
(6.3.4)a. LP: And also, he put an electrical signal on that nerve, and it was dead. It didn’t do anything
down in the hand, it didn’t make the hand twitch?
b. D: Correct.
c. LP: And we know in addition to that, that Dr. Tzeng tore apart this medial antebrachial cuta-
neous nerve?
d. D: Correct.
e. LD: Objection.
f. THE COURT: Overruled.
g. D: Correct. There was a division of that nerve. I’m not sure I would say “tore apart” would be
the word that I would use.
h. LP: Oh, there you go. You’re getting a hint from your lawyer over here, so do you want to retract
what you’re saying?
The defendant was resisting this line of attack relatively well, but then made an error by agreeing to LP’s
loaded question.
During the Dan Quayle-Lloyd Bentsen Vice-Presidential debate of 1988, Quayle was repeatedly ques-
tioned about his experience and his qualifications to be President. Quayle attempted to compare his ex-
perience to the young John Kennedy’s to answer these questions; his winning condition was probably to
suggest with this comparison that like Kennedy he was a worthy Presidential candidate. Part of his goal
too was to have this comparison pass without criticism (perhaps because he couldn’t defend it adequately),
and so it was indirect. However, Bentsen made a discourse move that Quayle didn’t anticipate.
(6.3.5)a. Quayle: [. . . ]the question you’re asking is, "What kind of qualifications does Dan Quayle have
to be president," [. . . ] I have far more experience than many others that sought the office of vice
president of this country. I have as much experience in the Congress as Jack Kennedy did when
he sought the presidency.[. . . ]
b. Bensten: Senator, I served with Jack Kennedy. I knew Jack Kennedy. Jack Kennedy was a friend
of mine. Senator, you’re no Jack Kennedy.
c. Quayle: That was really uncalled for, Senator.
d. Bentsen: You are the one that was making the comparison, Senator — and I’m one who knew
him well.[. . . ]
Bentsen’s surprise move successfully attacked Quayle’s strategy to establish a comparison between himself
and John Kennedy. Quayle had no effective defense and lost the debate handily.
(6.3.6)Allegedly, the physicist and Nobel laureate Richard Feynmann decided the topics of his next lecture
in advance and prepared for it for over 8 hours. However, when he entered the class he would start off
with: “So what shall we discuss today?” But he would always have a strategy to steer the conversation
to the topics he had prepared for, whatever his students, who always wanted to stump him (and so
had opposing interests to Feynmann’s), would answer. Feynmann’s winning condition was eventually
to get to his prepared topic and stick to it for the remainder of the lecture.
Our examples so far have described or been excerpted from finite conversations that are relatively
circumscribed. But conversations can occur over a much longer period, say over an entire Presidential
campaign as in our next example. Nevertheless, they are still linguistic conversations.
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(6.3.7)Recall President Clinton’s adage “it’s the economy stupid.”What Clintonmeant is that he should keep
the conversation focussed on questions concerning the economy in the extended debate between his
Democratic team and the opposing Republican one during the 1992 Presidential campaign. As long
as Clinton was able to bring the debate repeatedly back to a discussion of the economy, he achieved
his winning condition.
From the examples listed above, we draw a handful of principles that we think are essential constitutive
properties of strategic settings and that a conversational model needs to take into account:
6.3.2 Important features of conversations
We claim the following are important features of strategic conversations (and perhaps of conversations
generally).
(I) People have conversations for purposes. Their conversations are successful when they achieve those
objectives. Crucially, some of these objectives involve commitments to contents by other conver-
sational participants. In all conversations, including those where one person’s gain from the con-
versation is another person’s loss, the interlocutors’ contributions force them to commit to certain
contents, which are the conventional meanings and implicatures of their utterances in the context.
(II) In principle, conversational players have no limits on the length of their intervention, though they
are finite. In practice exogenous time limits may be imposed.
(III) Players can in principle “say anything" during their conversational turn, though what they say may
very well affect whether their conversation is successful or not.
(IV) While conversations are finite, they may have no designated “last turns;” conversational agents
cannot in general foresee who will “have the last word.” Hence, people strategize in conversations
even when they can’t anticipate when the conversation will end, what possible states might arise, or
what utterances their opponent will consider.
How well then do existing models, especially those based on signalling games, fare with respect to
these principles and strategic settings? The next section discuss this question.
6.4 Difficulties for signaling-based accounts
Signaling games and related model that we discussed in section 6.4 implements both the choice of a given
dialogue moves and the computation of its meaning, as the maximization of rational agents’ interests in a
given context. This context is formally expressed as a game arena, set of possible moves and payoffs for the
agents. As such, signaling games have proved valuable for many issues, particularly the formalization of an
effective computation of various kind of implicatures. Despite all this, we will see that they do not offer a
straightforward way to encode the principles that we outlined in the previous section, regarding strategic
contexts. As a consequence, we will propose in this thesis a models that differs from signaling games in
many aspects. Our proposed model won’t contradict the predictions of signaling models, however, but
rather propose a natural and convenient way of addressing situations that are not transparently expressible
as a signaling game’s context. We now explain why the strategic contexts we consider fall into this category.
A game requires, in order to be a reasonable candidate for modeling non-cooperative contexts, that
its structure encodes the players’ divergent preferences. As emphasized earlier, the most intuitive way of
doing that is to assume a 0 sum game. Signaling games however predict that no communication happens in
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such games: it can be shown that in equilibrium24 the sending of any message has no effect on the receiver
decision.
An immediate corollary is: assuming that the sender has the possibility of (costlessly) not sending a
message and that the sending of any message has at least an infinitesimal cost, є, makes it optimal for the
sender to not send anything. This leads to obvious, unintuitive and irrational consequences. Hence, the
most straightforward way of setting up non-cooperativity makes communication of any kind is impossible
in a signaling game.Thismeans that non-cooperativity of the sortwe are interestedhere shouldnot translate
as 0-sum utilities in a signaling model.
Still, there is between perfectly aligned utilities and 0-sum games, a space of games with partially
aligned utilities which could encode (some) lack of cooperativity into the context while still allowing for
communication to take place. Notice that, crucially, yielding the right equilibrium is not the only demand
to put on the game structure: a precise justification of the chosen utility profile is needed, just as much.
In order to use games as part of a general theory of meaning, one has to make clear how to construct, for
each situation of interest, an adequate game-context. Importantly, this includes providing an interpretation
of the game’s ingredients (types and actions) and explaining why the utility profiles fits the situation to
be modeled. Franke (2009), for instance, associates in a principled way an interpretation game to a given
utterance. Interpretation games form a subclass of signaling models assuming a specific class of sender
types actions and preferences. They intend to encode a "canonical context" for an utterance, in which
relevant conversational implicatures may be drawn. In interpretation games, the full game structure is
determined by the set of sender types: there is a bijection between the set of receiver actions and the set of
sender types, and the utility profile is such that both the receiver and sender get rewarded if they coordinate
on the sender actual type, and do not gain anything otherwise.
Such a setting is very intuitive and interestingly does not seem to require further precision on what
exactly it means for the receiver to take the action at associated with receiver type t and why such an action
should indeed maximize the receiver payoff if t is the sender’s actual type. Of course, one can still wonder
whether performing at means, for instance, that the receiver believes that the actual state is t (let us call
this option 1), or that the receiver interprets the sender’s message as a commitment to the actual state being
t (option 2), or even that she herself commits to the sender commiting to the actual state being t (option
3). But, despite this ambiguity between, in principle, distinct ways of understanding action at , there is, in
interpretation games, no necessity to settle the question, because, forGricean agents, the different options
collapse. A Gricean sender should intend to commit to what he believes is true (sincerity), cooperativity
should make a Gricean receiver intend to interpret the sender commitment as what the sender intends
to communicate, and belief in the sender’s sincerity should make him believe that the sender believes in
what he has committed to. Hence options 1 and 2 collapse. Finally the receiver’s sincerity and cooperativity
ensure that (at least if the sender’s needs her to), she acknowledges that the senders’ commits to what she
interprets the sender to commit to (namely, that t is the actual sender’s state). Hence option 2 implies option
3, and the other way around follows from the receiver’s sincerity again. Therefore, the games structure as it
stands seems to offer a perfectly adequate level of abstraction.
But things become much more intricate as soon as one is considering potentially non-Gricean players,
and thismakes the task of understanding andproviding justification for a (partially) unalignedutility profile
much more involved. It depends on what one takes actions and types to represent. Recall example (6.3.2)
and imagine, for the sake of argument, that we want to model Bronston’s answer with a signaling game
involving two sender types: tbank and t¬bank, two corresponding interpretative (or acknowledging) actions
abank and a¬bank, and three possible messages, myes,mno and mcompany. These messages are respectively
24Assuming bounded rationality of conversational agents may restore an effect to messages: for instance the Iterative Best-
Response model in Franke (2009) allows a level 2 sender to misdirect a less sophisticated level 1 receiver. However, we are
convinced that the conversational examples presented in this article are compatible with a common belief in rationality and
require an analysis making such an assumption.
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true in the sets of states {tbank}, {t¬bank} and {tbank, t¬bank}. Assume also that we want to accommodate
a fear of perjury on Bronston’s part into the game context. Consider first that performing action a¬bank
means for the receiver to update his belief to includes that t¬bank is the actual sender’s type, or at least, to
subsequently acts as if it were the case. Under such an interpretation, if the sender, Bronston, sendsmno and
the prosecutor takes in return action a¬bank, should Bronston fear being charged with perjury? Intuitively
no, because such an attack would indicate an inconsistent belief of the prosecutor that t¬bank holds (because
the action he took is interpreted as such) and does not hold at the same time.25 Then again, if actions are
to be interpreted at the level of public commitments (say, using option 3 of the previous paragraph), taking
action a¬bank after receiving mno commits the prosecutor to the proposition that Bronston is committed
to t¬bank. This does not imply that the prosecutor believes (or commits to) the latter state to be actual.
Hence, if the prosecutor takes this action, he is susceptible to attack Bronston for perjury by committing
to Bronston’s actual type being in fact tbank and not t¬bank. Bronston’s payoff in that case should depend
on whether the prosecutor will indeed charge him with perjury and how bad the consequences will be. If
the prosecutor has solid arguments to show that tbank is the actual state, then Bronston should fear such a
continuation and have a very low payoff for the triple ⟨tbank,mno, a¬bank⟩. Bronston should be better off
with the triple ⟨tbank,mcompany, a¬bank⟩ as, in that case, he disposes of a way to defend himself against a
charge of perjury, which consists in commiting that he never committed to t¬bank. Put another way, he can
argue that the prosecutor with a¬bank, committed to something false –namely that Bronston committed
to t¬bank. Notice that such a defense is not a very good option when Bronston sends mno, because in that
case, it requires Bronston to say something false26. Notice also, that ressorting to this defense should bear a
non-neglictible cost: allthough he avoids perjury, Bronston can be asked to answer why he did not respond
to the the prosecutor question in the first place and/or why he did not immediately correct the prosecutor
after the latter performed a¬bank.
These considerations illustrate two things: first, if not all agents conform to Gricean maxims, different
choices in the way to interpret actions and types yield different games context with different predictions.
Hence it becomes primordial to make precise what the exact set of actions is and what they represent
—something which may vary according to the nature of the player’s objectives (commitments, beliefs, both,
something else, . . . ). Second, the payoffs of the sender and receiver may depend on subsequent actions,
which requires that the possible outcomes of the signaling games encode all possible relevant continuations
of the conversation. None of this is self-evident (and we will examine some reason for why it is so) and
makes a systematic construction of a game context muchmore difficult than in the cooperative case. These
difficulties echoes the close correspondence between a general formalization of Gricean principles and
that of games with shared interests that Asher and Lascarides (2012) establishes. This doesn’t entail that
in strategic settings, Gricean principles don’t ever apply, but the result does establish that one shouldn’t
count on Gricean principles as operative; in general one can’t assume that players are maximizing quality,
quantity or relevance (to one’s own conversational ends).
Furthermore, there is a crucial difference between being a non-Gricean speaker, and admitting to being
so. A player’s conversational objectives are very likely to include not making such an admission. Conversa-
tions can thus involve sorts of hide-and-seek games where agents try to expose the "bad" behavior of their
opponent while making themselves look good. In other words, bad (typically, non-Gricean) behavior is
licenced as long as it remains hidden or deniable. In example (6.3.2), if the prosecutor rejects Bronston’s
indirect answer, he commits at the same time that Bronston’s cooperativity is, at least, subject to caution. If
Bronston then admit having had a swiss bank account, he justifies this cautious attitude, and commits to
25We assume here that the prosecutor has an interest to charge Bronston with perjury only if he believes that Bronston actually
performedperjury. One can relax this assumption,but thatwouldmean that the prosecutor’s beliefs are irrelevant to his subsequent
moves and that the commitments-related interpretation of actions should be considered here.
26and following the logical model of commitment that one adopts, it can evenmake him inconsistant. See part III of the present
thesis.
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the proposition that he was not cooperative in giving the indirect answer. In such a context, the prosecutor
intuitively should claim that Bronston is being non-cooperative but Bronston should try to avoid admitting
that he is. In analogous contexts occurring outside of the courtroom, itmight be rational for an interrogator
who cares for his reputation or his interlocutor’s friendship to prefer a misleading answer over formulating
a public accusation of non cooperativity that he cannot prove.
Signaling games being one-shot games basically leaves the modeler with two choices: either the game’s
payoffs are locally determined, and then the game, by choice of design, does not evaluate the long term
impact of a triple ⟨type,message,action⟩, ⟨t,m, a⟩, or the payoffs are global, but then must somehow be
computed taking every possible continuation of ⟨m, a⟩ into account (if this is possible at all, which is
discussedmore at length in section 7.2.1).There is also an afferent problematic asymmetry of the sender and
receiver in such games. While, in signaling games, the sender, sending amessage, reveals some information
about his type and associated preference profile that the receiver may seize on, the latter does not reveal
anything that is not already common belief when he chooses an action. There is anyway no subsequent
move of the sender to reward or punish such a revelation by the receiver.
Again, this is problematic because it blurs the frontier between public and private information which an
accurate analysis of strategic settings requires to be clearly marked. While types, preferences and beliefs are
intuitively private, messages are intuitively public.The nature of receiver’s actions however, as we have seen,
is not clear: belief update or interpretative actions are private actions whereas acknowledgments, responses
are not. Moreover neither option is plainly satisfactory (for a full account of strategic context): if actions
are private updates, then they are not sufficient on their own to constrain subsequent conversational moves,
unless the model is supplemented with a theoretical link between private and public attitudes (once again,
this is precisely what a formalization of the Gricean maxims provides for cooperative settings only). If
actions are public, then the rational receiver taking a particular action reveals, at the same time, having
a certain belief about the sender’s state, namely one that makes the choosen action rational. Even if we
assume this belief to be common to the sender and the receiver, it does not mean that either of the two
is comfortable with making this belief into a public commitment. There can be numerous reasons for
avoiding such an admission: for instance, a third party monitoring the conversation, and/or politeness
constraints preventing the players to put their cards on the table. Imagine two agents holding each other
in very low regard, with a common belief thereof: it seems reasonable to imagine keeping the conversation
polite and cordial as one of their objective, restricting without voiding the moves they might use toward
a second objective of defending a position at the expense of the other. They should, in particular never
explicitely commit to what they think of each other despite being fully aware of it on both sides. Yet, due
to signaling games’ assymetry, it seems much more easier to implement these constraints on the sender’s
side: to represent a sender who wants to avoid a commitment to having the preferences associated with
a given type tbad, it suffices to model the bad consequences of such a commitment, simply assuming an
action atbad optimal for the receiver iff tbad is the sender’s actual state, and which, in that case, comes with
a drammatically negative payoff for the sender. Doing the same on the receiver’s side, can, at best, only be
achieved by refining the set of sender types so as to distinguish between sender types accordingly to (at least
some of) the subsequent conversational moves that the sender will perform. But such a trick essentially
amounts to consider sequential games withmore than a single turn, which we advocate in the next sections.
Let us conclude with a more formal view of the above considerations and an example: how does
deception in the sense that we encountered in our examples translates in signaling terms? We can define it
this way: a sender S of type t, decieves a receiver R if he can induce an action a′ from the receiver which
is suboptimal for him given ⟨t,m⟩, i.e. such that there exists another action a verifying UR(t,m, a) >
UR(t,m, a′). Let, for any pair ⟨t,m⟩ of type and message, a∗t,m denote the optimal action for a receiver
knowing that t is the actual state andmwas sent. Following ournotion of deception,we say that the type tbad
has an interest to decieve using messagem iff there is a state tgood such that we haveUR(tgood,m, a∗tbad ,m) <
UR(tgood,m, a∗tgood ,m) and US(tbad,m, a∗tbad ,m) < US(tbad,m, a∗tgood ,m).
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Let T denote the set of sender types and Tgood denote the set of “good” sender types, i.e. the subset of
the set of sender type for which the receiver has better payoff using a∗tgood ,m than a
∗
tbad ,m upon reception of
m: Tgood = {t ∣ UR(t,m, a∗tbad ,m) < UR(t,m, a∗tgood ,m)}.
Fact 41. Using the above notations, we have the following: whenever a rational receiver is decieved by m,
i.e. he takes a∗tgood ,m with non zero probability after receiving m, he must believe after reception of m that
S being of a “good” type is at least δgoodδbad as likely as S being of type tbad, where δbad is the difference of
payoff for the receveir between choosing a∗tbad ,m and a
∗
tgood ,m in tbad, and δ
∗
tgood ,m is the maximal difference
of payoff for the receiver bewteen choosing a∗tgood ,m over a
∗
tbad ,m, in any other state.
As an immediate corollary, it follows that in any perfect bayesian equilibrium with a pure sender
strategy sending m in state tbad, if R is decieved then the prior probability of being of a “good” state in
which S sends m must be at least δgoodδbad as likely as the prior probability of S being of state tbad.
Proof. Let ρ(⋅∣m) be a receiver strategy. Let μ(⋅∣m) be a probability distribution over sender types such
that ρ is rational given belief in μ and such that ρ(a∗tgood ,m∣m) > 0. By definition, if ρ is rational given μ,
a∗tgood ,m must be a best response to m. In particular a
∗
tgood ,m must yield a better (or equal) expected utility
that a∗tbad ,m which writes as:
∑
t∈T
μ(t∣m)UR(t,m, a∗tgood ,m) −∑
t
μ(t∣m)UR(t,m, a∗tbad ,m) ≥ 0
that is to say
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∑
t∈Tgood
μ(t∣m) ((UR(t,m, a∗tgood ,m) −UR(t,m, a∗tbad ,m))
− ∑
t∈T∖Tgood
μ(t∣m) (UR(t,m, a∗tbad ,m) −UR(t,m, a∗tgood ,m))
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
≥ 0
Notice that both term of the above difference are positive (the first term on the left is strictly pos-
itive since tgood ∈ Tgood). Let δgood = maxt∈Tgood(UR(t,m, a∗tgood ,m) − UR(t,m, a∗tbad ,m)) and δbad =
UR(tbad,m, a∗tbad ,m) −UR(tbad,m, a∗tgood ,m). Since tbad ∈ T ∖ Tgood we have:
∑
t∈Tgood
μ(t∣m)δgood − μ(tbad∣m)δbad ≥
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∑
t∈Tgood
μ(t∣m) ((UR(t,m, a∗tgood ,m) −UR(t,m, a∗tbad ,m))
− ∑
t∈T∖Tgood
μ(t∣m) (UR(t,m, a∗tbad ,m) −UR(t,m, a∗tgood ,m))
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Hence we must have
∑
t∈Tgood
μ(t∣m)δgood − μ(tbad∣m)δbad = μ(Tgood∣m)δgood − μ(tbad∣m)δbad ≥ 0
and since δbad > 0 by hyptothesis we must have μ(Tgood∣m) δgoodδbad ≥ μ(tbad∣m) which concludes the
proof. qed
What this fact shows, is that, in a signalling game, the only basis for a receiver to ever accept a decep-
tive move (e.g. a misleading answer) is that he judges it more likely (modulo the ratio δgood/δbad which
quantifies the “badness” of the deception) that his opponent is of a “good” type, never that he lacks an
argument to confront him, or has reasons to avoid confrontation. Yet we are convinced that the latter are
equally good reasons to accept “dodging” moves. Consider as an example the following conversation:
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(6.4.1)a. A: Are you available on thursday afternoon? I need help moving in.
b. B: I have a very important meeting on thursday.
It seems intuitive to assume that B might be of two distinct types: the “free on thursday afternoon” type
tf, and the “not free on thursday afternoon” type t¬f. Assume further that B’s meeting is scheduled early
thursday morning, so that despite telling the truth, B is in fact of type tf (were B willing to, he would still
be able to help A in the afternoon). A’s best interest in that case involves intuitively to have B commit to
being of type tf as it makes it socially difficult for B to refuse his help (and unless A has, and is willing to
use, another way to pressure B, this is likely to be the best he can achieve by talking). Assume finally that
A, for some reason, has an incentive to not trust B and think that it is much more likely that is available
than not (because for instance, they work at the same company and B has a reputation of being very lazy).
Let us have a look at some of the possible responses A can make:
c1 A can take B’s answer has a no with “A: OK, too bad”.
c2 A can request a direct answer “A: So you are not available on thursday afternoon?”
c3 Depending on his relation with B, A can try other, more gentle or less direct denunciations of B’s
misdirection, for instance we can imagine something in the spirit of “A: Oh, I forgot about that!
Those morning meetings can be exhausting, I take it that you’ll be too tired in the afternoon then?”
Naturally, the best option for A depends on his familiarity with B, but the point still, is that the payoff
of continuation c2 highly depends on B’s reaction. In many cases, Amight judge c2 too abrupt, and not
really helpful in the case of B opting for an explicit no answer in return. Amight thus think that he has little
to gain using c2, and B, counting on that, even if he knows that A believes him to be more likely available
than not, will still try to misdirect, expecting A to opt for c1, or at worse for something like c3 which, unlike
c2, saves his face.
Indeed, if A opts for c2, B might react badly, for instance saying, annoyed, “No, as I just said, I have
an important meeting”27 Arguably this should yield a bad payoff for both A, who has not fulfilled his
objective28, and B who has been compelled to lie. But importantly, it is also possible that B alternatively
drops his attempt at misdirecting (e.g., saying “Well, actually my meeting is in the morning, so I guess I’m
free after all.”), in which case, c2 should yield high payoff for A and low payoff for B.
In summary, these considerations show that the rationality of B’s attempt at a misleading answer is
much more tight to the probability of the different continuations of c2 to take place than on A’s prior
belief about B’s actual type. Is it possible to account for this using a signaling game? From what we have
shown, only at the cost of an “odd”, non transparent payoff structure, and/or a rather complicated type-
space: let   denote B’s answer to the question. As B’s objective is to avoid commiting to tf, we
should haveUB(tf, , c2) < UB(tf, , c1). The real struggle is to set the payoff for c2. If we let
UA(tf, , c2) > UA(tf, , c1) then, given A’s prior, we are in a case of application of fact 41
and B is not rational in trying to misdirect. If we let UA(tf, , c2) < UA(tf, , c1), then an
important part of the reasonning becomes hidden in the payoffs, and the games becomes “artificially”
cooperative: any explicit encoding of the opposing interrests at stake is left behind.
Again, a solution to this dilemma, is to refine the set of types distinguishing for instance between B’s
of type tf that reacts agressively to c2 with the full lie and those that rather drop their misdirection attempt.
27Notice also that, interestingly, even if B with such an answer, explicitely lies about his availability, he remains only implicitely
commited that it is the meeting that makes him unavailable. So he can still drop this commitment at the cost of admitting that
he was incoherent or not responsive. Hence, even if A, for some reason, is willing to confront B for lying to him, and has formal
evidence that the meeting is indeed in the morning, doing so still requires a lot of efforts on his part.
28unless of course A is ready to accuse B of lying to him.
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But this mean that we must condition sender strategies to their type, and more generally this boils down
to considering another class of games that are involve more than one sending and response.
Other models like that of Glazer and Rubinstein (2004) exist that do not use signaling games. How-
ever, they also have difficulties in expressing the sort of constraints we have developed above. Signaling
games and persuasion games both still take a broadly Gricean view of communication: conversations are
essentially information gathering or exchange activities; agents exchange messages for the purpose of af-
fecting the beliefs of the other partner. This is precisely, however, what is in doubt in many conversations.
In many conversational settings and in all of our examples, agents converse not in the hope persuading
their opponents, but rather to impress or persuade others, and perhaps themselves. Just as Grice captures
important aspects of some but not all conversations, people do try sometimes to persuade or to exchange
information, but this is not a general framework for all conversations.
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7.1 Switching to sequential games
Following the conclusions of the previous chapter,we need a different (more general)model of conversation
departing from signaling- or other one-shot games models of the litterature. We still want to represent con-
versations as games in which the players are trying to achieve a certain end–namely, that the conversation
go in a particular way, but we want to adopt an explicit representation of agents divergent goals without
commiting to a complete lack of communication. To this aim, we now delve deeper into the structure of
conversational games. What do they concretely involve? What are the ‘moves’ of the players, what are their
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‘strategies’ and so on? What are their winning conditions? And how can we model conversational goals in
a formal setting?
Recall feature (I-IV) from section 6.3.2. In order to turn these into a model, we need three things:
(i) an appropriate vocabulary of conversational moves for building sequences of message exchanges
between players,
(ii) goals or winning conditions for conversational players and
(iii) a way of modeling the epistemic limitations that players cannot in general foresee the last move of a
conversation.
Infinitary games like Banach Mazur (BM) games (Oxtoby, 1957; Grädel, 2008; Kechris, 1995) furnish a
good point of departure, as they reflect some features of (I-IV). For simplicity, we will mostly restrict
our attention to two-player win-lose games, allowing us to concentrate on basic conceptual points. These
games involve a set of sequences of conversational moves and a characterization of winning conditions for
players of the game. We modify them however, in order to distinguish between turns of talk so as to keep
track of “who said what”, an information which is crucial in many settings. Our theory thus distinguishes
between conversations in virtue of their winning conditions, and different winning conditions require
different strategies for achieving them giving rise to different linguistic realizations. We show the game’s
determinacy and discuss existence of these strategies in various cases. We introduce a formal model of
winning conditions, enabling us to compare different conversational goals and their winning strategies.
Finally, we propose a formalization ofmisdirection and blindness to explain the rational basis of engaging
in 0-sum conversations.
7.2 What do agents communicate in strategic context?
In the pictures we have sketched so far, players interact with each other and exchange messages in a sequen-
tial process. But what do these messages convey, and how do they help players achieve their objectives?
Our foundational hypothethis, is that messages convey objective, public commitments. For instance,
D in (6.3.4-d) commits to Dr. Tzeng’s having “torn apart” the nerve by agreeing with LP’s description
in (6.3.4-c). D then tries to go back on that commitment in (6.3.4-g). Dmay ormay not believe this commit-
ment. But if he signal agreement with (6.3.4-c), then he is committed to its content, and he can be attacked
on the basis of that commitment or subsequent commitments. As the set of examples of section 6.3.1 illus-
trates, conversationalists often pay careful attention to the commitments of others, which encompasses not
only explicit commitments but also to their implicatures. In example (6.3.5) for instance, Bentsen seizes on
a weak or possible implicature of Quayle’s commitments, that he is comparable in Presidential stature to
JFK, and attacks Quayle on that basis. The moves players make to defend their commitments or to attack
those of an opponent exploit the conventional meanings and even the implicatures that messages have. So
an appropriate model of the conversational arena must enable us to fix the meanings of players’ moves to
their conventional meaning.
Why do conversationalists make the commitments they do, if they don’t do it to persuade their inter-
locutors or to send a signal that their interlocutors will find credible? Players make the commitments they
do, for the purpose of convincing or influencing an idealized third party, which we call the Jury. The Jury
is for us an abstract role that can be satisfied in diverse ways. In some cases the role of the Jury might be
endorsed by an actual agent, taking part or simply listening to the conversation, e.g. in examples (6.3.2)
and (6.3.4), the jury of the court or in examples (6.3.5) and (6.3.7), the American electorate. Sometimes
it can even be endorsed by one of the players, as in example (6.3.3). As such, the Jury does not perform
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conversational moves but is rather a scoring function for the game (even when it falls to one of the con-
versational agent to play the role of the Jury, we conceive of these two roles separately–as a player she can
make move, as the Jury she can only evaluate). Players choose their conversational objectives based on
what they believe they can defend against their opponents and that will find favor in some way with the
Jury. A player attempts to achieve her conversational objective, while her opponent tries to thwart her. The
Jury is an abstraction of a rational and competent user of the language of the players and judges on that
basis whether a given discourse move or a sequence of moves contributes toward the realization of the
conversational objectives of a player or not.
Let us now conclude this preamble to the fleshing of the model in full detail with a discussion of a last,
yet essential, characteristic of the model: the view of conversations as infinite sequences of moves.
7.2.1 Why infinite games?
As principle (IV) of section 6.3.2 already hints at,we believe, that humansmust act as though conversational
games were unbounded. If conversations have definite last moves and our players have opposing interests,
even the presence of the Jury will not explain why our agents converse in the way they do.
Consider example (6.3.2) again, or its non courtroom variant, example (6.3.3). Janet is presented with a
Hobbsian choice. Ideally, she would prefer not to answer the question at all or simply lie. To not answer the
question or to lie would be rational and what Janet should do, if she were playing a one shot game with no
further interaction with Justin (this is akin to the defectmove in the Prisoner’s Dilemma). As conversations,
however, have continuations, many people have the intuition that a refusal to answer will make Janet fare
worse in subsequent exchanges. Janet cooperates with her interlocutor in the minimal sense of providing a
response to the question, what Asher and Lascarides (2012) call rhetorical cooperativity, because of reputa-
tion effects. If Janet doesn’t cooperate by responding to Justin, she risks receiving uncooperative treatment
if in the future she asks a question or make some demands of him. This is a form of the “tit for tat” view of
Axelrod (2006). Nevertheless, the reputation argument has its problems. If a conversation is just a finite
sequence of one shot games, what holds for a one shot game holds throughout a conversation. Backward
induction over such a finite sequence would lead Justin to the conclusion that he should not bother to ask
his first question because it is in Janet’s interest to defect at the earliest possible opportunity. If there is a
foreseeable last move for one of the players i, then she will play to her advantage and defect on the last
move, if her opponent has gone along in the discussion.The opponent seeing this will reason by backwards
induction to defect at the earliest possible moment. The prediction is that given a foreseeable last move,
no message exchange should occur.
If the conversational game is assumed to be infinite, however, the formal argument for the rationality
of defection over sequences of exchanges in cases where conversationalists have opposing interests disap-
pears. The argument from backward induction fails because there is no last move from which to begin
the induction. However, there is still some explaining to do. A simple “tit for tat” model doesn’t explain
why interlocutors cooperate with each other rhetorically, even if their roles vis a vis their interlocutors are
never reversed, even if Janet and Bronston never make any demands of their interlocutors.
In our model, the Jury can force rhetorical cooperativity. A defection will hurt player i if the Jury can
infer that i is defecting because a rhetorically cooperative move would reveal a reason for them not to be
persuaded by her. This is also a feature of the model of Glazer and Rubinstein (2001, 2004) but their model
is more restrictive. In their model, the Jury only interacts with one sender who must persuade the Jury
to accept or reject a message. In addition, the sender of a message is restricted in her choice of messages
she can send in a given state, and so the Jury can draw more secure inferences from messages she doesn’t
send. Since she can only send certain messages in certain states (e.g., Bronston might be able to say he did
not have an account only in a state where he truly does not), a failure to send a message or to respond to a
question where the message is directly requested and would be in the player’s interest to send could well
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indicate that the player is not in the state where such a message is permitted.
We have made no such assumptions about messages, however, because we do not think that messages
are tied to states in such a simple way. One can say anything regardless of the state of the world in a
conversation (point (III) of our conversational features in section 6.3.2). So the reasoning from signals and
strategies to the persuasiveness of a player is much more uncertain for the Jury in our games. In addition,
while Player i needs to convince the Jury that she has achieved her conversational goals, her goals are more
complex than simply getting the Jury to accept the content of a particular message and crucially involve her
opponent. Player i could simply refuse to cooperate with her opponent, because she has a general strategy
of not revealing information to her opponents. Or she could provide a reasonable defense for why she is
not cooperating. In either case, it falls on the opponent to make the case to the Jury that player i’s lack of
rhetorical cooperativity provides a reason to reject i’s goals. If attacked, player i can reply to the opponent,
defending her lack of cooperativity, and then the opponent must press the issue.
The following excerpt from a press conference by Senator Coleman’s spokesman Sheehan brings out
these features of our model. Senator Coleman was running for reelection as a senator from Minnesota in
the 2008 US election (we thank again Chris Potts for bringing this example to our attention):
(7.2.1)a. Reporter: On a different subject is there a reason that the Senator won’t say whether or not
someone else bought some suits for him?
b. Sheehan: Rachel, the Senator has reported every gift he has ever received.
c. Reporter: That wasn’t my question, Cullen.
d. Sheehan: The Senator has reported every gift he has ever received. We are not going to respond
to unnamed sources on a blog.
e. Reporter: So Senator Coleman’s friend has not bought these suits for him? Is that correct?
f. Sheehan:The Senator has reported every gift he has ever received. (Sheehan continues to repeat
“The Senator has reported every gift he has ever received” seven more times in two minutes to
every follow up question by the reporter corps).
The record is available online at:  	

	 	.
Sheehan, like Bronston in example (6.3.2), is seeking to avoid committing to an answer to a question.
Sheehan’s move (7.2.1-b) in response to the reporter’s first question could be interpreted as an indirect
answer, a statement that implicates a direct answer; the senatordidnot commenton the question concerning
whether he had received the gift of suits because he felt he had already said everything he had to say about
the matter. But in example (7.2.1) the reporter does not accept this indirect answer; she says that Sheehan’s
response is not an answer to her question. In effect, she wants a direct answer to the question concerning
the suits. Sheehan with move (7.2.1-d) then explains why he won’t answer the question. The reporter then
presses the issue, and Sheehan becomes rhetorically uncooperative for the rest of the exchange, repeating
the same thing. At this point, the Jury will begin to reflect on Sheehan’s strategy: is he being rhetorically
uncooperative because he has something to hide? His earlier explanation for his defection from rhetorical
cooperativity becomes lost, and it becomesmore andmore plausible that Sheehanwon’t answer the question
because the true answer is damning to his interests. To win given a defection from rhetorical cooperativity,
Sheehan has to have a reply for every attack; on the other hand, if the opponent eventually introduces an
attack for which the first player does not have a convincing reply (e.g., he simply repeats himself or simply
stops talking), the opponent will win.
The need to justify uncooperative moves or defection generalizes. In most strategic situations, in order
to win, 0 must engage with questions and remarks of her opponent(s); she must show that her opponent
cannot attack her position in such a way that a rational unbiased bystander would find plausible. For any
discourse move, we can imagine a potential infinity of attacks, defenses and counterattacks. In successful
play, a player has to be able to defend a move m against attacks; she may have to defend her defense of
100
7.2. What do agents communicate in strategic context?
m against attacks and so forth. This is a general necessary victory condition for 0. Let attack(n,m) hold
iff move m attacks move n; commitments or types of discourse moves that generalize over more specific
discourse moves29 that are used to defend or attack commitments:
Observation 1. [NEC] A play is winning for 0 only if for all moves n of 0 and for all moves m of 1,
attack(n,m) → ∃k(move(0, k) ∧ attack(m, k))
Conversely for 1, a sufficient condition for winning is the negation of Observation 1. Given (1) 0 wins
only if she is prepared for the conversational game never to end and to rebut every attack by 1. It is this
constraint that provides a second reason for assuming conversational games to be infinite and is a powerful
reason for obeying rhetorical cooperativity.
NEC also has empirical consequences. In virtue of it, we can see why Quayle intuitively loses exam-
ple (6.3.5). Part of Quayle’s winning condition was not to come under attack for his implicit comparison
or at least to be able to rebut any attack on his move; that is NEC was also part of his winning condition.
But given that he had no rejoinder to Bentsen’s unanticipated move, he failed to comply with Observation
1 and so lost.
To Observation 1, we add another, motivated by example example (7.2.1): to win, 0 should not simply
repeat herself in the light of a distinct move by her opponent at least not more than twice.
Observation 2. [NR] A play is winning for 0 only if there is no move k by 0 such that 0 repeats k on m
successive turns, form ≥ 3, regardless of what 1’s intervening contributions are.This observation buttresses
NEC’s support for rhetorical cooperativity.
While we could weaken the quantifiers in NEC and NR to something like for most moves of 0, we
are rather interested in the general upshot of such constraints: to model winning play by 0, we need to
model a conversation as a potentially unbounded sequence of discourse moves, in which she replies to
every possible attack by her opponent. Moreover, at least some of the moves of player i must be related to
prior moves of her opponent. It follows that it is always risky, and often just rationally unsound, to play a
rhetorically uncooperative move like defection without further explanation that is optimal only if it is the
last move in a finite game. Defection from rhetorical cooperativity is possible, but it must be explained or
defended in any winning play convincing the Jury. A player who plays a rhetorically uncooperative move
opens himself up to an attack that will lead to a defeat in the eyes of the Jury, as in example (7.2.1). That
is, relatively weak and uncontroversial assumptions about the beliefs and preferences of the Jury validate
rhetorical cooperativity as a component of any winning play.
Even if in practice, conversations don’t go on forever, players have to worry about continuations of
conversations thus should rationally act as if a conversation were ‘potentially infinite’. In such situations,
a theory of finite play does not apply and one has to resort to infinite plays. This is why it is necessary to
adopt a framework of infinite games. Bymoving to a frameworkwith unbounded conversational sequences,
Aumann and Hart (2003); Aumann and Maschler (1995) show how games with unbounded cheap talk,
games involving extended conversations with an infinite talk phase consisting of a pattern of revelations
and agreements ending ultimately in an action, make possible equilibria for players that are not available
in one shot or even sequences of revelations of bounded length. While we have adopted the simplest of
payoff structures for our study, our examples show that unbounded conversational sequences allow players
to win conversations that they otherwise couldn’t. Had the reporters in example (7.2.1) been limited to one
question and one follow up, they could not have successfully attacked Sheehan in the way they did.
Another reason in favor of using infinitary games is, paradoxically, their simplicity. Given that we
cannot impose any intrinsic limitations as to the length of conversations, a formalization of purely finite
29Examples of suchmoves are Answering a question, Explaining why a previous commitment is true, Elaborating on a previous
commitment, Correcting a previous commitment, and so on–in fact, they correspond to the discourse relations of a discourse
theory (Asher and Lascarides, 2003).
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conversations is more complicated. In an infinitary framework, it is also straightforward to model finite
conversations. Finite conversations are not just conversations that stop but crucially involve a point of
mutual agreement that the players have finished (Sacks, 1992). We represent a finite conversation then
as one in which a finite sequence terminates with an agreement on a special "stop" symbol that is then
repeated forever. More than that, initial prefixes of infinite sequences will play a very important role in
the sequel. While our models of conversations will be infinite sequences, all that we ever make judgments
on are finite prefixes of such conversations. We will have to evaluate the play of players and whether they
have yet met or are meeting their objectives on such finite prefixes. Importantly though, evaluating a finite
prefix and declaring a definitive winner are two different things, and meeting one’s objective on a finite
prefix is not always sufficient. Typically one has to ensure a form of stability in the way one achieves one
goal.
7.3 Message Exchange Games defined
We have established that conversations should bemodeled as some sort of infinite games. In this section we
define such games, which we callmessage exchange games (ME games). The first step we take, is to define
what amessage his, i.e., to set a generic vocabulary for ME games.
7.3.1 The vocabulary of discourse moves
Chapters 2 and 5 have insisted upon the fact that messages in a conversation (or a discourse) are typically
related to each other. For instance, in example (6.3.2), (6.3.2-b) is related to (6.3.2-a) via an answerhood
relation, and (6.3.2-c) is related to the pair of (6.3.2-a) and (6.3.2-b) as some sort of follow up question.
Furthermore, this links come with semantic consequences which are essential to determine whether a
player has come closer to achieving her goals or not (and vice versa), and how he must respond and link
to his interlocutors contribution to win. The fact that (6.3.2-d) at least implicates an answer to (6.3.2-c)
means that if the Prosecutor’s goal is merely to get an implicated commitment, then he has at that point
achieved his victory condition.
Linguistic theories of discourse structure like SDRT, introduced in section 2.3, have developed a rich
language to characterize the semantics and pragmatics of moves in dialogue. We have seen that SDRT
features discourse labels, representing variables for dialogue moves. These moves are characterized by
contents that they commit their speaker to, and crucially some of this content involves predicates that
denote coherence relations between moves–like the relation of question answer pair ( ), in which one
move answers a prior move characterized by a question.
We will therefore rely on SDRT’s concepts to set up our vocabulary: the syntax for dialog moves that
we adopt is a simplified and linearized version of the syntax of SDRSs. This choice allows us to talk about
discourse moves and coherence relations while keeping the process of compositionally merging a sequence
of moves into a formal representation of the conversational context straightforward, which our games
require. In particular, we suitably abstracts over some peculiarities of SDRT’s complex syntax-semantics
interface. As we focus in this chapter on the exposition of the game model itself, and since the semantics
of discourse moves constitutes a rather vast topic on its own, we dedicate another part of the present thesis,
part III, to a detailed discussion of the logical language, its semantics and important phenomena such as
ambiguity, acknowledgments and a semantic definition of attacks.
For our present need, it will be sufficient to assume that the elements of syntax of our vocabulary
contains a countable set of discourse constituent labels DU = Π0 ⊍ Π1 = {π, π1, π2, . . .}, partitioned
between labels of player 0 (Π0) and labels of player 1 (Π1), a finite set of discourse relation symbolsR ={R,R1, . . . Rn}, and formulas φ,φ1, . . . from some fixed language for describing elementary discoursemove
contents. Our generic vocabular VU consists in a set of discourse moves ormessages, which are formulas of
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the form π : χ, where χ is a description of the content of the discourse unit labeled by π, i.e. either a formula
φ of the fixed language for the content of elementary unit, or a formula of the form R(π1, π2), which says
that π1 stands in coherence relation R to π2. This settings naturally inherits SDRT’s notion of complex
constituent (see section 2.3): we say that a formula π : R(π1, π2)makes π1 and π2 subconstituents of π. We
say that π labels the move π : χ. We let V0U and V
1
U denote the sets of moves labeled by labels in Π0 and
Π1 respectively. Following Asher and Lascarides (2003), each discourse relation symbolized in VU comes
with constraints as to when it can be coherently and consistently used in context and when it cannot.
We have assumed Π0 and Π1 to be disjoint, so that each move’s label encodes the information of
whether agent 0 or 1 performed the move. However, moves of VU are SDRSs (or simplified SDRSs), and
as such intermediary mental representations (see section 2.3) that we assume are derivable from more
elementary representations (e.g., the sequence of syntactic representations of EDUs’ content). So, at a lower
level of analysis, 0 and 1, do not choose their contributions in distinct vocabularies, they both say things,
for instance in English or French, and in principle, they can say anything. Only in the process of deriving
an SDRS for a given move in its context, the choice of labeling with a label of 0 or a label of 1 will be
made, accordingly to who performed the move. In ME games, assuming a level of analysis where players
moves are already SDRSs will help keep things as simple as possible. Yet it will proove useful on some
occasion to keep in mind that, at a lower level of analysis, the distinct vocabularies might be identified in
such a way that given a particular play, including information about turn-taking, we recover the separate
vocabularies representations. The simplest way to achieve this while still abstracting over the complexities
of the syntax/semantics interface, is to simply assume that Πo = Π × {i} for a common set of anonym
label symbols Π. The vocabulary V˜U of “anonym” moves is defined as the set of moves of the form π : χ
where χ is exactly as before (thus, possibly involving relational predicates refering to “attributed” labels in
Π0 and Π1) but π ∈ Π is an anonym label. It is straightforward to see that moves anonymization yield two
bijections, between VU0 and V˜U , and between VU1 and V˜U respectively. Thus, the function anonymizing all
moves in a sequence of moves by 0 and 1 is a non-injective surjection from sequences of moves in V˜U to
sequences of anonym moves. Only given a particular decomposition of a sequence of anonym moves
into a structure of turns, we might reattribute moves’ labels.
ME gamemessages comewith a conventionally associatedmeaning in virtue of the constraints enforced
by the Jury; an agent who asserts a content of a message commits to that content, and it is in virtue of such
commitments that other agents respond in kind. While SDRT has a rich language for describing dialogue
moves, it is not explicit about how dialogue moves affect the commitments of the agents who make the
moves or those who observe the moves. part III summarizes the results of Venant et al. (2014); Asher and
Venant (2016); Venant (2015) linking the semantics of the SDRT language with commitments explicitly
(in different ways). We will augment the SDRT language with formulas that describe the commitments of
dialogue participants: where φ is a formula for describing a content, Ciφ is a formula that says that player
i commits to φ. Commitment is modeled as a Kripke modal operator via an alternativeness relation in
a pointed model with a distinguished (actual) world w0. Which grants a semantics for discourse moves
that links the making of a discourse move by an agent to her commitments: i’s assertion of a discourse
move φ, for instance, we will assume, entails a common commitment that i commits to φ, written C∗Ciφ,
where C∗Ciφ entails arbitrary nestings of Cx0 . . .Cxk φ, k ∈ ω, xi ∈ {0, 1}. We will also show each discourse
move πi :φ defines an action, a change or update on the model’s commitment structure; for a propositional
language, this can be done in the style of public announcement logic viz. Baltag et al. (1999); Baltag and
Moss (2004). For instance, if agent i asserts p, then the commitment structure for the conversational
participants is updated such so as to reflect the fact that C∗Ci p. Postponing detailed definitions and a
thorough study of the semantics of commitments, let us simply assume in the following that we dispose
of a class of models and interpretation functions ∥A∥⋅ that allows us to interpret a discourse move x as
an update of the model A into a new model ∥A∥x . This semantics is useful because it allows us to move
from sequences of discourse moves to sequences of updates on any model for the discourse language. So
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a sequence of moves x0.y1 in a model with commitments for 0 and 1 will yield given an input model A, a
sequence of models A∥x0∥, (A∥x0∥)∥y1∥.
To conclude on the vocabulary and its interpretation, consider example (6.3.2) again. Associated syn-
tactic representations are given below:
Speaker Sentence Formula in L
P a. πA : ?bank
B b. πB : ¬bank ∧ πB : QAP(πA, πB)
P c. πC :?bank_ever ∧ π′C : Q-ELAB(πA, πC)
B d. πD : company ∧ π′ans : IQAP(π′C , πD)
Where πA, πC , π′C ∈ Π0, while πB, πans, π′ans ∈ Π1.
7.3.2 Definition of ME games
Now that we dispose of a (generic) vocabulary of discoursemoves,we are ready to definemessage-exchange
games. We use Banach Mazur games, a well-known sort of infinitary game, as a departure point and point
of comparison. We then make some remarks about the expressive capacities of our new framework and
examine how it addresses the problems we found with the signaling game framework.
A Banach Mazur game involves a countable, non-empty set vocabulary vocabulary V . For linguistic
modeling, we will generally assume that V ⊆ V˜U For any set X we let X∗ denote the set of finite strings
over X and Xω the set of countably infinite strings over X. Let ⋅ denote strings concatenation, and for two
sets of stringsW ,W ′ over some set X letW ⋅W ′ = {w ⋅w′ ∣ w ∈W ,w′ ∈W ′}. For any w ∈ X∗, w ⋅W ′ is
syntactic sugar for {w} ⋅W ′.
Definition 44. A Banach-Mazur game (BM game) BM(Vω,Win) consists of an infinite set of strings Vω
together with a winning conditionWin ⊆ Vω.
The game proceeds as follows. Player 0 first chooses a non-empty finite string x0 ∈ V∗. Player 1 responds
by choosing another non-empty finite string x1 ∈ V∗. Player 0 moves next choosing another finite string
x2. This process repeats itself forever yielding a play, an infinite sequence of alternating moves by 0 and
1. Define the flattening flat of a play p = (xk)k∈N as the infinite sequence eventually designed by the two
players: flat(p) = x0 ⋅ x1 ⋅ x2 . . . ∈ Vω where ⋅ denotes string concatenation. Player 0 wins the game if
flat(p) ∈Win. Player 1 wins otherwise. A strategy fi for player i, is a function from the set of finite plays
to the set of finite strings, V∗. A play p = (xk)k∈N of the game, is said to be consistent with the strategy fi
iff, for every integer k, k   2 = i ⇒ xk = fi(x0 ⋅ x1 ⋅ . . . ⋅ xk−1). In other words, each move of player i is
played according to fi . A strategy fi is said to be winning iff in every play consistent with fi , player i wins.
BM games suggest a natural model for conversations: participants alternate turns in which they utter
finite contributions. These contributions add to each other, and together form a conversation. This process
potentially goes on indefinitely, or, at least strategic reasoning requires thinking of it that way. However,
BM games “erase” the information of who said what in the following sense:
Proposition 1. Let BM(Vω,Win) be a BM-Game.Then, for any play ρ and every play ρ′ ∈ flat−1(flat(ρ)),
player i wins ρ iff player i wins ρ′.
Given any infinite sequence s, any infinitely countable set turns ⊆ N such that min(turns) > 0 yields
a play in flat−1(s) and conversely: every element in turns specifies a position in s which is the end of
a player’s move. A corollary of the above proposition is that we cannot define a winning condition that
imposes for instance that player 1 says something in particular, as long as she and 0 don’t infinitely repeat
the same single move. We formalize this observation as follows:
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Corollary 9. Let BM(Vω,Win) be a BM-Game. Let y ∈ V∗ be a finite sequence such that there is at least
one infinite sequence w inWin such that w ∉ V∗yωor ∣y∣ > 2. There is a play ρ of the game such that y is
never a substring of any move of player 1 in ρ.
The idea for the proof of this corollary is simple: since w does not end with infinite repetitions of y,
every occurrence of y in w is eventually followed by something which is not y, call it x. It suffices to define
the alternation of turns so that x constitute exactly the turns of 1. More formally: let i be a position in w at
which y appears. define li asMin({l ∈ N ∣ y does not occur at i+ l ×∣y∣ in w}. li exists by hypothesis since
otherwise w would end with infinite repetitions of y. For any position k in s, let ny(k) be the position of
the first occurence of y in w after k. Define inductively turns with ny(0)+ lny(0) × ∣y∣ ∈ turns, and for any
k in turns, ny(k) + lny(k) × ∣y∣ ∈ turns. turns yields a winning play in flat−1(w) for which player 1 never
“says” y.
BM games have a limitation that require us to introduce a more structured type of game given our
principle (I). A given conversationalist might have as a goal that her interlocutor and only her commits to
a particular content, or answer a particular question, which BM games do not allow. Consider again exam-
ple (6.3.2). There’s an important difference between Bronston’s response to a question by the prosecutor
and the prosecutor’s offering that information himself, and that difference can’t be captured in BM games
under all interesting scenarios. Discourse moves contain more information than the sentence itself. The
discourse move that Bronston commits to a negative answer to (6.3.2-a) provides more information than
just the string no sir provides, and it is such moves that are of interest.
To remedy the expressive limitations of BM games, we introduce our variant, message exchange (ME)
games:
An ME game involves two disjoint vocabularies of discourse moves, one vocabulary Vi for each player
i, i ∈ {0, 1}. In some occasion, it will proove usefull to consider the special case of the two players playing
with a common set of moves V , i.e. the case Vi = V × {i}. Assuming disjoint vocabularies allows keeping
track of the turn structure. Applying ME games to model linguistic exchanges, we will generally assume,
as we did with BM games, that the set of moves Vi is a subset of the generic set of moves of section 7.3.1,
and that in addition Vi only consists of discourse moves labeled with a discourse label π ∈ Πi .
An ME game is an infinite game where the players 0 and 1 alternate by playing finite sequences of
moves from V0 and V1. As opposed to BMGames, we do not impose ME games in their most general form
to be 0-sum:
Definition 45. An ME game is a tuple.
G =ME((V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω,Win0,Win1)
withWin0,Win1 ⊆ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω.
The game is structured so as to encode the information on which player played what into the plays,
and proceeds as follows: a turn by i is a non empty finite sequence of elements in Vi . The game (that we
will also refer to as a converstation) starts with 0 playing an initial turn. Then 1 plays a turn, then 0 plays a
turn, and so on and so forth in a strictly alternating fashion. The games ends after an infinite number of
steps. Thus, a partial play is a finite sequence of turns in (V+0 ⋅V+1 )∗. Define a round as a pair containing a
turn by 0 and a subsequent turn by 1. A complete play of the game ρ is an infinite sequence of turns which,
clustering turns into rounds, can always be uniquely represented as an infinite sequence in (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω.
Player 0 wins if ρ ∈Win0 and Player 1 wins if ρ ∈Win1.
Note that it might be the case thatWin0 ∩Win1 ≠ ∅. Then if ρ ∈ (Win0 ∩Win1) then both players win.
Furthermore,Win0 andWin1 need not exhaust (V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω. In that case if ρ ∉ (Win0 ∪Win1) then neither
player wins. Thus we define the following subclasses of ME games.
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Definition 46. Let ME((V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω,Win0,Win1) be an ME game. Then
• if Win0 = Win1 we say that ME((V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω,Win0,Win1) is zero-sum. In that case we denote
ME((V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω,Win0,Win1) simply as ME((V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω,Win0),
• if (Win0 ∩Win1) ≠ 0, we say that ME((V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω,Win0,Win1) is non zero-sum.
A strategy σ0 for player 0 in the game, is a function from finite sequences of turns of even length to
V+0 . A strategy σ1 for player 1 is a function from finite sequences of odd length to V+1 . We say that a play
ρ ∈ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω conforms to a strategy σi of player i if i plays according to σi to generate ρ. A strategy
σi is winning for player i if every play ρ that conforms to σi is in Wini . Thus, no matter what the other
player plays, as long as i sticks to σi she wins. A zero-sumME game G =ME((V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω,Win) is said to
be determined if either Player 0 or Player 1 always has a winning strategy.
For the case where there is a common underlying vocabulary V , i.e. where we have Vi = V × {i}, we
introduce the following definitions which will help us switch between different sets of sequences. We let π
denote the natural projection ofV0∪V1 ontoV (π(v, i) = v). π naturally extends to a function π⋆ over finite
sequences in (V0 ∪ V1)∗: π⋆(x0 . . . xk) = π(x0) . . . π(xk), and to a function πω over infinite sequences
in (V0 ∪ V1)ω: πω((xk)k∈N) = (π(xk)k∈N). Finally define π f ,ω = πω ○ flat as the function flattening and
projecting sequences of (V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω onto Vω: π f ,ω((v¯k)k∈N) = π(v¯0)0 . . . π(v¯0∣v¯0 ∣) . . . π(v¯k0) . . . π(v¯k∣v¯ k ∣) . . .
(where all the v¯k are rounds in V+0 ⋅ V+1 ).
To go further into the theory of ME games (or BM games), we need to introduce some topological
notions.
Let X be a non-empty set. The Cantor topology on Xω is defined as follows. A basic open set is of
the form xXω and is denoted O(x). The open sets are thus of the form AXω where A ⊂ X∗ is a set of
finite sequences over X. The closed sets are as usual, complements of the open sets. The sigma algebra
generated from the open sets is called the Borel algebra over Xω, B(Xω). The sets in B(Xω) can also be
defined hierarchically as follows.
Let Σ01 be the set of all open sets. Π1 = Σ01 is the set of all closed sets. Then for any α > 1 where α is a
successor ordinal, define Σ0α to be the countable union of all Π0α−1 sets and define Π0α to be the complement
of Σ0α . For a limit ordinal η, 1 < η < ω1, Σ0η is defined as Σ0η = ⋃α<η Σ0α and Π0η = Σ0η. For every ordinal
α, Δ0α = Σ0α ∩Π0α . The infinite hierarchy thus generated is called the Borel hierarchy. Figure 7.1 presents a
schematic picture of the initial sets and their inclusion relations in the Borel Hierarchy.
Σ01 Σ02 Σ
0
3
Π01 Π02 Π
0
3
Δ01 Δ02 Δ
0
3
Figure 7.1: The Borel hierarchy
To precisely characterise the complexity of a set A ⊂ Xω we need the notion of completeness which is
defined in terms of Wadge reductions. Given vocabularies X and Y a set A ⊂ Xω isWadge reducible to a
set B ⊂ Yω, denoted as A ≤W B, if and only if there exists a continuous function f : Xω → Yω such that
A = f −1(B). If A ≤W B and B ≤W A then A and B areWadge equivalent, denoted A ≡W B. It is known that
if A ≡W B then A and B belong to the same level of the Borel hierarchy. A set A ⊂ Xω is said to be Σ0α-hard
(resp. Π0α-hard if B ≤W A for all B ∈ Σ0α (resp. B ∈ Π0α). A is said to be Σ0α-complete (resp. Π0α-complete)
if A ∈ Σ0α (resp. A ∈ Π0α) and A is Σ0α-hard (resp. Π0α-hard). Intuitively, complete sets for a class represent
the most complex sets for that class in terms of structure. If A is Σ0α-complete or Π0α-complete, we shall say
that its Borel complexity is α.
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A subset Y of Xω is nowhere dense if the closure of Y contains no non-empty open set. Y ismeager
or topologically small if it is a countable union of nowhere dense sets. Y is co-meager or topologically large
if its complement is meager.
A Gale-Stewart game (GS game) GS(Xω,Win) (Gale and Stewart, 1953), over a non-empty set X is
similar to an ME game where the players take turns in playing ‘single’ elements from X.Win is a subset of
Xω and similar to an ME game Player 0 wins a play if and only if ρ ∈Win. Martin (Martin, 1975) showed
that all GS games whereWin is a Borel subset of Xω are determined.
To later define and discuss about “misdirection” we shall need the result that our ME games are deter-
mined as well. Hence, relying on Martin’s result, we show that
Theorem 1. A zero-sum ME game G = ME((V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω,Win) where Win ⊂ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω is Borel is
determined.
Proof. We proceed in two steps. We first assume that the underlying vocabulary is the same set V . That is
Vi = V × {i}, i ∈ {0, 1}.
For a sequence ρ ∈ (V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω, where ρ = (u00u10)(u01 u11) . . . with all the uik ∈ V+i . Define eV(ρ) as the
sequence of (V+)ω obtained by simply projecting the turns of ρ intoV+ (but preserving the turn structure).
That is, with the notations we introduced earlier, eV(ρ) = [π⋆(u00)][π⋆(u10)][π⋆(u01 )][π⋆(u11)] . . .. Note
that this is a sequence of strings onV , not a sequence of elements ofV : the turn structure is still present and
their is no implicit string concatenation between the bracketed elements. Notice also that because we still
have the turn structure eV is a bijection between (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω and (V+)ω. Let G′ = GS((V+)ω, π⋆(Win))
denote the GS game over vocabulary V+ with winning condition π⋆(Win). By Martin’s theorem, one of
the players has a winning strategy in G′. Turns are exactly the same in both games, and trivially, an infinite
sequence ρGS ∈ (V+)ω of turns is winning in G′ iff its disjoint-vocabularies counterpart eV−1(ρGS) is
winning in G. Therefore a strategy σ is winning in G iff it is winning in G′. All that remains to show is that a
set is Borel in (V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω iff it is Borel in (V+)ω. It suffices to note that eV is an homeomorphism between
both the sets: eV is clearly bijective, and the preimage of a basic open set u0 ⋅ u1 . . . un(V+)ω under π⋆ is,
with a slight abuse of notation (leting for a string u = (xk)k<l , (u, i) denote the sequence of the (xk , i)k<l )
• if n = 2k + 1
[(u0, 0)(u1, 1)] . . . [(u2i , 0)(u2i+1, 1)] . . . [(un−1, 0)(un, 1)](V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω
and
• if n = 2k
⋃
u∈V+
[(u0, 0)(u1, 1)] . . . [(u2i , 0)(u2i+1, 1)] . . . [(un−1, 0)(u, 1)](V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω
In both cases the preimage is open so eV is continuous. Conversely, eV−1 is continuous as well, since
eV([(u0, 0)(u1, 1)] . . . [(u2 j)(u2 j+1, i)](V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω) = (u0)(u1) . . . (u2 j+1)(V+)ω. The Gale-Stewart deter-
minacy theorem thus implies the Borel-determinacy of the ME game G.
We now reduce the case of distinct vocabularies to the above. Assume now anME-game G =ME((V+0 ⋅
V+1 )ω,Win) withWin borel and potentially V0 ≠ V1. We will augment the vocabulary of both player with
the moves of the other: Let V = V0 ∪V1, letU0 = V ×{0} andU1 = V ×{1}. U0 andU1 are the ‘augmented’
vocabulary, we will reduce the initial game to a game played with vocabularies U0 and U1. Note that(V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω canonically injects into (U+0 ⋅ U+1 )ω. We first establish that if W ⊆ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω is Borel in(V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω it is Borel in (U+0 ⋅U+1 )ω, which simply amounts to show that (V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω is borel in (U+0 ⋅U+1 )ω.
To get this, we note that (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω = ⋂
n∈ω
⋃
u∈(V+0 ⋅V+1 )n
u ⋅ (U+0 ⋅U+1 )ω.
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Since the vocabularies are countable, this set is indeed Borel in (U+0 ⋅U+1 )ω. Consider now the set
S1 = (U+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω.
It is easy to check thatd S1 is also Borel in (U+0 ⋅U+1 )ω. Let then G0∪ denote the ME-game over the common
vocabulary U with winning condition (Win ∪ S1). We have shown that this winning condition is borel
in (U+0 ⋅U+1 )ω. By reduction to the common vocabulary case, G0∪ is determined. In G, any strategy for 0
picks, by definition, moves in V+0 only. Thus, to obtain a winning strategy for 1 in G, it suffices to construct
a strategy that wins and plays legal moves against any such strategy for 0, and similarly for 0, with V+1
replacing V+0 . Now there are two subcases:
1. Assume that 0 has a winning strategy σ0 in G0∪. Assume that 1 plays a strategy σ1 for 1 that only plays
sequences in V+1 . Since σ0 is winning against any strategy in G0∪, it is in particular winning against
σ1, and yield a sequence that is either in S1 or inWin. but against σ1, this sequence might not be in
S1 so it is inWin, and since by definitionWin ⊆ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω, this requires that, at any point, 0 plays
in V0. Hence σ0 is a winning strategy for 0 in G.
2. Assume 1 has a winning strategy in G0∪. Assume a strategy σ0 that plays only sequences in V+0 . σ1
yields sequences in (Win) ∩ S1. Hence yields sequences that are in S1, which means that 1 only ever
play in V1, and that areWin. Thus σ1 a winning strategy for 1 in G.
qed
Let us now go back to BM games and examine closely how 0-sum ME Games and a BM Game are
related, depending on the winning condition:
7.3.3 Decomposition sensitive/invariant winning conditions
Assume that agents play with the same set of moves V i.e. Vi = V × {i}. An important condition on
Win is whether it hinges on which of the players made a particular discourse move. We call such winning
conditions decomposition sensitive.
Definition 47 (Decomposition sensitive winning conditions). Win ⊆ (V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω is decomposition sensitive
iff ∃W ⊆ π f ,ω(Win) such that ¬(π−1f ,ω(W) ⊆Win).
Conversely, an ME game G with a decomposition invariantWinG is one where: ∃W ⊆ Vω such that a
sequence σ1 ∈ (V0 ∪ V1)ω is an element ofWinG iff π f ,ω(σ1) ∈ W . Thus, if 0 has a winning strategy in G,
she also has one for attainingW in the BM game BM(V ,W), and conversely, if she has a winning strategy
for attaining W in BM(V ,W), there is a sequence of plays that she can make regardless of what 1 does
that will guarantee her a sequence s ∈W . That sequence of plays yields a sequence σ ∈ (V0 ∪V1)ω in which
0 and 1 are assigned different contributions at rounds such that π f ,ω(σ) = s and so σ ∈WinG . Thus, if 0
has a winning strategy in BM(V ,W), she also has a winning strategy in G. We have thus shown:
Proposition 2. Given an ME game G = ((V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω,WinME) whereWinME is decomposition invariant,
0 will have a winning strategy in G iff she has a winning strategy in the BM game BM(Vω,WinBM) over
Vω whereWinBM = π f ,ω(WinME).
In other words, whenME games involve decomposition invariant winning conditions, they collapse to
BM games, and the existence of a winning strategy is predicted by the basic theorem for BM games which
we expose now:
the Banach-Mazur theorem states necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a strategy to
achieveWin. The theorem intuitively says that Player 0, the player who starts the conversation, can win
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if her strategy takes into account, or has an ‘answer’, for almost all possible situations when her turn to
speak may come. That is, the set of situations that her strategy doesn’t take into account must be “small” in
a topological sense:
Theorem 2 (Banach-Mazur (Mauldin, 1981)). Given a BM game BM(Vω,Win), we have the following:
• Player 1 has a winning strategy if and only ifWin is a meager set for the Cantor topology on Vω;
• Player 0 has a winning strategy if and only if, there exists a finite string x such that O(x) −Win is
meager (that is,Win is co-meager in some basic open set) for the Cantor topology on Vω.
Remarks It is worth noting the following:
• Since V0 andV1 are disjoint, the ‘flattening’ flat of a sequences of round ρ ∈ (V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω into a strictly
alternating sequence flat(ρ) ∈ (V0 ∪ V1)ω ∖ ((V0 ∪ V1)∗Vω0 ∪ (V0 ∪ V1)∗Vω1 ) is easily shown to
be an homeomorphism between the two sets of sequences equipped with their respective Cantor
topology (or, more accurately for flattened sequences, the subspace topology on the set of strictly
alternating sequences of the Cantor topology on (V0 ∪ V1)ω). This shows, among other things, that
the meagerness and the Borel complexity of W and flat(W) are the same, so we might armlessly
switch from “flat” sequences to ones structured in rounds and back again.
• In addition,we can show that the combinaison of flattening and projection π f ,ω, of plays to sequences
in Vω, is a continuous function from (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω to Vω, it follows that the borel complexity of any
setU ⊆ Vω, is the same as the Borel complexity of the set π−1f ,ω(U) in (V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω but the converse is
not true: it is not generally the case that the Borel complexity ofW in (V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω is the same as that
of π f ,ω(W) in Vω. However, the converse is true for a decomposition invariant setW ⊆ (V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω,
since it that case we have π−1f ,ω(π f ,ω(W)) =W . Hence in the case of decomposition invariant sets,
and only it that case, we can indiferently study their Borel complexity or that of their projection on
Vω.
7.4 Constraints and the Jury
7.4.1 Concepts
While ME games as we have sketched them so far allow a player to say anything in a conversation, this
is not conducive to most winning conditions. Certain general constraints are constitutive of winning
conditions. Exploiting the resources of our discourse move vocabulary, we can define our constraints using
the following concepts. We will need the following notations: let T be the set of rounds (recall that each
round is a pair of moves of 0 followed by moves of 1) in an ME game and let proji : T → ℘(DU) be the
projection from a round τ to the set of DU’s labeling a move of the contribution by i (τi) therein. We
naturally extend proji to finite or infinite sequences of turns ρ letting proji(ρ) = ⋃k<length(ρ) proji(ρk). We
will also assume feasible, given a finite sequences of turns ρ and labels π, π′ ∈ proji, j(T) for some turn
T ∈ ρ, to semantically define a predicate attack(π, π′, ρ) that is true whenever the conversational context
constituted by the moves in the finite prefix ρ played so far is such that the move labeled by π′ indeed
represent an attack on the content of the move labeled by π. Defining and formalizing what exactly an
attack is, is one of the main concern of chapter 8. Similarly, we will write response(π, π′, ρ) when ρ is such
that π labels an attack on some other move, and that π′ is a response to that attack (typically π′ is itself
an attack on π). Whenever the finite play ρ is clear from context we might simply write attack(π, π′) or
response(π, π′).
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• Comparative NEC (CNEC): CNEC holds for Player i ∈ {0, 1} on round τ of a play ρ if there are
fewer attacks on i with no response in proj1−i(τ′) for τ′ ≤ τ than for 1 − i, i.e., defining ρ<τ as the
partial play up to τ, and the sets
Ai = {π ∈ pro ji(ρ<τ) ∣∃π′ ∈ proj1−i(ρ<τ) attack(π, π′)
and ∀π′′ ∈ proj1−i(ρ<τ) ¬response(π′′, π)}
we have card(Ai) > card(A1−i). CNEC holds for Player i ∈ {0, 1} over a play ρ if in the limit there
are more rounds of ρ where CNEC holds for i than there are rounds of ρ where CNEC holds for
1 − i [we shall make this notion formal later, after we introduce the model of the jury].
• Non vacuous consistency: A play ρ of an ME game over vocabularies V0 and V1 is consistent for
player i iff for any model A such that A updated by any initial segment x of ρ, A∥x∥ /⊧ Ci
 and for
some initial segment y of ρ, A∥y∥ ⊧ Ciφ, where ⊺ /⊧ φ.
• Coherence: A contribution by Player i ∈ {0, 1} is coherent on round τ if, considering the set proji(τ)
of all label of moves by i in τ, there is a single “top” label πtop, i.e. for every other label π ∈ proji(τ)
there is is a label π′ ∈ (proji(τ′)∪proj1−i(τ′)), where τ′ is τ or some previous round, such that either
π′′ : R(π, π′) or π′′ : R(π′, π) is a move in τi for some label π′′ ∈ proji(τ) and relation symbol R.
In simple terms, this requires that the contribution in τ links to a previous contribution by either
player.
• Responsiveness: Player i ∈ {0, 1} is responsive on round τ if there exists π, π′′ ∈ proji(τ) such that
there exists π′ ∈ (proj1−i(τ′))where τ′ is the previous round and for some R we have π′′ : R(π′, π) ∈
τi .
We think that these principles are elementary, reasonable constraints on winning conversations, in
particular consistency, coherence and responsiveness.We take consistency to be the fundamental constraint,
because inconsistency at the level of commitments implies a commitment to anything including to the
opponent’s winning condition. The motivation behind CNEC is that there are many times where a player
cannot prevent an attack, and yet she can still retain intuitively a strategy for achieving her objectives by
counterattacking. In the literature on argumentation, it is often assumed that any attack on an attack renders
it moot and ineffective (Dung, 1995) (exploiting theoretical results in the domain of abstract argumentation
couldmaybe help refine the definition of CNEC). CNEC requires that a string is winning for 0 if intuitively
0 defends her commitments more successfully than 1 defends hers in the sense that 0 has more successful
unrefuted attacks on 1 than vice versa. Note that this condition is beyond the expressive capacity of first
order logic over linear orders; we need at least first order logic with quantifiers (Libkin, 2004). In fact, we
need slightly more than this for the following reason: such a winning condition is impossible for 0 to attain
at every stage in the game; on her turn 1 can always pile on the attacks that have yet to be answered by 0.
7.4.2 The Jury
The Jury of ME games enforces these constraints by integrating them together with a players’ goals into
what we call the Jury winning condition. The Jury will penalize contributions that are not coherent, and
it will penalize a player that is not responsive on her turn. While being incoherent or unresponsive on a
turn is not a game changer; being inconsistent is–inconsistency makes the player automatically lose. In
addition, our Jury is sensitive to attacks that it deems successful; and it is sensitive to ones with no reply and
thus validates CNEC. The following model of the Jury with two components makes these claims concrete.
We wish to stress that the Jury does not alter the structure of the game, rather provides a model of what
a linguistically realistic winning condition is. The Jury’s scoring is only used in the course of defining the
Jury winning condition. Formally,
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Definition 48. The Jury is a tuple J = ({φi},{Pj},{ci, j}) j∈N,i∈{0,1} where
• φi ⊆ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω
• φ0 = φ1. φi is the Jury persuasion rule for each player i.
• For each j, Pj : {GOOD0,BAD0,GOOD1,BAD1} → [0, 1] is a probability function with Pj(GOODi) =
1 − Pj(BADi).
• For each i, j, ci, j ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 49. Given two set of playsWini ,Winj ⊆ (V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω, representing the initial objectives or initial
winning conditions of player i, j respectively, we say that:
• The Jury J is aligned with i ifWini ⊆ φi , it is biased against i otherwise (ifWini ∖ φi ≠ ∅).
• If the Jury is aligned with both i and j we say that it is aligned otherwise it ismisaligned.
Notice that the Jury is misaligned iff it is biased against one of the player. From the requirement that φi = φj,
it is aligned iffWini = φi = φ1−i =Win1−i (thus the initial objectives are 0 sum). For 0-sum initial objectives,
the Jury is misaligned iff it is aligned with one of the player, and biased against the other.
We will also use the same terminology (biased, aligned) relative to the initial ME Game G = ((V+0 ⋅
V+1 )ω,Win0,Win1) and the Jury.
Given anMEgames play, the Jury assigns a rating,∥τk∥ ∈ R, to the contribution in round τk (0 ≤ k < ∣τ∣)
with the following constraints:
• cohi(τk) = { 0 if k   2 = i and player i fails to respect coherence in τk1 otherwise
• resi(τk) = { 0 if k   2 = i and player i is not responsive in τk1 otherwise
• If i is inconsistent by round τk of ρ, then consi(τk′) = 0 for all k′ ≥ k. Otherwise, consi(τk) = 1
• In addition the Jury also assigns a value wini(τk) to every round τk as follows. Suppose ρk−1 is
the play so far and ρk = ρk−1τk . Then wini(τk) = 1 if (k   2) ≠ i or O(ρk) ∩ φi ≠ ∅. Other-
wise wini(τk) = −1. That is, wini(τk) = 1 if τk advances i towards the Jury persuasion rule φi30;
wini(τk) = −1 if τk takes i further away from φi .
The Jury also maintains a probability distribution over types: BADi and GOODi modeling the gain or
loss of credibility that i has faced so far. At each round we write this probability as Pk , and it is defined as
follows:
• P0(GOODi) = 1 and,
• Pk(BADi) = 1 − Pk(GOODi) and,
30We require for a move to advance i towards his winning condition that this move does not totally prevent him to reach that
condition. This is an approximation that should ideally be refined into a scalar evaluation of what the play actually brings to i.
This might be difficult to achieve for purely infinite conditions such that, coming back infinitely often to a given topic (as reaching
the topic once does not really alters what remains to do). An interesting perpective towards a better approximation is that of
ressorting tomean-payoff games (Zwick and Paterson, 1995). Mean-payoff games allow to combine a purely infinitary condition
(technically a parity condition), with opposed objective of maximizing (for 0) or minimizing (for 1) the average of local scores
associated with each moves.
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• if i successfully attacks (1 − i) at round k, then:
Pk(GOOD1−i) = Pk−1(GOOD1−i ∣ρk) = ckPk−1(GOOD1−i)
Pk(BADi) = ck .Pk−1(BADi) .
Where 0 ≤ ck < 1 is a constant representing the severity of punishment per single move of a player
1− i by the jury (ck = 2/3 looks reasonable, but this might be refined, for instance in order to make ck
dependant of the ‘badness’ of the attack). If noone successfully attack her opponent then Pk+1 = Pk .
These two ingredients contributes to a definition of the Jury’s evaluation in the following way: ∥τk∥ of
the kth round’s benefits to i is given as:
∥τk∥i = cohi(τk)resi(τk)consi(τk)Pk(GOODi)wini(τk)−
coh1−i(τk)res1−i(τk)cons1−i(τk)Pk(GOOD1−i)win1−i(τk)
And i’s score for a play ρ is given as
∥ρ∥↑i = lim infn→∞
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
n
n∑
k=1,τk∈ρ
∥τk∥i
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Then for a sequence ρ, the Jury assigns a win to Player i only if ρ ∈ φi and ∥ρ∥↑i > 0. Such plays form the
Jury winning condition for player i. It is easy to see that if a player’s winning condition in an ME GameG is her Jury winning condition, then she can win only with plays respecting consistency. She must also
respect CNEC, and must satisfy responsiveness and coherence ‘most of the time’ (unless the opponent is
really badly attacked, and even in that case, she must always eventually return to coherent and responsive
moves).
Remarks A few remarks are in order at this point. First on the Jury itself:
• Note that our assumption φ0 = φ1 on the Jury persuasion rule means that the Jury assigns ‘at most’
one winner for a play. Thus even assuming that an ME game G with winning conditionWin0 and
Win1 is non 0 sum and the Jury is aligned with G, the game G′ for the Jury conditions might not have
win-win plays, only lose-lose ones. The other situation where φ0 and φ1 may not be complementary
might also be explored. In that case, the Jury might assign a win to both the players.
• With the same notations and assumptions, in the case of a biased Jury, that is when φi ∩Win1−i ≠ ∅
for some i ∈ {0, 1}, it might be the case that the Jury assigns a win to Player i in G′ even though she
loses in the original ME game G and conversely.
• The above implies that we have different types of ME game-Jury pairs (G,J ) depending on whetherG is zero-sum or non zero-sum and whether the J is biased or unbiased. We shall explore these
scenarios and the impact of unawereness of the Jury’s bias in our section onmisdirection, Section
7.6.1.
Then, given the kind of evaluation that the Jury is performing, the meaning of a move is largely fixed by
its consistent and coherent uses in context, how it can be attacked and how it can be defended, amplified
on and so on. ME games thus enforce an exogenously specified notion of meaning, specified by linguistic
theory. This includes implicatures, which would seem to mark an important difference with the signaling
models of section 6.4. In signaling models, implicatures arise as a byproduct of cooperativity in the game’s
equilibrium; our model takes them to be provided by linguistic theory, and then predicts agents’ attitude
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toward them in the conversation’s continuations. We could thus think of a signaling model as one of
implicature generation, while our model is one of implicature ‘survival’.
We think however that the situation is more complicated for two reasons. First, on a commitment-
based view such as ours, the constraints of consistency and coherence determine implicatures. For instance,
Quayle’s implicature K in example (6.3.5) that he was comparable to John Kennedy as a politician translates
in our model into the fact that it is consistent and coherent both for Bentsen to commit that Quayle
committed to K and for Quayle to commit that he did not commit to K. Now as noticed earlier, a decision
to exploit or to deny an implicature brings with it a commitment that the linguistic premises (cooperativity,
sincerity, competence. . . ) of the implicature’s derivation hold, or do not hold. This being understood, it
does not matter whether one implements those premises within a logical theory, or within a signaling
game’s utility profile. But linguistic constraints like coherence and consistency do further work. Consider,
example example (6.3.2) with a fully cooperative Bronston. Where does the implicature to the “No” answer
comes from in the first place?This implicatures is fundamentally tied to coherence. Inferring “Yes” through
Bronston indirect answer makes him less coherent than inferring “No”, because the “No” allows for an
implicit contrastive discourse relation (“No I did not. [But] the company had one” while the yes would
require an explicitmarker “the companyhadone too” to infer a relation (this ismoreover actually confirmed
by the natural prosody of Bronston’s answer). Any model would have to rely one way or another on a
pragmatic theory to explain utilies and model this assymetry.
Second, we do not think that signaling games are independent of an exogenous linguistic theory with
regard to implicatures. One of the main concerns of the model in Franke (2009) is to bring conventional
meaning back into signaling model, which is not innocuous by constraining the set of player types in the
game. In order to capture implicatures properly, one needs to make conventional meaning a part of the
signaling model. To this end Franke (2009) suggests that the set of types constitute a potential answer set
to the question under discussion; hence, determining the game’s context requires a pragmatic model as
well.
In conclusion, both signaling games and ME game need to appeal to an exogenous theory. Signaling
games give a nice implementation of the Gricean theory where linguistic considerations can often be
“hidden” into the game context, whereas ME games allow a higher level form of quantification over those
possible game contexts, which is crucial to account for the possibility of Gricean or non-Gricean speaker.
7.5 Winning conditions and their complexity
Let us recap what we have done so far:
• we have examined BMGames, their limitations, definedME Games and sketched an SDRT-inspired
vocabulary to apply these games to the analysis of conversations. We have shown that both kind of
games are determined for winning sets Borel in their respective relevant topology, and charaterized
when an ME game’s condition is simple enough for the game to be emulated by a BM game and
winning strategies being predictable by the BM theorem.
• Looking more closely to the modeling of conversation, we have define a model for the Jury, as
enforcing particular kinds of winning conditions. Several constraints—consistency, coherence,NEC
contributes to this condition. These constrain the meaning of the signals players use independently
of the players’ beliefs or preferences, in contrast to other game theoretic frameworks.
Nevertheless, our model so far has not looked closely as what constitutes what we might call the initial
or ‘situation-specific’ component of winning conditions, nor to the general ‘shapes’ of conversations that
depend on them and the Jury constraints. We now investigate these questions.
113
Chapter 7. Message-exchange games
A related problem is that of the Borel complexity of the respective winning conditions. We will quickly
state the Borel complexity of strong appromixation (like being always coherent) of the different linguistic
constraints entering the Jury condition. Then we will turn to a more detailed examination of (non-Jury
part of) the conversational objectives that players choose, discussing their complexity as well, and when
can, whether there is a winning strategy in the game for achieving them.
7.5.1 Complexity of purely linguistic constraints
We have placed necessary constraints on winning conditions in the previous section. We now quickly
state their Borel complexity and draw some conclusions from this. LetNEC,COH,RESP,CONS,CNEC ⊂(V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω be the sets of sequences in (V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω which satisfy resp. the NEC, coherence, responsiveness,
consistency and the CNEC constraints. We have
Proposition 3. NEC,COH,RESP and CONS are Π02 sets.
Proof. We give the arguments for RESP. Those for NEC,COH and CONS are exactly similar. RESP can
be written as follows:
RESP = ⋂
n>0
{ρ ∈ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω ∣ ρn is responsive in each turn}
where ρn is the length-n prefix of ρ. Now
{ρ ∈ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω ∣ ρn is responsive for each turn}
is an open set. Thus RESP, being the countable intersection of open sets, is Π02 . qed
We now turn to the complexity of CNEC. The set CNEC ⊂ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω is defined as
CNEC = {ρ ∈ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω ∣ lim infn→∞
good attacks by 0 in ρn
good attacks by 1 in ρn
≥ 1}
That is, Player 0 has the upper hand over her opponent more often. Now by the definition of lim inf we
have the following sequence of equalities
CNEC = ⋂
N>0
{ρ ∈ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω ∣ ∃m > 0, ∀n > m good attacks by 0 in ρngood attacks by 1 in ρn > 1 − 1/N}
= ⋂
N>0
⋃
m>0
⋂
n≥m
{ρ ∈ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω ∣ good attacks by 0 in ρngood attacks by 1 in ρn > 1 − 1/N}
Now note that the set
⋂
n≥m
{ρ ∈ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω ∣ good attacks by 0 in ρngood attacks by 1 in ρn > 1 − 1/N}
is closed. So,CNEC is a Π03 set. Using ideas from Chaterjee (2007) we can also show that CNEC cannot
be expressed as a set of Borel complexity ≤ 2. That is, CNEC is Π03 hard. We thus have
Proposition 4. CNEC is a Π03 complete set
Propositions 3 and 4 establish that linguistically driven winning conditions fix in the most realistic case
winning conditions at Π03 since Π02 ⊆ Π03 . We note that to win according to the Jury has a Π03 complexity.
Now that we have settled the discussion for generic kind of linguistic constraint that the Jury enforces,
let us examine in more details some different kind of, more situation-specific conditions that can be en-
countered and enter the player objectives:
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7.5.2 Situation-specific conditions: reachability and safety
Let’s start by looking at the winning condition for the conversation in example (6.3.1), which, at least on a
certain interpretation, is a very simple, decomposition invariant condition. Suppose that in order to achieve
her winning condition, it suffices for candidate A that she, or her interlocutor, mention at some point, it
doesn’t matter when, the theorem that she has proved (leaving aside the constraints NEC, NR, consistency
or discourse coherence, which make winning conditions more complex). In other words, for A to win the
game, her conversation x must eventually contain this move. More generally, conversations in which the
objective of a player is to simply “touch upon” a certain topic exhibit the following shape:
Win = Reach(R)
Reachability, a characteristic property of many conditions classified as Σ01 in the Borel hierarchy, is defined
as follows. Given a non-empty subset R ⊂ (V0 ∪ V1) of the elements of the vocabulary, a string x in(V0 ∪ V1)ω is said to reach R if the elements from R occur somewhere in x. More formally, for a string
x over the vocabulary (V0 ∪ V1) we let x(i) denote the ith element of x. We define occ(x) = {a ∈ (V0 ∪
V1) ∣ ∃i, x(i) = a} to be the set of all the elements of (V0 ∪ V1) which occur in x. For x ∈ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω we
let occ(x) = occ(flat(x)). Then
Reach(R) = {x ∈ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω ∣ R ⊆ occ(x)}
is the set of all strings in which the elements of R occur at least once. The reachability set R of example
1 is the two elements set {(a, 0); (a, 1)} with a the move of mentioning A’s theorem. Since this winning
condition is decomposition invariant, by the BM theorem A has a winning strategy, since the winning
condition picks out an open set of strings of discourse moves.
Just as Reachability characterizes many conditions in Σ01 , Safety characterizes an important subset of
these Π01 conditions and is defined as follows. Suppose S (the ‘safe’ set) is a subset of (V0 ∪ V1).
Safe(S) = {x ∈ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω ∣ occ(x) ⊆ S}
is the set of all strings which contains elements from S alone. That is, the strings remain in the safe set
and do not move out of it. One common sort of Π01 condition is to prevent player 0 from reaching a Σ01
condition; another is to avoid a certain commitment or finite set of commitments.
Note An alternative way of thinking about reachability and many Σ01 conditions is to look at their defini-
tions in terms of temporal logic. As our space of infinite strings is a set of linear orders, formulas of linear
temporal logic (LTL) can describe some of its subsets, in particular many reachability conditions. For any
element a ∈ (V0 ∪ V1), let the proposition pa denote the property of visiting or playing a. For some finite
R ⊂ (V0 ∪ V1), the LTL defining formula for the strings that reach R is:
φreachable(R) = ⋀
a∈R
◇pa
where ◇ is interpreted as eventually.31 A reachability formula of the form ◇pa is true at an index i of a
sequence x (x, i ⊧ ◇pa) iff for some j ≥ i, x, j ⊧ pa. A string x satisfies◇pa (x ⊧ ◇pa) iff at the initial
point 0 of x, x, 0 ⊧ pa. Safety also has an LTL defining formula for the strings that stay in S: where ◻ is
interpreted as always,
φsafe(S) = ◻⋁
a∈S
pa
For a safety goal of the form ◻φ, x, i ⊧ ◻φ iff for all j ≥ i, x, j ⊧ φ. x ⊧ ◻φ iff x, 0 ⊧ ◻φ.
31For an introduction to LTL, see e.g. Lamport (1980).
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The simple Σ01 winning condition of candidate A’s is decomposition invariant. However, this is not so
for other goals. Consider example (6.3.3) again. Justin is playing a game with a disjunction of reachability
conditions as his winning condition: his goal is to get Janet either (i) to admit that she has been seeing
Valentino or admit that she hasn’t. These characterize an open set in an ME game where 0 is Justin. Never-
theless, unlike candidate A’s, Justin’s winning condition depends on Janet’s making a certain commitment,
a decomposition sensitive winning condition. We need to analyze the topological characteristics of such
winning conditions.
We first look at winning conditions that are decomposition sensitive in a particular way:Win depends
on 0 making a particular contribution at each turn. We call these conditions rhetorically decomposition
sensitive. Our constraints of responsiveness, coherence, consistency and NEC are all rhetorically decom-
position sensitive conditions.
Proposition 5. IfWin is rhetorically decomposition sensitive, then it is meager.
Proof. Let x ∈Win be a winning play. SinceWin rhetorically is decomposition sensitive, for every prefix
xn of x which ends with a contribution of 1 there exists a finite yn such thatO(xn yn) ∩Win = ∅. Since x
was arbitrary, this means the closure ofWin has empty interior. Hence,Winmust be meager. qed
Given the constraints enforced by the Jury, we will be mostly interested in rhetorically decomposition
sensitive winning conditions in ME games. Any winning condition incorporating these constraints is a
meager set. However, not all winning conditions that are meager provide a winning strategy for Player 1.
Consider the following abstract ME game. Suppose V = {a, b} and suppose Player 0 loses if and only
if at any point she plays b. That is, the winning setWin is
Win = (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω ∖ Reach({(b, 0)})
This is itself a rhetorically decomposition sensitive winning condition. Now, both Win and π f ,ω(Win)
are meager sets in their respective topologies. As the Banach Mazur theorem rightly states, Player 1 has
a winning strategy in the BM game (Vω, π f ,ω(Win)): play b at some turn. However, she does not have
a winning strategy in the ME game (V0 ∪ V1)ω,Win). That is because whatever she plays, Player 0 can
always avoid playing b. In other words, the decomposition sensitivity of the ME games breaks down the
applicability of the BanachMazur theorem inME games. Player 1 cannot ‘play for’ Player 0 now, which she
can do in the BMgame. A linguistic example of such a situation is a gameG where Janet fromexample (6.3.3)
is player 0. Janet has a winning strategy in G even though her winning condition is meager.
Conversely, consider a winning condition for 0 that depends on some finite number of contributions by
1. Call such goals 1-finite-decomposition sensitive. An instance of such a winning condition would be Justin’s.
Recall that Justin’s objective in example (6.3.3) is to get Janet to commit as to whether she has been seeing
Valentino or not. Symbolize this commitment by Janet’s as (c, 1) ∈ V1, as Janet is Player 1. Then Justin’s
winning condition is the union of open sets {O(x.(c, 1)) :x ∈ (V0 ∪ V1)∗} and is co-meager. Nevertheless,
his opponent Janet has a winning condition in such a game: never answer Justin’s question directly. More
generally,
Proposition 6. If an ME game G has a 1-finite-decomposition sensitive winning condition, then there is
no winning strategy in G for 0.
Corollary 10. There are ME games with 1-finite-decomposition sensitive winning conditions that are
co-meager, but where 0 has no winning strategy.
There are also 0-finite-decomposition sensitive winning conditions that depend only on finitely many
moves of 0. These conditions are Σ01 where 0 always has a winning strategy, as the BM theorem predicts.
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A final situation is the one of the prosecutor in (8.2.4) has components that are decomposition sensitive,
but the entire winning condition is not. The prosecutor’s winning condition as described above is that
Bronston must either commit to an answer or never answer P’s question. Given such a winning condition,
there is a winning strategy for the prosecutor: keep asking the question until Bronston commits to an
answer. In fact the entire game space is the winning condition for the prosecutor. Thus, we can infer:
Proposition 7. Decomposition sensitivity of winning conditions is not preserved under union.
Proof. Let Win1 be a decomposition sensitive winning condition and let Win2 = (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω ∖Win1.
ClearlyWin2 is also decomposition sensitive. Indeed, because if the play is decomposed according to some
play u ∈ Win1 then Player 0 cannot win. HoweverWin1 ∪Win2 = (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω is clearly decomposition
invariant. qed
We’ve now canvassed the whole spectrum of decomposition sensitive winning conditions inME games.
In general, decomposition sensitivitymakesME gamesmore expressive andmore complex than BM games,
breaking the delicate link between topology and winning conditions given by the BM theorem.
Decomposition sensitivity also affects Borel complexity. If Player 0 has a winning strategy in a rhetori-
cally decomposition sensitive ME game then the Borel complexity ofWin is at least Σ02 .
Proposition 8. Let G = ((V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω,Win) be an ME game such thatWin is rhetorically decomposition
sensitive. If Player 0 has a winning strategy in G then the Borel complexiy ofWin is at least Σ02 .
Proof. Let us mimic a winning play u of Player 0. u ∈ Win only if for every prefix un, n odd, of u that
ends in a Player 1 move,O(un) ∩Win ≠ ∅. Thus whatever 1 plays to reach un, 0 can choose vn such that
un+1 = unvn is still a prefix of u. We may thus write u as
u = u0O(u1) ∩ u2O(u3) ∩ . . .
HenceWin, being at least a countable union of the above sequences, is at least Σ02 . qed
7.5.3 co-Büchi conditions
We’ve alreadymet the next kind of set in the Borel Hierarchy, Σ02 sets, also known as co-Büchi sets. Suppose
C is a subset of (V0 ∪ V1) (the ‘co-Büchi’ set). Then
co-Büchi(C) = {x ∈ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω ∣ inf(x) ⊆ C}
where inf (x) = {a ∈ V ∣ ∀i,∃ j > i, x( j) = a} is defined to be the set of all the elements of V which occur
infinitely often in x.
In terms of LTL formulae, the co-Büchi condition may be viewed as follows. Let C ⊆ V be the co-Büchi
set. Then
φco−Buchi(C) = ◇◻ ⋁
a∈C
pa
Classic examples of co-Büchi conditions are those with strings that eventually contain only elements of
C or eventually settle down in C. That is, the strings eventually get stuck in the safe set C. example (6.3.6)
is a motivating example for a conversation with a Σ02 winning condition that also involves rhetorically
decomposition sensitive conditions like responsiveness, coherence and consistency: Feynmann had to
respond to his students’ questions and in a coherent way lead them eventually to the topic that he wanted
to discuss.
The winning condition that a conversation be finite is also a co-Büchi condition. A finite conversation
is easily modeled in the ME framework; the initial segment in which the agreement is reached is then
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succeeded by an infinite sequence of “null” moves that keep the content of the last move. Indeed, there is a
close connection between agreementwinning conditions andfiniteness. If the only goal of the exchange is to
achieve a fixed point in which the dialogue stays within this information state forever after, the conversation
should stop once the terms of the exchange and the agreement are common knowledge. Being rational
agents, our players will stop once they acquire the mutual knowledge that that state has been achieved and
that nothing will take them out of it.32
Bargaining agreements or agreements on some permanent exchange of goods, which could also be
information are naturally Σ02 conversations even in the absence of these constraints—e.g., . Any information
seeking conversation in which 0 has the goal of acquiring agreement about some intellectual issue φ, like
a Socratic dialogue also has the structure of a Σ02 winning condition. Walton (1984) calls these inquiry
dialogues. Co-Büchi conditions distinguish between provisional and real agreement. In a provisional
agreement, an agent provisionally may acknowledge another’s contribution and agree to a bargain but
later take the acknowledgment and the agreement back. IfWin of the conversational game consists only
in reaching a provisional agreement, Win is clearly Σ01 , as it does not constrain what happens after the
provisional agreement is reached. Real agreement is different. Once attained between two agents, the
agents do not deviate from it in any further conversation; no conversational moves take them out of that
state of agreement, as required for a co-Büchi condition. This is essentially also a decomposition sensitive
condition.
In the absence of any constraints, however, a decomposition sensitive winning condition of agree-
ment for 0 has no winning strategy for 0; 1 always has a non empty 1-play of disagreeing for any possible
continuation by 0. Similarly, no conversational goal of extracting a binding oath from an opponent can
succeed, unless additional constraints are imposed. For similar reasons to the lack of a winning strategy for
agreement type winning conditions, finiteness winning conditions are also easily seen to have no winning
strategy—1 can always prolong the game by talking when it is her turn.
Our general constraints of NEC, responsiveness and coherence, however, can make the agreement
happen in agreement seeking conversations. The Jury becomes an “arbitratror”, imposing agreement when
the opponent 1 no longer has any counter arguments to rebut 0’s arguments for a particular position or
exchange; the lack of counter arguments makes 1’s objections not credible, thus lowering 1’s score eventually
leading to 0’s winning condition. Thus, with the Jury’s constraints, 0 wins a Σ02 goal iff 1 has eventually no
more arguments against a certain proposition φ, where φ may describe a bargain or topic of discussion.
Co-Büchi conditions also characterize goals in which 0 repeatedly attacks 1 eventually to reduce the
opponent’s score in the eyes of the Jury. Example (6.3.4) is such an example. Let LD be player 0 in an
ME game. In the voire-dire transcript, 0 repeatedly returns to the question as to whether the defendant
Tzeng was responsible for severing a nerve in a patient’s hand; he seemed prepared to revisit the theme
indefinitely until he exposes that the expert witness D, or 1 in this game, was covering up for a fault of the
defendant. Repeatedly questioned, 1 replies each time in the play up to (6.3.4-c) to (6.3.4-d) that Tzeng was
not at fault. In the Jury’s eyes, 0’s questioning had little effect; the Jury’s probabilities assigned to the types
of 0 and 1 did not shift, and 0 was no closer to his winning condition in getting the court to agree with him
that 1 was not an impartial witness. However, at (6.3.4-d), 1 contradicts his previous testimony by agreeing
to 0’s loaded question, and his attempts to backtrack and correct his mistake are successfully attacked by 0
in (6.3.4-h). At this point, 0 has achieved his goal.
We note that our model of the Jury needs refinement in that it does not take account of successful
retractions in the face of inconsistency, and so we cannot really predict the counterattack at (6.3.4-h). We
plan to address this in future work.
32In principle, participants could continue acknowledging each other’s acknowledgments ad infinitem. But such acknowledg-
ments wouldn’t serve any purpose. For a discussion see chapter 10.
118
7.5. Winning conditions and their complexity
7.5.4 Büchi conditions
The complementary condition of a Co-Büchi condition, the Büchi condition, is the equivalent of (infinite)
iterated reachability, and is a condition that is not expressible on finite strings. Suppose B is a subset of(V0 ∪ V1) (the ‘Büchi’ set). Then
Büchi(B) = {x ∈ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω ∣ inf(x) ∩ B ≠ ∅}
is the set of all strings which contain infinitely many elements of B or equivalently which visit B infinitely
often. A Büchi set is Π02 in the Borel hierarchy. In conversations where player 0 has a Büchi winning
condition, she will win if she always has a path to B and revisits B infinitely often. A Büchi condition is
more sophisticated than a Π01 condition, in which a player never leaves a set of states. 0 can play for a Büchi
condition and allow 1 a reachability or Σ01 condition on his play. In such a game, player 0 can continue to
return to her chosen and preferred states infinitely often, reiterating a point or set of points that she wants
to make (once again, a finite conjunction of Büchi conditions is also Büchi).
Some Büchi conditions can be expressed using LTL formulas, however, that are finitely satisfiable. For
any x ∈ V , let the proposition px denote the property of visiting or playing x. Let B ⊆ V be the Büchi set
of states. Then
φBüchi(B) = ◻◇ ⋁
x∈B
px
If 0’s winning condition means revisiting a set of states B infinitely often, it must be for some other pur-
pose other than agreements on exchanges of goods or information, for once lasting agreement is achieved,
there is no point in revisiting that agreement. On the other hand, a Büchi condition can be effective in
debate. Political debates like those evoked in example (6.3.7) exemplify a Büchi condition. Such a condition
is more difficult to achieve if our rhetorical constraints are imposed on acceptable discourse sequences, be-
cause it means that any play by the opponent still must enable the player to have a rhetorically cooperative
path to return to B. But a practiced debater can have such a strategy.
Let’s now take a closer look at the analysis of one of our examples involving a Büchi winning condition,
example (6.3.5). Our excerpted example was a turning point in the Vice-Presidential debate. Quayle’s goal
as Player 0 was to continually revisit the theme that despite his youth he had the talent and experience of
a good Vice-Presidential and Presidential candidate. In effect this is a Π02 winning condition. Up to the
exchange in example (6.3.5), we can assume that Quayle had not made any disastrous moves, had remained
consistent, responsive and replied to attacks and that the Jury’s assignment to GOOD0 had not suffered
that much. His play had produced an initial segment of strings inWin. That is, we assume that the play σ
up until example (6.3.5) is such that ∥σ∥ was above 0, though not significantly above.
Given this goal, it would seem 0 had a clear winning strategy. What went wrong? To describe the
exchange in example (6.3.5) in detail, we need as basic vocabulary for both V0 and V1: an attack move,
attack(x, y), meaning that the move y attacks move x, descriptions of the content of basic moves x : φ
and y : ψ, a commentary move, comment(x, y) where a player expresses an opinion in y about move
x, and a question answering move (QAP). (6.3.5-a) is a QAP move to a question about his Presidential
qualifications. But the content of (6.3.5-a) is ambiguous. Quayle might have just intended (6.3.5-a)’s literal
meaning—that he was equal in governmental experience to John Kennedy as a candidate for President.
But he might also have intended, and probably did intend by mentioning a famous President, to have the
audience and Jury draw a direct and positive comparison between himself and Kennedy with regards to
the kind of President he might become in line with his winning condition. In response Bentsen plays
attack((6.3.5-a), (6.3.5-b)). (6.3.5-b) introduces a commitment to a proposition φ, with φ contradicting
the implicated direct comparison. This is what he should do; he should try to get the Jury to lower their
estimation of Quayle’s GOOD type. At this point Quayle should have counterattacked with another attack
move, asNEC requires. But instead,Quayle plays aweak comment((6.3.5-b), (6.3.5-c)). (6.3.5-c) introduces
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a commitment to a proposition ψ of Bentsen being “unfair” in the subsequent turn; and then Bentsen plays
another successful attack(comment((6.3.5-b), (6.3.5-c)), (6.3.5-d)). (6.3.5-d) commits Bentsen to χ, where
χ expresses that it wasQuayle that brought up the comparison and thus opened himself up to attack—hence,
attack((6.3.5-a), (6.3.5-b)) was perfectly fair. The Jury penalized Quayle severely for this double failure in
replying to attacks, with a negative score for each of Quayle subsequent turns, and as a result, a failure to
fulfill the Jury’s condition which made Quayle lose the debate.
7.5.5 Muller conditions
A Muller condition is defined as follows. Suppose we are given a set F = {F1, F2, . . . , Fn} of subsets of(V0 ∪ V1) (the Muller sets). Then Muller(F) = {x ∈ Vω ∣ inf (x) ∈ F} is the set of all strings which
eventually (after a finite point) get stuck in one of the Muller sets,Muller(F).
A Muller winning condition is a boolean combination of Büchi and Co-Büchi conditions. In terms
of temporal logic formulae this can be seen as follows. Let F = {F1, F2, . . . , Fn} be the set of Muller sets
where each Fi is a subset of V . Then
φMuller(F) = (φco-Büchi(F1) ∨ . . . ∨ φco-Büchi(Fn)) ∧ (φco-Büchi(F1) ⇒
⋀
x∈F1
φBüchi({x})) ∧ . . . ∧ (φco-Büchi(Fn) ⇒ ⋀
x∈Fn
φBüchi({x}))
Since Muller conditions extend Büchi conditions, Muller conditions are not compatible with the goal
of exchanging goods. Nevertheless, there are real life conversations with Muller “winning” conditions with
multiple states, in which the participants revisit the states indefinitely often. In fact conversations with
Muller winning conditions are commonplace. For instance, examples examples (6.3.5) and (6.3.7) have
both Π02 and also Σ02 components to their winning conditions, as the Jury requires that they obey rhetorical
cooperativity, NEC and consistency. Once a Π02 winning condition is combined with a Σ02 requirement,
the result is a Muller winning condition.
Proposition 9. If 0 must obey a rhetorically decomposition sensitive condition with a Π02 objective, then
her winning condition is Muller.
There are also examples of conversations withMuller winning conditions. One involves a conversation
between two partners who have lived for a long time together and who are quite old. After a certain point 0
always attempts to go through the same conversational moves, so that they can revisit the same memories,
and touch on the same themes, laugh at the same jokes. 0 asks the same questions to get the same answers.
To quote John Prine from the song Far from Me, a question ain’t really a question if you know the answer
too. In the song 1 plays along for a while, though she "waits a little too long," to laugh at the same, repeated
jokes. In the end 1’s goal is to break the cycle of repeated conversational moves by 0. Assuming that our
conversational agents are rational, the goal of such a conversation is not information exchange or some
sort of persuasion; it is something else like venting one’s emotions albeit indirectly, reliving an experience,
or conveying some other non literal message.
We have discussed an wide range of winning conditions, from the simplest to the more complex, in
term of Borel complexity. All these conditions are in the Borel hierarchy, and though it is theoretically
possible to define a non-Borel winning condition (at least up to the axiom of choice), it is not clear wether
an actual player might adopt a condition as its conversational goal. Since we have, in earlier sections shown
that for Borel conditions, 0-sumME games are determined, this means that in the vastmajority of instances
of strategic conversations, the corresponding games are determined, which appeal to discuss the rational
basis that player might have to start playing the game in the first place. The next sections adress this issue
formalizing the notions of misdirection and conversational blindness.
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7.6 Why talk?
In this section we propose an answer to the following : why would both players engage in a conversation if
it is a zero-sum game?
Captain Kirk’s response to an unwinnable test, the Kobayashi Maru Test, in the movie Star Trek was
to change the conditions of the test. Our response is similar for a player involved in a zero sumME game
and whose opponent has a winning strategy: change the winning condition hoping to convince the Jury!
The zero-sumME-games framework is very simple, and only allows two parameters of variation for either
player to achieve a win, when the opponent already has a winning strategy for achieving her winning
condition:
1. choose a different winning goal for herself rather than the complement of her opponent’s winning
condition, or
2. change or expand her vocabulary
We explore these options in what follows.
7.6.1 Misdirection
Let us consider the first option.We havemodeled conversations asME gameswhere the players have certain
winning conditionsWin0 andWin1. The ME game G might be zero-sum (Win0 =Win1) or non zero-sum
(Win0 ∩Win1 ≠ ∅). We complexify the game a little, and assume that both the players are ‘unaware’ of
the type of the Jury J . Thus crucially, the players are unaware of the Jury winning conditions φ0 and φ1.
Under such a setting 4 different situations might arise.
The simple cases are those where the Jury is unbiased, and G is either zero-sum or non zero-sum. In
both these situations, the Jury will award a win to i if she meets her chosen winning conditionWini and
adheres to the Jury constrains of consistency, responsiveness and coherence.
The interesting cases arise when the Jury is biased. In that case, the Jury has a prior opinion of what
0 or 1 should say and forms its winning condition φ0 and φ1 based on these. A Jury biased against 1 − i
allows i to ‘misdirect’. That is, i plays so that even if she does not satisfy her winning conditionWini in the
ME game G, she does (hope to) satisfy the Jury winning condition φi .
Since the Jury does not interact with 0 (or 1), our players must just take their best shot as to what the
Jury’s winning condition is. So 1 can have a winning strategy by transforming G by choosing a winning
condition that is not the complement of 0’s winning condition but that will nevertheless convince the
Jury to award 1 the win in the evaluation of G. This is what we callmisdirection. Note that this renders G
technically non zero-sum.
A similar argument holds for a non zero-sumME game as well. Thus we can formalise misdirection
as follows.
Definition 50. Let (G,J ) be an ME game-Jury pair. G is prone to misdirection when
• (G,J ) is misaligned, i.e., J is biased.
• There exists a play ρ of G and i ∈ {0, 1} such that ρ ∈ (φi ∩Win(1−i)).
We say that ρ is a misdirection of the ME game G and that Player i can misdirect if she has a strategy σi to
achieve ρ.
Consider again example (6.3.2) involving Bronston (B) and the Prosecutor (P) which is plausibly a case
where B and P are playing a zero-sumME game with winning conditionsWinB andWinP respectively. P
is playing for the winning conditionWinP , in which B plausibly commits to
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1. having had a Swiss bank account or,
2. or having never had one, or
3. refusing to answer the question.
It is clear that by just posing his question P has a winning strategy: either B must at least implicate an
answer by linking his response to the question, or he refuses to answer the question in this round; if B does
not answer, P can keep reposing his question, and thus establishes in the limit that B commits to refusing
to answer the question. In factWinP so described encompasses all of the game space. Though ideally B
would have preferred not to commit at all concerning bank accounts, had B taken his winning condition
to beWinP , he would have lost. So it is rational for B to misdirect - choose a different goal in the hope that
the Jury will be persuaded not to convict him in its evaluation of the ME game with respect to the goal of
P’s conviction. Given the goal set by P, B sets a goal of minimizing his losses and chooses a goal that may
enable him to escape conviction.
What happens then is that B chooses a goalWin′B that is the complement of a stronger winning condi-
tion thanWinP , the condition being that either B commits to a direct answer to (6.3.2-c) or to refusing to
answer the question. This transforms the original zero-sumME game to non zero-sum. He then fashions
a winning strategy that satisfies bothWin′B andWinP . Given that P has adoptedWinP as a conversational
goal, he is rationally happy with any continuation ofO(abc). So while Pwould have had a winning strategy
for Win′B, by asserting (7.6.1), it is not necessary, given our characterization of WinP , that P picks (7.6.1)
over any other continuation of example (6.3.2), which makes Bronston move to attempt the misdirection,
at least rationalizable.
(7.6.1)e’. Prosecutor: I’m not interested in whether the company had an account there. I am interested
in whether you ever did. Please answer my question.
Thus, P won the original ME game and B won the evaluation of it by the Jury.The utility of B’s decision,
and his assignment of a particular type to the Jury, paid off in the end. In effect the ME game between
P and B had two Juries deciding as to whether B avoided conviction or not. While the lower court, Jury
1, was convinced by P’s arguments and B was convicted of perjury, a higher court overturned the verdict
of perjury and the judgment of the lower court thatWinP was sufficient for conviction. The higher court
claimed that P should have achievedWin′B. This, then is a successful use of misdirection by B.
The outcome of each of the 4 situations mentioned above can be concisely represented in tabular form
as follows.
zero-sum G non zero-sum G
unbiased J not prone to misdirection not prone to misdirection
biased J prone to misdirection prone to misdirection
Remarks A further, arguably more interesting observation follows if we assume incomplete knowledge
concerning i’s goals on the part of 1 − i and the Jury winning conditions on the part of both the players.
To model these we need to introduce ‘types’ for the players and the Jury and prior probabilities about the
beliefs that the players have about the types of their opponents and the Jury.The players might dynamically
update their beliefs about these types as the game proceeds based on Bayesian update. To model this we
need to enrich our model of ME games to the Bayesian games framework. We do this in an ensuing paper.
In this framework, continuing with our courtroom example, suppose that B does not know whether
in fact P has adoptedWinP orWin
′
B. It is rational on B’s part to attempt to answer indirectly; if P is happy
with his indirect answer, then B has at least an even chance to achieveWinB, which is better than refusing
to answer and thus failing to achieveWinB with certainty. If P is not happy with the answer, he can then
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use the continuation in abcde. In this case B will fail to block eitherWinP orWin
′
B. However, given that B
assigns equal priors to bothWinP andWin
′
B, he has a good shot at blocking one.
There is also a moral in these extended Bayesian ME games for a player (Player 0 say). Player 0 may
have a winning strategy for a winning condition that she thinks will convince the Jury, but an ideal winning
condition for 0 for should preclude any setC for which shemight assign a positive probability to 1’s winning
in the eyes of the Jury, given that 1 plays to stay within C. If that is right, then intuitively in example
example (6.3.2), P picked the wrong winning condition; he should have played the stronger condition.
Our model fills some gaps in the analysis of Asher and Lascarides (2013), who analyze misdirections
in terms of two finite games with different utilities and moves. They do not explain the utilities assigned
to Bronston, whereas we explain the utilities for these local moves in terms of the global goals of the two
players. Asher and Lascarides (2013) also requires that P not be aware of the fact that Bronston could have
chosen a direct answer to (6.3.2-c) instead of the indirect answer that he gave. This seems to us unrealistic,
and we do not do this.
7.6.2 Conversational blindness
The second option for 1 in the face of 0’s having a winning strategy in G is to change the game by expanding
her vocabulary. Thus, Player 1 is playing with a vocabulary W0 but Player 0 assumes her to be playing
with a vocabulary V0 which is a strict subset of W0. Thus Player 1 has moves available to her that are
unknown to Player 0. Thus 1 has moves available to her of which 0 is not even aware, and we call this
option conversational blindness. We will show that conversational blindness can make it such that 0’s
winning strategy in G no longer works in G′ and 1 has a winning strategy in G′ instead.
In the previous section, we showed that in misdirection, both the players are aware of each others
moves but have different winning conditions. Here we have a different situation. If one player is playing
with a subset of the other’s vocabulary, then the epistemic situations of our two players is rather different.
The player with the smaller vocabulary can only play against an opponent of whom she assumes com-
mon knowledge of his own game. The player with the larger vocabulary, however, if she is aware of the
situation, will model her opponent’s strategies and winning condition over the smaller game but herself
strategize in her larger vocabulary. In such a situation, the player with the smaller vocabulary herself has
a winning strategy for her conversation only to discover that the strategy does not work given the moves
her opponent uses against her, moves of which she was unaware when devising her winning strategy. It
thus can behoove a player to play in a larger vocabulary of moves than her opponent is aware of. On the
other hand, playing in a smaller vocabulary simply limits the player’s vocabulary and does not improve her
chances of having a winning strategy in all but the most pathological cases. We shall elucidate this scenario
revisiting example (6.3.5).
In Asher and Paul (2013), it was shown that for X ⊊ Y , a Borel subset A of Xω will have a higher Borel
complexity in Yω under certain conditions. Thus, even if Player 0 has a winning strategy for a winning
conditionWin, she might cease to have a winning strategy if the vocabulary of the Player 1 changes to the
bigger set Y . That is because the complexity ofWinmight increase in Yω. Making use of that result we can
show the following for ME games. Let V1 ⊊W1.
Theorem3 (Asher&Paul, transferred toMEgames). LetME1((V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω,Win) andME2((V+0 ⋅W+1 )ω,Win)
be two ME games and letWin ⊂ (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω be Borel. We have the following in the Borel hierarchy (sum-
marised by Figure 7.2):
1. (a) IfWin ∈ Σ01 in the space (V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω thenWin ∈ Σ02 in the space (V+0 ⋅W+1 )ω; (b) IfWin ∈ Π01 in
the space (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω thenWin ∈ Π01 in the space (V+0 ⋅W+1 )ω.
2. For 1 < α < ω and α odd, (a) If Win ∈ Σ0α in the space (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω then Win ∈ Σ0α+1 in the space(V+0 ⋅W+1 )ω; (b) IfWin ∈ Π0α in the space (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω thenWin ∈ Π0α in the space (V+0 ⋅W+1 )ω.
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3. For 1 < α < ω and α even, (a) If Win ∈ Σ0α in the space (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω then Win ∈ Σ0α in the space(V+0 ⋅W+1 )ω; (b) IfWin ∈ Π0α in the space (V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω thenWin ∈ Π0α+1 in the space (V+0 ⋅W+1 )ω.
4. For α ≥ ω, ifWin ∈ Σ0α (resp.Win ∈ Π0α) thenWin ∈ Σ0α (resp.Win ∈ Π0α) on going from the space(V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω to (V+0 ⋅W+1 )ω. That is, the sets stabilise.
Σ01 Σ02 Σ
0
3 Σ04 Σ0ω Σ0ω+1 Σ
0
ω1
Π01 Π02 Π
0
3 Π04 Π0ω Π0ω+1 Π
0
ω1
Figure 7.2: Jumps in the Borel hierarchy
The proof is general and applies to ω sequences over any countable vocabularies X and Y . We first
prove the following:
Proposition 1. Let X and Y be two vocabularies such that X ⊊ Y . An open setO in the space Xω jumps
to Σ02 in the space Yω. A closed set C in the space Xω remains closed in Yω.
Proof. In the following a subscript X or Y will denote the fact that we are refering to the space Xω or Yω
respectively. LetO be an open set in Xω. ThenO is of the form AXω where A ⊂ X∗. We first show how to
codeO as a Σ02 set in Yω.
Each element u of A gives the basic open setOX(u) which is a subset of Xω. Now, when we move to
the vocabulary Y , the setOY(u) is the set of strings which have u as a prefix and all possible continuations
using letters of Y . ThusOY(u) is a strict superset ofOX(u). Hence, we need to restrictOY(u) in Yω such
that we obtain a set which is equal to OX(u) in Xω. One way to do do so is as follows. Consider all the
finite continuations of u in letters from X. For every k ≥ 1, let U k be the set of all the continuations of
length ∣u∣ + k and letOkY(u) be the set
OkY(u) = ⋃
u′∈U k
OY(u′)
Note that eachOkY(u) is of the form AYω where A is a set of words of bounded length. Hence, eachOkY(u)
is clopen. Thus, finallyOX(u) is the set
OX(u) = ⋂
k≥1
OkY(u) (7.1)
which is a closed set, being a countable intersection of clopen sets.
Thus the setO can be represented in Yω as
O = ⋃
u∈A
OX(u)
each of which by (7.1) is a closed set. HenceO ∈ Σ02 in the space Yω being a countable union of closed sets.
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LetO ∈ (Σ01 ∖Π01 ) in Xω. To see thatO is Σ02 complete for Yω we first establish thatO is not open in
Yω. Indeed, because otherwise, there exists a finite string u whose all possible continuations with letters
from Y are inO and that is a contradiction.
O is also not closed in Yω. To see this, we show that (Yω∖O) is not open in Yω. Since,O ∈ (Σ01 ∖Π01 )
in Xω, it follows from basic topology that (Xω∖O) is non-empty. It also follows that there exists a string
u ∈ (Xω∖O) such that OX(v) /⊂ (Xω∖O) for any v ∈ pref (u), where pref (u) is the set of prefixes of u.
Let u ∈ (Xω∖O) be such a string.
Suppose, for contradiction, thatO is closed in Yω. Then (Yω∖O)must be open and hence must be
of the form AYω for some A ⊂ Y∗. Now since (Yω∖O) should contain u there must exist v ∈ A such that
u ∈ OY(v). But then note thatOY(v) also contains some string vu′ such that vu′ ∈ (Yω∖O) but which it
should exclude. For example vu′ ∈ vXω is such a string. This is a contradiction. HenceO cannot be closed
in Yω.
Next let C be a closed set in Xω. We claim C is also closed in Yω. To see this simply note that the
complement of C in Yω can be represented as the open set
Yω ∖ C = ⋃
j≥1
(Y j ∖ pref j(C))Yω
where pref j(C) is the set of length- j prefixes of C. Each (Y j ∖ pref j(C))Yω is open. qed
Proof of theorem 3. Using the above lemma as a base case, an argument by induction proves theorem
2. qed
Theorem 3 shows that if a player i is playing with a particular winning conditionWin that is Borel in a
vocabulary V while her opponent is playing in a larger vocabularyW and she is unaware of or does not
anticipate this fact, i may cease to have a winning strategy, because of the increased ‘complexity’ of the
winning setWin.
Let’s now return to example (6.3.5). It is a delicate matter to say exactly what Q did not anticipate and
what went wrong. We give two interpretations; in both, Q plays a game with set of movesV and BN a game
with set of movesW such that V ⊊W . One interpretation is that he did not foresee (6.3.5-b); alternatively,
he foresaw (6.3.5-b) but did not believe that BN’smovewas relevant, because he failed to realize that (6.3.5-a)
was ambiguous between the mere comparison of experience and the comparison between John Kennedy
and Q as potential Presidents, the latter making BN’s attack relevant.
We have seen that this goal would be characterized as Π02 in the Borel Hierarchy in (V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω. Q has
a winning strategy for achieving this winning condition in ME1. However, if BN can make a move not in
V , thenTheorem 3 says thatWin jumps to Π03 in (V+0 ⋅W+1 )ω.
What does this mean for winning strategies in ME games? If the winning condition of an ME game
is decomposition invariant, then one can apply the Banach Mazur theorem and infer that 1 has a winning
strategy iffWin is a meager set. In ME1, the game Quayle is aware of and is playing in,Win is Π02 , and it
is a co-meager set. So by the Banach Mazur theorem, Quayle has a winning strategy in Π02 in ME1. But if
Win is a Π03 set in (V+0 ⋅W+1 )ω, the encoding technique of theorem 2 makes this set meager in the larger
topology and so Quayle ceases to have a winning strategy in ME2.
The presence of a winning strategy is a complex matter in ME games, however, as we have established,
because many winning conditions are not decomposition invariant; a winning condition may depend on
finitely or infinitely many moves of one or both players.
Quayle’s winning condition clearly depends on his contributions at every turn, and so it is decomposi-
tion sensitive. This means that a simple jump in Borel complexity or a move from a co meager to a meager
winning condition is not enough to preclude a winning strategy.
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Quayle’s problem is that he does not refute Bentsen’s attack or even really answer it, we assume, because
he had not anticipated this move. But though not refuting an attack is costly with respect to our Jury
winning condition, it is not a game losing condition. So what went wrong with Quayle?
Our intuition is that by not replying to Bentsen at all, Quayle made a game losing move. (6.3.5-b)
to (6.3.5-d) in discourse theory terms is a  	 on Bentsen’s attack move. Commentaries implic-
itly carry with them a commitment on their author to the content they are commenting on. Now if the
 	’s target is the content of what Bentsen said, then this is devastating for Quayle. Bentsen is
implicating by saying that Quayle is no Kennedy, something stronger, that he is not of Presidential material.
With  	 on the content, Quayle then commits to that content. In so doing he commits to his not
being of Presidential stature when precisely his winning condition was to constantly come back to that
commitment and reaffirm it. His commitments are now inconsistent, and inconsistency is a game-losing
property of conversations given our Jury winning condition. Moreover, this was an inconsistency involving
an intrinsic property of the Π02 part of Quayle’s winning condition.
There is an alternative interpretation of the  	 move by Q. The  	 move is not
about the content of BN’smove but rather about the fact that BNmade thismove.This seemsmore plausible
and it commits Q on the face of it only to the fact that Bentsen made a particular discourse move. But
by not counterattacking, Q sends a message that is terrible for him. First, he commits that the attack is
coherent and responsive. Second, by not replying he concedes and commits to the proposition that the
content of BN’s move and its implicatures are not attackable. That is, Q has no means to refute the content
of the attack. But this in turn implies that he implicitly must commit to their content. Hence, his non-reply
makes his commitments look inconsistent, and inconsistency is a game-losing property of conversations
given our Jury winning condition. Moreover, this was an inconsistency involving an intrinsic property of
the Π02 part of Q’s winning condition. So to have a hope of winning, Q should have replied somehow to
the attack.
Let us now look more closely at the details. An ‘irrelevant’ move by BN will not make a difference to
Q’s strategy. However, if we suppose that BN’s vocabularyW1 contains a relevant attack on (6.3.5-a) and it
is irrefutable, then indeed Q has no winning strategy in ME2.
To flesh this out, we need to know what a relevant attack is.
Definition 51. An attack move α by i is relevant when it is a responsive move to some contribution of j’s
in a finite play ρ such that α ⊧ CiCjψ and ρ ⊧ C∗¬Cj¬ψ; and α ⊧ Ci¬ψ. ψ is called a presupposition of
the attack.
BN’s move (6.3.5-b) presupposes that Q’s (6.3.5-a) suggested that the junior senator was comparing his
potential Presidential stature to that of John Kennedy’s, and it goes on to attack that supposed contribution.
Intuitively (6.3.5-a) does have this content at least as an implicature on one possible reading. If that is right,
then BN’s attack was relevant, according to our definition.
We now investigate irrefutable attacks. An irrefutable attack R(α, β) by j on a move α by i is a relevant
attack by j and i possesses no move γ ∈ V+i that attacks j’s move β that is potentially plausible to the Jury.
That is, while V+i always contains moves that attack the coherence or the responsiveness of any move of
the opponent, these attack moves will not be plausible to the Jury, if the Jury can attach the move of the
opponent to the discourse context to form a coherent SDRS. Since players have common knowledge of
the principles of coherence and responsiveness and are committed to those principles, from this, we can
conclude that given that there is no such attack move possible by i means that such moves are inconsistent
with prior commitments.
Just because a player has no way to attack a move does not mean that she agrees with its content. But
this disagreement is irrelevant, if she cannot defend herself. By not defending herself she concedes the
point of the opponent’s move (Lipman and Seppi, 1995). In our framework, if j does not attack i’s move
α with content ¬ψ, then the implicature is that j concedes the contents of ¬ψ and so Cj¬ψ. In addition,
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since such implicatures are common knowledge, we have at least defeasibly that C∗Cj¬ψ. On the other
hand, since ¬ψ was an attack move by i on j, jmust have committed to ψ in some previous move in α. We
must thus have α ⊧ CiCjψ, and so the attack α also has the content that Cjψ, which means that an attack
without a response yields Cj(ψ ∧¬ψ). With this analysis, we now see that Quayle indeed committed to an
inconsistency, that he was both of Presidential material and not, and this is sufficient for us to predict that
this move made him lose the debate.
In fact our analysis predicts that any time there is an irrefutable attack on player i, then i loses.
Proposition 10. Given an ME game G = ((V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω,Win), if for any finite play ρ ∈ (V+0 ∪ V+1 )∗ such
that ρ.(V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω ∩Win ≠ ∅, 1 has an irrefutable attack α, then 0 has no winning strategy in G.
Note that an attack α is such that α ⊧ Ci¬ψ ∧ CiCjψ. Without a refutation of the attack, 0 in effect
commits to the content of the attack which is inconsistent with her commitments in σ .
This is too strong a result. We have not considered the possibility that a player may correct his own
prior commitments and change them. Quayle cannot correct his prior commitments that are inconsistent
with what he tacitly commits to in not responding to Bentsen’s attack, because those prior commitments
define his debate goal. But in other cases, conversationalists can concede an opponent’s point without
automatically losing. We will come back to this point shortly.
When can a player respond to an unforseen attack in an adequate way? If one cannot rebut an attack,
an alternative is to avoid it or render it moot. This is akin to what is known as an undercutting defeater of a
proposition in epistemology (Pollock and Cruz, 1999). As a start to understanding this strategy, consider
the following observation:
Proposition 11. Let
ME1((V+0 ⋅ V+1 )ω,Win) and ME2((W+0 ⋅W+1 )ω,Win)
be two message exchange games such that V0 ⊂ V1,W0 ⊊W1. Suppose Player 0 has a winning strategy σ0
in ME1 and suppose that Player 1 cannot attach any move from W1 ∖ V1 coherently to any play ρ that is
consistent with σ0. Then Player 0 also has a winning strategy in ME2.
0 can thus have a winning strategy in the larger arena, even if she is unaware of the moves of the other
player. To formalize this point, assume (without loss of generality) that an attack move α by i attaches to
j’s last turn in a finite play ρ. We then define the set of commitments of j after a finite play ρ in a given
model as the set Tρ, j = {ψ ∣ ρ ⊧ C∗Cjψ}.
Definition 52. Two consistent theories T1 and T2 in a language L are potentially separable iff there is a
formula φ of L such that T1 ∪ {φ} is consistent and T2 ⊧ ¬φ. φ is then said to separate T1 and T2.
This definition reduces to separability, a standard notion in model theory when T is complete (Chang
and Keisler, 1973). We are interested in theories T1 = Tρ, j above and T2 = Tρ, j ∪ {ψ} for some ψ in a given
model A after a finite play ρ.
Definition 53. A set S ⊆ (V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω is closed under addition of φ, if appending φ in a consistent, coherent
way to a finite prefix of any play ρ ∈ S yields a string in S.
Definition 54. After a finite play ρ an attack α by i on j is inseparable from Tρ, j iff α has a presupposition
ψ, and Tρ, j and Tρ, j ∪ {ψ} are not potentially separable.
It is immediate from Proposition 10 that if Player 1 has an inseparable and irrefutable attack against
opponent 0 that can be coherently and responsively integrated into the play, 1 has a winning strategy.
On the other hand if players can be playing in different games, we can show that 0 may have a winning
strategy in some cases.
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Proposition 12. Given ME games G = ((V+0 ⋅V+1 )ω,Win) and G′ = ((W+0 ⋅W+1 )ω,Win) with V0 ⊂ V1 and
W0 ⊊W1, if 0 has a strategy in G for playing ρ ∈Win and for each irrefutable attack αi ∈ W1 by 1 on a move
by 0 in some finite prefix ρ′ of ρ, there is a formula φi that potentially separates αi from Tρ′, j andWin is
closed under addition of φi , then 0 has a winning strategy in G′.
Consider an attack α that responds to β in ρ′, a finite prefix of ρ, where α has presupposition ψ. So
α ⊧ CiCjψ. But since α is potentially separable, there is a formula φ that 0 may append to β via a re-
lation like  	
 or 	. Instead of playing β, 0 now plays β ⋅  	
(β,φ). Since
β ⋅  	
(β,φ) ⊧ C∗Cj¬ψ, α is not a consistent response to β. Thus, by adding the consistent, sepa-
rating formula φ to σ , 0 blocks the attachment of the attack move α to β in σ . Then 1 cannot use the attack
move on pain of inconsistency, which means that he would lose if he played α, and so that the conversation
will remain inWin. 0 now does this for each attack αi on her moves βi .
So far we have shown the persistence of a winning strategy for 0, if she can prevent an attack from
being made under the constraints of coherence and consistency or if she can convincingly refute the attack.
But often a conversationalist can be faced with an irrefutable attack that does not destroy her; a debater, for
instance can admit error and retract a commitment without thereby losing the debate. We could call such
moves self-corrections and they are part and parcel of concession moves. What a self-correction by player
i does is remove commitments that i previously made. One way of modeling such an to use the “erasure”
operation discussed in Serre (2004). We plan to examine the situation of counterattacks in future work.
We can apply our observations to example (6.3.5). We mentioned two interpretations, one where Q is
simply unaware of BN’s attack move (in which case he could do nothing) and one where Q was unaware
that his contribution was ambiguous—i.e., in his language V0 his contribution committed him merely to
a comparison about experience. BN’s move is relevant in both cases, because in W0 commits Q to the
possibility that Q committed to a comparison of the two men, and that is what BN seized on. We have
assumed that Q was unable to attack BN’s move directly. But he could, however, have deflected the attack,
had Q been aware of and willing to commit to the ambiguity of his contribution, by adding a particular
rider, e.g., the one emphasized in (7.6.2) to his response. BN’s move then would have been incoherent and
irrelevant.
(7.6.2)a’. Q: [. . .] I have far more experience than many others ... Although I would not presume to be
the man or the towering political figure that John Kennedy turned out to be, I have now as much
experience in the Congress as Kennedy did when he sought the presidency...
This deflection rider, however, has a cost. Would it have kept Q’s conversational contributions within
the winning condition that he set for himself? We have supposed that Win should convey that he was
Presidential material by comparing himself to John Kennedy. But how far did the comparison have to go
for him to achieve his objectives? If (7.6.2) does not affect Q’s attaining his objectives, then he has a winning
strategy to stay inWinG in G′. While (7.6.2) entails that Q commits to not having the stature of the great
John Kennedy, it brings the comparison to mind, in an almost classic example of praeteritio. On the other
hand, if Q’s objective was to commit that he was equal to John Kennedy in stature (an unwise thing to
do), (7.6.2) would take Quayle out of his winning condition. In that case, there was nothing for Quayle to
do.
7.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have defined ME games. ME games are played over two disjoint vocabularies V0 and V1
symbolizing the conversational moves available for player i and j, respectively. Moreover, ME games plays
are infinite, conversational agents altern turns in which they play sequences of moves of their vocabulary
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without stoping after any finite number of steps 33. These two characteristic features are the key to address
the challenges laid out in chapter 6, regarding strategic contexts: first, the game’s model per se imposes only
that (finite) conversations have the structure of a monoid; this is one of the fundamental assumption in the
studies of formal languages, and this level of abstraction (the same that we adopted in chapter 4), leaves
us free to define an appropriate vocabulary and intepretation function evaluating conversations into a
different semantic space. In other word, one can rely on her favorite symbolic framework to define her own
semantic constraints on successful plays. Second, the game abstracts ‘completed’ conversation as infinite
sequences, limit objects of the aforementioned syntactic monoid. As a consequence, although each finite
conversational prefix might (and following the way we formalized our Jury, will) be evaluated, a definitive
winner might only be declared over the completed, and essentially infinite, conversation. Hence, assuming
a semantic interpretation expressive enough, it becomes possible to define, on semantic grounds involving
the different players’ commitments at each finite prefix, their conversational goals and analyze whether a
conversation achieves or fails to fulfill those goals. Better,we can distinguish on a semantic basis too, generic
linguistic constraints (consistance, coherence, replying to attacks) from situation-specific constraints, such
as, coming back repeateadly to a given topic, or touching upon a certain subject.The infiniteness of the game
then ensures that in order to satisfy the generic constraints, the ‘dilemma’ that more classical settings face
(cf. section 6.4), namely assuming either aligned payoffs, or else lack of communication of any sort, fades
away as agents may not defect or opt out of the conversation without exposing themselves to subsequent
attacks.
In the particular case of player using a common vocabulary V , i.e. when there are two injections π0, π1
from V into V0 and V1 respectively, we can define a notion of decomposition invariant winning condition
(w.r.t. V , π0, π1) for which the game can be encoded as a Banach Mazur game, and winning strategies
topologically characterized. We have shown however that most natural constraints on conversations do
not fall into this category and have a particular and surprising complexity in the Borel Hierarchy. We have
also proven that ME games are determined. This led us to analyze what conversationalists can do when
faced with an opponent who has a winning strategy in an ME game. ME games predict that there are
only two types of rational response to such a situation, each of which leads to an interesting linguistic
phenomenon. The first was misdirection and the second conversational blindness. As far as we know, the
notion of conversational blindness, though intuitive, has not been explored before in any systematic way;
and our approach to misdirection, we believe, fills in some blanks in previous accounts. All in all, we find
ME games to be a powerful tool in the analysis of conversation, one that we plan to use in future research.
In practice, the predictive power of the model crucially depends on the faculty of the choosen vocabu-
lary and interpretation to successfuly implements the linguistic constraints contributing to form an agent’s
winning condition. Regarding the constraints we have identified, this means that the underlying language
must express at least, commitments, coherence links, attacks, and be subject to a notion of a consistency.
These are codependent and their interplay must also be laid out clearly. We have already sketched some
of the underlying relations: from section 7.6.2 we know that attack moves presuppose certain commit-
ments, in particular commitments about others’ commitments. Through all our examples we also know
that implicit, implicated or ambiguous contents of one’s commitment licence attacks and rebutal as well.
The logical language of SDRT is a good starting point to capture each of this notion and their relative
dependencies. It furnishes the kind of concepts (dicourse labels, relations) and interpretation mechanism
(dynamic semantics changing the commitment slates of agents) that we need. Yet we will see that there is a
need to alter the theory in order to integrate such things as commitment about commitments, ambiguous
commitments with a sound notion of consistency and logical consequence. This is the object of the next
part of the present thesis.
33Which, as we have seen, does not mean that we cannot encode a common decision to end the conversation, only that a player
can never, on its own, impose an end to the conversation.
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In part I we have been concerned with the logical form of discourse: what it must be, and how existing
representations differ. A fundamental necessary condition, central to all candidatemeaning representations
is that they express more than the sum of their constitutive units’ litteral meaning: implicit coherence links
and other form of implicated content add to themeaning of one’s contributions, andmust be represented as
well. Part II, examining conversation as a rational process, raised additional complications: it is well known
that an essential property of the aforementioned pragmatic inferences is their defeasability, meaning that
they can be cancelled or altered by subsequentmoves, andwhether such inferences eventually end up in the
common ground, or whether they do not, depends on agents preferences over the possible conversational
outcomes. These considerations have lead to approaches deriving meaning from equilibria that agents
reach given their respective preferences. Yet it appears that, in case of divergent goals, such approaches
make ‘unsafe’ implicatures essentially like nothing, collapsing for instance (misleading) indirect answers
and utterances of random facts, which, we have argued, is unintuitive.
The problem is therefore that, in order to formalize the rationality of using a particularmove,we need to
refine the link between the implicatures that a givenmove triggers, and the way they affect commitments of
one using thatmove. To achieve that,we need logical forms and a semantic interpretation that give us a clear
understanding of how the semantic evaluation at a given pointwill be transformed in subsequent evolutions
of the conversation, which appeals to the classical view of dynamic semantics where the interpretation of
a move expresses the way it transforms an input context, i.e., a context change potential. Indeed chapter 4
and chapter 7 share a possible answer to both the problem of semantically and dynamically comparing
conversations (via a continuation-based pseudometric) and that of formalizing one’s conversational goals
and evaluating the rationality of a move given these goals (viaME games): in both cases the idea is to look
at the set of consistent continuations of one’s contribution. Each continuation, might or might not retain
implicated content, and raise other kinds of ambiguity. Looking at the set of all continuations avoids the
need to make a final ‘guess’ regarding the presence or abscence of such implicated content as part of the
meaning of one’s contribution. Alltogether, what we need a move’s interpretation to tell us is
• When that move can be consistently used.
• How it restrains the sequence of subsequent moves that can be consistently played after it.
Making such a view as precise as possible in an SDRT-inspired framework is the goal of the present
part.
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8.1 Introduction
Part II made a case that deceptive moves such as misdirections or lies, are common in strategic contexts
(e.g., in trials or political debates), and should be analyzed in terms of agents’ commitments, and preferences
thereon, rather that beliefs or other private attitudes toward the content of the different dialog moves. It is
also commitments, or lack thereof, that subsequent ‘attack’ moves target.
Independently of the context being cooperative or uncooperative, the concept of objective, public com-
mitment (Hamblin, 1987) captures the immediate change of theworld that the action of sending of amessage
brings about. Changes in beliefs, realization of intentions, are secondary effects, that must be derived from
the content of commitments and additional assumptions about agents’ cognitive states. Section 6.4 argued
that, while in cooperative settings, Gricean theories might sucessfully model such a derivation and yield
simple, elegant theories of meaning as belief change (implemented, for instance, in signaling games), the
link gets broken as soon as cooperativity is dropped. Only sometimes, asking a question has indeed the
purpose of raising some uncertainity, but always, it represents a commitment of the speaker to a request for
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the addressee to commit over some answer. Typically in a political debate, an agent Amight ask a question
to another agent B, even though A knows the answer to the question. In such a case A is just seeking for
B’s commitment to an answer. If B complies and provides an answer, it can be in A’s interest to further
challenge this answer, even knowing it is correct.
Modeling strategic contexts therefore requires a semantic theory of the objective commitments that
agents can force out of each other; on that basis the ME games of chapter 7 then propose a model of
conversation as a rational process. Addressing the above requires us:
1. to dispose of a logical model of dialog moves and their interpretation as commitments.
2. to determine semantically what constitutes an attack and
3. to distinguish between attacks from a semantic perspective.
In the next section, section 8.2.1, we precise our definition of attacks and credibility, linking these to
linguistic public commitments. In section section 8.2.2, we give some examples of attacks on credibility
and/or theoretically challenging forms of commitments. Section 8.3 proposes a first semantic model captur-
ing nested commitments in a simplified SDRT framework, out the analysis. Section 8.4 reviews the Jury’s
credibility scoring of section 7.4 (through constraint CNEC). Section 8.5 discusses related work, some
limitations of the model that we will address in subsequent sections and concludes.
8.2 Attacks and commitments
8.2.1 Defining attacks from commitments
An attack can be thought of as exposing a deceitful intention. But determining intentions behind speech
acts is a tricky business we will not be getting into. In line with the introductory discussion, we consider
notions of credibility and attacks depending on overt and public linguistic commitments by speakers.
Using commitments, we now precise these. A dialogue agent i is not credible after move m iff
• It is shown for some φ that after performing m i has committed to φ and φ is absurd or clearly
refutable (shown to be inconsistent with a prior claim of the agent or a background common as-
sumption),
• and that it was plausibly in i’s interest to ressort to m, would this situation have gone unnoticed.
An attack by player j on the credibility of i occurs iff j commits to the following: i has performed m, i is
committed to φ, φ ⊧ ψ, ψ is absurd or refutable, and it is in i’s interest to use m. m enables an attack on
credibility iff j can consistently attach a move m′ to m that entails such an attack. In terms of discourse
relations, an attack m′ by j typically attaches to i’s attacked move m with a   relation. As Las-
carides and Asher (2009) advocates, if such an attack is left without a reply, it is defeasibly inferable that i
agrees to the attack’s content, and therefore that i is not credible in the above sense: this intuition underlies
the constraint CNEC in ME games (cf. section 7.4).
Our notion of credibility differs considerably from that employed in the signaling games literature
where credibility is defined in terms of beliefs, typically in equilibrium (see for intance Farrell, 1993b;
Franke et al., 2009). Our notion of credibility is complementary: since, we claimed, it is too difficult to get
a good grasp of private attitudes in strategic contexts, we rather define credibility in terms of commitments
and attacks, agent’s interests and logical consequence, none of which depends on how a message affects
the agents’ beliefs. Moreover, credibility in our sense is an evaluation of agents themselves, performed
by a third party (the Jury, see section 7.4), rather than an agent’s evaluation of the messages he receives.
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Messages affect credibility by the attack they enable or carry: if an agent commits to a proposition that has
disputable consequences, she leaves the door open to subsequent attacks.
To flesh out our picture of credibility and attacks more precisely, we need to explain our notions of
consequence and interest or preference. We appeal to two distinct notions of consequence classical in dis-
course theories: ordinary logical consequence and defeasible consequence. We will assume that our agents
are logically (though not factually) omniscient and so if i publicly commits to φ he also publicly commits
to ψ if ψ is a logical consequence of φ (which we write φ ⊧ ψ). Agents also commit to implicatures that are
defeasible but what we shall term normal consequences that interlocutors would draw upon learning that
i commits to φ. Finally, implicatures may be more tentative, as when i draws attention to an alternative to
something to which he is explicitly committed. We’ll assume that implicatures are modeled in a defeasible
logic using a space of preferred models of the conversation. We also allow that some weak implicatures
may exist only in some of the preferred models while stronger ones are true in all preferred models. We
thus distinguish between the following three levels of commitment.
• Non-defeasible commitment by i to φ: φ is a logical consequence of every possible interpretation
of i’s contribution.
• Implicit defeasible commitment by i to φ: the “prefered" interpretations of i’s contribution entail
φ.
• Weak implicit defeasible commitment by i to φ: some interpretations of i’s contribution imply φ.
Section 4 will provide more formal definitions.
We take preferences to be tied to a conception of rationality, provided by the setting of ME games
of chapter 7: let us recall here the ingredients of ME games that are needed to precise what “interest” means
in our definition of attacks.
A conversational game involves two agents (or players) 0, 1, and a third party, the Jury, who observes
and judges (via a scoring function) but does not participate in linguistic exchanges. The player’s objectives
bear two components: players adopt a winning condition, which is a set of conversations such that an
unbiased Jury will declare 0 sucessful iff 0 manages to play the game so as to realize one of the conversation
of the winning set and respect some generic linguistic constraints. Hence, a first component (that we call
the initial winning set) concerns specifics about what is sufficient to make the Jury decide in 0’s favor,
given that the necessary conditions of the second component (that we call the constraints of the Jury, or
linguistic constraints) are respected. Staying credible i.e., avoiding attacks, enters the second condition.
We further assume these two sets of constraints to be defined on the basis of the players’ respective com-
mitments in each of the (finite prefix of the) sequences they accept. The first component may therefore set
some contextual parameters, which are common knowledge among the players. For instance, at court, the
Jury should know that an “honnest” expert witness must not share an interest with the defendent lawyer.
Conversations in which the witness commits to such a shared interest should therefore enter the defendant
initial winning set. To give another example, the constraints of the Jury should encode that some facts are
irrefutable and commonly known as such, by having the Jury considering everyone to be committed to
these. Thus either player denying one of those facts will be deemed inconsistent and fail the Jury condition.
Using this general set up, we can now precise what we meant earlier by “it is in i’s interest to commit to
φ if φ is not attacked", in the definition of an attack. This means that, assuming that the Jury’s condition
is automatically fulfilled, i committing to φ advances her toward her goal. In other words, φ advances i
toward her initial winning setWini34.
34To make this notion more formal, we can for instance use a similar definition as we used for the score wini assigned at each
turn by the Jury in section 7.4: namely that i’s move doesn’t exclude his initial winning set from all possible continuations. Of
course this is a crude an approximation, which should ideally be refined to a scalar notion; the more in i’s interest a move appears
to be, the stronger an attack on that move. Here as well, usingmean payoff games is something to explore.
137
Chapter 8. Commitments, credibility, coherence and the Jury
For instance, one way to analyze example (7.2.1), is that the Reporter’s (R) refusal (7.2.1-c) of Sheehan’s
(S) answer (7.2.1-b), implicates an attack, where R commits to the following:
1. S’s role as a spokesman comeswith an non-deniable commitmentCSφ of honnestly and cooperatively
respond to R’s questions (at least, unless they are obviously out of topic).
2. after (7.2.1-b), S has acknowledged R’s question and is yet not committed to an answer, therefore ¬φ
obtains.
3. S’s preference is to avoid committing to an answer to the question, and given this, (7.2.1-b) is in S’s
interest in the sense we explained.
Notice, that in our setting, committing about the opponent’s preferences is non vacuous even if we assume
these preferences to be common knowledge between the players, as knowledge does not entail commitment
(moreover they need not be known to the Jury).
After this exchange, Sheehan fails to address the attack; worse, he justifies his preference to not answer
with (7.2.1-d) (“We are not going to respond to unnamed sources on a blog”), and thereby agrees that he
has such preference whereas, at the same time, he does not deny his commitment to transparency as a
spokesman. This makes him at least defeasibly inconsistent.
Globally, players will prefer moves which make them look good in the eyes of the Jury and make the
other look bad, or at least worse. An attack by i on a player j’s credibility is a way to make j look less good,
as the CNEC constraint of the Jury conditions ensures. Part of i’s looking good is to not make mistakes, to
not invite attacks on her credibility, but to make herself look good a player must provide positive reasons
for the position she favors.Mutatis mutandis for the preferences of player j. More generally: (i) our players
must play moves that make them look good; (ii) if player i is rational, she will prefer moves that make
possible moves that j cannot attack; (iii) between 2 moves that make i look good but make possible attacks,
she will prefer the one with the more indirect or weaker damaging context, since a more indirect damaging
consequence is one that has a rebuttal move that’s not what I meant to say.
8.2.2 Examples of complex commitment dynamics and attacks
In this section we discuss some linguistic examples featuring different sorts of commitments and attacks on
credibility. These examples involve not only commitments to propositions expressed by assertoric clauses
but also to propositions involving coherence relations that link clauses, sentences and larger units together
into a coherent whole. That is, players commit to a particular content and to its relations with what has
been said before. In so doing a player may also commit to contents proferred by his conversational partner
as in Asher and Lascarides (2003).
The following two examples provides a simple illustration of what will constitute this section and subse-
quent onesmain semantic concern: how coherence links, ambiguity, and commitment about commitments
interract. Consider first a case in which speaker A takes C’s initial moves to be ambiguous:
(8.2.1)a. C: N. isn’t coming to the meeting. It’s been cancelled.
b. A: Did you mean that N. isn’t coming because the meeting’s cancelled or that the meeting is
cancelled as a result?
c. C: As a result.
A’s clarification question in (8.2.1-b) presupposes that C’s initial contribution was ambiguous between a
  and an 	

move (DeVault and Stone, 2007; Purver, 2004). We take this to imply at least
a weak implicature for both readings, either of which a conversational participant could have exploited.
This is something we want to model, and we’ll see in the next example how such implicatures are exploited
by an interlocutor.
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Now consider the following example:
(8.2.2)a. C: N. isn’t coming to the meeting. It’s been cancelled.
b. A: That’s not why N. isn’t coming. He’s sick.
c. C: I didn’t say thatN. wasn’t coming because themeetingwas cancelled.Themeeting is cancelled
because N. isn’t coming.
This example illustrates how commitments embed. In (8.2.2-b) A commits to the fact that C committed
in (8.2.2-a) to providing an  	 for why N isn’t coming, even though (8.2.2-a) is ambiguous.
Only such a commitment explains why A attacks that commitment in the way that he does by giving
an alternative  	. But in fact, C takes that commitment by A to have misinterpreted him; C
commits in (8.2.2-c) that he committed in (8.2.2-a) to offering a consequence or 
 of N’s not coming
to the meeting.
Note that while A attacks a move of C’s in example (8.2.2), he does not attack C’s credibility in our
sense. But neither does this example provide a case of misleading implicature.
However, example (6.3.5) from section 6.3.1, for instance, does. Implicatures play a key role in this
example where Quayle argues, against the thesis that his little governmental experience would make him
unsuitable for the presidency, that Kennedy before him, with as much experience as he have, was able to
handle the presidency. But this answer to the question suggests an implicit comparison between the two
politicians (both junior senators from a state, each with little governmental experience) and gives rise to
the possibility of interpreting Quayle’s move as a stronger commitment that he would likely be able to
handle the presidency in the same way that John Kennedy handled his, which, if not challenged would
serve Quayle’s claim better. Bentsen seized upon this weak implicature of Quayle’s contribution and refuted
it, indirectly exposing to the audience the self-serving nature of the comparison.
Example (6.3.2) is yet another attested example, in which Bronston, unwilling to make an explicit
commitment to having or not having had an account in a swiss bank, chooses instead to defeasibly commit
to an answer with 6.3.2-d in an attempt to avoid further questioning (Asher and Lascarides, 2012). We
duplicate this example below:
(8.2.3)a. Prosecutor: Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?
b. Bronston: No, sir.
c. Prosecutor: Have you ever?
d. Bronston: The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.
It is interesting to consider a continuation of this in which the prosecutor would indirectly attack the
response (8.2.3-d).
(8.2.4)e. Prosecutor: I would like to know whether you personally ever had an account there?
If Bronston is forced under the threat of perjury to answer affirmatively, his response in (8.2.3-d) now
looks pretty deceiving. The natural thought arises: Bronston was trying to deceive us into taking him as
committed that he did not have an account. Though the prosecutor did not proceed as in (8.2.4), had he
done so he would have successfully attacked Bronston’s credibility.
Let us finally also recall example (6.3.4), introduced in section 6.3.1 as well, which features a quite
challenging structure of commitments: the example is an excerpt from a voir dire examination in Friedman
and Malone (2010), where, the plaintiff lawyer (LP) interogates an expert witness (D), whose role as an
indendant witness, we take it, presuposes him to be committed to share no interest with the defendant.This
example is challenging because the plaintiff lawyer efficiently plays simultaneously on two different lines
of attack: he has been repeatedly coming back to questions about, on the one hand, the social relationship
between the expert and the defendant, and second, the division of a nerve during a surgery, with a twofold
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objective of getting the witness to characterize the surgical operation as mishandled, or else undermining
the witness credibility as tainted with partiality.
(8.2.5)a. LP: And also, he put an electrical signal on that nerve, and it was dead. It didn’t do anything
down in the hand, it didn’t make the hand twitch?
b. D: Correct.
c. LP: And we know in addition to that, that Dr. Tzeng tore apart this medial antebrachial cuta-
neous nerve?
d. D: Correct.
e. LD: Objection.
f. THE COURT: Overruled.
g. D: Correct. There was a division of that nerve. I’m not sure I would say “tore apart” would be
the word that I would use.
h. LP: Oh, there you go. You’re getting a hint from your lawyer over here, so do you want to retract
what you’re saying?
D’s error was to agreed to LP’s loaded question, in which LP ‘hides’ the proposition that is really at issue,
namely that Dr. Tzeng was negligent, as a presupposition by embedding it under a factive verb. This makes
it difficult for D to answer the question in a straightforward way without embedding that presupposition
into his commitments. LP then successfully attacks D’s credibility in (8.2.5-f) when D attempts to recover
from this mistake with (8.2.5-e), by seizing on a weakly implicated discourse connection between (8.2.5-c)
and 8.2.5-e, in SDRT terms, a relation of  ∗ (the commitment in (8.2.5-c) caused the commitment
in (8.2.5-e)).
Overall, the examples suggest two general methods of deception: moves that implicate propositions
that cannot be committed to explicitly for strategic reasons, and moves that trap agents into making com-
mitments they should rationally refrain from, in prevision of attacking subsequent correcting moves for
betraying reprehensible preferences.
Another feature of attacks is that generally they work gradually in damaging an opponent’s credibility.
Perhaps no one move succeeds on its own in convincing the jury that the opponent is duplicitous or
incompetent; rather a series of moves gradually move a jury to a skeptical view of the opponent over the
course of a conversation. The victory conditions for our players are to succeed in eventually moving the
jury to a position in which the opponent is no longer credible.
8.3 Nesting commitments in SDRT
8.3.1 Ingredients
We need a semantic (dynamic) model in order to formalize an analyzis of our examples and attacks on
credibility. We have already seen that we need to model as part of a speaker’s contribution not only its
compositional semantics but also its illocutionary effects, in particular the implicit discourse links between
utterances, as these can trigger or convey attacks on credibility. We will therefore build on Lascarides and
Asher (2009), as SDRT already offers a formal, logic-based approach of dialogue content (semantics and
illocutionary effects).
Lascarides and Asher (2009) models the semantics of dialogue by assigning to each conversational
agents a commitment slate. Each commitment slate contains a list of propositions that an agent is com-
mitted to, which involves rhetorical relations as well as elementary propositions. Lascarides and Asher
(2009) models explicit and implicit agreements and denials of one agent about another agent’s commit-
ments. However, the analysis of credibility threats requires that we go a step further. Conversational agents
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explicitly or implicitly refer to, and dispute, others’ commitments. They attack their opponent’s credibility
by exposing inconsistencies in something they claim the opponent committed to or implicated, and defend
against such attacks by denying a commitment to content that the opponent claims they committed to or
implicated.
We thus need to represent the commitments of all speakers from their own and their interlocutors’
points of view, as in Stone and Lascarides (2010). Moreover, we need to represent arbitrary nesting of
commitments explicitly. Recall example 8.2.2. In (8.2.2-b) A corrects C’s prior utterance, and thereby
commits that C is committed to a false proposition p (N. is not coming because the meeting is cancelled).
C rejects A’s correction. But what C rejects is not the proposition that corrects p, but A’s commitment that
C committed to p. Therefore, C also commits that A commits that C commits that p. Further, we need to
distinguish between weak and strong commitments: when an agent tries to misdirect another, he might
for instance give a weak commitment the look of a stronger one. Thus our dialogue model will add three
things to Lascarides and Asher (2009): explicit nested commitments, the commitments of each agent from
every agents’ point of view and explicit strong and weak commitments.
According to what we have laid out in chapter 7, conversations proceed as follows: speakers alternate
turns, each performing a sequence of discourse moves. Because we are interested in commitments and
attacks, we will not import the full machinery of SDRT here. We will symbolize clausal contents within a
propositional language, but incorporate labels for speech acts and discourse relations so that we can roughly
express discourse-structures following Asher and Lascarides (2003). Crucially, however, our language
allows us to embed discourse structures under 3modal operatorsCi , Si andNi , for each agent i. A discourse
move for an agent i is defined as a proposition labeled by a discourse label (also called speech act identifier).
A proposition is either a base-level proposition, or a formula expressing a commitment over a discourse
structure, e.g., i commits that a label have some particular content, or a complex formula R(π1, π2)where R
is a coherence-relation symbol and π1 and π2 are discourse labels. A complex formula recursively involves
previously introduced discourse labels.
The modalities make the language more expressive, since we can express commitments of different
agents to different contents for a single speech-act. The formula π : γ describes a set of possible worlds in
which the content assigned to the discourse label π is γ. A formula Ciφ denotes the set of worlds in which
the assignment of contents to labels is such that it makes i commited to φ. Niφ is weaker and means that
i defeasibly commits to the contents of the formula φ. Discourse structure and commitments interract:
when Ci(π : γ) holds, it must also hold that i commits that the speaker of π commits to γ. Put another way,
the semantics will ensure (Ci(π : γ)) → CiCspk(π)γ. More generally, given the assignements to discourse
labels in different possible worlds, we retrieve commitments over informational content by looking at the
content assigned to the labels of a given speaker.
This sketches the general picture, which we need to refine slightly: the language we consider inherits
SDRT distinction between veridical and non-veridical coherence relations (depending or whether or not
their semantic consequences entail the content of their arguments, see section 2.3), and SDRT hierachical
organization of labels, allowing complex constituents (also referred to as complex discourse units, CDUs, in
SDRT terms). Thus, in order to deal with non veridical relations like  , 	 or 

	
which do not import all of the content of their arguments into their host complex constituent, we define
an agent’s commitments as provided by the contents of the maximal labels of that agent only. These are
the labels which are not used as argument of a relation as part of the content of another, complex, label of
the same speaker. Hence, a speaker is committed to a content φ in a world w iff w is such that the content
associated to one of her maximal labels entails φ. We will finally make the simplifying assumption (in
this section and in subsequent ones) that there is only one maximal label per speaker at a given point in
time. This assumption is an harmless one: the different semantics we propose will be easy to adapt to keep
track of more than one maximal label per speaker (notice that more than one maximal label requires one
contribution to be incoherent). Alternatively one can add a default veridical cunjuntive relational predicate
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into the language with no semantic effects, and not sufficient to ensure coherence. Let us now describe the
language in full detail.
8.3.2 Syntax and semantics
Assume a set Φ0 of base-level propositions, a countably-infinite set of labels Π, a finite set of relation
symbolsR and a set of conversational agents I. In order to keep track of which agent x performs speech
act π, we assume Π partitioned in card(I) disjoint subsets (Πi)i∈I . We define spk(π) as the unique i ∈ X
such that π ∈ Πi .
Definition 55 (Syntax of (linearized) SDRSs). The sets of propositions, Γ(Φ0), and discourse moves
Δ(Φ0), are defined by the following BNF grammar:
Γ(Φ0) ::= φ ∣ R(π1, π2) ∣ CiΓ ∣ NiΓ ∣ SiΓ ∣ ¬Γ ∣ Γ ∧ Γ ∣ Γ ∨ Γ ∣ Γ > Γ ∣?(Γ) ∣ Δ
Δ(Φ0) ::= π : Γ.
Where the nonterminal symbols Γ and Δ are shorthand for Γ(Φ0) and Δ(Φ0) respectively, the variables
πi and φ respectively range over Φ and Π, and i and R respectively range over I andR. In addition, we
define γ1 → γ2 as shorthand for ¬(γ1 ∧ ¬γ2).
Our language has a dynamic, possible worlds semantics: the interpretation of a formula is a context-
change potential i.e., a relation between, input and output states. We will take our states to encompass a
world and an assigment function, as is classical in dynamic semantics but also a vector c of card(I) labels
denoting the maximal label for each agent, and an equivalence relation ∼ over worlds, to represent polar
questions. States are thus tuples (w, c,∼, σ). We let c(i) denote the ith component of c, i.e., the maximal
label for agent i, and C = Π0 × ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ×Πcard(I) denotes the set of such different maximal labels vectors. We
call a pair (w, c) a c-world, and a triple (w, c,∼) a p-world. A state is thus a ( p-world, assignment ) pair.
To develop a treatment of our examples, we will need a basic account of polar questions. We therefore
adopt a simplistic version of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) and take questions to semantically denote
an equivalence relation over worlds (propositions denote sets of possibilities which are partitioned into
equivalence classes raised by questions). For intance, the question whether p? partitions a set of worlds in
two, those worlds at which p on the one hand, and those at which ¬p on the other.
An assignment assigns a propositional content to discourse label at a given world. Since our proposition
are partitioned sets of worlds, an assignment is therefore a function that assigns to a label and a world a
set of c-worlds and a partition thereof. σ(w, π) is roughly the (partitioned) set of c-worlds in which the
interpretation of π at world w is true.
The semantics is defined relative to a model with a (dynamic) selection function representing a condi-
tional modal operator that we will use to represent the defeasible commitment and suggestion modalities,
Ni and Si). The selection function, in a given state, output a (semantic) proposition representing ‘normal’
consequences of a given (semantic) input proposition:
Definition 56 (Model, states and assignment). LetW denote a set of possible worlds, letWC = (W × C)
denote the set of associated c-worlds, let E ⊆ ℘(WC)2 denote the set of equivalence relations overWC andWP = WC × E denote the set of p-worlds, i.e., the set of tuples ⟨w, c,∼⟩ with ∼ an equivalence relation
over c-worlds. The set (static) of semantic propositions is the set of partionned set of c-worlds: P =℘(WC)×E (a semantic proposition in that sense is thus a pair made of the ‘classical’ semantic counterpart
of a proposition, a set of worlds, and a set of polar questions represented by an equivalence relation).The set
of assignment overW is the set of functionsA = PΠ×W from label,world pairs to semantic propositions:
σ(w, π) = (W ,∼) withW ⊆ WC a set of c-worlds, and ∼ an equivalence relation onW . The set of states
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over W is the set S = WP × A. Finally, a dynamic proposition is a relation between states: the set of
dynamic propositions is defined asD = ℘(S2).
A modelM is a tuple ⟨W , ν,⋆⟩, where ν : Φ ↦ ℘(W) is a valuation function evaluating at which
worlds a base-level proposition φ0 ∈ Φ0 is true, and ⋆ : S ×D ↦ D is a dynamic selection function.
Given a modelM, the function ⋅M maps each formula δ of the language to a binary relation δM
over states. Discourse-level assertoric propositions in Γ(φ) act as filters that let through only the worlds at
which the proposition is true; Discourse moves in Δ filters the assignments.
Another bit of needed machinery is for interpreting discourse relations. In our semantics each relation
affects the contents assigned to its terms. Veridical relations like  	 or 
 will simply up-
date the contextually given values to its terms with the semantic effects of the relation on those terms Asher
and Lascarides (2003). Non veridical relations like 		 or 	 place constraints on the
truth of the contents associated with the terms at worlds verifying the relation in question.
To ease notational clutter (especially regarding tuples) we will use ‘bar’ variables like w¯ to range over
c-worlds and p-worlds, and variables s, t,u, . . . z for states. w¯ and s thus abreviates tuples, and we write
w¯[k] or s[k] to denote the kth component of w¯ and s respectively (starting at k = 0); if w¯ is a p-world,
for instance, w¯[0] is a world, w¯[1] a vector of maximal labels, and w¯[2] an equivalence relation. Assume
now a modelM = ⟨W , ν,⋆⟩, and let p denote a dynamic proposition (i.e, a relation between states).
we use both infix notation s p s′ and prefix notation (s, s′) ∈ p to denote that p relates s and s′ (and
similarly for other binary relations). We will slightly abuse the set-theoretic notations such as ⊆ and ∖ to
ease manipulation of semantic propositions: for a semantic proposition P = (W ,∼) and set of c-worldsW ′,
we letW ′∖P = (W ′∖W ,∼) and P =WC∖P. For two semantic propositions P = (W ,∼), P′ = (W ′,∼′)we
let P ⊆ P′ be a synonym forW ⊆W ′ and ∼⊆∼′. Let ∥?p∥σ ,∼M denote the equivalence relation over c-worlds
defined as
(w¯, w¯′) ∈ ∥?p∥σ ,∼M iff (∃u¯ (w¯,∼, σ) p (u¯,∼, σ)) ↔ (∃u¯′ (w¯′,∼, σ) p (u¯′,∼, σ))
i.e. the relation making two c-worlds equivalent if and only if they both validate p or they both fail p.
Finally, given a dynamic proposition p we let ∥p∥∼,σ = ({w¯ ∈ WC ∣ (w¯,∼, σ) p (w¯,∼, σ)},∼) the (static)
semantic proposition corresponding to the c-worlds that p transforms, given an assignation and partition.
Conversely given a static semantic proposition P = (W ,∼)we let testσ(P) = {⟨(w¯,∼, σ), (w¯,∼, σ)⟩ ∣ (w¯) ∈
W} the dynamic filter version of P. This is all we need to define the semantics:
Definition 57 (Semantics). Below is the semantics of discourse propositions:
• (w¯, σ)φM(w¯′, σ ′) iff (w¯, σ) = (w¯′, σ ′) and w¯[0] ∈ v(φ).
• (w¯, σ)R(π1, π2)M(w¯′, σ ′) iff (w¯, σ) = (w¯′, σ ′) and w¯ ∈ ∥R(π1, π2)∥σw¯[0].
• (w¯, σ)?(δ)M(w¯′, σ ′) iff (w¯, σ) = (w¯′, σ ′) and w¯[2] ⊆ ∥?(δ)∥σ ,w¯[2]M .
• (w, c,∼, σ) CiδM (w′, c′,∼′, σ ′)iff (w, c,∼, σ) = (w′, c′,∼′, σ ′) and
letting (W ′′,∼′′) = σ(c(i),w) we have: ∀w¯′′ ∈W ′′∃s′′′ (w¯′′,∼′′, σ)δMs′′′.
• (w, c,∼, σ) NiδM (w′, c′,∼, σ ′) iff (w, c,∼, σ) = (w′, c′,∼′, σ ′) and
letting P = σ(c(i),w) we have ∀s, t ∈ S s ⋆((w, c,∼, σ), testσ(P)) t⇒ ∃u ∈ S tδMu.
• (w¯, σ) SiδM (w¯′, σ ′) iff (w¯, σ) ¬Ni¬δM (w¯′, σ ′).
• s ¬δM s′ iff s = s′ and not ∃s′′ s δM s′′.
• s δ1 ∧ δ2M s′ iff ∃s′′ s δ1M s′′ and s′′ δ2M s′.
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• s δ1 ∨ δ2M s′ iff s δ1M s′ or s δ2M s′.
• s δ1 > δ2M s′ iff s = s′ and ∀t,u ∈ S t ⋆(s, δ1) u⇒ ∃v u δ2 v.
Discourse moves are interpreted as follows:
(w, c,∼, σ) π : δM (w′, c′,∼′, σ ′) iff (w,∼, σ) = (w′,∼′, σ ′), c′(x) = { π if x = ic(x) if x ≠ i
and letting (Wπ ,∼π) = σ(π,w) we have: ∀w¯′′ ∈Wπ (w¯′′,∼π , σ)δM(w¯′′,∼π , σ)
.
Remarks
• As suitable, whether a question is true at a given state s does not depend on the actual world s[0],
only on the partition of worlds s[2]. Note that, what the set-inclusion condition s[2] ⊆ ∥?(δ)∥σ ,s[2]M
requires, is, back in relational terms, that if w¯ s[2] w¯′ then it must be that both (w¯, σ[2], σ[3]) and(w¯′, σ[2], σ[3]) are transformed by p or that they both are not. Hence it means that “whether p?” is
indeed one of the question encoded by the equivalence relation s[2].
• The semantics for the defeasible commitments Niφ requires that the (semantic) proposition that i’s
commited to so far (i.e., σ(c(i), s[0])) normally entails φ in s[0].
• The ‘suggestion’ modality Siφ is simply the dual of the defeasible commitment modality. It means
that some normal worlds given i’s commitments in the actual state are φ worlds which implements
the weak implicit defasible commitment.
• Niφ ⊧ Siφ. Assuming that the selection function satisfies an axiom of facticity (e.g., ⋆(s, p) ⊆ p)
gives in addition Ciφ ⊧ Niφ.
The semantics of relation must be defined on an individual basis, but we have made available the
ingredients needed to that end; for instance an intuitive approach to  	 (left-right veridical)
and 
(non left veridical) could be:
• Left (resp. right) veridical relations must verify ∥R(π1, π2)∥σw ⊆ {(w, c,∼) ∣ letting (Wx ,∼x) =
σ(πx ,wx) for x ∈ {1, 2}, (w, c) ∈W1(resp.W2) and ∼=∼1 (resp. ∼2)}.
• ∥ 	(π1, π2)∥σw ⊆ {(w, c, σ) ∣ ⋆(w, testσ(σ(π2,w))) ⊆ testσ(σ(π1,w))
and ⋆(w, testσ(σ(π2,w))) ⊆ testσ(σ(π1,w))} (this is a ‘pure semantic’ version of the clause Kπ2 >
Kπ1 ∧ ¬Kπ2 > ¬Kπ1 of section 2.3)
• ∥
(π1, π2)∥σw ⊆ {(w, c, σ) ∣ letting (Wx ,∼x) = σ(πx ,wx) for x ∈ {1, 2}, (W2/ ∼1 ) ⊊ (W1/ ∼1 )}
that is, the proposition represented by π2 admits strictly less equivalence classes for questions in π1,
than the proposition in π1 does. Therefore, π2 induces a strict refinement of the partition of worlds
by questions in π1, and hence π2 must resolve one of π1’s questions (note that this semantics entails
that π1 has more than one equivalence class, and thus indeed encodes at least one question).
This gives us a picture of how speakers’ commitments evolve throughout a conversation.
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Table 8.1: Analyisis of example (8.2.2) following Lascarides and Asher (2009).
turn C’s SDRS A’s SDRS
(8.2.2-a)
π1 : ¬N
π2 :   	
π3 : 
(π1, π2)
(8.2.2-b)
π4 : ¬(π1, π2)
π5 :  (π3, π4)
8.3.3 Examples revisited
We start with example example (8.2.2). Lascarides and Asher (2009) would analyse the two first turns as
in table table 8.1
This representation is problematic; it makes A committed to an absurdity, here is why: the semantic condi-
tions of  (π3, π4) require that the content of π3 implies the negation of π4, but 	
(π1, π2)
does not imply (π1, π2) (the two are even contradictory). Keeping with the same kind of
tabular representation that Lascarides and Asher (2009) use would require to further divide each cell of
the table above in two, introducing A′ interpretation of C′s moves, and to repeat this subdivision process
potentially infinitely many times to express arbitrary nestings as in table table 8.2. Our language provides
C’s SDRS A’s SDRS
π1 : ¬N
π2 : 
π3 : 	
(π1, π2)
C A
π3 :
(π1, π2)
π4 :
¬(π1, π2)
π5 :
 (π3, π4)
Table 8.2: Adding nested commitments
a well-defined syntax and semantics to implement this changes, for instance example (8.2.2) in its entirety
is analysed as:
π1 : ¬N ∧ π2 :  ∧ (π3 : 	
(π1, π2) ∨ π3 : (π1, π2))
∧ π4 : ¬(π1, π3) ∧ π5 : (π3 : (π1, π2) ∧ π5 :  (π3, π4))
∧ π6 : ¬CC((π1, π2))
∧ π7 : (π5 : CC(π1, π2)) ∧  (π5, π6)
with spk(π1 ∣ π2 ∣ π3 ∣ π4 ∣ π6 ∣ π7) = C and spk(π4 ∣ π5) = A.
The keys to this example’s representation are thus, first, the representation of C’s ambiguousmove using
the non-determinism of dynamic semantics with π3 : 	
(π1, π2) ∨ π3 : (π1, π2) and
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second the possibility ofC andA to select different branches of that commitment.Moreover,we can propose
a systematic explanation of the way SDRSs’ derivation process must be adapted to yield such a logical form.
The crucial point is that correcting move like π5 triggers presuppositions: here, a presupposition that C’s
move π3 commits him to the negation of π4’s content i.e.,  	(π1, π2). This presupposition must
be accommodated as part of th content of π5. Similarly π7 is a correcting move too, so the negation of the
correctant π6, namely CC( 	(π1, π2)), has to be accommodated as well as part of the content
of π7.
In example (8.2.2), the ambiguity stayed unacknowledged. But in (8.2.1-b), A takes C’s commitments
to involve two possibilities, and he commits to not know which C has in fact committed to. Thus, in exam-
ple (8.2.1), we must have:
π1 : ¬N ∧ π2 : 

 ∧ (π3 : (π1, π2) ∨ π3 :  	(π1, π2))
∧ π4 :?(CC 	(π1, π2))
∧ π5 : ((CC(π1, π2) ∨ CC 	(π1, π2)) ∧ 
	(π3, π4))
∧ π6 : CC(π1, π2) ∧ π7 : (π5, π6)
with spk(π1 ∣ π2 ∣ π3 ∣ π4 ∣ π6 ∣ π7) = C and spk(π4 ∣ π5) = A.
That is, A asks, with π4, a question of whether C has commited to  	(π1, π2) or not. This
question must coherently attach to π3, so we infer that the link represent a question of clarification over
the content of π3. Now, as 	
	s do, such a link also comes with its presuppositions, in that case, a
presupposition that the content of π3 is ambiguous between the question’s answer sets. Hence, the logical
form accommodates the ambiguity of π3 as part of π5. Finally C answers that he commited to a 
relation.
In example (6.3.5), Bentsen (B) seizes on a weak implicature of Quayle’s (Q). Q explicitly commits to a
direct comparison between his experience in government and that of the young JFK, but B corrects a more
general equivalence between the presidential promise of JFK and his own. Let us symbolize the formerwith
the atomic proposition ≈ and the latter with a second atomic proposition . Let us further assume
that our modal conditional validates a specifity principle (or ‘penguin principle’), i.e., an axiom shema⊧ (p > q ∧ p > r ∧ q > ¬r) → (q > ¬p) (see Asher and Mao, 2000). If we assume now, as a non-logical
axiom that being of equivalent stature as JFK is a normal consequence of having as much experience as JFK,
i.e., we restrict our attention to models that let ≈ >  transform any input state, then the following
must hold: Let δ in our language, represent an input context, and let πδ denote the maximal label for i
in δ. Then we have: ⊧ (δ ∧ ¬(≈ > ¬πδ) ∧ πδ : ≈) → Si()35. This means that, unless Quayle
commits to something that is not normal given Quayle being of equivalent stature as JFK, if Quayle adds≈ to his commitments, one can take him as suggesting being of equal stature as JFK.
With this in mind, we can represent Q and B’s turns ((6.3.5-a) and (6.3.5-b)) as:
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∧ π : ≈
π′1 : ¬ ∧ π′2 : ((π : ) ∧ 	
	(π, π′1))
with spk(π) = Q and spk(π′1 ∣ π′2) = B.
Once again, we take B’s corrective move in π′2 to trigger a presupposition that the corrected move π
commits its speaker to the negation of the correctant π′1 which is accommodated in π′2. The success of this
attack relies on a decision of the Jury: does B’s move π2 : (π : ) represent an admissible claim in the
context of Q’s having performed π : ≈? Intuitively, yes, since, we have seen, Quayle’s move implicates
SQ(=). But it should also be consistant for Quayle to deny this claim (without explicit self-correction).
35There is a slight abuse here as we did not let single labels π be proposisitions of our language, but it is a simple add defining
(w¯, σ)π(w¯, σ ′) iff (w¯, σ) testσ(σ(π,w)) (w¯′, σ ′).
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If Quayle opts instead for a veridical comment on π′1, he embarks the content of π′1 under his commitment
(which is not really a claim serving his objective), and he fails to attack in return.
This example illustrates two needs: one is to revisit a little the Jury’s scoring, in order to accurately
account for the different strength of commitments and hence, of attacks. The second is to augment the
model capacity of representing agent’s claim about their own commitments or other commitments, with a
more constrained approach to when it is possible to consistently make these claims, given what has been
acknowledged by the different agents. In the next section we therefore briefly discuss how to adapt the
Jury’s behaviour, then we explain some of the model’s limitations that will be overcome in subsequent
sections.
8.4 Revisiting the Jury’s evaluation
Returning to the ME games framework (chapter 7), speakers’ winning condition involve conveying com-
mitments that will make them look good in the eyes of the Jury; they also want to make an opponent look
bad if possible by attacking her weak points.Themodel of the Jury (section 7.4) must ensure that the moves
open to a participant that lead her to her winning condition may decrease or even vanish if her credibility
is repeatedly attacked. In terms of commitments, a player has to weight whether a move that makes her
look good or make the other look bad, but can be attacked in return, is worth using.
This weighting of pros and cons, is accounted for in ME games looking at the infinite sequence of
attacks and rebutals that might ensue the use of the move. What has changed in this picture, in light of this
chapter’s consideration is,
• that attacks have different strength,
• that commitments have different strength too, and that they might be ambiguous and,
• that the strength of an attack, and the strength of the commitment it attacks should be related some-
how.
In the same order of ideas, the Jury’s evaluation should also reflect the duplicitous nature of weak
implicatures that agents don’t dare put out as full commitments. So the update of the probability on
Pk+1(GOODi) = ckPk+1(BADi) should no longer hold ck a constant, and rather depend on the strength of
the commitment under attack: for instance, the weaker commitment, the more duplicitous the temptative,
the stronger the attack.
But then, as another consequence, ambiguities and defeasible commitments make possible mutually
attackingmoves. Attacks on weak implicatures have a rebuttal: youmisinterpreted what I said (not that this
might renders the move useless for the player, as if e.g. Bronston in (8.2.4) explicitly denies committing to
an answer). We might now reach situations in which, consistantly: i commits that he commited to φ ∧ ¬ψ,
j commits that i commited to φ ∧ ψ, on the basis of which j issues an attack a on ψ and i a rebutal r (“I
never said that”). Such a rebutal is a statement that j is wrong in her interpretation, it is not a proof that
she is. Thus, unless j accepts i’s correction, a satisfies our definition of an attack on r as well. In such a
situation a attacks r and conversely.
To deal with mutually attacking moves, the Jury should evaluate CNEC in a branching way, along
two different paths, considering one and only one of the two mutual attacks successful in each path (e.g.,
one with a successfully attacking r and not conversely, and the other with r successfully attacking a and
not conversely in the example above). The final score should be the average of the score on each path
ponderated by the respective credibility score Pk(GOODi) for the path where i’s attack is kept as winning
over 1 − i’s one, and Pk(GOOD1−i) for the other.
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With the above modifications, the upshot of the model then should be that agents pay dearly if their
credibility is successfully attacked when they advance a weak implicature, as evidenced in example (6.3.5).
This is because, accordingly to our first remark, considering Quayle’s possible rebuttal (“I did not say that”)
as winning, impacts less Bensen’s credibility than considering B’s attack as successful over the rebuttal,
since it attacks a duplicitous implicated content. So accordingly to our second change, evaluating the play
with a ponderated average will tilt the balance towards Bensen.
This changes could also explain the assymetry between replying to an attack by denying commited to
an attacked content, and preventing the attack using a deflecting rider beforehand (e.g. in example (6.3.5)
the one we considered in section 7.6.2), making the second generally preferable, at least if one is aware of
the attack and as no other rebuttal.
8.5 Conclusions
8.5.1 Related work
Our work assumes a commitment based view of conversation rather than one based on the internal, men-
tal states of the participants Hamblin (1987); Traum and Allen (1994); Traum (2008) and builds on and
complements the model proposed in Stone and Lascarides (2010), which in turn extends DeVault and
Stone (2007). They introduce a dynamic Bayesian model for discourse actions based on prior moves. The
work we present here is more limited in scope but also goes into more detail: the model details how attacks
on credibility function with respect to various types of commitments that come from different kinds of
discourse moves; we show that even in simple conversations levels of embedded commitments can be very
complex (contrary to a suggestion of Stone and Lascarides (2010)); and The Jury’s Bayesian update on
player types details a part of the picture of Stone and Lascarides (2010).
Related to our work are also recent attempts to investigate argumentation in actual dialogue Cabrio
et al. (2013). Argumentation theory provides a framework for analyzing attacks and counterattacks Dung
(1995). We have given more linguistic detail on how such attacks are carried out and how this can affect
ones’ strategy in conversation. On the other hand, we have presented a general model for credibility in
strategic conversation. Different contexts may affect the parameters of the model that we have set up. For
instance, sometimes the Jury may be a participant in the conversation in the sense that it is allowed to ask
questions, sometimes not. Given a particular context, Jury might also function according to persuasion
rules that are different from the one considered so far. We have chosen simple settings to illustrate our
model. Finally, we have not gone into the details of how particular conversational contexts may dictate
specific linguistic forms of attacks and defense, e.g., Drew (1992). Overall the model is general enough, we
believe, so that we can tune the parameters to fit the particularities of specific contexts.
8.5.2 Limits of the commitment logic
The dialog model we proposed suffers several expressive limitations that we will address in subsequent
sections. Each follows from the interpretation of discourse moves we have adopted. Let us recall this
interpretation:
(w, c,∼, σ) π : δM (w′, c′,∼′, σ ′) iff (w,∼, σ) = (w′,∼′, σ ′), c′(x) = { π if x = ic(x) if x ≠ i
and letting (Wπ ,∼π) = σ(π,w) we have: ∀w¯′′ ∈Wπ (w¯′′,∼π , σ)δM(w¯′′,∼π , σ)
.
What is problematic, is that this clause makes our semantics dynamic in a very weak sense: given a
sequence δ of discourse moves, a set of worldsW and a model over that set of worlds, each finite prefix
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δi of δ of length i corresponds to a set of states Si such that each set s ∈ SI is transformed by δi . However,
the language offers absolutely no way to talk about which si ∈ Si ‘survives’ the i + 1th move in δ, and if so,
how it is transformed. In other words, the model offers a screenshot of commitments’ slates at each point
in time but no way to talk about commitments’ evolution and the future.
Besides, as the semantics above requires the worlds in π to be transormed by δ into themselves, it
follows that the propositional nature of the underlying language Φ0 is essential. Indeed, if we were to
adopt a first order dynamic language, instead of Φ0, a formula in the spirit of π : ¬P(x) ∧ ∃xP(x) would
wrongfully yield inconsistent commitments (at least in some models).
The only part of states that is ‘truly’ dynamic is the vector of maximal labels, as it is transformed. The
content assigned to labels is not, which has quite unintuitive consequences. For instance, the formula
f = (π : φ ∧ ¬Ciψ) → (π : ψ → Ci
) is a theorem for π ∈ Πi : after interpreting π : φ, the semantics
ensures that π becomes the label maximal for i, then ¬Ciψ filters out the states in which the assignment
to π verifies (in addition to φ) that ψ. Then, since φ : ψ is a test and not a transformation, the only way it
can be verified, is that the assignment to π is empty. So i is committed to the absurd. Yet understanding
π : ψ as a refinement of the content assigned to π rather than a test should make, at least, some states not
transformed by f , for some φ and some ψ.
The right thing to do then, is to write a semantics for discourse moves that transforms the assignment
of content to labels rather than test them, exactly as assignment of variables to individual of the models are
transformed by DRSs or DPL formulae. However, this appears to requires a different setting that the one
we have set up in this section. Here is the problem: consider a vocabulary of two labels π ∈ Π0 and π′ ∈ Π1,
and the assignment below over a set of two worldsw andw′, where the set of worlds assigned to π at world
w is symbolized with π-labeled arrows from w to the worlds assigned to π at w. For sake of simplicity, we
drop the representation of questions and maximal labels here:
φ ¬φ
π
π′
π, π′ π, π′
w w′
Let us call σ this assignment and place ourselves in the state (w, σ) (again, we drop here the c and ∼ for
simplicity). What should be the effect of π : (π′ : φ) on that state? It should leave the world unchanged and
transform σ into an assignment σ ′. There are two possibilities. The first is to remove from the assignment
to π those worlds in which π′ is not assigned only φ worlds. We would thus get:
φ ¬φ
π
π′
π′ π, π′
w w′
We see that, in worldw, 0 is now committed to an absurdity via φ. In the case of a two-labels vocabular,
this option makes π : (π′ : φ) essentially equivalent to π : C1φ, but not to C0C1φ (which is what our initial
semantics would amounts to). This assymmetry is unsatisfactory: π : φ is interpreted as an update at the
top-level, but as a test when nested in another construction.Whywould be the reason for such a behaviour?
There is, moreover, another difficulty. We see on the above assignment that, in worldw, 1 commits that 0
is committed to ‘either ¬φ ∧C0¬φ or φ ∧C0
’. Hence 1 has acknowledged 0’s move, but only in one of her
commitment-world, because that world ‘accidentaly’ appeared to be shared with 0. This appeals to a more
complex construction.
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A second option, to keep with the present notions of worlds, states, assignments and dynamic proposi-
tions would be to define π : δ by transforming each of the worlds assigned to π using δ. Let us consider,
this time, the update of (w, σ) by π : (π′ : ¬φ). We would get the assignment σ ′ below:
φ ¬φ
π
π′
π π, π′
w w′
But we see that this has an immediate, extremely unintuitive consequence. Because of the particular
structure of the initial assignment σ , using the move π : (π′ : ¬φ), 0 is able to change 1’s (1st order)
commitments and yield an assignment in which C1¬φ, in other word, he can “make 1 talk”!
Both problem stem from the impossibility of our global assignments to dynamically produce a dis-
tinction between worlds that are identic in a given initial state. This is a well known problem in dynamic
epistemic logic: formalizing private annoucements within a subset of agents expresses the same need for a
given action to ‘split’ worlds. We will see in the next chapter how to apply these techniques to our model.
8.5.3 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented new notions of credibility and attacks on credibility that are relevant to
the formalization of attacks and credibility threats, in strategic conversationswhere interlocutor preferences
may be opposed. We have developed a symbolic dialogue model extending both Lascarides and Asher
(2009) to capture ideas from Stone and Lascarides (2010) and previous sections, with a semantics for
dialogue turns and commitments that allows for arbitrary nestings of commitments. We have also shown
that this complexity is required to analyze many examples of dialogue with attacks on credibility. We have
exposed some limitations of our model that we will now improve on.
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9.1 Introduction
In previous chapters, we have argued that a semantics in terms of commitments is an attractive idea (a
claim also supported by Hamblin, 1987; Traum and Allen, 1994; Traum, 1994). Furthermore we agree with
Asher and Fernando (1997); Lascarides and Asher (2009) that dialogues typically involve differing points
of view, which the semantics must separately represent. To this picture we have add a complication that has
gone so far unnoticed in formal semantics and the prior work we just mentioned, albeit it is well-known
from epistemic game theory: commitment slates interact; agents typically commit to the fact that other
agents make certain commitments. We have thus formulated a semantics of dialogue moves in terms of
nested, public commitments. We have proposed a relational language inheriting the main concepts of
SDRT, with a linearized syntax that eases the expression of an SDRS as a succession of discourse moves,
keeping everything at a semantic level of analysis where each move’s logical form has already been derived
(but can involve ambiguities).
This language however, suffers from two limitations: from section 8.5.2 we know that the language lacks
a ‘true’ dynamics, and from the treatment of examples like example (6.3.5) in section 8.3 we know that the
language is too permissive, insofar as the consistency of one’s commitments about others’ commitments is
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not tied to the moves that have actually been performed: no assumption has been made of linguistic com-
petence and/or evidence of acknowledgment that would constrain the commitments that one makes about
the content of previous moves. Instead we have so far left it up to an abstract entity (the Jury of section 7.4),
monitoring the conversation, to decide on the admissibility of a claim about commitments. For instance
we have argued in the context of example (6.3.5), that given Quayle’s suggestion of being of equal stature
as John Kennedy, Bensen’s claim that he commited to such a fact was admissible. But we should provide a
more systematized account of what one can consistently say and what one cannot, in particular regarding
others’ moves. Such an account should then be used in the course of the Jury’s evaluation.
In this chapter, we will address these two limitations of the model, with two simplifying assumptions:
to address the first issue, we will, in a first step, concentrate our efforts on the dynamics of commitments,
its logic, and its link to acknowledgments. We will therefore drop the full relational semantics and define
a dynamic propositional logic, with only some relational actions (acknowledgments). Recovering the full
expressivity of SDRT discourse labels will be the topic of chapter 10. To address the second issue, we will
further assume a simplified representation of ambiguity.
Ambiguity arises in dialogue content at various levels of granularity–lexical, syntactic, semantic levels
and at the level of discourse structure. In context, these ambiguities trigger pragmatic inferences. These dif-
ferent mechanisms interact in an especially complex way: for instance, the coherence of a dialogue agent i’s
contribution is tied to the possibility of inferring coherence relations between i’s utterances (see chapter 2)
which often constrain in return the possible disambiguisations of those utterances, and force or cancel
scalar implicatures (Asher, 2013). Integrating every part of such a complex interplay as well as the dynamics
of commitments into a single model would be too wide a scope for this chapter. Too keep things manage-
able, we assume ambiguities of any kind (lexical, syntactic, semantic, or relative to the presence/absence
of an implicature as part of a move’s content) to be provided externally and, at the semantic level of anal-
ysis that we adopt, built into discourse moves of the form m1 ∼ m2, where ∼ is an operator of ambiguity,
syntactically producing an ambiguous move from a set of moves in the language representing its possible
resolutions.
We will attribute to an underlying linguistic theory the task to axiomatise the onset of ambiguity, for
instance SDRT’s default reasoning and glue logic (section 2.3), relying on axioms in the spirit of (π : φ∧π′ :
QAP(π0, π) ∧ Siψ ∧QAP(πo,ψ)) → [(π : φ) ∼ (π : (φ ∧ψ)]36 (adding ∼ to the language of the previous
section, but assuming a dynamic interpretation such as chapter 10 will provide); looking back to chapter 8
and the treatment of example (6.3.5), such a mechanism should inform us that Quayle’s move suggests
that he is of equal stature as Kennedy, and that given the question he was asked, this suggestion makes
his commitment ambiguous between a commitment that he has as much experience in the congress as
Kennedy did (≈ ), and another commitment that, in addition to this, he has equal stature that John
Kennedy (≈ ∧ ), so that in fine, his move is represented in the propositional language as [(≈ ) ∼(≈  ∧  )]. In so doing we also drop the distinction between different strength of commitment,
but this could be reconquered (under the same assumptions), with distinct ambiguity constructors ∼S of
different strengths S.
What remains central for the propositional dynamic language to account for is that, by performing
a dialogue act X, an agent A commits to some content, potentially ambiguous, then, by responding with
another dialogue act Y , a second agent B might commit to having interpreted X in a particular way. (or
else to be incoherent). We define a semantics for the propositional dynamic language and provide an
axiomatization for a simple, first kind of dynamics. We then consider some problems this simple dynamics
has with the semantics of dialogue acts like acknoweldgments, and produce a second dynamics that resolves
the problems of the first.
36Or, maybe more accurately, an inference rule of the glue logic deriving the ambiguity from clues expressible in the glue
language that such a suggestion and question are present.
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9.2 A Language for theDynamics of public Commitment with Ambiguities
9.2.1 Syntax
To model the dynamic of public commitment with ambiguous signals, we assume here an abstract, simpli-
fied view of conservations as sequences of ⟨(l inguistic)action, speaker⟩ pairs. We will build ambiguity
into the linguistic actions recursively: in the base case, an action is an unambiguous utterance, whose con-
tent we simplify to be a propositional formula. Ambiguous actions are recursively constructed from a set
of (lower-level) actions (representing its possible disambiguations). In order to explain this in more formal
terms, we introduce some preliminary definitions: Let prop denote a set of propositional variables (at
most countably infinite) and I a set of agents. We define simultaneously the set of actionsA and formulasL0:
Definition 58 (Actions and formulas). A and L0 are the smallest sets such that:
∀p ∈ prop p ∈ L0
∀φ,ψ ∈ L0∀i ∈ I ¬φ,Ciφ,φ ∧ ψ ∈ L0
∀φ ∈ L0∀α ∈ A∀i ∈ I [αi]φ ∈ L0
∀φ ∈ L0 φ! ∈ A
for any finite collection of actions (αs)s=1...n inA
(∼ αs)s=1...n ∈ A
Additional logical constants and connectors are defined as usual: φ∨ψ ≡ ¬(¬φ∧¬ψ), φ → ψ ≡ ¬φ∨ψ,
 ≡ p ∧ ¬p, ⊺ ≡ p ∨ ¬p.
9.2.2 Semantics
The semantics of our language is based on that for Public Announcements logic (PAL) with private sus-
picions introduced in Baltag et al. (1998). More specifically, we translate each of our actions in action
structures of Baltag et al. (1998) and then rely on their semantics.
Recalling some basic definitions, a frame is a tuple ⟨W , (Ri)i∈X⟩withW a set ofworlds and for each i ∈ I,
Ri is a binary relation overW , and amodelM is a pair ⟨F , ν⟩withF aKripke frame and ν : W ↦ ℘(prop)
an assignment at each world w of propositional variables true at w. We will sometimes use models as
superscripts for set of worldsWM, or accessibility relations RMi to refer to the set of worlds or the relation
of that particular model or frame. We will also abuse notation and writew ∈ M as a shortcut forw ∈WM.
A pointed model is a pair ⟨M,w⟩ with w ∈WM.
The semantics of action-free formulas is as usual with respect to a pointed model:
Definition 59 (Semantics of static formulas).
⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ p iff p ∈ νM(w)
⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ ¬φ iff ⟨M,w⟩ /⊧ φ
⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ φ ∧ ψ iff ⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ φ and ⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ ψ
⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ Ciφ iff ∀w′,RMi (w,w′) → ⟨M,w′⟩ ⊧ φ
In order to provide a semantics for terms with actions, we need the definition of an action structure in
Baltag et al. (1998):
Definition 60 (Action Structures). An action structure is a pair ⟨F , pre⟩where pre : WF ↦ L0 associates
to each world in F a formula, called the precondition of this world.
Interpreting formulas with actions require us to first update the model with the action, then to evaluate
the formulas with respect to the updated model. As mentioned earlier, we proceed in two steps; we first
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associate a pointed action-structure with each action inA× I, and then classically update the model with
this action. We first recall Baltag et al. (1998)’s informal definition of the update operation. The update of
a modelM through an action a is obtained by taking, for each world in a’s structure a different copy ofM’s world that satisfy the precondition, then allowing a transition for agent i from a world to another iff
i)the two worlds were initialy i-related and ii)the two copies they belong to are i-related in a’s structure.
More precisely:
Definition 61 (Action updates). Let S = ⟨F , pre⟩ be an action structure. Let k ∈ S and let ⟨M,w0⟩ be
a pointed model. Let ∣φ∣M = {w ∈ M ∣ M,w ⊧ φ}. If w0 ∉ pre(k), the update ⟨M,w0⟩ ⋆ ⟨S, k⟩ fails.
Otherwise, it is defined as ⟨MS , (w0, k)⟩ themodelwithWS = ⋃
l∈S
∣pre(l)∣M×l as set ofworlds, accessibility
relations defined as RM
S
i ((w, l), (w′, l ′)) iff i)RM(w,w′) and ii) RSi (l , l ′), and valuations left unchanged
i.e. ν((w, l)) = ν(w).
We now provide the translation of conversational moves of our language (i.e. elements ofA× I) into
pointed action-structures:
Figure 9.1: Some action structures
(a) Unambiguous move φ!i
k0
ki k j
i j
j
i
i j
pre(k0) = ⊺
pre(ki) = φ
pre(k j) = ⊺
(b) Ambiguous move (φ! ∼ ψ!)i
k0
k1jk1i k
2
j k2i
i j
j
ii j
j i
i
jj i
pre(k0) = ⊺
pre(k1i) = φ
pre(k2i ) = ψ
pre(k1,2j ) = ⊺
A simple unambiguous discoursemove by i will generate a common commitment toCiφ. An ambiguous
move, on the other hand, will not but will involve a disjunction of common commitments. A common com-
mitment for a groupG towards a proposition φ,C∗Gφ, has the effect thatCGφ∧CGCGφ∧. . .CG(CG)nφ∧. . .
(analogously to common knowledge). Semantically, we define common commitments for a group G, C∗Gφ,
as
⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ C∗Gφ iff ∀w′(⋃
x∈G
Rx)+(w,w′) → ⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ φ,
where the union ∪ of two relations is defined as (R ∪ R)(w,w′) iff R(w,w′) or R′(w,w′), and R+ denotes
the transitive closure of the binary relation R (R+(w,w′) iff ∃n > 0∃w1, . . .wn wn = w′ ∧ R(w,w1) ∧
. . . R(wk−1,wk) . . . R(wn−1,wn) ).
Definition 62 (Interpretation of conversational moves). The interpretation function ⋅ interprets conver-
sational moves ofA× I) as pointed action-structures. Letm = α!i ∈ A × I. m is defined inductively over
α:
• Ifα = φ! then α = ⟨K, pre, k0⟩withK = {k0, ki , k j}, accessibility relation is definedasRKi (k{0,i, j}, ki),
RKj (k{0,i, j}, k j) and no other transitions; preconditions are defined as pre(k0) = pre(k j) = ⊺ and
pre(ki) = φ. The pointed world is k0 and the action-structure is depicted in fig. 9.1(a).
154
9.2. A Language for the Dynamics of public Commitment with Ambiguities
• If α = (∼ αs)s=1...n, let ⟨Ks, pres, ks0⟩ = αs!i be the action structure recursively computed for αs!i .
Assuming the Ks- and Ks
′
-worlds are disjoint for s ≠ s′ (otherwise, first take disjoint copies of the
Kss), define αm = ⟨K, pre, k0⟩ with K = ⋃s Ks ∖ {ks0}, accessibility relations defined as i)∀k ∈
Ks x ∈ {i, j} RKx (k0, k) iff RKsx (ks0, k), ii) ∀k, k′ ∈ Ks ∖ {ks0}RKx (k, k′) iff RKsx (k, k′) and iii) there
are no other transitions than the one previously listed. pre is defined as pre(k0) = ⊺ and for pre(k) =
pres(k) for k ∈ Ks. The pointed world is k0. fig. 9.1(b) shows the action-structure (φ! ∼ ψ!)i for a
move by i which is ambiguous between a commitment to φ and one to ψ.
Note that given this definition, ∼ is “associative” in the sense that
((α1 ∼ α2) ∼ α3)i = (α1 ∼ (α2 ∼ α3))i = (α1 ∼ α2 ∼ α3)i (up to renaming of the worlds).
Armed with these definitions, we can now complete the semantics of L0 providing the semantics for
action terms:
Definition 63. Semantics of dynamic formulas:
⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ [αi]φ iff ⟨M,w⟩ ⋆ αi ⊧ φ
Note that due to the fact αi’s pointed world always has ⊺ as precondition, the update ⟨M,w⟩ ⋆ αi
cannot fail and the definition is correct.
9.2.3 Worked out example
We illustrate our dynamics by providing an abstract but principled view of the evolving commitments
in example (9.2.1):
(9.2.1)a. i : I have my piano lesson in ten minutes. When I get back the shop will be closed.
b. i : And there is no more beer.
c. j : I am not going to get you beer. Go get it yourself.
d. i : I did not say that. I am not asking you to get it.
e. j : Oh yes you did.
What is central to the picture here? i commits to some proposition (we abbreviate it as p), and then to
something else, that in its context of utterancemight be interpreted as a commitment on a request for j to get
beer. imakes an utterance that entails that he takes j to be committed to the request. j then this dispute this
commitment of his. i refuses the correction. Assume that we can refer to an external semantic/pragmatic
theory that licenses or rejects possible interpretations of a sentence in context, and that such a linguistic
theory tells us that (9.2.1-b) as (at least) an assertion that there is no more beer (¬b) licenses a pragmatic
inference to a request for i to get some beer (¬b ∧ r). We can then correctly describe example (9.2.1) as
involving these action sequences:
(9.2.2)a. i : p!i
b. i : (¬b! ∼ (¬b ∧ r)!)i
c. j : (Cir)! j
d. i : (CjCir ∧ ¬Cir ∧ ¬r)!i
e. j : (Ci(CjCir ∧ ¬Cir) ∧ Cir)!i
Figure 9.2, show how the dynamics transform the initial model. In order to keep the figures readable, we
graphically group nodes into clusters, edges going in and out of these clusters are to be understood as
distributing over each inner node. We also omit some isolated worlds that therefore have no impact (i.e.
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they are present in the definition of action update, but not reachable from any other world). Nodes are
labelled by their valuations, except for the actual world labelled asw0.The initial model of the conversation
is depicted in fig. 9.2(a).
Figure 9.2: Models at different stages of example (9.2.2). Arrows should be understood as distributing over
all inner nodes.
(a) Initial Model for exam-
ple (9.2.2)
w0
∅ . . . pqr
i, j
i, j
(b) Models after (9.2.2-b) and (9.2.2-c), respectively with and without the dashed
edges.
w0
∅ . . . pbr ∅ . . . pbr
p pr pr
j j
j j
i i
i ij j
i i
(c) Model after (9.2.2-d)
w0
∅ . . . pbrp
j jii
The initial model in fig. 9.2(a) shows that neither speaker commits to anything. Figure 9.2 shows how
i’s assertions in (9.2.2-b) to (9.2.2-d) have transformed the commitment space for j and i: after updating
with (9.2.2-b), i’s public commitments and j’s commitments concerning i’s commitments are ambiguous as
to whether the implicature to go get beer holds; but after the update with (9.2.2-c), only i’s commitments
remain ambiguous. j’s commitments concerning i′’s commitments are no longer ambiguous; he commits
to i’s having committed to the implicature that he should go get the beer. After (9.2.2-d), j’s commitments
concerning i have become inconsistent. This is a consequence of our strong modeling assumptions about
a perfect communication channel leading to common commitments. We will see in section 5 yet another
reason to weaken our proposal.
9.3 Complete Deduction System for L0
One of the interests in keeping the base language of our analysis simple is to be able to investigate the logical
properties of the dynamics of commitments. Accordingly, in this section, we present a complete deduction
system for L0. The system and completness proof follow from the general picture drawn in (Baltag et al.,
1998), where the authors provide a complete deduction system for the language allowing any kind of action-
structure. It turns out however, that the restricted action-structures that are the interpretations of our
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conversational movesA(see definition 62) allow nice simplifications, most notably the elimination of any
reference to action-structures in the syntactic rules. This allows us to have deduction system for L0 which
does not require embedding of L0 into an larger language with additional syntactic constructions. The
deduction system is presented on fig. 9.3.
Figure 9.3: Deduction system for L0. i, j, x ∈ I, p ∈ prop
All propositional validities
from ⊢ φ → ψ and ⊢ φ to infer ⊢ ψ (MP)
⊢ [αi](φ → ψ) → ([αi](φ) → [αi](ψ)) ([αi]-normality)
⊢ Ci(φ → ψ) → (Ci(φ) → Ci(ψ)) (C-normality)
from ⊢ φ to infer ⊢ Ciφ (C-necessitation)
from ⊢ φ to infer ⊢ [αi]φ ([αi]-necessitation)
⊢ [αi]p↔ p (rw1)
⊢ [αi]¬ψ↔ ¬[αi]ψ (rw2)
⊢ [αi](ψ1 ∧ ψ2) ↔ [αi]ψ1 ∧ [αi]φ2 (rw3)
⊢ [φ!i]Cjψ↔ Cj[φ!i]ψ (for j ≠ i) (rw4)
⊢ [φ!i]Ciψ↔ Ci(φ → [φ!i]ψ) (rw5)
⊢ [∼(αs)is∈S]Cxφ↔⋀
S
[αis]Cxφ (rw6)
In order to proof completeness of the above system, we adapt step by step (Baltag et al., 1998)’s proof
to the simplified system.The proof function by reduction of the logic to the static logic K. The idea behind
the proof is, once soundness is established, to see our system’s axioms as rewrite rules (rewriting the left-
hand sides of the equivalences into the right-hand sides), and show that the system is able to proof the
equivalence of any given formula to an action-free formula. From there it is quite straightforward to reduce
provability of a formula to provability of an action free formula, which is granted as K−axioms are part of
our system.
Proposition 2. The deduction rules are sound.
Proof. The proof is trivial for Modus Ponens, necessitation and normality rules. (rw1)’s, (rw2)’s and (rw3)
soundness follows directly from definitions (and the fact that our actions never fail). (rw4),(rw5) and (rw6)
requires a little more work:
• Let for a world w ∈ M ⟨Mα , (w0, k0)⟩ denote ⟨M,w⟩ ⋆ φ!i, the update ofM by action φi at
w (recall that the set of worlds and relations ofMα does not depend on w). Notice first that the
following is true for any formula γ, k ∈ {k0, ki , k j} and w such that (w, k) ∈Mα :
⟨Mα , (w, k0)⟩ and ⟨Mα , (w, k)⟩ are bisimilar.
by definition the valuations of (w, k0) and (w, k) are the same. Since the worlds accessible from
k0 in φ are exactly those accessible from k, it follows from the definition ofMα that the worlds
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accessible from (w, k0) are exactly those accessible from (w, k) which is sufficient to establish the
bisimulation.
Let us now prove the soundness of (rw5). The proof for (rw4) is similar. Let ⟨M,w0⟩ be a pointed
model. ⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ [φ!i]Ciψ iff ⟨Mα , (w0, k0)⟩ ⊧ Ciψ iff ∀(w, k) ∈ Mα Ri((w0, k0), (w, k)) →⟨Mα , (w, k)⟩ ⊧ ψ. Since we have shown that ⟨Mα , (w, k)⟩ is bisimilar to (w, k0) and using the
definition ofMα , we find the above to be further equivalent to ⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ φ and RMi (w0,w) →⟨Mα , (w, k0)⟩ ⊧ ψ. But since by definition ⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ [φ!i]ψ iff ⟨Mα , (w, k0)⟩ ⊧ ψ, satisfaction of
the initial formula is finally equivalent to ⟨M,w0⟩ ⊧ Ci(φ → [φ!i]ψ).
• Let α = ((∼ αs)s∈S) and x ∈ I. by construction, for any world k x-accessible from k0 in α there is
world ks in αs x-accessible from k0 and such that ⟨Kα , k⟩ and ⟨Kαs , ks⟩ are bisimilar. This implies
that for any world in (w, k) x-accessible from (w0, k0) inMα there is a s ∈ S and a world (w, ks) inMαs such that ⟨Mα , (w, k)⟩ and ⟨Mαs , (w, ks)⟩ are bisimilar. Conversely, for any world (w, ks) ∈Mαs x-accessible from (w0, k0) there is a bisimilar world (w, k) ∈Mα x-accessible from (w0, k0).
Assume that for each αs, ⟨Mαs , (w0, k0)⟩ ⊧ Cxφ. Let (w, k) be x-accessible from (w0, k0) ∈Mα . We
me must have ⟨Mαs , (w, ks)⟩ ⊧ φ and by bisimilarity ⟨Mα , (w, k)⟩ ⊧ φ, hence ⟨Mα , (w0, k0)⟩ ⊧
Cxφ.
Conversely, assume that ⟨Mα , (w0, k0)⟩ ⊧ Cxφ. Let (w, ks) ∈ Mαs be a world x-accessible from(w0, k0), there is a (w, k) ∈Mα bisimilar to (w, ks) and therefore ⟨Mαs , (w, ks)⟩ ⊧ φ and ⟨Mαs , (w0, k0)⟩ ⊧
Cxφ.
All together we can conclude to ⟨M,w0⟩ ⊧ [(∼ αs)s∈S]Cxφ iff ⟨M,w0⟩ ⊧ ⋀S[αs]Cxφ, i.e. (rw6) is
sound.
qed
Proposition 3. Rules (rw1)–(rw6) seen as rewrite rules rewriting the left-hand sides of the equivalences
into the right-hand sides form a terminating rewriting system.
This is classicaly obtained from (for instance) the technique of lexicographic path ordering.
Since a rewrite-rule can always be applied to a formula starting with an action, a direct corollary
of lemma 3 is that any formula can be rewritten into an action-free formula by the by the rewrite system
obtained from the deduction rules.
Proposition 4. If ⊢ φ↔ ψ then for all well formed formula γ of L0, ⊢ γ[φ/p] ↔ γ[ψ/p].
This can be achieved by induction over the length of γ.
Proposition 13. The deduction system is strongly complete.
Together with lemma 3, lemma 4 yields through a quick induction over the rewrite steps, that for any
formula φ ∈ L0, there is an action-free formula φ0 (one of φ normal forms w.r.t the rewrite system) such
that ⊢ φ↔ φ0, from there the strong completeness is reduced to the one of modal logic K.
9.4 Acknowledgments and corrections
9.4.1 What is the effect of acknowledgments?
For many researchers, including Clark (1996); Traum (1994); Traum and Allen (1994) inter alia, an ac-
knowledgment as in (9.4.1-c) by 0 of a discourse move m by 1 can signal that 0 has understood what 1
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has said, or that 0 has committed that 1 has committed to a content p with m, and serve to “ground” or to
establish a mutual belief that 1 has committed to p. For Clark, grounding by the other conversational par-
ticipants is a necessary condition for the content of utterances to enter the common ground. Corrections,
and self-corrections, as in (9.4.1-d), on the other hand, serve to remove commitments.
(9.4.1)a. 0: Did you have a bank account in this bank?
b. 1: No sir.
c. 0: OK. So you’re saying that you did not have a bank account at Credit Suisse?
d. 1: No. sorry, in fact, I had an account there.
e. 0: OK thank you.
The problem is that grounding doesn’t follow just from the simple gloss above. With Traum and Allen,
we will argue that grounding that i committed to p should require to reach a state where a common
commitment over some content K holds (e.g. typically over the fact that i performed m and the content
of m is p). A common commitment by a group of agents G means that every agent in G is committed to
K and to the fact that every agent is committed to K, and to the fact that every agent is committed that
every agent is committed to K, and so on. But if an acknowledgment performed by agent i only brings
additional levels of commitments by i to some given content, it is far from straightforward to see how
and why grounding would be possible at all in finite time. Clark indeed mentions such a problem and
proposes that the solution lies in a continuous exchange of instantaneous and concurrent, unspoken signals.
Other theories such as Lascarides and Asher (2009) assume implicit acknowledgments in the absence of
explicit corrections,whichmight provide another possible explanation of how to fill the gap, for cooperative
conversations at least. But there has been no logically precise semantics of acknowledgments that logically
entails common commitments and grounding. We provide that below.
Let us get a clearer picture of the problem: We have taken public commitment to be an operator with
a weak modal logic (K). We do not believe that commitments validate type 4 or 5 axioms of modal logics;
asserting φ does not entail asserting I assert that φ; neither does not asserting φ entail asserting I do not
assert that φ. Indeed Vieu (2011) argues in favor of adding commitments into the semantics of relations in
SDRT, insisting that the commitment operator should not support negative introspection to account for
phenomena such as e.g., contents blocking the inference of a coherence relation.
Analogously to common knowledge, let us define common commitments for a group G, C∗Gφ, as the
infinite cunjunction of all possible nesting of the commitment operator for agents in G. CGφ ∧ CGCGφ ∧
. . .CG(CG)nφ ∧ . . . . If common commitment, even for a single agent, does not follow from static logical
axioms, it could follow dynamically, from a background assumption that agents communicate through
a perfect communication channel, have a perfect semantic competence implying perfect knowledge and
understanding of speakers unambiguous discourse moves and are committed to these two assumptions.
This would let the proposition a message m has been sent entails the proposition i commits that a message
m has been sent, for all agents i. From there a common commitment tom has been sent would be achieved
inductively, via deductive closure of commitments. Hence, the effects ofm should be applied at every level
on every agent’s commitments, and produce a common commitment that the speaker of m commits to
the content of m.
Such an assumption underlies the dynamic logic that we developped so far (we will see in section 10.1
how it might be seen to correspond to such an inductive process): it leads to a very strong view of as-
sertions and other discourse moves: our dynamic logic so far has [φ!i]C∗Ciφ as a theorem. But then, it
appears that grounding acknowledgments are semantically superfluous (we shall formalize this in the
dynamic propositional logic, after concluding this general discussion of acknowledgments and common
commitments). Moreover, perfect communication channels and perfect linguistic competence are often
not realized, even in the most constrained settings. People can argue that they made a sincere, honnest
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mistake in their commitment as in (9.4.1-d), or they can (sincerely or not) act as if they were unaware of
such a mistake, in denying some previously made commitment.
Then, the only informative contribution of an acknowledgment by i of a move by j would be that i
agrees with the content of j’s move, in other words acknowledgments would always be accept moves, we
think this is innacurate: we can imagine 1 in example (9.4.1) acknowledging 0’s response even if he patently
does not believe its content and neither commits to that answer being true. Such acknowledgments are
often present in legal questioning but in many other conversations too.
Wemight thus opt for a much weaker semantics for discourse moves, where, in particular, an assertion
of φ by speaker i only entails that Ciφ. A similarly weak semantics for acknowledgments would mean
that an acknowledgment by j of the content of an assertion by i entails CjCiφ. But this makes grounding
impossible in finite conversations: if a discoursemovem by i entails onlyCi p, (a) and, (b) entails that all the
conversational participants believeCi p (Traum andAllen, 1994; Ginzburg, 2012).Then j’s acknowledgment
of m would entail CjCi p ∧ BelGCjCi p. and BelGC. Thinking about conversations as infinit strings of
discourse moves inAω by players i and j, we have, inductively:
Observation 3. For a conversational sequence σ ∈ Aω of assertions and acknowledgments, no finite prefix
σk ∈ Ak of σ of arbitrary length k ever entails a common commitment to the fact that i commits to φ,
C∗Ciφ.
That is, common commitments might be achieved only after an infinite sequence of acknowledgment
moves between i and j.
Someotheroptions are logically possible. For instance,we couldkeep the simple semantics fordiscourse
moves, but assign acknowledgments a very strong semantics. On such a semantics, j’s acknowledging a
discourse move by i that entails Ciφ would imply a common commitment by i and j to Ciφ. But this
implausibly imputes to j the ability to force commitments on i that quickly leads to absurdities. If i says,
for instance, I don’t want to go to the meeting, j can “acknowledge” i’s move by saying, OK, thank you very
much for agreeing to go to the meeting, thus forcing a common commitment to Ci i goes to meeting. But
clearly i didn’t commit to going to the meeting.
9.4.2 Do agents need to achieve common commitments?
Can we do without common commitments? We think not. Common commitments are essential (see also
Clark (1996)) for strategic reasons and can be present even when mutual beliefs about a shared task are
not.
Suppose, for instance, that i want to adopt a ‘fix point’ goal in which
1. Cjφ and
2. jmust ‘admit’ her defeat, i.e. j cannot consistently assert that i fails to achieve her goal.
If i adopts the simplest goal of satisfying the first condition, and extracts from j amovem implyingCjφ,
j has a winning strategy for denying i’s victory. She simply denies committing to φ (I never said that), since
Cj¬Cjφ is consistent with Cjφ, even if Bel jC jφ. Player j lies, but she is consistent. If i now adopt a more
complex goal to achieve Cjφ∧CjCjφ, j can still similarly counter i’s goal while maintaining consistency: j
can assert something to the effect that Cj¬CjCjφ. However, if i adopts achieves a goal of reaching common
commitment C∗GCjφ, withG the group of conversational participants, j does not have a way of denying her
commitment without becoming inconsistent, as C∗Cjφ → (CjCjφ∧CjCjCjφ∧⋯), for any finite depth of
nesting of Cj operators. And only common commitments rule out other, more elaborate ways of defeating
conversational goals. For instance, on a weaker semantics j could deny that i had committed to what j
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had committed to at some level of embedding. Thus, if i’s goal depends on j’s committing to one of i’s
commitments, a lack of common commitment will allow j to deny i’s achieving her conversational goals.
This argumentmight seem abstract, but we think that the need for grounding is quite real. In section 6.4
we have made a case that there is an important difference between being non-Gricean and admitting to
being so. Assume a view of Gricean sincerity in which BeliCiφ → Beliφ and a view of linguistic
competence in which Ciφ → BeliCiφ. Let us revisit the previous argument and assume that j is com-
mited to Ckj φ for 1 ≤ k ≤ n (where Ckj denotes the nesting of k Cj operator), but not to no higher nesting
of commitments. j can not only commits to ¬Ckj φ consistently, she can do it and respect sincerity as
well, at a (rather cheap) cost of committing to have failed once at linguistic competence. Moreover,
assuming that each level k of commitment over φwas achieved using a different dialogmove, it it is possible
that j honnestly failed k times at linguistic competence, then it is possible that j believes that she
did not commit to φ. Now if there is a common commitment over Cjφ, a sincere denial of any level of
commitment implies for j to fail linguistic competence for infitely many different propositions
which seem intuitively much worse. Of course, the higher k grows, the more difficult it seems to find a real
example where one can argue that he failed to understand something k times in a row. But then, using a
jump to common commitment is a way, in a symbolic setting, to model a point where there is no more
plausibly sincere rebutal.
We could have formulated the problem of grounding and common commitments in doxastic terms,
i.e. asking that j’s acknowledgement of a move by i leads to a mutual belief by i and j in some content.
However problems for the semantics of assertions and acknowledgments analoguous to those we have just
sketched in terms of commitments would surface for an account of grounding in terms of mutual belief as
well. The simple reason for that is that, even in cooperative settings, beliefs changes must themselves reflect
some changes in commitments. In cooperative settings though, Gricean cooperativity might come in as
an additional piece of machinery allowing to derive inifitely many implicit acknowledgments: Clark and
Brennan (1991) observes that grounding seem to require conversationalist to give infinitely many positive
bits of evidence–Requiring positive evidence of understanding seems to lead to an infinite regress, and claims
that some form of evidence such as continued attention solves the situation as it can occur continuously and
does not require a separate presentation. Lascarides and Asher (2009) assumes implicit acknowldegments
in the absence of explicit correction. In both cases, a solution (relying on some form of cooperativity) is
proposed where infinitely many acknowledging moves might happen in a finite amount of time. We will
propose a formal analysis compatible with these two solutions, with an additional mechanism to allow
grounding in non-cooperative settings under certain assumptions.
Let us finally discuss briefly the semantics of self-corrections. While Lascarides and Asher (2009) give
a general semantics for corrections in terms of simple commitments, according to which one speaker
commits to the negation of what another speaker committed to with a prior move, they do not look at
self-corrections: in self-corrections, speakers can not only deny prior commitments but also “undo” or
“erase” them. For instance, if in (9.4.1-b) 1 commits to not having a bank account; in (9.4.1-d) 1 no longer has
this commitment. Self-corrections thus entail a revision of commitments. No one has proposed a logical
analysis of self-corrections. We will very briefly sketch such an analysis and argue that these moves have
an essential, strategic role to play in dialogue, even if we assume a perfect communication channel and
unambiguous commitments in dialogue moves.
9.4.3 Acknowledgments in the dynamic commitment logic
To treat acknowledgments, we first enrich our language into a language LD with actions for acknowl-
edgments. We do that by adding the recursive construction Ack(αx) to the set of linguistic action A,
for any α ∈ A and x ∈ I. Defining the semantics of LD only requires us to define the interpretation of
acknowledgment-actions into action-structures. Let α ∈ A be a linguistic action. Let ⟨Kα , kα0 , preα⟩ = αx.
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Let k0 and k j be “fresh” symbols not appearing in Kα .
Definition 64 (Acknowledgment as action structures).
Ack(αx)i = ⟨{k0, k j} ∪ Kα , k0, pre⟩
Accessibility relations are defined as Ri(k0, kα0), Rj(k0, k j), Ri, j(k j, k j), ∀k, k′ ∈ Kα ,∀x ∈ {i, j} Rx(k, k′)
iff RK
α
x (k, k′) and no other transitions. pre(k0) = pre(k j) = ⊺ and pre coincide with preα on Kα .
Acknowldegments are relational moves (actually, the only relational moves of our dynamic language).
This means that conversational agents should not have the action Ack(α) for just any α as part of their
vocabulary, but might make such a move only if α is a move which is part of the conversational context,
i.e. has been played by an agent as such, or as part of an ambiguous action. We do not focus on imposing
such constraints into the language itself, but a fully relational account of acknowledgments is proposed
in chapter 10.
It is easy to check that effects of action Ack(αx)i commit i to the effects of αx and that, given the
dynamics of sections section 9.2 and section 9.3, acknowledgments of previous actions have no effect in
the sense that ⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ [αx][Ack(αx)i]φ iff ⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ [αx]φ. This formalizes the problem. To address
the problem, we provide an alternative weak semantics for LD, in which we redefine the interpretation of
linguistic actions as action structures. Only unambiguous utterance-actions need a new definition, as the
recursive computation mechanism of action-structures for ambiguous utterances- and acknoledgments-
actions stays the same.
Definition 65 (Weak action interpretation). Define ⋅w by φ!iw = ⟨k0, ki , k1, k0, pre⟩ with Ri(k0, ki),
Rj(k0, k1), Ri, j({ki , k1}, k1) and no other transitions. pre(k0) = pre(k1) = ⊺ and pre(ki) = φ
∼(αs)is∈Sw and Ack(αx)w are computed as before
Interpretation of assertions under the strong and weak semantics, and interpretation of acknowledg-
ments thereof are depicted on fig. 9.4
Define finally ⊧w as the new truth-maker operator defined as ⊧ was, but this time based on the inter-
pretation ⋅w of linguistic actions.
Under ⊧w action [φ!i] has i commits to φ, but changes neither i’s second order commitments (in
general ⟨M,w⟩ /⊧w CiCiφ) nor anyone else’s commitments. This now fixes our problem of the liar who
denies commitments he has previously made; someone can now commit to φ but then later say I never
said φ and remain consistent.
This weaker semantics, however, makes grounding impossible in finite conversations. We think never-
theless that grounding is possible. Our proposal is that a particular sort of acknowledgment and confirming
question licenses the move to common commitment. It is the one in (9.4.1-b) and (9.4.1-c), where 0 asks
a confirming question after an acknowledgment of a move m. If 1’s answer to the confirming question is
consonant with m, then C∗{0,1}C1φ, and 0 has achieved her goal.
We can formalize this proposal using our notion of ambiguous commitments. An acknowledgment
is in fact ambiguous. One reading comes from our simple semantics where an acknowledgment adds
one layer of commitment–i.e. if j acknowledges i’s commitment to φ with a simple OK, we have CjCiφ.
The other reading is that it indeed implies a common commitment of the form C∗i, jC jφ, following our
second semantics for assertions. The clarification question, when answered in the affirmative, selects the
common commitment formulation. Our proposal is compatible but distinct from Clark’s (ours is also
formally worked out), and interestingly survives in non-cooperative settings.
We quickly now turn to corrections. Speakers can not only deny prior commitments but also “undo”
or “erase” them with self-corrections. For instance, if in (9.4.1-b) 1 commits to not having a bank account; in
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Figure 9.4: Assertions under the strong and weak semantics and acknowledgments thereof.
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9.4.1-d 1 no longerhas this commitment (SeeGinzburg 2012 for a detailed account of repair). Conversational
goals of the form C∗GCi p are unstable if i may correct herself; they may be satisfied on one finite sequence
but not by all its continuations. j’s being able to correct a previous turn’s commitments increases the
complexity of i’s goals (Serre, 2004), which affects the existence of a winning strategy for i; an unbounded
number of correction moves will make any stable C∗GCi p goal unattainable, if p is not a tautology. We
observe, however, a sequence of self-corrections is only a good strategy for achieving j’s conversational
goals if she is prepared to provide an explanation for her shift in commitments (and such explanations
must come to an end). As chapters 7 and 8 argue, conversationalists are constrained to be credible in a
certain sense if they are to achieve their conversational goals. Constantly shifting one’s commitments with
self-corrections leads to non-credibility, thus avoiding the problem of unbounded erasures.
To provide a semantics for corrections, we begin from Lascarides and Asher (2009), who provide a
syntactic notion of revision over the logical form of the discourse structure. Using the correction of m
as an action update on the commitment slate prior to m yields a semantics for corrections. Our formal
semantics captures the dynamic effects of announcements, corrections and acknowledgments; common
commitments are important conversational goals and that particular conditions must obtain if they are to
be achieved.
9.5 Conclusions
We have presented two semantics for dialogue in terms of commitments that is general enough to handle
non-cooperative and cooperative dialogues. The first one is conceptually simple and has a straightforward
axiomatization but fails to give a sensible semantics for acknowledgments and is also too restrictive con-
cerning denials of commitments, which our semantics makes inconsistent instead of simply a lie. Finally,
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we discussed corrections as another problem for the semantics of dialogue and offered a solution.
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10.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has introduced a dynamic propositional language with ambiguity and acknowledg-
ments. This language is equipped with two distinct interpretations: one, the strong semantics, can arguably
be thought of as implementing a vision of perfect linguistic competence, communication channel and
commitment thereon, and produces as a common commitment over C∗Ciφ as the result of an assertion
φ!i of φ by i. As a consequence, acknowledgmens are also semantically superfluous under the strong inter-
pretation. The other, the weak semantics, let φ!i alter only i’s first order commitments, leaving everything
else unchanged.
The concern of this chapter is twofold:
• First, we will show how the weak and strong semantics relate, via infinite sequences of acknowledg-
ments, confirming our intuition that the strong semantics implements a view of inductive inference
of acknowledging moves.
• Second, we will complete the solving of chapter 8’s puzzle, turning our dynamic propositional logic
into a fully dynamic alternative to the language of chapter 8, with relational predicates ranging over
discourse moves.
10.2 Linking the strong and weak semantics for assertions
Going beyond chapter 9, we now provide a link between the strong and weak semantics, on which the
strong semantics corresponds to an idealization of an infinite sequence of acknowledgments. In what
follows, C∗ is a shortcut for C∗I i.e. common commitment over all agents. We first define such sequences:
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Definition 66 (Iterated acknowledgments). Let αx ∈ A× I be an ⟨action, agent⟩ pair, let G ⊆ I be a group
of agents. Define inductively the set of ⟨action, agent⟩ pairs ↑nG (αx) as follows:
• ↑0G (αx) = {αx}
• ↑n+1G (αx) = ⋃i∈G ⋃β∈↑nG ack(β)i .
Level n in the above hierarchy consists of every possible acknowledgment by every agent in G of
actions at the lower level. Note that ∣ ↑nG (αx)∣ = ∣G∣n. An easy induction shows that at each level n, the
order in which actions in ↑nG (αx) are applied to amodelM do not change the final result; for any complete
orderings β0, β1 . . . β∣G∣n and β′0, β′1, . . . β′∣G∣n of ↑nG (αx) , and for every modelM, (. . . ((⟨M,w⟩ ⋆ β0) ⋆
β1) ⋆ . . . ) ⋆ β∣G∣n) and (. . . ((⟨M,w⟩ ⋆ β′0) ⋆ β′1) ⋆ . . . ) ⋆ β′∣G∣n) are isomorphic. Our choice of ordering of↑nG (αx) will thus not affect our results.
Let <I be any total order on the set of agents I. We inductively extend <I to ↑n+1G (αx), by defining
ack(β)i <I ack(β′) j iff i <I j or i = j and β <I β′ (thus taking a lexicographic ordering at each step). We
write ↑n+1G (αx)k as the kth action in ↑n+1G (αx) according to <I . We can now define the infinite sequence of
actions
!ωG(αx) = ⟨↑0G (αx)1, ↑1G (αx)1, ↑1G (αx)2, . . . , ↑nG (αx)1, . . . , ↑nG (αx)∣G∣n , . . . ⟩
and
ackωG(αx) = ⟨!ωG(αx)n⟩1≤n<ω.
We have defined here two infinite sequences of actions: !ωG(αx) corresponds to the sequence starting with
action α executed by x followed by its acknowledgment by every agent in G, again followed by acknowl-
edgments of these acknowledgments by every agent in G and so on, while ackωG(αx) corresponds to the
same sequence of acknowledgments without the initial performance of α by x.
The last ingredient needed to complete the correspondence between the strong and weak semantics of
acknowledgments is a semantics for such infinite sequences:
Assume in what follows that for any G ⊆ I, C∗G is not part of the language LD37.
Definition 67. Let U be a pointed model and ⟨Un⟩n∈ω be an infinite sequence of models. U is a limit model
of ⟨Un⟩n∈ω iff ∀k ∈ ω∃n0 ∈ ω∀n ≥ n0 U is k-bisimilar38 to Un. Notice that existence of a limit model
requires that ∀k∃n0∀n > n0 Un+1 is k-bisimilar to Un. Let ≡ω denote unbounded finite bisimilarity, i.e.
k-bisimilarity for every k ∈ ω. By transitivity of finite bisimulation, two limit models are ≡ω equivalent,
and conversely an ≡ω equivalent to a limit model is a limit model.
Definition 68. Let ⟨αxkk ⟩k∈ω be an infinite sequence of ⟨action, agent⟩ pairs. Let φ ∈ LD ∪ {C∗Gφ ∣ G ⊆ I},
and ⟨M,w⟩ be a pointed model. Define inductively U0 = ⟨M,w⟩ and Uk+1 = (Uk ⋆ αkxk). The effects of
an infinite sequence of actions are defined as follows:
• If ⟨Uk⟩k∈ω has no limit model, the effects are undefined.
• Otherwise ⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ [⟨αxkk ⟩k∈ω]φ iff ∀U if U is a limit model of ⟨Uk⟩k∈ω then U ⊧ φ
The following proposition links the strong and the weak semantics:
Proposition 14. • For an action α, the effects of ackω(α) are always defined and
• let ⟨M,w⟩ be a pointedmodel, ⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ [φ!x]ψ in the strong semantics for utterances iff ⟨M,w⟩ ⊧[!ωI (φ!x)]ψ in the weak semantics.
37which does not prevent us to study whether actions might yield a model where it holds
38For an introductionto finite bisimulation see for instance Blackburn et al. (2006)
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We now have a formally precise statement of the intuition that the strong interpretation of φ!x is
logically equivalent to [φ!x][ackωI (φ!x)], i.e. that the strong semantics logically behaves as if utterances
were always followed by every possible acknowledgment. It also shows something non-trivial: such infinite
iterations of acknowledgments are regular enough to be finitely representable as an update of the model.
Thismeans thatwe can nest such constructionswithout further effort. Following the same kindof reasoning
we can then define the action acki(!ωI (φ!x)), to represent i’s acknowledgement of an infinite sequence of
acknowledgment yielding a common commitment over Cxφ, and shows that this action does the same
as the “finite” one acki(φ!x) under the strong semantics. Our analysis regarding infinite constructions
supports our formal treatment of grounding.
We have requestedC∗ to not be a part of the agents’ vocabulary.Thismight seem an annoying limitation
preventing us to use the jump to common commitment of chapter 9 with infinite acknowledgments. Recall
that the proposed solution to reach common commitment is to have an ambiguous action between a
‘regular’ acknowledgment and a ‘strong’ acknowledgment followed by a clarification question establishing
whether or not the common commitment has been reached.
Using infinite actions, the ambiguous acknowledgment of φ!x becomes [acki(φ!x)] ∼ [ackωI (φ!x)],
which is fine, however a response to the clarification question C∗φ? should yield either an action (C∗φ)!x
or (¬C∗φ)!x , which we have ruled out. There are different possible ways to address this:
• The initial motivation to rule C∗ out of the vocabulary is that an infinite sequence of actions that
does not fail on a modelM defines a unique update of the model up to ≡ω. It is well known that
satisfaction of basic modal formulae is invariant up to ≡ω, but that a formula like ¬Ci¬C∗i ¬Ci

is not because it imposes at least an infinite branch, and we can find two ≡ω inifinitely branching
models, one with an infinite branch and one without. However the definitions remain valid, the
effect of adding C∗ to the vocabulary is to introduce non-determinism: for all we know, there can be
an infinite sequence of actions ⟨αxkk ⟩k∈ω yielding at least two limit models not equivalent up to full
bisimulation, so that ⟨M,w⟩ /⊧ [⟨αxkk ⟩k∈ω]¬Cx¬C∗x¬Cx
 and ⟨M,w⟩ /⊧ [⟨αxkk ⟩k∈ω]¬Cx¬C∗x¬Cx
.
But this not per se a problem to our account, in particular we still have:
⊧ [acki(φ!x) ∼ ackωI (φ!x)][(C∗Cxφ)!x][ack((C∗Cxφ)!x)y]C∗Cxφ.
Hence the restriction can simply be raised without much harm.
• Alternatively, since we are only interested in infinite sequences of acknowledgments, we can notice
that the sequence of updates of a model through actions in ackwI (α) exhibit more structure than
we have exploited so far. In fact, we have exploited in our definition that iterated acknowledgments
successively refine commitments of higher order, and therefore yield sequences of model such that
the k + 1th is k-bisimilar to the k-th. But there is more, actions as we have considered them cannot
‘create’ an infinite path out of nothing.They can unfold a path, duplicate it, and eventually prune it. So
we might update the definition of limit models, for instance, in the following way: U is a limit model
iff of ⟨Un⟩ iff there is a sequence of simulationsGk ofUk+1 byUk such thatGk is also a k-bisimulation
between the two pointed model, and in addition there is a sequence Fk of simulations of U by the
Uk such that Fk−1 = Fk ○Gk . With this more demanding notion of a limit model, we can show that
there is at most a unique limit model up to (full) bismilarity.
As already mentioned, existing theories, without proposing a fully worked out semantics, solve the
problem of grounding by assuming that, at least by default, infinitely many weak acknowledgments can
synchronously be performed by conversational agents. The previous discussion establishes that the strong
semantics implements precisely such a behavior. Our proposed solution thus complements existing ones.
167
Chapter 10. Commitments, acknowledgments and grounding in SDRT with nested commitments
10.3 Semantics with nested commitments for richer languages
In the preceding sections, we gave a semantics for acknowledgments using a propositional language
in which discourse moves like acknowledgments were analyzed as action operators on propositions.
While this approach works for acknowledgments, it is difficult to adapt this to truly relational moves
like   or most discourse relations. In this section we offer a full dynamic semantics for a lan-
guage with nested commitments in which we can refer to conversational moves and make assertions about
relations between conversational moves.
We build on the mechanisms of SDRT (Asher and Lascarides, 2003), with some modifications and
extensions: we deal with nested commitments by allowing the informative content of discourse labels to
talk about the content assigned to other discourse labels. As in SDRT, we will assume given lower-level
language, typically, Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL, Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991)), or DRT (Kamp and
Reyle (1993)), and extend this language with discourse labels and relations.
Let I be a finite set of agents. Let Π = ⊍i∈I Πi be a disjoint union of ∣I∣ countable sets of symbols
(discourse labels). By definition, agent i is the speaker of any label π ∈ Πi , which we write spk(π) = i. LetR be a finite set of relation symbols.
We assume a basic languageL0 with the following:L0 has a binary constructor ∧ and a unary construc-
tor¬, i.e.∀φ,φ′ ∈ L0 φ∧φ′,¬φ ∈ L0. We assume a class of models forL0, and everymodelM defines a set
of states XM and an interpretation ⋅M0 such that φM0 ⊆ X×X, ¬φM0 = {(x, x) ∣ ¬∃x′(x, x′) ∈ φM0 }
and φ ∧ ψM0 = φM0 ○ ψM0 = {(x, y) ∣ ∃z (x, z) ∈ φM0 and (z, y) ∈ ψM0 }. The latter requirements
ensure that the interpretation of ¬ and ∧ coincide at the lower and upper levels.
Our intended base-level language is DPL, as it yields a rich and expressive discourse semantics that can
handle questions. However, in order to make clear the link between the present section’s semantics and
the dynamic logic of the previous section, we will also occasionally use a simpler propositional test logicL   (which can be seen as a fragment of DPL). Simply define L   as to contain the same formulae
as the propositional logic over signature prop, states X   are valuations prop ↦ {0, 1}, and for two
valuations v, v′ ∈ X  , define φ   = {⟨v, v⟩ ∣ v ⊧ φ, where ⊧ is the classical truth-maker of the (static)
propositional logic over prop.
The language LΠ,R extends L0 and is defined by structural induction:
Definition 69. LΠ,R is the smallest language such that:
∀φ ∈ L0 φ ∈ LΠ,R
∀π1, π2, π3 ∈ Π∀R ∈ R R(π1, π2, π3) ∈ LΠ,R
∀α ∈ Lπ ∀i ∈ I Ciα ∈ LΠ,R
∀α ∈ Lπ ∀π ∈ Π π : α ∈ LΠ,R
∀α, α′ ∈ Lπ α ∧ α′ ∈ LΠ,R
∀π, π1, π2 ∈ Π π1 π∼ π2 ∈ LΠ,R
∀α ∈ Lπ ¬α ∈ LΠ,R
An SDRS is a formula of LΠ,R such that every occurrence of a formula ofL0, or a formula of the form Ciα
is guarded by some label π ∈ Π. In addition, define φ → ψ as ¬(φ ∧ ¬ψ).
LΠ,R adds several constructions to L0. First there are statements of the form π : φ that “store” proposi-
tion φ in the content of a discourse label π. It implements the linguistic action of the speaker of π’s saying φ.
φmay itself be a structured discursive object, as in SDRT. Relational propositions R(π1, π2, π3) update the
content of π3 to express a relational move, recursively computed through the meaning of R and the content
assigned to π1 and π2. Commitment operators are added, as well as a construction π1
π∼ π2, which will
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implement ambiguity between the discourse moves stored under π1 and π2. We now turn to the semantics
of LΠ,R.
A model for LΠ,R is simply a modelM for L0. Let C = {c ∈ (Π)I ∣ ∀i ∈ I c(i) ∈ Πi}, the set of
function associating to each agent i a label c(i) whose speaker is i. The set of (LΠ,R-)states SM forM is
the product XM × C × FM where FM is the set of assignments to labels (also called label-assignments
in the remainder of the chapter). A state for the extended language LΠ,R is thus a triple, consisting of a
state x of the base language, a label c(i) for each agent representing her current commitments39, and a
label-assignment f . We define label-assignments below. The purpose of a label-assignment f is to assign a
(semantic) proposition f (π) to a given discourse label π—i.e., in our dynamic logic, a set of transitions
between states. Such a transition is technically a pair ⟨(x, c, f ), (x′, c′, f ′)⟩, and itself involves assignment
functions. We must therefore be careful to avoid circularity in the definition of FM, as is familiar from
the work of Frank (1996) on modal subordination. Our problem and our solution are, however, slightly
different than those for modal subordination. We will proceed in two steps. We will first define a set of
bounded label-assignments, bounded in the sense that it only allows for a finite nesting of labels with a
defined content into other labels. We give a semantics relative to such assignments of content to labels. The
boundedness of assignments has an intuitive semantic counterpart: in any state, regardless of the linguistic
actions executed so far, there is a finite bound n, for each agent i, on the maximal nesting of commitments
CiCi . . .Ciφ that may evaluate to true for a non-tautological φ. In other words, there is always a maximal
n such that agent’s i commitments of order n are minimal (contain nothing besides logical tautologies).
This is analogous to what happens in the “weak” dynamic commitment logic (without infinite sequences of
acknowledgments) if we assume an initial model with minimal commitments. An immediate consequence
is that it’s impossible to reach common commitment on any content. Wemake this correspondence explicit
below.
We will then extend our label-assignment functions to unbounded ones. Avoiding circularity in this
case will require a quite tricky mathematical construction; however, the complexity of this construction
will fade away thanks to two propositions stating that we can manipulate unbounded assignments exactly
as bounded ones (namely, that a label assignment can evaluate any label into a set of state transitions, and
that we can construct a new label-assignment from any label assignment σ , set of transitions T and label π
by setting σ(π) = T). The semantics with unbounded assignments will be exactly the same as for bounded
assignments.
In what follows, every definition is relative to a given modelM; in order to simplify notation we drop
the ⋅M when referring to the sets FM,XM, SM and interpretations ⋅M0 and ⋅M.
We define by simultaneous induction the sets Fn of rank-n label-assignments, and Sn of rank n states.
Definition 70. Rank of assignments
• F0 = є, S0 = X × C × F0
• Fn+1 = (℘(Sn × Sn))Π (functions from labels to set of transitions between rank-n states), Sn+1 =
X × C × (⋃k≤n Fn)
• F = ⋃n<ω Fn, S = X × C × F
Informally, a label-assignment of rank n, is either the special symbol є, or a function from discourse labels
to a set of transitions (of rank n − 1).
Our semantic requires only two operations on label-assignments: the evaluation of a label-assignment
f at a given label π, and the substitution of a new set of transitions T for the set of transitions previously
39i.e. the label which is currently maximal w.r.t discourse subordination, this allows to dynamically exclude labels which
introduce only intermediary contributions that do not constitute a commitment of their own, as e.g. antecedents to conditionals.
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assigned to π yielding a new label-assignment denoted as f [T/π]. To avoid circularity, however, we cannot
define substitution by any set of transitions T ; it suffices for our purposes to restrict the definition to
bounded sets of transitions, bounded in the sense that there must be some k < ω such that T ⊆ Sk × Sk .
ΔB ⊊ ℘(S × S) is the set of such bounded sets of transitions (ΔB = ⋃n∈ω ℘(Sn × Sn)). The two operations
(substitution and evaluation) are defined below.
Definition 71. • f (π) is already defined for f ≠ є, since by construction, f is a function. We define in
addition є(π) = ⋃x∈X,c∈C⟨(x, c, є)(x, c, є)⟩ (this choice of definition makes є represents a state with
minimal commitments over logical tautologies only).
• for T ∈ ΔB, π ∈ Π, f [T/π] is defined as the function f ′ such that:
{ f ′(π) = T∀π′ ≠ π f ′(π′) = f (π)
Note that, T ∈ ΔB is sufficient to ensure that f [T/π] stays in F.
Since the semantics depends on the considered set of relations and their semantics, we will assume
that for every symbol R ∈ R, assignment f and top labels c, a semantics ∣R(π1, π2)∣ fc ∈ ΔB is defined,
which, given an assignment to π1 and π2 provides a new proposition, that is to say, an element of ΔB. ⋅
interprets formulae into sets of transitions, and is defined inductively as follows (using infix notation x δ y
as a syntactic sugar for ⟨x, y⟩ ∈ δ):
Definition 72 (Semantics for LΠ,R). • For φ ∈ L0 s φ s′ iff s = (x, c, f ), s′ = (x′, c, f ) and x φ0 x′
• (x, c, f ) R(π1, π2, π3) (x′, c′, f ′) iff c′ = c[π3/spk(π3)] and f ′ = f [(∣R(π1, π2)∣ fc )/π3]
• s Ciα s′ iff s = s′ = ⟨x, c, f ⟩ and ∀⟨s, s′⟩ ∈ f (c(i))∃s′′ s′αs′′
• (x, c, f ) π : α (x′, c′, f ′) iff f ′ = f [( f (π) ○ α)/π]
• (x, c, f ) π1 π∼ π2 (x′, c′, f ′) iff x = x′ and c′ = c[π/spk(π)] and f ′ = f [ f (π1) ∪ f (π2)/π]
• s ¬α s′ iff s = s′ and there exists no s′′ ∈ S such that sαs′′
With c[π/i] defined as the unique c′ such that c′(i) = π and ∀ j ≠ i, c′( j) = c( j)
Since a bounded label-assignment f assigns a bounded set of transitions to any label, a easy induction
on α show that f (π) ○ α is always a bounded set of transitions as well, and thus f [( f (π) ○ α)/π] is
always well defined and so is the semantics.
We provide in addition the semantics of two basic discourse relations:   and 	
:
Definition 73.
∣ (π1, π2)∣ fc = f (π1) ○ f (π2)
∣	
(π1, π2)∣ fc = {(⟨x, d, g⟩, ⟨y, e(spk(π1)/π1), h[ f (π1)/π1]⟩) ∣
(⟨x, d, g⟩, ⟨y, e, h⟩) ∈ f (c(spk(π2)))}
We can now link the propositional dynamic logic of the previous section and our dynamic semantics.
We define a translation fromLD into LΠ,R taking L   as lower-level language. LetM0 = ⟨X, (R0i )i∈I⟩ be
the model of LD whose set of world X is the set of valuations over signature prop and R0i = X × X (thus
M0 represents minimal commitments only to logical truths by each agent in I).
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Algorithm 1 translation of LD into LΠ,R
Assume a function   : I ↦ Π which enumerates each Πi , i.e. such that each call  (i) returns a
label in Πi and successive calls never return twice the same label.
1: function t(φ, c) ▷ φ ∈ LD ∪A, c ∈ C
2: Case φ = p ∈ prop :
3: Return p
4: Case φ = Ciφ :
5: Return Ci t(φ, c)
6: Case φ ∧ ψ :
7: Return t(φ, c) ∧ t(ψ, c)
8: Case φ = [αi]ψ :
9: Let χα = t(αi , c) and χψ = t(ψ, c)
10: Return χα → χψ
11: Case φ = ψ!i :
12: Return c(i) : t(ψ, c)
13: Case φ = ack(βx)i :
14: Let πβ =  (x)
15: Let χβ = t(βx , c[πβ/x])
16: Return c(i) : χβ
17: Case φ = (α ∼ β)i :
18: Let πα = f resh(i) and πβ = f resh(i)
19: Let χα = t(α, c[πα/i]) and χβ = t(β, c[πβ/i])
20: Return χα ∧ χβ ∧ πα c(i)∼ πβ
21: end Case
22: end function
Proposition 15 (translation). Algorithm 1, given as input a formula φ ∈ LD and an initial “top” label c ∈ C
for each agent, yields a proposition t(φ, c) = χ ∈ LΠ,R such that
⟨M0, x⟩ ⊧ φ iff ∃ f ∈ F (x, c, є) χ (x, c, f )
Consider φ = [(p! ∼ q!)i]([Ci p! j]Cj
 ∧ [ack(p! j) ∼ ack(q! j)][(Ci p)! j]¬Cj
). This formula of LD
states that after i said something ambiguous between p and q, j is inconsistent in saying that i is committed
to p, unless he first (ambiguously) acknowledges one of the two readings. φ is true in (any world of)M0.
The translation of φ is the formula χ below (where symbols with a ⋅x exponent denote labels in Πx):
(πi1 : p ∧ πi2 : q ∧ πi1 πi∼ πi2) →
((π j : Ci p) → Cj
) ∧ ((π j1 : πi : p ∧ π j2 : πi : q ∧ π j1 π j∼ π j2) → ((π j : Ci p) → ¬Cj
)))
χ first updates the content of labels πi1 and πi2, set the content of πi to be the union of the content of those two
labels, then set πi to be i’s top label. Since this first state leaves the assignment to label π j unchanged, If the
initial assigment is є, π j contains no transitionmaking Ci p hold, hence executing the action π j : Ci pwould
empty π j and commits j to the absurdum.The ambiguous action (π j1 : (πi : p)∧π j2 : (πi : q)∧π j1 π j∼ π j2) on
the other hand upates π j to contain at least one transition placing p in the content of πi , which can then
be selected through π j : Ci p, and won’t empties j’s commitments. Thus, a state ⟨x, c, є⟩ is accepted by χ.
We now extend our semantics with assignments interpreting infinite descending chains of labels with
defined content. This will enable us to do two things: 1) deal with infinite sequences of 	 and 2) have
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states in which agents are commonly committed to some non-tautological content. We build unbounded
label-assignments over bounded ones. by exploiting a notion of bounded bisimulation over bounded label-
assignments. In the following, x¯ will generally denote a tuple ⟨x, c⟩ ∈ X × C.
Definition 74. We define n-bisimilarity (≅n) between bounded label-assignments inductively:
• ∀ f , f ′ ∈ F f ≅0 f ′.
• f0 ≅n+1 f1 iff the two following conditions hold:
(forth) ∀π∀⟨(x¯, g0), (x¯′, g′0)⟩ ∈ f (π)∃⟨(x¯, g1)(x¯′, g′1)⟩ ∈ f ′(π) such that g1 ≅n g′1 and g0 ≅n g′0.
(back) ∀π∀⟨(x¯, g1), (x¯′, g′1)⟩ ∈ f ′(π)∃⟨(x¯, g0)(x¯′, g′0)⟩ ∈ f (π) such that g1 ≅n g′1 and g0 ≅n g′0.
To ease notational clutter,we extend the notation≅n to pairs of transitions, bywriting ⟨(x¯, f ), ( y¯, g)⟩ ≅n⟨(x¯′, f ′), ( y¯′, g′)⟩ as a shortcut for x¯ = y¯, x¯′ = y¯′ and f ≅n f ′ and g ≅n g′. We are now ready to define
unbounded assignments:
Definition 75 (Unbounded label-assignments). The set of unbounded label-assignments Fω is defined as
the set of infinite sequences σ = ⟨σ0, σ1, . . . , σi , . . . ⟩ of bounded label-assignments, such that: (i) ∀i σi ≅i+1
σi+1 and (ii) ∀i σi ∈ Fi+1.
The idea behind this construction is that, at each index, we find a label-assignment that is compatible
with and refines the assignment of the preceding indices, allowing us to evaluate arbitrarily deep nestings
of discourse labels by picking an assignment at a sufficiently high index.
Let Sω = X × C × Fω denote the new set of states, now based on unbounded assignments (the analog
to S). Corresponding transitions are thus in Sω × Sω.
Definition 76. let σ , σ ′ ∈ Fω, σ ≅ σ ′ iff ∀i σi ≅i+1 σ ′i . ≅ is an equivalence relation.
We extend the notation ≅ to pairs of transitions, as we did for finite bissimulation. Finally, we introduce
the notion of a diagonal, which will prove useful later on:
Definition 77 (Diagonal). Let ⟨si = (x¯, σ i)⟩i∈ω be a sequence of states with constant first components
x¯ = ⟨x, c⟩, and such that σ00 ≅1 σ 11 ≅2 σ22 . . . σnn ≅n+1 σn+1n+1 we call the diagonal of such a sequence, the state
δ(⟨si⟩i∈ω) = ⟨x¯, ⟨σ ii ⟩i∈ω⟩
The last ingredients needed for our dynamic semantics with unbounded assignments are evaluation
and substitution, which we now define:
Definition 78 (Evaluation). Let σ ∈ Fω. Define σ(π) as:
σ(π) = {⟨(x¯, α), ( y¯, β)⟩ ∣∀i⟨(x¯, αi), ( y¯, βi)⟩ ∈ σi+1(π) and α, β ∈ Fω}
For any equivalence relation , let x = y[] denote equality modulo .
Proposition 16. if σ ≅ σ ′ then σ(π) = σ ′(π)[≅]
An unbounded assignment always assigns to a label a set of transitions closed under diagonal; i.e.,
whenever ∀k ∈ ω ⟨sk , s′k⟩ ∈ σ(π), such that both δs = (⟨sk⟩k∈ω) and δs′ = δ(⟨s′k⟩k∈ω) are defined, we have⟨(δs, δs′)⟩ ∈ σ(π).
We now define the substitution operation. As in the bounded case, we must ensure that the set of
transitions T we substitute is of the same kind that an unbounded label assignment can have as output.
This time the restriction is not one of boundedness, but instead, following the previous remark, that T be
closed under diagonal.
172
10.4. Examples revisited
Definition 79 (Substitution). LetT ⊆ Sω×Sω such thatT is closedunderdiagonal. DefineTi = {⟨(x¯, αi), ( y¯, βi)⟩ ∣⟨(x¯, α), ( y¯, β)⟩ ∈ T}. For π ∈ Π and σ ∈ Fω define σ[T/π] as
σ ′ = σ0[T0/π] ⋅ σ1[T1/π] ⋅ . . . σn[Tn/π] ⋅ . . .
Note that since by definition of Fω, Ti ∈ Si+1 × Si+1 ⊆ ΔB, σi[Ti/π] is well defined.
The final proposition we need is:
Proposition 17. σ[T/π] ∈ Fω. Furthermore σ[T/π](π) = T[≅].
Propositions 16 and 17 together imply that we can define our semantics exactly as we did for bounded
assignment in definition definition 72, provided that the interpretation of discoures relations satisfies the
following constraint: for every relation symbol R and assigment f , ∣R(π1, π2)∣ f has to be closed under
diagonalization. This can be shown for our definition of   and 	
.
Diagonalization captures precisely the regularity required for an infinite sequence of actions to be
representable as a simple model update, which, as we have seen, is the case for acknowledgments. The very
reason that allowed us, in the previous section, to capture an infinite sequence of iterated acknowledgment
in a finite action-structure, was that level n actions of the hierarchy of acknowledgments only affects
commitments of order n. The model obtained after any acknowledgment of order 1 is 0-bisimilar to the
initial model (actual facts are not modified). Applying second-order acknowledgments modifies only
second order commitments, and the model after this second step is 1-bisimilar to the model at step one.
Applying the successive level of the hierarchy of acknowledgment therefore yield a sequence of models
such that the nth is n− bisimilar to the (n + 1)th. The reason why the finite action-structure semantically
equivalent to iterated acknowledgments, is that it yields through update a single model, which is, for every
integer n, n−bisimilar to the nth model in the infinite sequence of updates. As the exact same relationship
holds between an infinite sequence ⟨σk⟩k∈ω of assignment which admits a diagonal and its diagonal, we
can use infinite iterated acknowledgments in our dynamic semantics, and to that end we introduce a new
relation 	
ω:
Just as with the propositional infinite sequence of actions of section 10.1, we define first an infinite
sequence of actions. Let π ∈ Π, c ∈ C and for i, j ∈ I let ⟨πk
ok ji
⟩k∈ω be a sequence of pairwise disjoint
labels in Πi . Define level-n iterated acknowledgments of π, χackn , with χ0 = ⋀i, j∈I 	
(π, π0ok ji , c(i)) and∀n χn+1 = χn ∧⋀i, j∈I 	
(c( j), πkok ji , c(i)). Let x ∈ X and f ∈ F and define ⟨x, cn, fn⟩ as the unique state
such that ⟨x, c, f ⟩ χn ⟨x, cn, fn⟩. ∀n cn = c, moreover the sequence ⟨x, c, fn⟩n∈ω admits a diagonal. Let
δack⟨x,c, f ⟩ denote this diagonal. We can finally add a construction 	

ω(π, (πi)i∈I) to the language, which ,
first, copy each agent i’s commitment into πi (in order to not erase the content of the current top labels
and keep track of previous states), and then to proceed to iterate acknowledgments. Define therefore for a
pair ⟨c, f ⟩, the pair c¯ = c[(πi/i)i∈I] and f¯ = f [( f (c(i))/πi)i∈I], this performs the “copy” of each agent’s
commitment into the new labels. Define:
s 	
ω(π, (πi)i∈I) s′ iff s = ⟨x, c, f ⟩ and s′ = δack⟨x,c¯, f¯ ⟩
10.4 Examples revisited
We will conclude this chapter with the relational version, using the language and interpretation we have
set up in the previous section, of the solution our common commitment dilemma which we recall here:
neither a systematic “strong” interpretation of dialog moves, nor a “weak” one is satisfactory, as it either
yields meaningless acknowledging moves or impossibility of grounding. However, as we have made both
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kind of interpretations part of a common semantic vocabulary, we are no longer commited to a systematic
use of one or the other.The remaining question is thus: what is exactly the condition at which an agreement
is reached that synchronous iterated acknowledgements indeed happened?
The answer we provided to this question is: one has to ask. Our solution builds on our treatment of
ambiguity: acknowledgments, such as the one that 1 performs in (9.4.1-c) of example (9.4.1), are considered
as ambiguous in their strength and only a confirming question and answer might raise this ambiguity,
and reach a non-deniable common-commitment. Considering again 1’s acknowledgment in (9.4.1-c), we
represent 1’s contribution (OK), as ambiguous between a simple acknowledgment by 1 and an acknowledg-
ment of a common acknowledgment of 0’s “no” answer. Representing 0’s “no” as the propositional action¬ !0, (9.4.1-c) is modeled in the propositional language as ack( !1) ∼ ack(!ω0,1( !0)).
In the relational semantics on the other hand, we have (9.4.1-b) as π0 : ¬ , followed by (9.4.1-b)

ω(π0, (π0strong , π1strong)) ∧ π0 π′0∼ π0strong ∧ (π0, π1OK , π1weak) ∧ π1weak π1∼ π1strong .
This move commits 1 (via π1) to an ambiguous proposition. The confirming question following the
acknowledgment in 9.4.1-b, is then modeled as asking 0 to raise the ambiguity. We did not discuss the
semantics of questions, but questions in dynamics semantics have been discussed at length in the litterature
(see e.g. Groenendijk (2003)). We could modifies states as to include issue partitions in order to represent
questions, as we did in chapter 8. On the propositional side, the recent account in dynamic epistemic logic
of van Benthem and Minica (2012) could also be integrated to the propositional dynamics of chapter 9.
What is crucial independently of this choice, is that 1’s commitments indeed licences a polar question
C∗C0¬bank?, to which 0 answering yes brings a commitment C0C∗C0¬bank and, at thus, disambiguates
0’s commitments in π′0 by selecting the content of π0strong . After such amove, whatever 0may say, he cannot
deny, at any level, that he commited to ¬bank. A simple acknowledgment of 0’s answer yield the common
commitment.
Our relational semantics also allows us to deal with self-corrections. Corrections need the full relational
semantics, because one content is revised by another. Consider again example example (9.4.1), repeated
here. We are interested in the correcting move by 1 in (10.4.1-d).
(10.4.1)a. 0: Did you have a bank account in this bank?
b. 1: No sir.
c. 0: OK. So you’re saying that you did not have a bank account at Credit Suisse?
d. 1: No. sorry, in fact, I had an account there.
e. 0: OK thank you.
When 1 saysNo. sorry, in fact, I had an account there, the move attaches to 1’s negative answer (10.4.1-b)
to 0’s initial question in (10.4.1-a). But the effects of this discourse move change the surrounding discourse
structure. The semantics of Correction replaces the content of the original affirmative answer with the
negative answer in the correctivemove. Because of this, the followupquestion of 0 and 1’s secondaffirmative
answer are nowmoot. To mirror Lascarides and Asher (2009), this revision requires that our states include
a copy of the SDRS constructed for the dialogue up to reaching the present state, and that the revision is
calculated using that structure, by ‘rerunning’ the whole sequence of moves, suitably updated: 1 and 0’s
commitments are recomputed on the revised SDRS. We thus model self-corrections as a revision of one’s
commitments.
Self-corrections thus erase the commitments of the corrected action andpossibly also the commitments
ensuing from subsequent dependent actions like its acknowledgment. An immediate consequence is that
self-corrections make commitments, even common commitments, unstable (non-monotonic).
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The work of the present thesis was driven by a general goal of providing a formal model of conversational
meaning accounting for aspects of
1. Logical consequences, i.e., what follows logically from what has been said, by either participant: the
objective was to provide a formal answer to questions such as who said what? Do the participants
agree on some given fact? does what A said entails a given proposition φ?
2. Rationality, i.e., providing a model of what to say at a given point in time, given one’s preferences
and goals.
3. The interaction bewteen these, in particular regarding the status to give to implicatures and other
pragmatic inferences as part of the meaning of an agent’s contribution.
4. The dynamics of conversational meaning, i.e., how to provide logical forms that adapt with time,
in order to capture a formal account of meaning, at each step of the conversation; how to represent
the dependance of a contribution on the context of previous conversational moves, and conversely,
the impact of a given move on subsequent continuations.
We have addressed different aspects of these questions, in three different parts:
1. The first part of the thesis has been concerned with questions 1 and 3 of above. In this part, we have
addressed differences in discourse structure representations, theoretical methods of comparison of
representations, and investigated the foundations of a quantitative account of semantic similarity.
2. In the second part of the thesis we have addressed difficulties arising in strategic settings, regarding,
mainly, questions 2 and 3. Driven by the idea that existing formal accounts of question 3 may lay
the basis of a solution, we investigated a class of infinite games called Message Exchange games,
involving a vocabulary equipped with a well-defined dynamic semantics, as a candidate solution.
3. In the third part, we have mostly focused on question 3, though we have established some link to
credibility and grounding related to question 2. Our general object of investigation was the dynamics
of public commitments in conversations, the semantics of acknowledgments, and the problem of
grounding.
Contributions
• We first looked, in part I into the structure of the logical form of discourse and dialog: what structural
constraints to adopt, what impact for a choice of constraints.
To do this we adopted a semantically driven perspective: formalisms differ in the constraint they
adopt, but they all agree that coherence relations have semantic consequences. Hence, their disagree-
ment pertains as to whether these consequences can be directly read from the structure, or whether
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the structure needs first to be interpreted, or transformed in some way. There is here an analogy
with sentential syntax: each structural constituent certainly contributes to some part of the logical
form, yet it is not always clear how and where exactly it must be integrated.
To address the above, we defined in chapter 3 a monadic second order language with two sorts,
which we used to axiomatize each of the different formalisms’ structural constraints, and when these
constraints allow it, to switch from one representation to another.
The model-theory of this second order language allowed us to formalize the different kinds of inter-
pretations that, we argued, are needed to extract from a given structure a logical form expressing
semantic consequences transparently. In particular,we formalized different versions of the nuclearity
principle of Rhetorical Structure Theory. This further pursues the analogy with sentential syntax:
we have shown how some of these interpretations are indeed underspecified ones, which brings a
novel understanding of the sort of information that theories of discourse structure encode.
This yields also a way to compare logical forms expressed over the same set of elementary discourse
units.
As the more general problem of comparing logical forms, without restricting these forms to involve
the same elementary units is also of interest, and, also, as logical forms undergo changes as conver-
sations unfolds, we turned to the question of quantifying the impact of a new linguistic action. We
adopted, in chapter 4, a more abstract setting and a more general notion of semantic similarity.
Assuming, for our foundational study, a view of conversations as simple as possible, i.e. sequences of
atomicmoves, equipped with an interpretation function taking them into a distinct, ‘semantic’ space,
we investigated semantic metrics i.e., distances or similarity between sequences of linguistic moves
that base the closeness of two conversations on that of their respective semantic interpretations.
We also formalized definitions of different levels of ‘semanticness’ for a (pseudo-)metric, and we
drew a ‘map’ of the logical links between the axioms characterizing these definitions.
We then considered different possible structures for the semantic space (partial orders, general
lattices, bounded lattices, set lattices) and defined some generic distances (assuming finite semantic
universe though) for the different kind of spaces. We introduced, in particular, a distance based on
measuring the possible continuations and showed that it generalizes (as does its link to the symmetric
difference metric) as a distance defined in terms of shortest path in a finite bounded semi-lattice.
We have investigated a list of candidate axioms capturing different intuitions about links between the
structure of the semantic space, the concatenation or internal properties of some sequences, and the
semantic interpretation function. Most of the proposed axioms led to impossibility results. Yet some
interesting facts remain, for instance, the continuation metric satisfies a non-trivial axiom linking
the join operation in the lattice to the metric behaviour, which other distances violate.
• A second body of work, part II, focused on the interaction of logical forms and rationality, with a
focus on strategic dialogs, where the interests of the participants diverge.
We proposed in chapter 7 a game theoretic account of such conversations within a new perspective:
conversation as infinite sequences of moves. An agent is successful if he plays certain sequences,
otherwise he looses. The set of successful sequences forms her winning condition.
These games bring a mathematical characterization of classes of conversational objectives describing
the ‘shape’ that a successful conversation must take. Crucially, as we dispose of the complete, conver-
sational unfolding, we can explain why a player adopts a given set of winning sequences on semantic
grounds, avoiding both problems of locality, on the one hand, and trivializing non-cooperative be-
haviour through backward induction, on the other hand.
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We introduced the notion of a Jury as an abstract third partymonitoring conversations, and enforcing
a form of ‘good’ behaviour from the participants.The Jury is a conceptual tool that allows to conceive
of a form of communication in non-cooperative settings: intuitively, agents, even if they do not take
their opponents’ interests in consideration, are still committed to other forms of constraints (e.g.
politeness, or simply, avoiding a public admission that they do not care for their opponents’ interests).
Assuming a logical representation of the meaning of a sequence of moves (using, e.g., Segmented
Discourse Representation Theory), we can formalize how the Jury enforces linguistic constraints
which are generic necessary conditions on successful plays (staying coherent, consistent, credible).
We can describe agents’ preferences in term of the contents that agents commit to.
Finally, we established that ME games are determined games for Borel winning conditions, and that
many intuitive winning conditions are Borel, therefore determined. We provided two theoretical
explanations of a rational basis for one to engage ina determined losing conversations: misdirection,
and conversational blindness.
• In part III, we established that the above framework requires a semantics expressive enough to
express commitments about others’ commitments.
We therefore defined across chapters 8 to 10 a dynamic logic of (nested) commitments and integrated
it in SDRT.
We refined in chapter 8 the link between credibility and commitments.
In chapters 9 and 10we investigated the semantics of acknowledgments.We proposed two versions of
our commitment dynamics: one where grounding is systematic and acknowledgments superfluous,
and a weaker one, where acknowledgments are required but grounding, in terms of common com-
mitment (as we argued seems to be what grounding demands) is not achievable in finite time. We
proposed an ambiguity thesis for acknowledgment,mixing the strong andweak dynamics that would
allow to reach common commitment via particular sequences of acknowledgment and confirmation
questions.
In chapter 10 we considered a link between the two dynamics, and a conservative embeding of the
propositional dynamics of chapter 9 in a language with discourse relations similar to that of chapter 8.
Future Work
Discourse formalims
A first perspective for future work would be to apply our formalisms interlingua to problems of discourse
parsing. RST, for instance, disposes of sets of annotated data across different corpora larger than those
existing for SDRT or dependency structures. A possibility would thus be to use these data, and the partial
correspondence we developed between RST and dependency trees to train a dependency discourse parser
on RST data.
In the same order of thought, we could try using the similarity function defined in chapter 3 as a loss
function. Of course this asks the question of the complexity of this function and requires to implement
it efficiently. This similarity function essentially tries to align relations from one structure with those of
another structure over the same set of EDUs, minimizing a global loss which is a function of each pair of
aligned relations’ differences in scope. Though we did not work this out, we conjecture that this can be
implemented using the Hungarian algorithm. Computing the matrix of scores for each possible alignment
of a relation of one strucure with a relation of the other structure should be doable in time r × e with r the
number of relation in the structure that has the most relations, and e the number of EDUs. The Hungarian
algorithm should then compute the result in time O(r3).
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A second, both theoretical and practical problem that we wish to investigate is the possibility of using
our second order formulation to achieve interesting tree-automata treatments, for instance for model
checking, or a compact representation of one of our underspecified interpretations. This necessitates that
we establish clearly what the tree-width of our classes of structures (especially for the less constrained one)
is.
Semantic metrics
Most of our proposed axioms have led to trivialisation results. We think that the reason for this is that
we have not structured the semantic space in the right way. The semantic space should involve some
representationalism, e.g., discourse graphs, but not too much. In particular it would be interesting to try
and extract some relevant aspects of the model-theory of dynamic semantics in general and our dynamic
propositional logic for commitments in particular, and pursue our study of semantic metrics on a semantic
space and interpertation function reflecting these aspects.
On the long run, we would also like to examine whether we can find a theoretical application of a
continuation-based distance in the settings of the ME games.
ME games
We have so far developed ME games as an abstract theoretical framework to account for strategic conver-
sations in their generality. One thing we plan to do, is therefore considering small arena with a restricted
vocabularies to test and refine the model.
As we have seen, the topological characterization of winning condition is lost when switching fromME
to BM games. We therefore wish to investigate further conditions ensuring the existence of winning strate-
gies, in particular in regards of the way winning conditions might be axiomatized using the commitment
logic.
Public Commitment
We have relied on related, but different notions of ambiguity in chapter 8 and chapter 9 respectively.
In chapter 8 we have been using dynamic disjunction, i.e., non-determinacy. In the propositional settings
this amounts to defining φ! ∼ ψ! as non determistically outputing a model updated with one or the other
action:M⊧ [φ! ∼ ψ!]χ iff both updates ofM by, respectively [φ!] and [ψ!], satisfy χ. In chapter 9 we have
used another notion of ambiguity: φ! ∼ ψ!, performed by agent i, duplicates the worlds in the commitment
set of i, and applies a different actions to each of the copies. In fact we can show that both notion are linked.
They coincide when evaluating formula without negated commitment, but do not behave in the same
way w.r.t. negation. We plan to show that we can make the link explicit, by adding a second, S4 modality,
representing ambiguity explicitely in the modal logic. Letting [∼] denote such modality, we plan to work
out the dynamics for [∼] and recover for instance the notion of ambiguity of chapter 9, by showing that a
proposition like Ciφ in the semantics of chapter 9, is logically equivalently to proposition [∼]Ciφ in the
refined semantics with an explicit modality for ambiguity. If this works, we would have [φ! ∼ ψ!]χ in our
propositional model iff [φ! ∼ ψ!][∼]t(χ) in the refined model, where t(χ) is obtained replacing Ciφ with[∼]Ciφ everywhere. Moreover we think that the refined model would be ideal for a detailed account of
clarification questions.
Finally, we did not propose a detailed, fully worked out treatment of rejections and corrections, which
interacts importantly with commitments, and have a great strategic role too. We plan to extend our logic
to a detailed treatment of rejections, and to further study how rejection moves should enter ME games’
winning conditions, and what the propoerties of corresponding winning sets ensue.
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Structures, commitments and games in strategic conversations
Résumé
Les effets d’une action linguistique dépendent du contexte. Cela pose plusieurs questions, auxquelles il est
essentiel qu’un modèle linguistique réponde: comment représenter le contexte conversationnel, la façon
dont celui-ci influe sur le “sens” de chaque contribution et sur le choix rationnel fait par un agent de ce
qu’il va dire ensuite? Il existe plusieurs théories de la structure du discours, mais celles-ci ne s’accordent
pas sur un ensemble précis de contraintes structurelles régissant le contexte conversationnel. Nous pro-
posons un formalisme unifié pour traduire et comparer entre théories et représentations distinctes et nous
étudions les fondations axiomatiques d’une mesure de déviation ‘sémantique’ entre deux contextes con-
versationnels, et de l’impact de l’entrée de nouveaux éléments dans le contexte sur cette deviation. Un
second travail porte sur l’interaction entre forme logique et rationnalité dans les conversations, plus spé-
cifiquement, lorsque les intérêts des participants divergent. Nous proposons un modèle en théorie des
jeux, dans lequel une conversation est une séquence infinie de coups linguistiques. Dans ce cadre nous
formalisons certaines contraintes linguistiques génériques comme des conditions nécessaires au succès
d’un agent (rester consistant, cohérent, crédible). Les préférences des agents sont décrites par des contenus
auxquels ceux-ci souhaitent, ou ne souhaitent pas s’engager. Crucialement, on peut justifier et expliquer
via des considérations sémantiques le choix des objectifs conversationnels des agents, et montrer quand
et comment certaines inferences (implicatures) survivent ou disparaissent. Cela nécessite une sémantique
adéquate, pour l’obtenir nous définissons une logiquemodale dynamique des engagements publics. Celle-ci
permet de représenter les déclaration des participants vis-à-vis de leur propre engagements et de ceux de
leurs interlocuteurs. Cela permet enfin un modèle de "grounding" a granularité plus fine que les approches
existantes, qui demeurent cependant axiomatisable comme des cas particulier.
Abstract
The effects of a linguistic action depend on its context of use.This raises a certain number of issues for a
model of language use: how to represent the conversational context, its relation to the meanings that agents
convey, and how to model agents’ rational choice of the next thing to say, in context? There is, between
existing theories of discourse structure, no general agreement on a precise set of structural constraints
governing the conversational context. To remedy this, we propose a unified framewok to translate and
compare between distinct theories and representations. We then lay the axiomatic foundations of metrics
measuring the semantic deviation between two conversational contexts, and the changes brought into
such a deviation, as new moves enter the context. A second body of work focuses on the modeling of
conversational meaning and its interaction with that of rationnality in conversations, more specifically
strategic dialogs, where the interest of the participants diverge. We propose a game theoretic account of
such conversations, as infinite sequences of linguistic moves. We formalize linguistic constraints that are
generic necessary conditions on successful plays (staying coherent, consistent, credible), anddescribe agents’
preferences in terms of the contents that agents commit to. Crucially, we can describe a player’s objective
and explain why it is adopted on semantic grounds. We show on this basis how and when inferences to
non-litteral meaning survives or are cancelled. As this requires a semantics expressive enough, we define a
dynamic logic of public commitments to represent participants’ commitments about the content of theirs,
or their opponent’s moves, and keep those representations subject to a sound notion of logical consequence
(and hence, of consistency). This yields an account of acknowledgment and grounding more formal and
fine-grained than traditional approaches, recoverable as particular cases.
